


AFTER ITS OWN IMAGE





1. Malaya

AFTER ITS OWN  
IMAGE

The Trengganu Experience  
1881-1941

SHAHARIL TALIB

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*To Azanin*

## *Preface*

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SOME words are necessary to explain the scope and intention of this book. It forms part of an on-going research on the dissolution and reconstitution of the Malay social order by capitalist penetration backed by the coercive apparatus of the colonial state to serve the needs of the global expansion of capital. Each was determined to order social life after its own image. Central to this enquiry is the underlying belief that the history of a society is first and foremost the production of man. It is the interplay of man, his toil, the fruits of his labour, his consumption and natural reproduction that is the basic concern of human experience through the ages. Each historical epoch, however, shapes its own social order in which man the producer is placed.

The movement from one historical epoch dominated by production for use value to another dominated by production for exchange value greatly altered human experience. By the late nineteenth century Trengganu society was captured in the vortex of changing historical epochs. Its world of yesterday differed immensely from that of today. In the brief period of a half century Trengganu was incorporated into the world capitalist system at its periphery, mediated by the colonial state.

Contrary to established views local society did not simply cave in to external pressures. Nay, for a short period of time the natural ruling class was favourably entrenched wielding the existing instruments of state power to further their interests in an expanding economy. They succeeded—until the colonial state that understood land, labour and produce as wealth-creating and marketable commodities enforced its will. The producing classes on the other hand were brought to serve larger imperial interests.

Written from the standpoint of the working masses the historical experience of this period could be best articulated by an old Malay

saying: 'Raja itu berlangkah mara rayaat itu menyembah kubor'—literally, 'The ruler [natural, colonial and others] advances [their interests], the *rayaat* [peasant, commoner and working man] is left worshipping his grave' (encl. 1, Syed Hussein bin Ghalam to SUK, 6 July 1930, in CLM 48/1350).

*Southeast Asian Studies*  
*University of Malaya*  
*Kuala Lumpur*  
*July 1983*

SHAHARIL TALIB

## *Acknowledgements*

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THE roots of this book, which is a revised version of my Ph.D. dissertation submitted to Monash University, Australia, can be traced from as early as 1970 when I was warmly invited by a group of zealous Malaysian graduates to teach in their newly established private school, Sekolah Kadir Adabi, in Kota Bharu, Kelantan. They were bent on providing educational opportunities to those previously deprived. My brief teaching experience there fortified my sympathy with victims of historical processes. It led more immediately to my MA research on Kelantan which traced the state's changing government institutions and concluded with the impact of British colonial policies on Kelantan society. This book, which is an extension of the previous study, seeks, however, to examine the response of the indigenous ruling class and peasantry of Trengganu society to the British imperial advance.

In preparing this work, I have incurred a great many debts of gratitude to individuals as well as institutions and I welcome this opportunity to acknowledge them formally. I am deeply indebted to Professor J. D. Legge who supervised my Ph.D. dissertation. His unending patience and understanding will always be remembered. Special thanks must be made to Professor M. G. Swift who generously gave of his time to read my earlier drafts and gave me the benefit of his specialized knowledge. The same gratitude goes to my colleagues in the social sciences, especially Dr Wan Zawawi Ibrahim of Universiti Sains Malaysia and Dr Shamsul Amri of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, who shared with me their anthropological insights. Much is also owed to Dr B. Harvey, Dr G. Dunkley, and Professor John A. Larkin who read the manuscript and offered valuable suggestions and criticisms.

To the numerous people who shared with me their personal knowledge of Trengganu, I must express my warmest appreciation. I would like to thank in particular Haji Muhammad Saleh bin Haji Awang, Haji Su bin Datuk Amar, Tan Sri Dato Haji Mubin Sheppard, and Abdullah bin Embong. The skill of Wan Omar bin Wan Ahmad has been invaluable. He helped in transliterating stacks



of documents in *jawi* script, often virtually illegible, into *rumi* script for my benefit.

This research was made possible by a scholarship grant from Monash University and travel allowances to Kuala Lumpur by the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies. I would like in particular to express my thanks to the members of the Centre and its former Director, Professor J. A. C. Mackie, for creating a lively environment for the expression and exchange of thought. I wish them well in their endeavours. The staff of a number of archival centres and libraries too have helped me enormously. In particular, I wish to express my appreciation to those of Arkib Negara Malaysia, Monash University Library, and University of Malaya Library. Special thanks are due to Tengku Ismail bin Tengku Su for the loan of his personal photograph collection and Muzium Negara Malaysia for the coin collection.

Writing a book demands great sacrifices from family members. Azanin, in particular, is one without whom this work could not have been written. In spite of her academic, professional and artistic commitments, she constantly found the time to offer intellectual stimulation and suggestions and the energy to help with typewriter and blue pencil. Needless to say, the responsibility for the actual contents, including views expressed as well as errors, is solely my own.

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- 8. J. L. Humphreys, MCS, CBE  
(*Courtesy Tan Sri Dato' Haji Mubin Sheppard*)

## Abbreviations

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AAK	Assistant Adviser, Kemaman
ADT	Arkib Di-Raja Trengganu
ART	<i>Annual Report Trengganu</i>
BAT	British Adviser, Trengganu
BOP	Baginda Omar Papers
BP	<i>The Burney Papers</i>
CLM	Pesuruhjaya Tanah dan Galian (Commissioner of Lands and Mines)
CLR	Pejabat Collector of Land Revenue, Kuala Trengganu (Guaman Tanah)
CO	Colonial Office
DID	Pejabat Parit dan Tali Ayer, Trengganu (Drainage and Irrigation Department)
DOD	District Office, Dungun
FMS	Federated Malay States
FOCP	<i>Foreign Office Correspondence Papers</i>
FWCP	Fort William Council Proceedings
HCO	High Commissioner's Office
JIA	<i>Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia</i>
JMBRAS	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Malayan Branch</i>
JSBRAS	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Straits Branch</i>
JSEAH	<i>Journal of Southeast Asian History</i>
LOD	Land Office, Dungun
LOK	Land Office, Kemaman
LOT	Land Office, Trengganu
MBAM	Mahkamah Besar, Trengganu—Appeal Mal (Appeal Court)
MBGM	Mahkamah Besar, Trengganu—Guaman Mal (High Court)

## ABBREVIATIONS

xvii

MBO	Jabatan Menteri Besar, Trengganu (Menteri Besar's Office)
MD	Mines Department, Trengganu
<i>MIH</i>	<i>Malaysia in History</i>
MU	Malayan Union
SSR	Straits Settlements Factory Records (Great Britain, India Office Library)
STT	Perbendaharaan Negeri Trengganu (State Treasury)
SUK	Setiausaha Kerajaan Trengganu (State Secretary)
SUK (SCAO)	Setiausaha Kerajaan Trengganu (Senior Civil Affairs Officer)





# 1

## Introduction

---

THE profound impact of the world economic system on Third World societies has captured the attention of scholars cutting across academic disciplines. Latin American and African studies, in particular, are increasingly concerned with the incorporation of vast regions into the world economic system. South-East Asian studies, on the other hand, have tended to find answers by burrowing into provincial history.<sup>1</sup> This book is yet another stride in that attempt to understand global processes of history involved at the local level. It aims, first, to examine the response of the ruling class of a Malay state to the accelerated inflow of outside capital and expertise and to the imposition of colonial rule which followed hard on its heels, and second, to notice the increasing social differentiation within Trengganu as it came under external pressure.

The Malayo-Muslim state of Trengganu lies in the eastern seaboard of the Malay Peninsula where it is continuously bathed by the waters of the South China Sea. It is bordered on the north and north-west by Kelantan and on the south and south-west by Pahang. For about four months of every year, beginning in early November, the state is lashed by wind and rain brought by the north-east monsoon. This is the period to which the locals refer as *musim tutup kuala*—the season when the river-mouth is closed. Unlike the other Malay states, Trengganu possesses fourteen separate river basins which breach, at intervals, the 200 mile long coastline. Being only about 55 miles at its widest point, the 5,500 square mile state has a long and narrow configuration. Moving inland from the saffron-coloured beaches laced with palm trees, the topography changes several times. There is first of all a flat belt of deep, soft sand which is followed, a little further inland, by old raised beaches running parallel to the sea. The sandy ridges are separated by watercourses. Still further inland, the topography changes again. There is, in this third region, the usual belt of coastal plains extending to varying distances depending on the size of the river. These plains eventually merge into undulating country of low hills which run into dark green chains of jungle-clad mountains.

This picture-book land is known from historical times to have been long settled. Indian and Chinese records mention the existence of a Malay kingdom engaging in trade at the beginning of the Christian era. It appears that, for much of its history, the state maintained a tributary relationship with successive South-East Asian empires—Majapahit, Melaka, Johor, and Siam.<sup>2</sup>

The present line of the Trengganu Sultanate emerged only in the first few decades of the eighteenth century with the accession of Sultan Zainal Abidin (r. 1702–26), a son of the Bendahara of Johor, Abdul Majid.<sup>3</sup> Over the next century, against the background of occasional Siamese meddling in its affairs,<sup>4</sup> the state lost control over the territories that now make up the state of Kelantan,<sup>5</sup> and shortly afterwards a major civil war led to the successful enthronement of Baginda Omar (r. 1839–76). The reign of Baginda Omar saw considerable British intervention in the state (including intervention in the form of a naval bombardment) but it was during this period and the reign of his successor, Sultan Ahmad II (r. 1876–81), that the foundations of a strong and stable government were established. The latter was succeeded by Sultan Zainal Abidin III (r. 1881–1918) and he in turn was succeeded by his two sons, Sultan Muhammad (r. 1918–20) and Sultan Sulaiman (r. 1920–42), during whose reigns great changes occurred.

In the late nineteenth century Trengganu was at that twilight period when the incoming production capital began to merge with the established usury and merchant capital forms resting on the largely subsistence economy of the peasantry.<sup>6</sup> Broadly, each of these elements can be identified in different sectors of the state's rapidly expanding economy. The peasants were involved in petty commodity production whereby they owned their own means of production and satisfied their needs through exchange for other goods which they did not produce themselves. Usury and merchant capital, on the other hand, existed in the realm of commodity exchange. Trengganu, as did the other Malay states, traded with the trading empires of the region as well as with the European merchants. In the eighteenth century it was recognized as the leading trading centre on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, commodity trade expanded noticeably. Simultaneously production capital made its presence felt in the state. Capital was organized in Singapore and elsewhere for the pioneering of export-oriented productive activities, i.e. plantation agriculture and mining. Soon after, in the twentieth century, British

rule was established in Trengganu which ensured the survival of production capital.

In recent years historians examining the extension of British rule in Malaya have tended to focus on its political rather than its economic aspects: on the creation of a new kind of state and bureaucracy and on the erosion, modification, or persistence of traditional forms of authority as British rule established itself. Sharom Ahmat, for example, has examined the struggle of the Kedah ruling class to preserve its Malay identity and Malay control of the state in its handling of the British advance.<sup>7</sup> W. R. Roff has described the way in which Kelantan leaders created, in 1915, a new institution, the 'Majlis Ugama dan Istiadat Melayu', in order to circumvent the threat of total British domination.<sup>8</sup> More recently Heather Sutherland, writing on Trengganu, discusses the various styles of political response that fell somewhere along the spectrum from accommodation to open conflict.<sup>9</sup> She sees Britain as fashioning new procedures and as attempting to establish a rule-based government, and the Trengganu ruling class as resisting these innovations in the name of older customary ways.

In every instance of Malaya's history, the period immediately prior to British political advance into the Malay states was marked by a rapid economic expansion at the local level.

This study regards as important the time-lag which occurred between the expansion of the economy of Trengganu and the imposition of British rule which followed. The gap between the two phases gave the indigenous leaders of Trengganu breathing space and an opportunity. They managed, at first, to graft themselves, by using indigenous state institutions, on to the changing economic situation, to manipulate it, and turn it to their own ends. They later resisted Britain's political advance, though unsuccessfully, and their economic ventures were, in consequence, to be brought under more rigorous control by successive British Advisers. Their resistance to Britain's political advance, however, could hardly be described in terms of an attempt to preserve the traditional system. As a further aspect of the question, the economic opportunism of the Trengganu ruling families might seem to foreshadow the emergence of a new entrepreneurial spirit and therefore to be part of a modernizing process. That also would be a misjudgement. Members of Trengganu's ruling class did make a great deal of money in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but their doing so did not resemble a bourgeois adaptation to the new economic situation.

Their acquisitive instincts were directed at acquiring wealth in order to consume it rather than in order to put savings to productive use. For a brief moment in history, the dominant social class was able to consolidate itself in the changing circumstances from a traditional to a colonial state. The peasantry, on the other hand, were exposed to the full brunt of capitalist penetration and colonial administration in the countryside.

The interdependence of political and economic power elsewhere in Malaya has received attention from J. M. Gullick in his *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya*.<sup>10</sup> Khoo Kay Kim, in *The Western Malay States, 1850-1873*,<sup>11</sup> has gone further than Gullick and has shown in some detail the control over the economy exercised by the Malay ruling class in the west coast states during the two decades before British intervention. However, an examination of the income-extracting machinery of the traditional political system will reveal the adaptation of the ruling class towards the changing economy. These mechanisms, in Trengganu at least and probably elsewhere as well, underwent change with the passage of time and became increasingly complex in a period of rapid economic development. The traditional leaders of society were, in effect, using the political system for their direct economic advantage. There is scattered evidence to suggest that other Malay rulers on the Peninsula were adapting state instruments to changing economic and political circumstances. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Temenggong Ibrahim, the *de facto* ruler of Johor, encouraged the development of gambier and pepper plantations, and then increased his private purse by issuing *surat sungai* (river documents) to Chinese headmen empowering them to open river valleys for trade within Johor.<sup>12</sup> Towards the end of the nineteenth century, his successor, Sultan Abu Bakar, used various devices such as Royal Charters and concessions to channel funds from the growing economy into his own coffers.<sup>13</sup> Similar devices were seen elsewhere. By 1888 (the eve of British involvement in his state), the Sultan of Pahang had issued forty concessions, covering all the known mining land, to a number of Singapore investors.<sup>14</sup> The grants were made irrespective of the customary rights of territorial chiefs or of the Malay and Chinese miners at work on the land.<sup>15</sup> Similar grants were issued by the ruler of Kelantan in the years before the imposition of colonial rule. The huge Duff Syndicate concession was a clear enough sign of that.<sup>16</sup> It would appear from these references that the Malay Sultanates were grafting their

political institutions on to changing economic and political realities. The case of Trengganu will be used to examine in detail the nature and meaning of these responses.

It is the intention of this book to study at some length the response of Trengganu society towards the penetration of capital and the establishment of British rule. In that interim period when the local economy was expanding, and prior to the imposition of formal colonial administration, members of the indigenous ruling class used the traditional state apparatus to tap different sectors of the changing economy. They extended, revised, modified, and adapted their existing institutions in order to gain economic advantage. Generally, all these devices were created in the late nineteenth century and their full significance was unfolded only in the twentieth century. Thus, there occurred a proliferation of *pajak* (revenue farms) with the purpose of exacting profits from the rapidly expanding commodity trade. This internal adaptation was an attempt by the ruling class to benefit from their established control over the flow of trade which was essentially developed by merchant capital. The *cap zuriat* (concessions given to members of the royalty and their heirs in perpetuity) system, on the other hand, was created by them with the ambition of securing income from production capital which was invested in the plantation and mining sectors of the expanding economy. Finally, the *cap kurnia* (deed of Royal gift) was a revival of customary land rights with the ruling class intention of soaking surpluses and profiting by other means from the subsistence economy of the peasantry by controlling the basic means of production—land.

Each of these income-extracting devices served the ruling class most efficiently in different periods of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the first phase its members profited from merchant capital's participation in the expanding trade. This was followed by an energetic involvement with gains from production capital's presence in the plantation and mining sectors. Finally, when these two sources of income began to dry up with the consolidation of British rule in the state, the ruling class turned to *cap kurnia* as an alternative means of income. This drive towards the countryside by members of the ruling class impinged on the peasant subsistence economy, already strained by increasing monetization, colonial penetration, and demographic changes. It precipitated a hostile peasant reaction.

As a final introductory comment it is perhaps crucial to state that

this effort is not an attempt to write a complete history of Trengganu for the period. That, in itself, is not possible. Rather, it seeks to integrate several themes within the broader framework of the encapsulation of Trengganu society into the world economy at the periphery. This process of incorporation was riddled at the local level by contradiction, conflict, and consolidation. The ruling class's efforts to consolidate its hold on the expanding economy eventually contradicted its own interests and conflicted with the ambitions of British rule which aspired to protect and further advance capital. The whole process was ultimately to the detriment of the peasants' interest and well-being. The penetration and consolidation of colonial administration in the countryside inevitably generated a series of contradictions felt and opposed by peasants. These situations heightened tensions within Trengganu society which later erupted into an open conflict commonly referred to as 'The 1928 Trengganu Uprising'. The real triumph of colonial rule over Trengganu society was marked by the breaking of the ruling class grip on the economy and the political system, and by the suppression of the peasant uprising. After this, the colonial state gained, with little further opposition, total control over the means of production—land, labour, and capital. During the heyday of the colonial state the real losers were the peasants. Whilst members of the ruling class suffered economic and political losses, they were nevertheless absorbed as salaried members of the colonial administration. This abstraction of historical reality outlining the impact of capital and colonialism on a Malay state is told in the ensuing chapters in an attempt to pull historiography from a narrative account towards the mainstream of social science enquiry.

1. This observation was made by James C. Scott in his foreword to John A. Larkin, ed., *Perspectives on Philippine Historiography: A Symposium*, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series No. 21, 1979.

2. For a detailed account of Trengganu's early history see M. C. ff. Sheppard, 'A Short History of Trengganu', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 22, Pt. 3, 1949, pp. 1-74.

3. See 'Salasilah Sultan-sultan Trengganu' in *Sambutan dan Perayaan Genap 25 Tahun Pemerentaban Duli Yang Maha Mulia Tuanku Ismail Nasiruddin Shah ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Zainal Abidin dan Yang Di-Pertuan bagi Negeri Trengganu serta Jajahan Ta'alok-nya Darul-Iman* (henceforth *The Trengganu Silver Jubilee Souvenir Book*), [Trengganu, Government Printing Office] 1970, pp. 72-82.

4. The state, like its northern neighbour, Kelantan, and other Malay states, sent the *Bunga Mas dan Perak* (Golden and Silver Flower) to Siam once in three years. However, there were conflicting views as to whether this token was a gift or tribute. See Ismail Bakti, 'Bunga Mas dan Perak, Golden Flowers—Gift or Tribute', *MIIH*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1960, pp. 40–2. The Trengganu rulers in their dealings with the West had always maintained their independence of Siam. See, for example, the offer of Sultan Mansur Shah I (r. 1741–95) to Sir Francis Light shortly after the establishment of the British settlement in Penang. (J. Anderson, 'Political and Commercial Considerations relative to the Malayan Peninsula and the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca', *JIA* (Series 1), Vol. 8, 1854, p. 156). After failing to secure a British alliance the Sultan made overtures to the Dutch at Melaka (P. J. Begbie, *The Malayan Peninsula*, Madras, Vespary Mission Press, 1834; reprinted, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 89). For a recent account of the ruler's highly independent diplomatic policy, see Barbara W. Andaya, 'An Examination of the Sources Concerning the Reign of Sultan Mansur Shah of Trengganu, 1741–1795', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 49, Pt. 2, 1976, pp. 80–106.

5. Haji Abdullah, 'A Fragment of the History of Trengganu and Kelantan', *JBRAS*, No. 72, 1916, pp. 3–23; romanized text and translation by H. Marriott.

6. For a recent study on various forms of capital and its impact on society at the national level, see Jomo Kwame Sundaram, 'Class Formation in Malaya: Capital, the State and Uneven Development', Ph.D. thesis, Department of Sociology, Harvard University, 1977; to be published as *A Question of Class: Capital, the State and Uneven Development in Malaya*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

7. Sharom Ahmat, 'Transition and Change in a Malay State: A Study of the Economic and Political Development of Kedah 1879–1923', Ph.D. thesis, University of London, June 1969.

8. W. R. Roff, 'The Origins and Early Years of the Majlis Ugama', in W. R. Roff, ed., *Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 101–52; and W. R. Roff, 'Islam as an Agent of Modernization: An Episode in Kelantan History', in Hans-Dieter Evers, ed., *Modernization in South-East Asia*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 170–4.

9. H. A. Sutherland, 'Between Conflict and Accommodation: History, Colonialism, Politics and Southeast Asia', *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1978, pp. 1–25.

10. J. M. Gullick, *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya*, London, The Athlone Press, 1958.

11. Khoo Kay Kim, *The Western Malay States 1850–1873: The Effects of Commercial Development on Malay Politics*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1972. For a discussion on the significance of the indigenous political system in the natural economy see Wan Hashim, 'The Political Economy of Peasant Transformation: Theoretical Framework and a Case Study', *The Journal of Social Sciences*, No. 10, October 1980, pp. 47–79; and Shaharil Talib, 'Nineteenth Century Kelantan: A Malay Tributary State', *Jurnal Antropologi dan Sosiologi*, Vol. 9, 1981, pp. 43–59.

12. C. M. Turnbull, 'The Johore Gambier and Pepper Trade in the Mid-19th Century', *Journal of the South Seas Society*, Vol. 15, 1959, pp. 43–55; C. A. Trocki, 'The Johor Archives and the Kangehu System 1844–1910', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 48, Pt. 1,



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13. K. Sinclair, 'Hobson and Lenin in Johore: Colonial Office Policy towards British Concessionaires and Investors, 1878-1907', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1967, pp. 335-52.

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*Mas Dinar*

## *The Indigenous Ruling Class and Its Political Machine*

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THE political élite of the late nineteenth century, which comprised members of the Ruling House, the main aristocratic families, senior religious functionaries, and court favourites, was drawn from a narrow base in Trengganu society. This microscopic minority exercised political power in the Sultanate, while the great bulk of the agrarian population lived in its shadow. As in other pre-industrial states, there was in Trengganu a predominance of political power over economic power: it was easier for a man of power to acquire wealth than for a man of wealth to acquire power.<sup>1</sup> Trengganu, like most pre-colonial Asian societies, was an example of a state in which the apparatus of royal government was the source of wealth and key to upward status mobility. The political system did not distinguish between official and private sources of income<sup>2</sup> and thus it provided the holders of political power with unchallenged authority to use the state system and its coercive apparatus to tap resources and channel them into their own hands.<sup>3</sup>

During the closing years of the nineteenth century powerful commercial and economic forces made their presence felt in Trengganu. Here, as elsewhere, the impact of industrial Europe began to transform traditional societies; and by the end of the century the east coast of the Malay Peninsula had experienced an unprecedented flow of investment and expertise from the centres of capital developed under British control in Western Malaya and the Straits Settlements. Familiar with the nature of Britain's earlier advance elsewhere on the Malay Peninsula, certain sections of Trengganu society were well placed to attach themselves to this manipulation of late nineteenth-century economic expansion. However, following shortly in the wake of large-scale economic penetration, the local élite faced the challenge of British officials who, on the basis of treaty engagements, riveted on Trengganu an administrative grid for purposes of colonial rule. The dual forces of British advance—the creation of an extractive colonial economy and of a state

bureaucracy—in the sixty-year period under study not only offered to those in power unparalleled economic opportunities but also threatened them politically.

The full dimension of the initiatives by the local ruling class towards the changing historical conditions can only be appreciated in its finer details by a proper understanding of the structure of the indigenous ruling class and the state political machine.

In broad outline, Malay society was composed essentially of only two classes: a ruling class and a subject class. This broad division was noted by contemporary British officials and has been a subject of study by later scholars.<sup>4</sup> Admittedly this division of classes blurred at its borders. The social ramifications of the ruling class in Trengganu were complex and there is some difficulty in drawing a demarcation line between it and the subject class. A small group of merchant capitalists—some Chinese and some Malays—could also be identified. With the exception of the *Kapitan China* (leader of the Chinese community) and the Chinese *Jurubahasa* (interpreter) the merchants had no official status, but they belonged by wealth and standing to the upper levels of society. As a group, however, they were too feeble and too dependent upon the patronage of the ruling class to be described as a 'middle class' and their presence did not therefore significantly alter the dichotomous model to which reference has been made.

Nevertheless, within the upper layer of that two-class division certain further distinctions appeared. J. M. Gullick, in his pioneering study of the west coast Malay states, identified the main elements of the ruling class as royalty, aristocracy, and commoners.<sup>5</sup> The third group comprised those who were absorbed into the ruling class rather than belonging to it by hereditary right. The same model with some modifications could well be applied to Trengganu. The *Kerabat Diraja*<sup>6</sup> and the *Kerabat Am* were the Trengganu equivalents of Gullick's 'royalty' and 'aristocracy' respectively; but his 'commoner' group might with advantage be divided into *Ulama* (religious scholars) and *Orang Keistimewaan* (literally 'special men', but in this context the term might be translated as 'court favourites'). Royalty, aristocracy, religious scholars, and court favourites formed the four main elements in the Trengganu ruling class and each responded in this period of change with significant differences.

Some problems in defining the first two of these groups exist. The lineages<sup>7</sup> of royalty and aristocracy were extremely complex. At

first glance intermarriages may seem to make it difficult to draw clear lines of division between one branch of the Trengganu Royal Family and another or between all of them and the so-called aristocratic families. Certainly the title 'Tengku' did not indicate where precisely one belonged. The ruling class clearly understood the distinctions, even though, to the outside observer, a full account of the pattern of relationships must inevitably present a bewildering system of interlocking connections.

The Trengganu Constitution of 1911,<sup>8</sup> a document which in part embodied past practices and in part attempted to update some of them, tried to formalize what was then believed to be the situation and for the purpose of the present study it provides a useful starting point in unravelling the distinction between Kerabat Diraja and Kerabat Am. Chapter 21 of the Constitution was quite explicit as to where one ended and the other began. Those who were considered Kerabat Diraja were as follows:

1. The Raja's consorts who were styled Permaisuri or Tengku Ampuan.
2. Princes and Princesses of the blood.
3. Brothers and sisters of the Raja.
4. Parents and grandparents of the Raja.
5. Nephews and nieces of the Raja whose parents have died.

These groups of relatives were specified as relatives of the *ruling* Sultan, but the Constitution also provided that the same five groups of relatives of *former* Sultans who had died or ceased to be ruler for any other cause, were also members of the Kerabat Diraja.<sup>9</sup> That is to say, a person who once qualified as a member of the Kerabat Diraja by virtue of his relationship to the ruler, was always a member, even after that ruler had been succeeded. The remainder of those who bore the honorific 'Tengku', and who did not fall into any of the five categories of relationship to a sultan, could be grouped as Kerabat Am. Some of these were of royal descent, but further removed from the relationships as defined. For example, a son of a living brother of a Sultan carried the title 'Tengku' but was only a member of the Kerabat Am and not of the Kerabat Diraja. (If his father died before the ruling Sultan, he would then become a member of the Kerabat Diraja as a member of the fifth group.) Others owed their positions to non-royal aristocratic descent.

A complete account of the structure of the Kerabat Diraja will reveal a complex web of related lineages.<sup>10</sup> In fact it is possible to identify three distinct groupings within what might loosely be

called Trengganu royalty—the Kerabat Diraja. There was first of all the main trunk—the Trengganu Royal House itself—the immediate family of Sultan Zainal Abidin III.<sup>11</sup> He was the eleventh Sultan in the royal lineage of the first Sultan of Trengganu, Sultan Zainal Abidin I.<sup>12</sup> The Sultan traced his descent from the first Bendahara of Melaka, Tun Perpatih Besar, uncle of Sultan Mohamed Shah.<sup>13</sup> His family, as defined in the five groupings of the Constitution, represented the central core of the Trengganu royal class and was by far the largest of the groups within it. It claimed primacy of status not only within the boundaries of Trengganu, but even beyond. Relative isolation, the particular royal lineage of the Sultan, and the heady success of independence contributed to the Sultan's belief that Trengganu was one of the principal kingdoms on earth.<sup>14</sup> The Trengganu Sultanate considered itself to be of a higher status and this distinction was acknowledged by some of the other Sultanates. The Royal Houses of Sultan Ahmad II and his successor, Sultan Zainal Abidin III, were the focus of marriage contracts from Royal Houses elsewhere in the Malayo-Muslim world, i.e. from those of Riau-Lingga and Singapore. The frequent intermarriages between these three lineages formed the Trengganu Kerabat Diraja.<sup>15</sup> Together they formed the first element in the Trengganu ruling class.

The Kerabat Am—the second element in the ruling class—formed the bulk of that class. Members of the class all carried the personal honorific of "Tengku"<sup>16</sup> and were distinguished from the Kerabat Diraja by their remoteness from royal lineages, either because, though of royal descent, they fell outside the five groups specified in the Constitution's definition, or because they were not of royal descent at all. And it was possible to say fairly clearly who was, and who was not, of royal descent. This point is important. The Trengganu Royal House, in finding marriage partners from outside Trengganu, managed to keep itself remarkably distinct from the local aristocracy. Its female members seldom married non-royal aristocrats; and if its male members showed somewhat less discrimination, such departures from the general rule were infrequent and did not blur the clear lines of distinction between aristocracy and royalty. There was little amalgamation between the two elements, and royalty generally kept aristocracy at arm's length.

Within the aristocracy itself, however, there existed some differences in status. Each aristocratic lineage was keenly aware of its descent in its relation to other families of the same class. They all

aspired to move up the status ladder. Most of them were generally left to fend for themselves and the more favoured ones served the Sultanate as official functionaries. It was not uncommon to find the more powerful aristocrats with their own courts and retainers. By virtue of their birth they were clearly demarcated as a group from the *rakyat* (commoner).

The Ulama formed the third group to be identified as a distinct element in the Trengganu ruling class. These religious leaders, some of whose lineages went back several generations, were deeply entrenched in Trengganu society and were held in great reverence. Their influence in the state clearly distinguished them as a group from the *rakyat*. Trengganu, at the turn of the century, was a religious centre of repute on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula.<sup>17</sup> Its religious leaders were the scholars and intellectuals of the state. They were drawn from Sayyid (descendants of Prophet Muhammad) and from others who had performed the *haj*, the pilgrimage to Mecca, and they had a grounding in religious law and doctrine. There were others, not strictly Ulama, who enjoyed this 'saint-like' status, not because of their religious training, but through less orthodox ways.<sup>18</sup> The Ulama enjoyed great authority in the eyes of both the subject and ruling classes. They patronized the Kerabat class and were in turn patronized by them. Some of them were associated with state institutions, holding office as such.

The Trengganu Ulama of the late nineteenth century was not the stray Arab who appeared in the state and claimed recognition and respect, though there might occasionally have appeared a few such men. More usually the religious-scholar tradition could be traced through definite family lines. Religious scholarship was kept within the family, so to speak, and passed down from father to son almost like a hereditary profession. These families became the Ulama, teachers, advisers, and personal friends of the Kerabat class. Three such families may be distinguished.<sup>19</sup>

Finally, there were the Orang Keistimewaan, the fourth element in the Trengganu ruling class. The court favourites were on the same footing as the Ulama as they both were outside the Kerabat class by birth and were clearly demarcated from them on the basis of occupation. They gained their position in the ruling class not because of their religious background but rather for their services to the Sultan in particular and the Sultanate in general. These low-born leaders were official functionaries who held positions in the royal court and government.

During the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin III those who could be counted in this category included the *Datuk Panglima Perang* Yusof bin Musa; *Orang Naia Pahlawan* Wan Hamid; *Datuk Panglima Muda* Othman bin Idris; *Datuk Syahbandar* Embong bin Ja'afar; *Panglima Dalam* Wan Ngah Muhammad bin Wan Muda; and Kapitan China Khoo Swee Lin, to name a few.<sup>20</sup> As their titles suggest, they all held office in the state. Although the offices were of minor designation, it must be noted that court favourites did occasionally attain the office of *Mentri* (Minister). The personal relationship developed by some of them with the Sultan allowed them to exercise considerable influence over him. Each of them had special qualities, such as being an outstanding warrior, medicine-man or script-writer, which led to their appointment to office and made them leaders.

The late nineteenth-century court favourites were usually drawn from established families whose services to the Sultanate ran through several reigns. Occasionally, there appeared a new leader who gained the Sultan's attention and favour. An example of the latter category was Abdul Rahman bin Ishak (Drahman) who rose from the ranks of the Sultan's *Budak Raja* (lit. 'Raja's Youth'; retainers). As a young man in 1885 he was put to the test by Sultan Zainal Abidin III. The Sultan wished to rid himself of Tengku Long, his cousin, who had designs on the throne. Abdul Rahman was ordered to eliminate a man known to him personally and noted for his prowess with the *keris* (Malay dagger with a straight or wavy blade) and spear. An unwitting Tengku Long walked into a trap laid for him and was waylaid and stabbed at Iliran, just outside Kuala Trengganu. For his services Abdul Rahman was later rewarded with the title 'Datuk Sri Lela Diraja' and also the revenue derived from the Kemaman River.<sup>21</sup> However, such spectacular advances in rank were uncommon. Court favourites were usually drawn from well tested and tried families which had proved to be loyal to successive Sultans.<sup>22</sup>

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the ruling class numbered about 1,000 males in a total population of approximately 100,000. This figure included the relatives and the 'hangers-on' of that class.<sup>23</sup> The number would be slightly bigger if female members of the Kerabat class were included. Several of them shared the privileges of their male counterparts and should therefore be considered part of that class; on some occasions, perhaps even more than was commonly admitted, they influenced decision-

making. However, a breakdown of the figure of 1,000 shows that the men who really counted came from only a few families, and that some of these were interrelated through marriage.

The most important household in the state was, of course, that of the Sultan whose establishment was the largest and the most elaborate. For ceremonial purposes alone, the Sultan had, in 1915, 58 men at his disposal. These comprised the persons who carried the state symbols and other paraphernalia in state processions.<sup>24</sup> There was, in addition, a host of retainers attached to the royal household. The aristocrats too had their own courts, but naturally these were on a lesser scale—reproductions of the Sultan's court in miniature form.

Among the retainers the more important institutions were the Budak Raja and the debt-slaves. The Budak Raja performed, in effect, a civil service function. They carried out the administrative tasks for which members of the ruling class were personally responsible and were thus the executive arm of the official functionaries. The system was open to abuse. According to local tradition, they carried '... their master's work upon their head, and their own under their arms'.<sup>25</sup> The debt-slaves on the other hand were usually domestic workers. There were about 6,000 of them in 1917.<sup>26</sup> They could be grouped into three categories according to their mode of employment. The domestic class of debt-slaves were usually females. Their tasks included chopping firewood, drawing water, washing clothes, marketing, nursing, needlework, serving at meals, and massage. In 1918 each Kerabat household had an average of between 5 and 10 debt-slaves; the figure was reputed to have been much higher in earlier times. The second group, which comprised the agricultural labourers, was small in number and unimportant in Trengganu. However, they were known to be used by the Sayyid community of Paluh and Iliran on the Trengganu River. The third group were retainers. At the turn of the century the social status and power of a Tengku depended on the number of debt-slave retainers he possessed. It was common for him to walk about town escorted by five or six armed followers.<sup>27</sup> These social institutions were in varying degrees common to the four main elements of the ruling class.<sup>28</sup>

The political system was naturally biased in favour of the rulers rather than the ruled. It is hardly surprising that the Trengganu Constitution of 1911, in all its fifty-three clauses and the preamble



and afterword, had only one passing reference to the rakyat and their welfare.<sup>29</sup> The document was a royal charter defining the rights of the ruling class and in composition and orientation was far from being a people's Constitution.

At the apex of the government was the Sultan, who also carried the title *Yang Dipertuan Besar* ('He who is made Lord'). As defined in the Constitution he was 'the ruler and fountain head of all authority of Government in Trengganu and in all provinces and districts under it'.<sup>30</sup> He drew his sacred power from *daulat*—the concept of divine majesty which combined indigenous, Indian, and Arabic traditions—and his position as the representative of Allah (God).<sup>31</sup> The office of the Sultan had an Heir Apparent who was referred to as the *Yang Dipertuan Muda* and below him there were two other heirs, the first- and second-rank heirs, who could, under defined circumstances, take the place of the successor to the Sultan.

Sultan Zainal Abidin III, the ruler during the period under review, succeeded his father at the age of nineteen. He was described by the High Commissioner, Sir Charles Mitchell, who met him in 1896, as '... very studious, reading many Arabic works of science, very strict in his religious observance. It is to these he owes his shy and retiring disposition ...'<sup>32</sup>—a feature which was noted by other British officials.<sup>33</sup> He kept many a British official, much to their exasperation, waiting for him as he attended Friday prayers.<sup>34</sup> A man of religious piety, he preferred a cloistered style of living which stood in sharp contrast to that of his granduncle, Baginda Omar, who travelled extensively throughout the state.<sup>35</sup> He rarely stepped out of the *Istana* (palace), except for his Friday prayers at the main mosque which was near his residence.<sup>36</sup> Although he was known to have visited Bangkok, Pahang, Singapore, and Riau-Lingga, he never visited the outlying rivers in the state except for Dungun and Kemaman. The first occasion he ever visited Paka, Kretai, and Kemasik was in May 1913.<sup>37</sup> In fact all his work was done in the privacy of the *Istana*. Towards the end of his reign he went to Mecca to perform the haj. At about this time he empowered his eldest son, the *Yang Dipertuan Muda*, Tengku Muhammad, to act in the capacity of ruler—a position he had hoped would prepare Tengku Muhammad to take charge eventually.<sup>38</sup>

During the early part of his reign the *Yang Dipertuan Muda* was Zainal Abidin's uncle, Tengku Abbas, who died on 7 November 1889.<sup>39</sup> Subsequently the Sultan's eldest son, Tengku Muhammad, was appointed Heir Apparent with his younger brother, Tengku

Sulaiman, as the Heir of the First Rank.<sup>40</sup> Tengku Muhammad presented a strange contrast to his father. He was neither pious nor scholarly. Various British Agents who were in Trengganu from 1909 to 1919 found him illiterate, haughty, and short-tempered.<sup>41</sup> He resented forcefully the British presence in the state and this might explain the numerous adverse reports about him.<sup>42</sup> One official described him as 'presumptuous with a good conceit of himself and full, too full perhaps, of confidence in his own powers'.<sup>43</sup> Even those closely associated with him found him extremely difficult to get along with. For example, his servant of thirty years who was in financial difficulties, incurred his master's wrath and was chased out in rage when his assistance was sought.<sup>44</sup> He once slapped a debt-slave girl in the public *padang* (field) for no obvious reason.<sup>45</sup> On another occasion he cancelled the *Hari Raya* (end of fast celebration) festivities, apparently in a fit of pique.<sup>46</sup> His daughter, Tengku Tengah, was subjected to the humiliation of appealing to the British Adviser in order to recover from him the sum of \$13,700 which was hers by inheritance.<sup>47</sup>

The training his father had hoped to give him by relinquishing some authority proved to be to no avail. He lacked the stamina and direction of an administrator and found satisfaction instead in house-building and in purchasing cars—an extravagance which was found difficult to curtail.<sup>48</sup> He became the Sultan in 1918 with Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim, his brother-in-law, as the Heir Apparent,<sup>49</sup> but he was to hold that office only for a short while. On 20 May 1920 he abdicated, partly because of pressure exerted by the British Adviser and partly because his personality made it difficult for him to submit to the rigorous control of public expenditure under the advisory system of government.<sup>50</sup>

In descending order of status, the next level of government was the *Mesyuarat Kerajaan* (State Council).<sup>51</sup> The Trengganu Constitution stated that this body was composed of *Ketua-Ketua* (chiefs), other officials who bore the title 'Ulama' (learned men versed in the scriptures), *Orang Kaya* (men of substance), and *Penghulu-Penghulu Besar* (men of influence), all of whom were appointed by the Sultan. There was no fixed membership and the Sultan could add names at will, or invite only a limited number to any particular meeting of Council (attendance was only by the ruler's invitation). The State Council was a general advisory body whose function was to assist in the administration of the state. Within the Council there

was a small group known as the *Jumaah Mentri* (Cabinet of Ministers) who were hand-picked by the Sultan. They performed specific duties in the state.<sup>52</sup>

It must be noted that this political structure as set out in the Constitution was neither as cohesive nor as formal as it appeared on paper. Admittedly the institutions described in the Constitution did exist and can be identified but this must not be allowed to obscure the fact that government continued to be personal rather than institutionalized, and office depended very much on patronage. The composition of the State Council during the long reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin III changed only gradually, as older members passed away and were replaced by new ones. There did occur, however, at the beginning of his reign a sudden replacing of senior officials so that a new group came into power with his appointment.<sup>53</sup>

Some idea of the distribution of Council membership among the ruling class elements may be obtained from Table 1 which lists those who were among the more prominent members in 1911. The list consists of those who signed the Constitution of 1911.

TABLE 1  
The Trengganu State Council, 1911

<i>Name and Position</i>	<i>Relationship to Sultan</i>	<i>Ruling Class Group</i>
1. Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim. Mentri	Cousin and son-in-law	Kerabat Diraja
2. Tengku Embong Musa bin Tengku Sulaiman. Mentri	Nephew	Kerabat Diraja
3. Tukku Sayyid Paluh (Sayyid Abdul Rahman bin Mohd. Al-'Idrus). Sheikhu Ulama	Brother-in-law	Ulama
4. Tuan Dalam (Sayyid Mustapha bin Mohd. Al-'Idrus). Ulama	Brother-in-law	Ulama
5. Tengku Kazaki bin Tengku Abu Bakar. Mentri	Son-in-law	Kerabat Am

<i>Name and Position</i>	<i>Relationship to Sultan</i>	<i>Ruling Class Group</i>
6. Tengku Chik bin Tengku Hitam. Pesuruhjaya Besar Besut		Kerabat Am
7. Bentara Dalam (Tengku Mahmud bin Tengku Mohamed). Mentri		Kerabat Am
8. Panglima Besar (Tengku Long Abdullah bin Tengku Othman). Mentri		Kerabat Am
9. Tengku Chik Abdul Rahman bin Tengku Ishak.		Kerabat Am
10. Tengku Chik Ahmad bin Tengku Abdul Rahman. Mentri		Kerabat Am
11. Datuk Nara Wangsa (Mohd. Ali bin Abdul Rahman). Mentri		Orang Keistimewaan
12. Datuk Panglima Dalam (Wan Mohamed bin Ibrahim). Mentri		Orang Keistimewaan
13. Haji Wan Mohamed Saleh bin Mohamed. Mufti		Ulama
14. Haji Wan Mohamed Saleh bin Ismail. Hakim		Ulama
15. Haji Wan Sulaiman bin Daud. Hakim		Ulama
16. Datuk Panglima Perang (Yusof bin Musa).		Orang Keistimewaan
17. Datuk Panglima Muda (Othman bin Idris).		Orang Keistimewaan
18. Datuk Sangsura Pahlawan (Wan Hamid bin Sa'aid).		Orang Keistimewaan

*(continued)*

TABLE 1 (continued)

<i>Name and Position</i>	<i>Relationship to Sultan</i>	<i>Ruling Class Group</i>
19. Haji Ngah Muhammad bin Haji Yusof. Mentri		Orang Keistimewaan
20. Nik Mohamed bin Hitam. Naib Hakim		Orang Keistimewaan
21. Datuk Syahbandar (Embong bin Ja'afar).		Orang Keistimewaan
22. Mat (Mohamed) bin Abdul Rahim.		Orang Keistimewaan

*Source: Laws of the Constitution of Trengganu, pp. 24-5.*

The State Council could be much larger than the twenty-two who are outlined above, as has been indicated—or much smaller if the Sultan chose to meet only a few. It was a gathering of an élite within the ruling class and a cynic might even be justified in commenting that when it met it was more like a dinner party for the Sultan's in-laws and relations than a State Council. The Council sittings were normally held at night in the Istana with the Sultan presiding. The only regular member was the Yang Dipertuan Muda who always attended the meetings but it appeared that the Sultan had a select congregation whom he invited regularly to discuss state matters. They included Tengku Abu Bakar bin Tengku Abdul Jalil and his son Tengku Kazaki, Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim, Tengku Embong Musa bin Tengku Sulaiman, Tengku Chik bin Tengku Hitam, Tengku Chik bin Tengku Ngik, and Tengku Chik bin Tengku Long. On other occasions he was known to have invited Tengku Abdullah bin Sultan Ali, Tengku Mahmud bin Tengku Dalam, and the Tuan Dalam. However, if matters of religious importance were to be discussed, he invited also Tukku Sayyid Paluh and the two *Hakim* (Judges). The final say in all religious matters was left to Tukku Sayyid Paluh in whom was '... vested the interpretation of all difficult legal matters'.<sup>54</sup>

The changing composition of the Council from meeting to meeting gives strength to the observation that the Trengganu government was a system of essentially personal rule. The Council

meetings lacked formality and ceremony. In an atmosphere of cordiality the members dealt with the matters of the day. The Sultan was reported to be affected by a 'distressing indecision of character' which made it difficult for him to take a stand even on simple issues. He was known to waver from day to day, making decisions on one day and revoking them on the next. This personal characteristic allowed his chiefs to carry out orders or delay their execution to suit their own needs of the moment. The state was thus very loosely governed and it is likely that most executive decisions were shaped by the desire to give minimum pain to any one of the Council members and to provide maximum gain to all concerned. This loosely accepted arrangement, however, could be thrown into disarray over controversial issues. On such occasions suspicion among members ran high and members fought for their own interests only.<sup>55</sup>

Within the group of more or less regular attenders was a still more select inner circle of the State Council—the Sultan's select body of *Mentri* headed by a *Mentri Besar* (Chief Minister). During the early part of Sultan Zainal Abidin's reign the *Mentri Besar* was Sayyid Abdullah, a brother-in-law of Sultan Ahmad II. He was appointed in 1878 and held the post until he resigned in 1886.<sup>56</sup> The ruler then picked as successor his own brother-in-law, Tengku Mohamed Yusof bin Sultan Mahmud Mustapha Shah of Riau-Lingga. This official, who had spent part of his youth in Siam with his father, the deposed Sultan of Riau-Lingga, was extremely powerful in Trengganu.<sup>57</sup> He was described by Sir Frank Swettenham in 1903 as second only to the Sultan.<sup>58</sup> After his death in 1907 Trengganu lacked a strong leader, although the Yang Dipertuan Muda for some time afterwards filled the gap, albeit in a clumsy and brash fashion. In 1917 it was made known that the Sultan wished to appoint a new *Mentri Besar*. Among the names that were put forward for his consideration were the Datuk Sri Amar Diraja, Tengku Ngah Omar, and Tengku Chik Ahmad. The Sultan finally selected the Datuk Sri Amar Diraja, who was his personal secretary, as the *Naib Mentri Besar* (Deputy Chief Minister), and left the post of *Mentri Besar* vacant to avoid possible ill will from the other candidates.<sup>59</sup> The choice of the Datuk Sri Amar Diraja was a sound one, as he proved in his dealings with the British officials to be a skilled diplomat. The role of the *Mentri Besar* was a delicate one. He had to pacify and lead divergent factions. From the little that is known of Tengku Mohamed Yusof and the information gleaned

from the files about the Datuk Sri Amar Diraja, they both fitted this role admirably.

A more specialized body at the State Council level was the *Jumaah Pangkuan Negeri* (Council of Regency) whose members were referred to in the *Hukum Syariah* (Religious Law) as *ablul-hal-wal'aqd* (a ceremonial body involved especially in coronation arrangements). They were drawn from Mentri, State Councillors, Ulama, and other titled officials.<sup>60</sup> From the records, it is apparent that this group was dominated by the Ulama who, from the very beginning of the Trengganu Sultanate, had played a crucial role in determining the successor to each Sultan. Their influence might well explain the fact that succession in Trengganu did not follow the common practice in the west coast states of Malaya.<sup>61</sup> It was not common for the Sultan's eldest son, nor the son of his royal wife (*anak gahara*) nor even the Yang Dipertuan Muda to succeed a deceased ruler.<sup>62</sup> It appears that when the Ulama proposed, the other elements in the ruling class feared to dispose otherwise. This feature of open succession gave rise to the common belief that the office of the Yang Dipertuan Muda was accursed.<sup>63</sup>

There were other officials who held titles in the state political system. These titled officials were generally concentrated in Kuala Trengganu and performed duties in and about the royal capital. The demands of their office were undoubtedly great—sufficiently so to be beyond the capacity of such men as the Datuk Kaya Biji Diraja who went amok.<sup>64</sup> During the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin III there was a marked decrease in the great titular offices. It appears that when a title-holder died, the Sultan allowed the office to fall into disuse.<sup>65</sup>

The next level of political control was the *jajahan* or *daerah* (district) which was under the charge of the *Raja Anak Sungai* (district chief).<sup>66</sup> Unlike the other Malay states which usually had one main river system and two smaller ones constituting its borders, Trengganu possessed a great number of separate river systems. Its territorial boundaries embraced fourteen river basins: these were, from south to north, Kemaman, Kijal, Kemasik, Kretai, Paka, Dungun, Merchang, Marang, Ibar, Trengganu and its tributaries (Telemong and Nerus), Merang, Setiu and Chalok, Keluang, and Besut. The more important rivers after the Trengganu River were the Kemaman, Dungun, and Besut.<sup>67</sup> At the end of the nineteenth

century each of these river systems was ruled by a district chief appointed by the ruler.

By the end of the nineteenth century the office of the district chief had undergone significant changes. Sir Hugh Clifford stated that Trengganu, prior to the reign of Baginda Omar, was divided into a number of districts, each of which

... is held in fief from the Sultan by a dato' or district chief. These districts are subdivided into minor baronies, each of which is held by a dato' muda, or chief of secondary importance, on a smaller tenure from the district chief. The villages of which these subdistricts are composed are held in a like manner by the ka-tua-an [*ketua*] or headmen from the dato' muda.<sup>68</sup>

The district chief was drawn from a lineage which usually had a long established connection with the area. He was, as Clifford put it,

... usually related more or less closely by ties of blood with the people over whom he rules. He has been born and bred among them, has wed their womenfolk, lived their lives, shared in their troubles and good fortune, more especially the latter, and even at his worst knows and is known most intimately by them, and cannot but be largely in sympathy with them.<sup>69</sup>

By the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin III these local lineages had been gradually brought under control by former rulers. They were replaced by leaders from the royal capital who were not of the blood of the people over whom they ruled. The local leaders of early settlers were replaced as chiefs by ruling class members sent from Kuala Trengganu. By the end of the nineteenth century the process had been completed. The district level of the Sultanate had thus been totally captured by the ruling class of Kuala Trengganu, and more especially by the Kerabat Diraja element of that class.<sup>70</sup>

The usurpation of the office of district chief—at the expense of the local leaders—led to the centralization of appointment to that office in the hands of the ruler. Sultan Zainal Abidin III, as seen from Appendices 1–3, usually assigned the districts to members of his family with a fair mixture distributed to other elements of the ruling class. The chief held his office by the Sultan's *cap* (seal) which gave him the right to levy taxes. Since the collection of revenue was an important function of government, a great deal of power inevitably found its way into the hands of the chief.<sup>71</sup>

The district chiefs, being non-locals, rarely resided in the district. Most of them stayed in the royal capital where they were in a position to influence the Sultan.<sup>72</sup> In 1882 the only chiefs who



resided in their respective districts were those of Dungun and Besut; and those of Kemaman and Setiu also spent time in their districts.<sup>73</sup> These district chiefs generally sat in the shade of their verandahs in Kuala Trengganu and left the work of collecting revenue to their Budak Raja who usually were sent from Kuala Trengganu and exercised very great authority. The people in the outlying riverine districts stood in awe of them. In extreme cases the Budak Raja was capable of inflicting great hardship on the rakyat. Clifford points out:

The Budak Raja ... looks upon the capital as his home, and sojourn in an out-district as banishment. He is not of the blood of the people over whom he rules, he does not know their affairs, despises their ways, is too arrogant to make himself acquainted with their feelings or their thoughts, is utterly out of sympathy with them, and merely regards them as a potential source of revenue, missing no opportunity of enriching himself at their expense.<sup>74</sup>

Even the resident chief was almost as much an alien to the people of the district as was the visiting retainer. He, too, looked upon them simply as sources of revenue.<sup>75</sup> However, there were some customary restraints on ruling class power. Tengku Sulong, the Sultan's son-in-law, was removed from his office in Paka because of the resistance he provoked to his rule. His successor, Tengku Abdullah bin Sultan Ali of Singapore, another of the Sultan's sons-in-law, fared no better.<sup>76</sup> He was prevented from going to the district after complaints had been made about him. And there were, of course, many differences in the nature of the chiefs. The Besut chiefs, for example, were reputed to be benevolent and to have given every encouragement to settlers in their district. In Kemaman, on the other hand, Abdul Rahman bin Ishak (the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja), Tengku Mohamed Yusof's and later the Sultan's resident retainer, was described as a gambler, cock-fighter and extortioner but '... not without some good as a man'.<sup>77</sup> But it would not be unreasonable to describe the general picture as oppressive from the point of view of the peasant.

Below the district chief, and usually outside the ruling class, was the *penghulu* (village headman), the important link of communication between the general rural population and the district chief. The *penghulu* was one of several categories of rural leader that can be identified.<sup>78</sup> Normally of the subject class, he enjoyed high status in the village and it was remarked that his influence was immeasurably increased if '... a drop however diluted and remote of royal

blood ...' could be traced. However, in Trengganu the rural aristocracy was weak.<sup>79</sup> The penghulu system was allowed to degenerate during the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin III,<sup>80</sup> who was more concerned to show attention and favour to the district chiefs to whom were delegated the responsibility of appointing the penghulu. This policy was contrary to that of Baginda Omar and Sultan Ahmad II who had conferred prestige upon the office of penghulu by appointing them personally.<sup>81</sup> Thus in the late nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, the decline of the penghulu strengthened the role of the village religious functionaries in rural politics.

Generally, the cut-off point of the ruling class in the structure of the indigenous political system was at the district-chieftainship level. Below that point the day-to-day leadership of society came, with only some exceptions, from within the subject class. Above it power and authority were shared between the Sultan and his appointees. Previous Sultans such as Baginda Omar and Ahmad II were known to have concentrated power and authority exclusively in the hands of a select few.<sup>82</sup> By comparison Sultan Zainal Abidin III relied on a much wider base of support. British officials interpreted this sharing of power as a sign of weakness on his part.<sup>83</sup> However, this apparent weakness must be understood in the light of several factors. First, Baginda Omar had returned as a conqueror who deposed a reigning Sultan and prudently he could not trust those around him.<sup>84</sup> Secondly, when Sultan Zainal Abidin III became ruler in 1881 he was a youth and coupled with that he had a relaxed disposition and was more inclined towards religious studies than towards affairs of the state. This characteristic led him to delegate authority to a broader group. Last, and perhaps more important, were the demographic changes that Trengganu was undergoing in the nineteenth century. In the 1830s the population was estimated by different sources to be between 31,000 and 35,000.<sup>85</sup> By the end of the century it was about 100,000 and in 1911, when the first census was taken, it was 154,073.<sup>86</sup> The dramatic increase in little over three-quarters of a century would have led most certainly to a greater distribution of power by the ruler. Despite the relatively large population in 1911, the government officials numbered only 184—a figure that could well have exceeded 1,000 had kinsmen, retainers and others closely associated to these officials been counted.

The political system rested, in effect, on ruling class control over certain crucial aspects of government: religion, the judiciary, land, and revenue.<sup>87</sup> It was in these sectors of administration that the reforming British officials were to be most fiercely resisted, for it was the control of these areas that enabled the elite to be the effective rulers of the people at large, and provided them with exceptional economic opportunities in a period when the state was on the threshold of a rapid expansion of wealth. Each of these sectors will be discussed briefly.

J. M. Gullick, speaking of the west coast of Malaya, remarked that Islam was the religion of a Malay state but was not a 'state religion' as such.<sup>88</sup> He argued that the Malay state lacked a priesthood other than the village *imam* (vicars) who in any case were part of the community. They did not form a caste apart from the general society. In addition, he pointed out that at the ruling level the chaplains of the more pious Sultans and district chiefs never attained collective importance in the political system because of their lack of organization. However, in Trengganu there is some evidence to cast doubt on this as a general proposition. The beginnings of what might be regarded as a state religion in Trengganu must be seen in their historical context. It has been pointed out previously that the positions of the leading Ulama were hereditary and during the development of the Sultanate these Ulama could be identified as a separate element in the ruling class. That they did have collective power was seen in their influence on the succession of Sultans. Their role in the political system was not merely confined to religious teaching nor for that matter were they mere chaplains to a devout Sultan. They were ministers, state councillors, and district chiefs of Sultans. They participated in the Trengganu body-politic and at times played a major role in some aspects of British-Trengganu relations.<sup>89</sup> The rulers and other members of the ruling class were known to have sought their support and were prepared in return to encourage religious education. They gave *wakaf* (religious endowment) land to religious leaders to help in particular undertakings.<sup>90</sup> On occasion they provided symbolic expression to the links between Islam and the state, as when Sultan Zainal Abidin III gave a state funeral to a leading Ulama of Pulau Duyong, Haji Wan Muhammad bin Abdullah. He arranged for the body to be carried from Duyong to lie in state in front of the Istana so that all could pay their last respects.<sup>91</sup>

Admittedly, Islam in Trengganu lacked a corporate organization. The first *Mufti* (Jurisconsult) to be appointed was Sheikh Abdul Kadir Bukit Bayas from Pulau Duyong, in the early nineteenth century.<sup>92</sup> It is known that his relative, Sheikh Abdullah (Tukku Pulau Duyong), also held the office, possibly after him, and he in turn was succeeded by his son, Haji Wan Muhammad, in 1889. The other Mufti in Trengganu were Haji Muhammad bin Abdul Malik (grandson of Tukku Pulau Manis), Haji Wan Musa (a Kelantanese), Haji Wan Mohamed Saleh bin Mohamed, and Sayyid Abu Bakar bin Tukku Sayyid Paluh,<sup>93</sup> the last two of whom were early twentieth-century Mufti. There were also the titles '*Sheikhul Islam*' and '*Sheikhul Ulama*' given by the Sultan to those who were jurists of more than usual standing. As religious authorities of the state the Sheikhul Ulama clearly had precedence, followed by the Mufti and Sheikhul Islam respectively.<sup>94</sup> At the grassroot level the focus of village religious life was the mosque or *surau* (a prayer-house not used for Friday congregation). The functionaries of the village mosques—the imam, *khatib* (a prayer leader), and *bilal* (caller of prayer times)—came from the villages themselves.<sup>95</sup> They were the undisputed leaders of rural Trengganu.

Given the absence of institutional links between the state-level religious officials and those at the bottom reaches of society, it is tempting to conclude that communication between the two was weak if not totally absent. However, this view could be seriously questioned if the influence of *pondok* (lit. 'hut') schools, more especially those of the leading Ulama, is taken into consideration. The religious centres at Pulau Manis, Pulau Duyong, and Kampung Paluh spawned other religious schools in different parts of the state.<sup>96</sup> Students came to these centres from all corners of the state and even from other states. They returned to their villages as local religious officials and often started their own religious schools there. Thus, it can be said that the religious officials at the village level came from the same 'nurseries' and were of the same mould. This is not to say that there were neither theological differences nor possible rivalries between the various Ulama. However, the Ulama were known to each other and they travelled widely, visiting different centres both within and outside the state. Communication on religious matters thus had no need of an organizational framework; it was informal and personalized.<sup>97</sup>

Nineteenth-century processes of institution-forming at the top level, and non-organizational forms of communication which

linked the centre to the lower levels of society, reached their climax in the 1911 Constitution where it was categorically confirmed that Islam was the state religion. Chapter Fifty-one of the Constitution reads:

Whereas it has been asserted and laid down and established that for all time this Government of Trengganu is of the comity of Islam in Malaya that it is called the State and Official religion, no other religion whatever may be set up or referred to as State Religion, however many of other races or creeds are protected and allowed to shelter in the State and provinces of Trengganu.<sup>98</sup>

Religion, unbureaucratized as it was, was an important sinew in the indigenous political system on which the power of the ruling class was partly based.<sup>99</sup> Closely associated with religious institutions was the judicial system. The maintenance of internal order and the redressing of wrongs were crucial aspects of the political system. Oppression by the ruling class beyond an undefined degree of tolerance often led to the flight of their subjects. The consequence of these actions undermined the wealth and power of the ruling class which were dependent on the rakyat.<sup>100</sup> However, the control of the judicial apparatus was a vital instrument in the hands of the ruling class in enforcing its will on the economic sector of the state.

The laws of the state were based on Hukum Syariah and Malay *adat* (custom). These two fundamental sets of laws were to some extent in conflict and in competition with each other. In 1835 W. G. Earl observed that Hukum Syariah was supported by the Ulama, while Malay *adat* was preferred by the other elements of the ruling class.<sup>101</sup> Sultan Zainal Abidin III, a devout Muslim, however, upheld the enforcement of Muslim law. He felt that he was personally responsible for any departure from it.<sup>102</sup> In theory, all crimes committed in the state were to be tried in the royal *balai* (audience-hall);<sup>103</sup> in practice the ruling class interpreted and implemented the laws. The powerful members of this class had long usurped the powers of the Sultan in judicial matters and had a free hand. It was remarked that 'None dared to bring to his notice misdeeds of his officials and if they did, His Highness had not the courage to put things right'.<sup>104</sup> There were no fixed places for a hearing. Cases were dealt with in houses, boats, mosques or indeed wherever a complaint was made. In addition, there was no machinery for enforcing the decisions except force employed by the favour of some chiefs.<sup>105</sup>

An attempt was made at the turn of the century to organize the judicial apparatus. Law courts modelled vaguely along the lines of those of the Federated Malay States (FMS) were introduced by a State Council decree. The court rules, known as the *Undang-Undang Mahkamah Trengganu 1881-1918*, were printed on a lithographic machine owned personally by the Sultan. They were kept a closely guarded secret. (The British Agent, W. L. Conlay, attempted, but failed, to obtain a copy of them.)<sup>106</sup> These rules, a copy of which is now in the Arkib Negara (National Archives),<sup>107</sup> contained 13 chapters and they regulated the procedures of the judicial system. They provided for a Hakim who was responsible for the running of the court. He was assisted by a *Naib* (Deputy), a bailiff to enforce the court decrees, an examiner of witnesses, an official to administer oaths, a khatib, interpreters, and others with minor functions. There was a separate department headed by a *Qasim* (executor of estates) who was responsible to the Hakim and dealt with property matters.

The *Undang-Undang Mahkamah* was innovative in that it helped to institutionalize the structure of the judicial system but in the main it merely confirmed the existing practices. The judiciary was not independent of the executive—the ruling class—nor was it a check on them. Chapter 3 of the rules allowed for the interference of the State Council—the lawmakers—in the judicial processes. State Council members were expected to discuss matters raised by the Hakim *sub judice*. They were to attend courts and to ensure that all serious cases were settled. More significant was the fact that they had the power to override the decision of the Hakim, if in their opinion there was an error in his judgment. The courts used the Koran and its commentaries for laws or precepts related to the dispute in hand.<sup>108</sup> In cases involving extremely difficult issues, the final say was left to Tukku Sayyid Paluh.<sup>109</sup>

In both civil and criminal cases the plaintiff and not the government brought action against the accused. The plaintiff was required to pay court fees (*pembasuh balai*) amounting to 75 cents in advance. If judgment was in his favour, the court claimed 10 per cent of the money in dispute for which the decree was given. If he lost, he paid nothing more.<sup>110</sup> Court revenue was also raised by fines which were imposed for almost every offence. The proceedings were lengthy and expensive, some even lasting for 16-17 years without arriving at any solution.<sup>111</sup> In the case of murder, the suit was instituted by the heirs of the victim for *diat* (blood

price).<sup>112</sup> The murderer, if arrested, was detained without trial until the heirs of the victim considered it necessary to appear before the court to demand blood-money.<sup>113</sup>

The courts, in practice, actually served to manipulate justice for the gain and protection of the ruling class. The rich and the strong were protected in court and were often above the law. They had no fear of the law and the local court rule maintained that court decrees were not enforceable on men of the Kerabat Diraja class.<sup>114</sup> This caused the Chief Justice of the Straits Settlements, Sir John A. S. Bucknill, to remark in 1918:

As between the ruling and the lower class justice is practically non-existent: the power and prestige of the former class is so great that an individual drawn from the lower ranks of life would probably neither dare nor even think of daring to dispute any mandate, however arbitrary, issued by one of those in the upper hierarchy.<sup>115</sup>

Justice could be bought at a price and in cases involving persons of standing it could be delayed or deferred.<sup>116</sup> The judges were wary of making decisions against such people and hoped that by constant postponement, the plaintiff would cease to press the claim and the matter, in the course of time, would be dropped.<sup>117</sup>

The partiality of the courts was well known to the local people. In 1909 lampoons appeared on the court pillars during the night accusing the judges 'by name' of corruption.<sup>118</sup> Little else, however, could be done. The Hakim, Haji Wan Sulaiman bin Daud, was known to be a very wealthy man.<sup>119</sup> In 1914, due mainly to pressure by the British Agent, the Hakim was convicted on a charge of corruption. The Agent commented in his monthly journal that the Hakim, while holding office, had:

... lent himself to many a scheme of questionable procedure and practice, had no mercy for the poor and weak, and when decisions had to be given against the rich and more powerful parties, decisions were made nugatory by not enforcing the orders of the court or by making a further order altering the first decision.<sup>120</sup>

This observation seems fairly to summarize much of the workings of the court system. In fact when the Hakim was sentenced, his former victims, now his cell-mates, took the opportunity to settle scores. He was manhandled so severely that after serving a few months of his term he appealed to the Sultan and was subsequently released and allowed to depart on a pilgrimage to Mecca.<sup>121</sup>

The judicial apparatus served only the royal capital. In the outlying river systems the district chiefs remained in charge of such matters. Only a handful of litigants from the districts could afford to seek a settlement in Kuala Trengganu.

The peculiar position of the ruling class in relation to the judiciary allowed its members to use this state apparatus to enforce their will on the changing economic situation. Usury, merchant and production capitalists were exposed to their unacceptable demands. In the larger society oppression by the ruling class was clear enough but it did not fall below the line of accepted tolerance. There were occasional rumours of the intended flight of people in certain districts but there were no reported instances of large-scale depopulation of river basins during the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin III. The rakyat remained fairly settled as peasant cultivators.

Their rights to land tenure were limited. The soil was vested in the Sultan, and the peasant acquired a transferable tenant-right by effective occupancy, subject to the claim of the Sultan to one-tenth of the produce and to certain semi-feudal services.<sup>122</sup> This brings the discussion to the third foundation of power of the ruling class—the control of land.

The nature of land tenure in traditional societies is always complex, and it is not always easy to say what customary tenure is. Where land law has not been codified, views as to the nature of tenure may differ, and difficulties may arise where 'rights' not exercised over a long period may be regarded by some as having lapsed, but by others as being still in force. If a group has the power to assert its claims, a confrontation between conflicting customs may occur. There were, in fact, two conflicting views of the nature of land tenure in Trengganu. The ruling class generally based their claims on Malay adat under which it was held that all land was the property of the Sultan and that the peasant was a tenant-cultivator who had certain obligations towards the ruler. The subject class on the other hand claimed land on the principle of continuous cultivation on land hitherto unoccupied and unclaimed. In the early years of the Sultanate, land was cultivated and claimed on the latter basis but from the mid-nineteenth century and with greater intensity towards the end of that century, the ruling class in their demands on the peasant cultivator enforced their interpretation of Malay adat.<sup>123</sup>

While the peasant cultivator claimed his land rights on effective occupation, there appeared another set of claims based on royal gifts. These gifts, referred to as 'cap kurnia', were often made by



word of mouth from the Sultan.<sup>124</sup> The few early traces of these gifts that survive showed that they were made by the Sultan to those who did special favours. Baginda Omar gave one such cap to a loyal subject who had helped him drive off his enemies and another to Tengku Endut for *jasa* (loyal service).<sup>125</sup> These cap kurnia were the only suggestion that earlier rulers used their theoretical rights over the control of land. There were of course occasional demands by the ruling class for *kerah* (corvée labour) from the peasant and for agricultural produce but neither was claimed on an extensive scale.<sup>126</sup> During the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin III, however, there was an unprecedented spate of land seizures by members of the ruling class. Large tracts of land were parcelled out through cap kurnia and often these covered areas already under cultivation. The peasants who worked ancestral lands, it was remarked, literally '... awoke one morning to find that they had a feudal master to whom they had to contribute a tithe of the fruits of their land'.<sup>127</sup> The significance of this sudden movement of the ruling class into the countryside will be dealt with in greater detail in a later chapter.<sup>128</sup>

By the end of the nineteenth century, as a result of economic expansion, land had grown in importance as a source of wealth to the ruling class landlord, while to the peasant it remained his sole means of subsistence.<sup>129</sup> The latter's rights were acknowledged in the middle of that century with the introduction of wooden seals.<sup>130</sup> These early land titles show the value of land to the peasant. The common forms of document issued to determine ownership were those known as *cap keputusan* (in cases of dispute), *cap jual-beli* (in cases of sale), and *cap akuan* (in cases of original claim). In the case of the death of the owner, the property was usually divided among the heirs, and if this proved inconvenient it was sold and the proceeds were divided by the courts.<sup>131</sup> There is nothing in the records to suggest that there was a rush by the cultivators to obtain documentary titles nor was there any attempt on the part of the government to register all land-owners by issuing titles. The Land Office machinery was weak and it operated mainly on the Trengganu River. At the turn of the century the Office was under the exclusive control of the Datuk Sri Amar Diraja, the Sultan's secretary, who prepared the documents.<sup>132</sup> The great majority of the peasantry, however, did not possess any documents covering their holdings which were commonly referred to as *tanah tebang* (lit. 'cleared land'; cultivated land) or *tanah waris* (inherited land). In fact documentary titles were not common and for the most part

this did not prejudice the peasant's right of ownership.<sup>133</sup>

By far, the most important foundation of political power was the control of revenue. In theory all the revenue of the state belonged to the Sultan by virtue of his office. In practice, however, the spoils were divided among the members of the ruling class under a system of revenue collection which was the basis of power.<sup>134</sup> The subject class was looked upon as a mere source of revenue.

The only form of direct taxation in the state was the triennial taxation, levied on all circumcised males throughout the state, at rates varying from 25 cents to \$20 per head. This poll-tax was associated with the need to raise money to defray the cost of the tribute to Siam. The collection of the tax was entrusted to the district chiefs who were also empowered to collect yet another poll-tax, a sum of about 50 cents per head, either annually or triennially. However, they generally preferred other more productive ways of exacting their income.<sup>135</sup>

One common method used for raising revenue was *serah* (a form of indigenous tax). By this method either a consignment of goods was sent to the village or to an individual and a price beyond the market value was demanded, or alternatively a small token amount of money was sent together with a demand for a stated quantity of jungle produce. The hardship imposed on the subject class was considerable. Often the villager had to leave the cultivation of his land to meet the demand. There was also the method of *kerah* by which labour was organized for the services of the chief. Another leading source of revenue was from the administration of justice.<sup>136</sup> In addition, the arbiters of justice obtained considerable income from the settlement of cases as one or the other, or even both, of the parties in a dispute often paid to sway the decision in their favour.

The mainstay of the political system was revenue collected from taxes imposed on almost every conceivable trading commodity or service. Each of these taxable items was usually let out to Chinese merchant capitalists who were known to make lavish gratuities in their efforts to secure a particular tax farm.<sup>137</sup> The ruler distributed district revenue or parts of it by *kurnia* (an act of royal grace) to the ruling class members for their personal maintenance.<sup>138</sup> They in turn made arrangements with Chinese revenue farmers. In the early years of the Sultanate a single general revenue farm covered all produce going in and out of a river system in the state. However, towards the end of the nineteenth century, besides these export and import duty farms, there were numerous smaller farms ranging

from ferry services and squirrel shooting to collection of turtles' eggs.<sup>139</sup>

During the reign of strong rulers, such as Baginda Omar, all forms of revenue in the state were paid to the Royal Treasury from which money was doled out to meet the costs of government, to reward favourites, etc. In contrast, Sultan Zainal Abidin III managed to retain for himself only a small portion of the total revenue of the state which generally came from the royal district.<sup>140</sup> In his early years his income was relatively small but by the end of his reign there had been considerable expansion. He had, in addition to the revenue derived from Kuala Trengganu, income from other sources. These included an opium farm which covered the whole state and certain export duties on tin.<sup>141</sup> In 1910 his income was reported to have been about \$100,000 per annum, about half of which was absorbed by his establishment and the remainder by that of the Yang Dipertuan Muda. From his share the ruler had to provide for the allowances of certain officials and maintain the existing government institutions.<sup>142</sup>

The crushing weight of the taxes in the state was borne by the subject class—and indeed the whole political system can be said to have rested heavily on the rakyat. The wretchedness of the peasant's position in the late nineteenth century was bluntly described by Clifford:

The latter may be said to have practically no rights, whether of person or property, under this system. Not only does he pay all the taxes and exactions which the raja, the district chief, or the more immediate headmen may exact; not only is he called upon to labour continuously that others may profit by his toil; not only is he required to perform any work that may be demanded of him by his superiors without recompense or reward; but the fruits of his labours, all the property of which he stands possessed, and the very persons of his womenfolk only remain so long as he is strong enough to resist the person by whom they are coveted.<sup>143</sup>

Despite the overwhelming odds against him, the peasant had several options open to him, short of running amok. He could petition his ruler and, if unheard, he nursed the hope that the next ruler would hear him.<sup>144</sup> He could switch allegiance and support another chief. In extreme cases he simply fled his district to another, or from the state altogether, though that course of action had to be carefully considered; it meant leaving behind inherited property and lifelong labour on the fields. Probably the most dangerous option

and one which was rarely undertaken was to openly rebel and challenge the ruler. The penalties for failure were great. Revolts in Malay society in any case were led not by peasants but by disgruntled members of the ruling class who aspired to hold high office. They were not aimed at overthrowing the political system.<sup>145</sup>

While the subject class on the one hand had little option except to lead a life of bondage, the ruling class on the other remained fairly stable. This is not to say that there was not some fluctuation in the fortunes of individual members of that class. Some fell out of favour and lost positions of authority. More important, however, was the fact that fluctuations did not affect the basic structure of the ruling class as a whole. Such modifications as occurred were never radical. The Sultanate had faced rebels but had never confronted revolutionaries.

From this account of Trengganu's ruling class structure and its political machine one central point should be clear. Though it is possible to describe the institutions of the state at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth in terms of such formal Western categories as executive functions, deliberative functions, administrative and judicial functions, in fact the traditional system was loosely structured and of a highly personal character, with the ruler and a small ruling class able to exercise considerable—and perhaps arbitrary—power. Power was exercised, no doubt, within an accepted customary framework, but to say that is not to deny the wide range of freedom enjoyed by the ruling élite and the narrowly restricted range of choice open to their subjects.

Given that general character, the most significant development during the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin III was the response of members of the ruling class to the expansion of capital. Prior to the imposition by Britain of formalized political control in Trengganu there had already been signs in the Sultanate to suggest that the ruling class was poised to exploit the new situation to its advantage. Its members who monopolized political power and were aware of the implications of British advance elsewhere were in an advantageous position to respond to economic expansion. The close association of politics in business generated a 'politically oriented capitalist system' in which the holders of public office were wedded to the economy,<sup>146</sup> that is to say, the most attractive openings for profit were in the hands of officials by the acquisition of state rights.

By contrast, the 'market-oriented capitalist system', resting on the modern capitalist basis of marketable commodities, was weak in Trengganu. Those merchants who were without political connection and protection took enormous risks as they were unprotected by a legal framework which guaranteed contractual obligations, unable to forecast taxes and government regulations from year to year, and uncertain of official arbitrary power. The more dominant politically oriented capitalism of late nineteenth-century Trengganu involved the granting by the state to members of the ruling class, privileged opportunities for private profit. These users of public office for private gain spun an intricate web of state devices to absorb the new wealth flowing into Trengganu.

Broadly, it is possible to identify three distinct economic initiatives of the 'official capitalists' and these will be discussed in subsequent chapters. These economic moves had their origins in the late nineteenth century when production capital began to merge with the established usury and merchant capital sector which was itself rapidly expanding and also with the peasant subsistence economy. The first involved the extension and elaboration of the revenue-collecting apparatus of the state to enable profits to be drawn from the growing merchant capital in the import and export trade. The second state creation was the concession system which was an innovation designed to tap the wealth of the newly developing production capital in the plantation and mining sectors of the economy. The final thrust was the revival of ancient state rights to extract surplus produce and to gain by other means from the otherwise subsistence economy of the peasantry. All of these state devices provided private income to members of the ruling class in the twentieth century. However, each had differing importance in the period of ruling class adaptation to the changing economic and political situation. Thus at the turn of the century the pajak was the most important source of revenue and its significance was increasingly replaced by the concession system from about the second decade of that century. It was only in the third decade that the kapurnia dominated the other forms of revenue extraction.

1. J. C. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption*, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972, p. 49.

2. W. F. Wertheim, 'Sociological Aspects of Corruption in Southeast Asia', in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ed., *Political Corruption*, New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 1970, pp. 197-9.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 199.

4. See in particular Chapter 2 of J. M. Gullick's *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya*, London, The Athlone Press, 1958. See also W. R. Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*, Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya Press, 1967, pp. 3-11.

5. Gullick, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-6.

6. In Trengganu the Kerabat Diraja is also referred to as 'Kerabat Yang Akrab'. See *Laws of the Constitution of Trengganu*, Kuala Lumpur, Government Printing Office, 1973, p. 24.

7. The term 'lineage' is used in the broader sense to mean a line of descent and not in the technical sense to mean a unilineal exogamous corporate group. See M. G. Swift's review of J. M. Gullick, *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya*, in *JSEAH*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1960, p. 92.

8. The Trengganu Constitution dated 2 November 1911 and named *Itkal-nul Muluk Bidadil Al' Saluk* (The Constitution of the Way of Illustrious Sovereignty) is an important document which sets out to regulate the machinery of government. It was drafted soon after the arrival of the first British Agent in 1909—a period when the British presence was viewed with concern and was seen as a threat to Malay government. It was reported that each clause of the fifty-three clause Constitution was blessed by the Ulama before it was actually sealed and signed by the witnesses. This information was communicated to the present writer by Haji Su bin Datuk Amar, the son of the first Mentri Besar of Trengganu during colonial rule, who wrote a brief account of his father's life, dated 6 May 1975. See also *Laws of the Constitution of Trengganu*.

9. *Laws of the Constitution of Trengganu*, p. 24.

10. Shaharil Talib Robert, 'The Trengganu Ruling Class in the Late Nineteenth Century', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 50, Pt. 2, 1977, pp. 29-36.

11. For a personalized account of the ruler, his family as well as highlights of twentieth-century events as seen by a member of the Trengganu royalty, see Tengku Dalam Kalthum binte Tengku Wook Khazaki, 'Syair Tawarikh Zainal Abidin III', Vols. 1 and 2 (transliterated manuscript by Yusoff Hashim). This manuscript is currently being studied by Yusoff Hashim for his doctoral thesis, Jabatan Sejarah (Department of History), University of Malaya.

12. See 'Salasilah Sultan-Sultan Trengganu' in *The Trengganu Silver Jubilee Souvenir Book*, pp. 72-82.

13. See M. C. ff. Sheppard, 'A Short History of Trengganu', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 22, Pt. 3, 1949, p. 11.

14. See CO 273/412: Young to CO, 22 October 1914, desp. 518, f. 318; and CO 273/445: Young to CO, 7 June 1916, desp. 186, f. 428.

15. See Shaharil Talib Robert, 'The Trengganu Ruling Class', pp. 29-36.

16. There was another set of honorifics such as 'Engku', 'Ungku', and 'Tuan' which were held by non-aristocrats. Lower down there was also the title 'Wan'. This information was provided by Haji Su bin Datuk Amar during an interview on 5 April 1975.

17. See HCO 1580/1911. The other religious centres were in Kelantan and Pattani. See Muhammad Salleh bin Wan Musa (with S. Othman Kelantan), 'Theological Debates: Wan Musa b. Haji Abdul Samad and His Family', in W. R. Roff, ed., *Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 154-5.

18. This distinction was noted by W. R. Roff (see Roff, *The Origins of Malay*

*Nationalism*, p. 9). See, for example, R. O. Winstedt, 'Karamat: Sacred Places and Persons in Malaya', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 2, Pt. 3, December 1924, pp. 264-79.

19. They include the lineages of Tukku Pulau Manis, Tukku Pulau Duyong, and Tukku Sayyid Paluh (see Shaharil Talib Robert, 'The Trengganu Ruling Class', pp. 37-40). These three families, like the eighteenth-century Sayyid family in Perak, acquired high state offices, married into the Kerabat class and several of them were known locally as 'saints'. For an account of the position of the Sayyid in Perak, see R. O. Winstedt, 'The Hadramaut Saiyids of Perak and Siak', *JMBRAS*, No. 79, September 1918, pp. 49-62.

20. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, f. 220. It was a common practice for a Sultan to confer titles on his favourites, which gave them a status and distinguished them from the rakyat. In 1907, for example, to commemorate his twenty-fifth anniversary of independent rule, Sultan Zainal Abidin III bestowed titles on four of his officials (see Sheppard, op. cit., p. 52). The office of Kapitan China was held by the leader of the Chinese community. Other officials from that community included the Sultan's scribe and interpreter. There is evidence to indicate that previous Kapitan China took Malay wives and some of their children followed their mother's heritage. In any case, some of them were reported to have dressed themselves in Malay costumes and to have spoken fluent Malay. For notes on the leadership of the Chinese community see Sheppard, op. cit., p. 28; Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir, Munshi, *Kisah Pelayaran Abdullah*, ed. Kassim Ahmad, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1960, pp. 51-2; CO 273/362: Anderson to CO, 19 September 1910, desp. 359, ff. 425-428; and CO 273/363: Anderson to CO, 12 October 1910, desp. 389, ff. 89 and 93-97. The other non-Malay who appeared on the list was a Japanese physician known as Dr Kondo who attended the Sultan daily. The ruler suffered from a dropsical affliction resembling beriberi (CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 17 November 1909, desp. 345, f. 395).

21. The cover-up story for the execution of Tengku Long was that he was an unwanted lover of the Sultan's married sister, Tengku Chik. For further details on the plot see Sheppard, op. cit., p. 39, and *Report of the Commission Appointed by His Excellency the High Commissioner to Enquire into Certain Matters relating to the State of Trengganu*, Singapore, Government Printing Office, 1918 (henceforth referred to as *The Bucknall Commission Report, 1918*), p. 145. As for the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja he continued his career in the civil service during the British period until he was pensioned from his post as *Pesuruhjaya* (Commissioner) for Kemaman in July 1924. He was subsequently appointed a member of the State Council and 'Orang Besar' to Sultan Sulaiman (encl. 53 in SUK 679/1342). He died on 1 July 1939 (encl. 1 in STT 445/1939). For a short account of his career, see 'Dato Sri Lela Diraja', *MIH*, Vol. 12, No. 1, October 1968, pp. 16-20.

22. See genealogical tree and notes on one such family in Shaharil Talib Robert, 'The Trengganu Ruling Class', pp. 44-6.

23. Trengganu had at that time a male population of about 40,000 comprising mainly artisans (5,000), fishermen (8,000), and farmers (26,000) (Sheppard, op. cit., p. 45).

24. In about 1915 it was decided to pay royal court retainers some form of monthly salary. A list of those involved in the ceremonial procession is to be found in SUK 127/1334.

25. H. Clifford, *In Court and Kampong*, London, The Richards Press, 1897, pp. 186-7. The Budak Raja were also referred to as 'juak-juak raja'. They were

recruited from the younger members of the Kerabat class and other promising tough characters. Instances of their notoriety have been documented. See, for example, the statement of Awang bin Haji Muhamad, dated 7 February 1916, in SUK 135/1334. The Budak Raja were under the command of the Datuk Mata-Mata. See 'Dato Mata-Mata', *MII*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1968, p. 33. For information on their duties, see also H. Clifford, 'Life in the Malay Peninsula; As It Was and Is', *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, Vol. 30, 1898-9, pp. 379-80.

26. CO 273/486: Young to CO, 20 January 1919, desp. 17, f. 77.

27. For a brief and interesting account of the origins of the institution in Trengganu see J. L. Humphreys, 'Report on Debt-slavery in Trengganu', dated 12 May 1918. This report is enclosed in *The Bucknill Commission Report, 1918*, pp. 156-61. The institution was well established and widely accepted by all levels of society; the ruling class strongly opposed any attempt to abolish it (CO 273/486: Young to CO, 20 January 1919, desp. 17, f. 77; CO 273/473: Young to CO, 14 September 1918, desp. 254, f. 244; and Sheppard, op. cit., p. 57). Debt-slavery was abolished after 1919. See MBO 351/1341.

28. For a discussion of the institution in the other Malay states see Gullick, op. cit., pp. 98-104; and W. E. Maxwell, 'The Law relating to Slavery among the Malays', *JSBRAS*, No. 22, December 1890, pp. 247-97.

29. See *Laws of the Constitution of Trengganu*. For a comparative account of the indigenous political systems on the west coast states of the Malay Peninsula, see Gullick, op. cit. More recently individual political systems have also been a subject of study. See Sharom Ahmat, 'The Political Structure of the State of Kedah, 1879-1905', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2, September 1970, pp. 115-28; and L. R. Robert, 'Kelantan 1890-1939: Government in Transition', MA thesis, Jabatan Sejarah, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1973, pp. 25-55.

30. *Laws of the Constitution of Trengganu*, p. 10. See also Chapters 1-10, pp. 10-16, which define the conditions and duties attached to the office.

31. H. A. Sutherland, 'Between Conflict and Accommodation: History, Colonialism, Politics and Southeast Asia', *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1978, p. 7. See also Gullick, op. cit., pp. 42-51, for a more detailed account on the aura of sanctity and supernatural power that shrouds the office.

32. CO 273/217: Mitchell to CO, 14 September 1896, desp. 423, f. 288.

33. See CO 273/168: Dickson to CO, 28 October 1890, conf., f. 625; CO 273/209: FO to CO, 11 July 1895, f. 281; and encl. 2 in no. 100, Duff to Acting British Resident, Pahang, 24 April 1896, *FOCP/8*, pp. 103-7. Sultan Zainal Abidin III was raised and educated by some of the leading Ulama of his time. For an account of his religious background see Abdullah bin Embong, 'Sultan Zainal Abidin III, Trengganu, 1881-1918', BA (Hons.) exercise, Jabatan Sejarah, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, pp. 12-13.

34. Both Hugh Clifford and Frank Swettenham faced this situation (CO 273/204: Mitchell to CO, 18 July 1895, desp. 241, encl. 1, f. 326; and CO 273/284: Swettenham to CO, 20 October 1902, secret, f. 123).

35. For notes on the tours of inspection of Baginda Omar see Sheppard, op. cit., pp. 28, 30, and 35. See also C. Skinner, 'A Trengganu Leader of 1839', *JSEAH*, Vol. 5, No. 1, March 1964, pp. 178-87.

36. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 17 November 1909, desp. 345, f. 395.

37. CO 273/399: Young to CO, 25 June 1913, desp. 317, f. 490; CO 273/474:



Young to CO, 15 December 1918, desp. 421; and HCO 923/1912: W. D. Scott to HCO, 5 July 1912, conf.

38. By 1907 Tengku Muhammad was already involved in the administration of the state in a limited way (Sheppard, op. cit., p. 52; and CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 17 November 1909, desp. 345, f. 400). On 19 February 1913 he was granted still wider powers by his father (see *ADT*, No. 6; and HCO 368/1913: Sultan Zainal Abidin to HCO, 31 March 1913, for the powers embodied in the instrument of authority).

39. Sheppard, op. cit., p. 37; and Abdullah bin Embong, op. cit., p. 28.

40. *Laws of the Constitution of Trengganu*, p. 24.

41. See for example CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 17 November 1909, desp. 345, ff. 392 and 395; and CO 273/372: Anderson to CO, 22 February 1911, f. 373. For a very unflattering report on him see CO 537/797: F. S. James to CO, 30 December 1919, conf., ff. 1-19.

42. Sutherland, 'Between Conflict and Accommodation', p. 10.

43. HCO 368/1913: E. A. Dickson to HCO, 26 March 1913.

44. HCO 1643/1920: Mamat bin Mohamed Amin to HCO (undated).

45. CO 273/399: Young to CO, 17 July 1913, desp. 353, f. 648.

46. CO 273/401: Young to CO, 24 December 1913, desp. 628, f. 215.

47. Encl. 2, Tengku Tengah to BAT, 1 August 1934, in MBO 316/1353.

48. See CO 273/409: Young to CO, 3 February 1914, desp. 53, ff. 309-310; CO 273/411: Wilkinson to CO, 22 June 1914, desp. 342, f. 169; and E. A. Dickson's minute dated 16 November 1913 in HCO 1471/1913.

49. CO 273/487: Young to CO, 4 June 1919, conf., f. 274.

50. CO 717/2: Guillemard to CO, 31 May 1920, tel., f. 403. For an account of the pressures exerted on him by British officials see CO 273/487: Young to CO, 14 April 1919, desp. 122, ff. 60-61; and CO 273/487: Young to CO, 4 June 1919, conf., ff. 272-283. The official reason given for his abdication was ill-health (see *Istibar* (Proclamation) in MBO 366/1388 and SUK 524/1338).

51. The role of this institution in the west coast states in the pre-British period was weak if not absent (see Gullick, op. cit., pp. 21 and 51-4). In the east coast states of Kelantan and Trengganu the State Council was an important institution in the pre-colonial political apparatus. For an account of the State Council in Kelantan see Robert, 'Kelantan 1890-1939', Chapters 2 and 3.

52. *Laws of the Constitution of Trengganu*, pp. 21 and 51-4.

53. The same thing happened in Kelantan in 1900. See Robert, 'Kelantan 1890-1939', pp. 73-4 and Chapter 4.

54. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, ff. 221-223.

55. See *ibid.*, and CO 273/412: Young to CO, 8 October 1914, conf., f. 260.

56. Sheppard, op. cit., pp. 37 and 40.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 40. See also CO 537/48: Mitchell to CO, 13 May 1896, secret, no. 62, encl. 1, ff. 280-282.

58. CO 273/284: Swettenham to CO, 20 October 1902, secret, f. 122.

59. This information was related by Haji Su bin Daruk Amar and Haji Muhammad Saleh bin Haji Awang.

60. See *Laws of the Constitution of Trengganu*, pp. 11-12, which contains the rules for the succession to the throne. For a list of members appointed to this body by Sultan Muhammad in 1918 see SUK 54/1337.

61. For the principles of selection of a ruler in the west coast states see Gullick, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-61.
62. The appointments of Sultan Mansur (r. 1741-95), Baginda Omar, and Sultan Zainal Abidin III were all Ulama-inspired. See Sheppard, *op. cit.*, pp. 11 and 26; and Haji Muhammad Saleh bin Haji Awang, *Sejarah Trengganu*, Kuala Trengganu, Mansor Printing Press, 1968, pp. 59-60.
63. There was a superstition in Trengganu that when the Yang Dipertuan Muda was the Sultan's eldest son, he was unlikely to succeed in the ordinary course of events (CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 17 November 1909, desp. 345, f. 401). Consider also the case of Baginda Omar's eldest son who never succeeded him ('Journal kept on Board the Cruiser', *JIA*, Vol. 8, 1854, p. 176).
64. Hugh Clifford has an interesting account of the fate of this court favourite of Baginda Omar (see H. Clifford, *The Further Side of Silence*, New York, Doubleday, Page and Company, 1927, pp. 319-40).
65. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, f. 220. Sultan Sulaiman, on the contrary, made a definite attempt to revive and preserve old Malay titles drawn from the *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals), though he found the British Adviser quite unsympathetic to the practice. For details see MBO 245/1339: Sultan Sulaiman to MBO, 17 January 1921, and enclosures.
66. This title was given to those who ruled the districts (Haji Muhammad Saleh bin Haji Awang, *op. cit.*, p. 55).
67. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, f. 215.
68. H. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States of Trengganu and Kelantan', *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 1897, p. 16.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
70. The structure of the chieftainship between 1882 and 1913 outlined in Appendices 1-3, pp. 230-4, shows the control exercised by them.
71. Encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenues, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, ff. 118-119.
72. In Kelantan, too, absentee district chiefs were a known feature (Robert, 'Kelantan 1890-1939', p. 270). This was in contrast to the west coast states where the chief resided in the area he ruled (see Gullick, *op. cit.*, p. 106; and Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*, p. 2).
73. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States', p. 17.
74. *Ibid.*
75. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
76. See HCO 1325/1913: E. A. Dickson to HCO, 4 March 1914; and minute, E. A. Dickson, 16 November 1913, on HCO 1325/1913. See also petition written by a local trader against him in HCO 74/1912: Haji Wan Ismail bin Datuk Megat Mahkota to HCO, 6 January 1913.
77. *The Bucknill Commission Report, 1918*, pp. 31 and 145. See also Sulong bin Zainal, 'Dato Lela: Viceroy of Kemaman', *MHI*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1968, pp. 16-19.
78. For a study on contemporary rural leadership in Malay society see S. Husin Ali, *Malay Peasant Society and Leadership*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1975.
79. Encl. 3, Hayward to CLM, 31 August 1933, in CLM 98/1352.
80. This feature was commented on by British officials who in their efforts to establish an advisory system of government realized the importance and urgency of

reconstructing a system of penghulu for the purpose of rural administration. See ART, 1915, draft, in HCO 731/1916; and encl. 2, Memorandum on the Penghulu System, G. A. C. de Moubray, 15 June 1940, in CLM 368/1940.

81. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States', pp. 16-17. See also Dato Haji Mubin Sheppard, 'Baginda Omar "The Conqueror"', *MJH*, Vol. 12, No. 1, October 1968, p. 37. During the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin III, these territorial chiefs appointed their own men to act as functionaries in their districts. See for example encl. 7, Datuk Nara Wangsa to Komite Kerajaan Trengganu, 27 June 1921, in MBO 303/1339; and encl. 11, Tengku Seri Indera Segara to Komite Kerajaan Trengganu, 16 July 1921, in the same file.

82. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States', pp. 14-15.

83. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, f. 219.

84. Sheppard, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

85. T. J. Newbold puts the population at 31,000 and J. H. Moor at 35,000 (see T. J. Newbold, *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca*, Vol. 2, London, John Murray, 1839 (reprinted, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 60; and J. H. Moor, ed., *Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries*, Singapore, 1837 (reprinted, London, F. Cass, 1968), p. 245). By the 1850s there had been only a slight increase in population. It was then estimated at around 37,000 (see J. Crawford, *A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and Adjacent Countries*, London, Bradbury and Evans, 1856 (reprinted, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 440). In 1875 a figure of 70,000 was quoted by the ruler of Trengganu to Frank Swettenham (see P. L. Burns and C. D. Cowan, eds., *Swettenham's Malayan Journals 1874-1876*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 262).

86. A copy of the 1911 census can be found in HCO 260/1912: W. D. Scott to HCO, 18 March 1912.

87. See Robert, 'Kelantan 1890-1939', Chapter 2, where an attempt was made to identify the core sectors of Malay government in Kelantan.

88. Gullick, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

89. At the height of his troubles with the British in November 1862, Baginda Omar went to consult a certain 'cazee' (*kathi*: religious magistrate) in the outskirts of Kuala Trengganu. For the details of the danger of the circumstances that led him to visit his Ulama see *Attack upon Trengganu*, Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, Vol. 43, 1863, p. 36. In 1909 when the first British Agent arrived in Trengganu he was advised '... to walk warily ...' as it was known that the Ulama had a strong influence on the Sultan (CO 273/350: Anderson to Stubbs, 28 July 1909, f. 368). See also the two letters of Tukku Sayyid Paluh to Sultan Zainal Abidin III giving him advice in Mohamad Abu Bakar, 'Sayyid Abdul Rahman bin Muhammad Al-Idrus (Tukku Paluh)', BA (Hons.) exercise, Jabatan Sejarah, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, Appendices 1 and 2.

90. British officials noted that in Trengganu the word 'wakaf' could be classified in a greater variety of ways than in the west coast states (BAT 671/1938: Diary of Settlement Collector, Trengganu, A. Glencross, April 1938). In 1931 the government attempted to control wakaf land for purposes of land administration. A list of all wakaf lands was drawn. Some of the wakaf land in that list dated from the nineteenth century and gave the names of the donor and the recipient as well as the purpose of the wakaf. This list shows conclusively the role of the Sultans and other ruling class elements in the nurturing of religion in the state (see CLM 216/1348 and enclosures

in that file).

91. Abdullah bin Embong, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

92. Mamat Adam bin Taib, 'Struktur dan Organisasi Pentadbiran Hal Ehwal Ugama Islam Trengganu', BA (Hons.) exercise, Jabatan Pengajian Melayu (Department of Malay Studies), University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1970, p. 3.

93. This list was provided by Haji Su bin Datuk Amar and Haji Muhammad Saleh bin Haji Awang.

94. This distinction between the three appointments was made by Mohamad Sarim Mustajab in his MA thesis entitled 'Islam dan Perkembangannya dalam Masyarakat Melayu di Semenanjung Tanah Melayu, 1900 sehingga 1940an', Jabatan Sejarah, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, 1975, Chapter 3.

95. See Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*, p. 8, for the functions of these rural religious officials.

96. Munshi Abdullah noted in 1838 that every *kampung* (village) in the royal town of Kuala Trengganu had its own *madrasah* (religious school) (Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir, Munshi, *op. cit.*, p. 47). Some of the leading pondok schools in the late nineteenth century according to their districts and teachers were: 1. Trengganu River: Sungai Rengas (Tok Kali); Bukit Bayas; Kampung Atas Tol (Haji Awang); Kampung Belandau Selat (Tukku Sayyid); Pulau Babi (Haji Wan Taib); 2. Kemaman (Haji Abdul Rahman Lumbong); 3. Ulu Nerus; 4. Marang; 5. Besut. The informant, Haji Su bin Datuk Amar, could provide only a very short list from memory. He stressed that there were many others. The subject of pondok schools merits a more thorough investigation than time on the field could permit. However, Haji Su and Haji Muhammad Saleh bin Haji Awang did point out that religious teachers were known to each other and many came from the same schools.

97. Clifford has commented on the ramifications of the system of communications from man to man by word of mouth (see Clifford, 'Life on the Malay Peninsula', p. 371). A fascinating study on administrative institutionalization and bureaucratization of early religious institutions in Kelantan has been completed. See W. R. Roff, 'The Origins and Early Years of the Majlis Ugama', in W. R. Roff, ed., *Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 101-52.

98. *Laws of the Constitution of Trengganu*, p. 22.

99. The bureaucratization of religious institutions in Trengganu for the period 1900-40 forms a chapter in Mohamad Sarim Mustajab's MA thesis mentioned earlier.

100. For an elucidation of the judicial system as a base of power in the indigenous political system, see Gullick, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-20.

101. G. W. Earl, *The Eastern Seas*, London, Wm. Hallen and Company, 1897 (reprinted, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 186.

102. CO 273/459: Young to CO, 11 April 1917, *desp.* 110, f. 557.

103. In the days when the *balai* was the only court, the dispensing of justice was a royal function. The various Sultans were remembered for the manner in which they performed their duties. Sultan Zainal Abidin III evidently abstained from executing his royal function. He preferred to allow such matters to be handled by his officials. Baginda Omar, on the other hand, was well known for his grim jests whenever he pronounced a severe sentence (Sheppard, *op. cit.*, p. 30).

104. HCO 923/1912: W. D. Scott to HCO, 5 July 1912, *conf.* See also Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States', pp. 23-4, for a description of how the ruling

class controlled and executed judicial functions.

105. See SUK 692/1346: Ringkasan Darihal Tawarikh Dahulu Zaman.
106. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 17 November 1909, desp. 345, ff. 393-394.
107. See 'Surat Persendirian Datuk Perba Diraja Trengganu' (Arkib Negara, Malaysia).
108. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 17 November 1909, desp. 345, f. 394. For an account of the development of the state's legal institutions see Heather Sutherland, 'The Transformation of the Trengganu Legal Order', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1980, pp. 1-29.
109. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, ff. 221 and 223.
110. See CO 273/384: Young to CO, 28 February 1912, desp. 70, f. 416; and CO 273/400: Young to CO, 21 August 1913, desp. 407, f. 108.
111. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, f. 209.
112. CO 273/445: Young to CO, 11 April 1916, desp. 117, f. 199.
113. CO 273/413: Young to CO, 22 December 1914, desp. 605, f. 184. If the accused was found guilty and could not pay the compensation, he and his family may become slaves of the victim's family (CO 273/412: Young to CO, 22 October 1914, desp. 518, f. 321). For an account of early nineteenth-century punishments see W. Medhurst, *Journal of a Tour through the Settlements on the Eastern Side of the Peninsula of Malacca*, Singapore, Mission Press, 1828, pp. 39-40.
114. CO 273/399: Young to CO, 25 June 1913, desp. 317, ff. 481-482.
115. *The Bucknill Commission Report, 1918*, p. 32.
116. The procedure of bribing was to present a book in which banknotes were enclosed with a request to do nothing or 'diam' (CO 273/399: Young to CO, 25 June 1913, desp. 317, f. 480).
117. CO 273/372: Anderson to CO, 22 February 1911, f. 371. The cases that dragged on for years were usually those involving inheritance (CO 273/399: Young to CO, 25 June 1913, desp. 317, f. 480). Land disputes, which formed the bulk of court work, were the most profitable source of income for the officials (CO 273/425: Young to CO, 24 March 1915, desp. 131, f. 528).
118. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 17 November 1909, desp. 345, f. 394.
119. CO 273/399: Young to CO, 4 June 1913, desp. 284, f. 304. In 1908 a petition was submitted accusing the Hakim of favouring his people in land cases (see HCO 814/1908: Haji Che bin Inche Man to HCO, 18 May 1908).
120. CO 273/399: Young to CO, 25 June 1913, desp. 317, f. 480. This practice was well known in Trengganu (SUK 37/1336: Wan Ngah bin Wan Abdul Rahim, 6 December 1917). The British Agent twice demanded the Hakim's resignation but the Sultan refused on each occasion (CO 273/399: Young to CO, 4 June 1913, desp. 284, f. 304). In January 1919, the newly installed Sultan Muhammad pardoned him and appointed him his Legal Adviser (CO 273/486: Young to CO, 18 February 1919, desp. 46, f. 378). For his subsequent career in the civil service see BAT 448/1935: Pejabat Agama dan Keadilan to SUK, 8 February 1935.
121. CO 273/444: Young to CO, 23 February 1916, desp. 57, f. 651.
122. See ART, 1915, draft, p. 17, in HCO 731/1916. The services that the rakyat provided was kerah. By this method the ruling class could obtain free timber or jungle produce which they sold in the open market (Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States', pp. 19-20). For an example of such an order see encl. 2, Chap Sultan Zainal Abidin, 6 June 1904, in SUK 359/1342.

123. For an elaborate account on the principles of Malay land tenure see W. E. Maxwell, 'The Law and Customs of the Malays with reference to the Tenure of Land', *JSBRAS*, No. 13, June 1884, pp. 75-220. Tengku Chik bin Tengku Abdul Rahim offers a good summary of the position of the cultivator in the late eighteenth century (see CLR 207/1347: Tengku Chik bin Tengku Abdul Rahim to CLM, 3 November 1926). For other similar expressions see CLR 240/1348: Enche Ali bin Salleh and others versus Tengku Wook binte Tengku Othman; and CLR 52/1357: Cap Tengku Osman.

124. CO 717/61: H. Marriott to CO, 6 December 1928, encl. 7, file no. 52432/28, f. 59.

125. See CLM 205/1350: Memorandum by Sulaiman, 27 September 1931; and BAT 689/1936: Tengku Abdullah bin Abdul Rahman to SUK, 9 May 1936.

126. Unlike Kelantan, Trengganu did not have an organized system of taxes on agricultural produce (see Robert, 'Kelantan 1890-1939', p. 200; and CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, f. 208).

127. CLM 75/1940: H. R. Hughes Hallet to CLM, 26 June 1940.

128. See Chapter 5.

129. Gullick holds the view that in the west coast states, land had no value in the pre-British period (see Gullick, *op. cit.*, p. 113).

130. The printing on wooden blocks was introduced by a Frenchman whose descendants continue to live in Trengganu (HCO 1580/1911: Memorandum by E. A. Dickson, undated).

131. In fact disputes and suits involving land-ownership comprised the bulk of the court work (CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, f. 209). For examples of these early land titles see LOK 211/1347: Cap Keputusan dated 2 August 1900; LOT 234/1346: Cap Jual-beli dated c.1890; CLM 12/1350: Cap Keputusan dated 23 December 1861; SUK 269/1342: Cap Keputusan dated 4 June 1860; and CLM (Mines) 329/1342: Cap Keputusan dated 28 July 1866. These title deeds, especially cap keputusan and cap jual-beli, contain detailed accounts of the transactions of the various parties.

132. CO 273/375: Young to CO, 2 October 1911, conf., f. 237A.

133. ART, 1915, draft, p. 17, in HCO 731/1916.

134. For a discussion on wealth as a basis of power in a Malay state see Gullick, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-31. The collection and distribution of revenue in the 200-year history of the Sultanate before 1900 had undergone several distinct phases. See Chapter 3.

135. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States', p. 18; see also CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 17 March 1910, desp. 107, f. 416.

136. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States', pp. 18-21.

137. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, f. 216.

138. ART, 1919, draft, p. 6, in HCO 1235/1920.

139. For the terms of these farms see CO 273/411: Wilkinson to CO, 22 June 1914, desp. 342, f. 172; ART, 1915, draft, p. 22, in HCO 731/1916; and ART, 1919, draft, p. 5, in HCO 1235/1920.

140. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States', pp. 14-15.

141. Encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenue, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, ff. 119-120.

142. CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 17 March 1910, ff. 414-415.

143. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States', p. 16.

144. HCO 975/1922: Memorandum by J. L. Humphreys, 25 November 1922.

145. In the history of the Sultanate there have been numerous instances of dynastic quarrels. The most noted was the emergence of Baginda Omar who himself towards the end of his rule confronted successfully the rebel chief, Tengku Ali of Besut. The reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin III was comparatively stable. There were minor instances in which his throne was threatened. The first attempt was made by Tengku Long, his cousin, who was ruthlessly knifed, and the second was made by Tengku Abdul Rahim, his uncle, who was driven out of the capital and confined at Kampung Chedering (Sheppard, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-8 and 35-40).

146. The distinction between 'politically oriented capitalism' and 'market-oriented capitalism' was made by J. C. Scott in his discussion on proto-corruption in early Stuart England (see Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption*, pp. 37-54).



*Mas Dinar*

### 3

## *The Pajak System*

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THE pajak system was an established means of raising revenue from the commodity trade generated by the peasantry and thus, in a period of dramatic commercial expansion such as the two decades before 1910, when Britain formally concluded a treaty with Trengganu, it gave the ruling class an opportunity to benefit directly from the new developments. Against the background of expanding merchant capital the apparatus for collecting revenue became increasingly differentiated, which indicated that Trengganu's rulers in the late nineteenth century were effectively developing and adapting existing political institutions for the purpose of diverting resources into their own hands.

Broadly, two categories of trade commodities in the peasant sector could be identified. The first type were royal monopolies which classified certain articles as the exclusive trade right of the ruler, that is to say, no article under the royal monopoly—exported or imported—could be sold except through the ruler. He had exclusive right to purchase these articles at a price fixed by himself and he then sold them on the open market. The second type comprised those commodities of trade that fell outside the royal monopolies. These were usually articles that were neither in great demand nor sufficiently scarce to be worth monopolizing. These commodities, however, were still a source of tax revenue. All trade was thus either monopolized or taxed by the ruler.<sup>1</sup>

The Sultan was, in theory, the owner of all revenue in the state, and the collection of revenue was, in theory, an administrative function carried out by his officials.<sup>2</sup> In practice the pajak system provided an alternative to the direct collection of tax by officials as part of their duty. Under this system an agent, as distinct from an official, was appointed to collect revenue on behalf of the government. The agent paid the 'government' rent to operate a revenue farm which gave him the right to collect taxes on imports and exports. There was, in addition, a second category of farms—not strictly revenue farms at all—for which the farmer paid the government for the sole right to trade in royal monopolies at a price fixed



by the farmer. This farm, to distinguish it from the revenue farm, could be termed a 'monopoly farm'.<sup>3</sup> The rents earned from these two farms, reflecting the basic twofold division of articles of trade, were the major sources of official income for the Sultan and the ruling class. This is not to say that they did not also draw funds from unofficial sources. The Sultan and his officials, for example, often participated directly in trade. It should be stressed, however, that in a political system as personal in character as that of Trengganu, the distinction between official and private functions, or between official and private sources of income, was inevitably blurred. In the period prior to British intervention the two were intertwined and are difficult to separate.

Information on the operation and organization of the *pajak* system in Trengganu prior to the late nineteenth century is scanty but scattered references indicate its existence. The system was an old and established method of organizing revenue in Asia. It was common in the Malay states.<sup>4</sup> British diplomat John Crawfurd, in the early nineteenth century, described it as being the way in which revenue was collected from trade.<sup>5</sup>

In the early eighteenth century, the main products of Trengganu were pepper and gold. Both of these commodities were exported by the Chinese.<sup>6</sup> By the end of that century, the state had gained a reputation as a pepper-producing country and yielded between 13,000 and 17,000 *pikul* (1 *pikul* = 133½ lb.) annually. The produce was traded by English and Chinese merchants.<sup>7</sup> Even in this early period, when the present Sultanate was being formed in Trengganu, the ruling class controlled the economic resources of the state, and all the revenue of the princes was reported to come from the profits of restrictive commerce.<sup>8</sup> The ruling class monopolized the pepper trade but allowed a small portion of it to be in the hands of private individuals.<sup>9</sup> Sultan Mansur I (r. 1741-95) was reputed to be the state's only merchant and all business was carried out only with his permission. He personally owned boats and also chartered them from his subjects for trading purposes. These boats were sent northwards to Siam, Cambodia, Cochin-China, and China, and southwards to Java, Sumatra, Moluccas and elsewhere.<sup>10</sup>

In the early decades of the nineteenth century Trengganu continued to produce pepper at a rate of 3,000 *pikul* annually in the 1820s and it also exported large quantities of sugar manufactured from coconut. Cultivation of coffee, too, had been recently introduced. The output of tin was in decline, production being

limited to 1,200 pikul per annum which came mainly from the mines at Dungun and Kemaman.<sup>11</sup> The Kemaman mines, which opened at the beginning of the nineteenth century, provided in their initial years a handsome profit to the ruler.<sup>12</sup> By the 1830s tin production had increased again and at that stage Trengganu, with an output of 7,000 pikul per annum, was the leading east coast producer, and rivalled the west coast mines of Perak and Sungai Ujong which produced 7,000 and 7,500 pikul per annum respectively.<sup>13</sup> In addition to tin, Trengganu also exported ivory, pepper, camphor, gambier, and gold.<sup>14</sup>

As in the case of earlier rulers, the early nineteenth-century rulers and their close officials too dominated commodity trade in the state. They had formed in this period a quasi-commercial company which monopolized the entire foreign trade and ensured that every transaction passed through their hands.<sup>15</sup> They were to profit in the first half of the nineteenth century from the expansion of trade with Singapore following the latter's establishment as a free port.<sup>16</sup>

Despite evidence of direct participation in trade by rulers prior to Sultan Zainal Abidin III, their main source of income came from the collection of state revenue, on the unchallenged principle that the state and its revenue were the personal property of the ruler and that any allowance made to others was an act of *kurnia*.<sup>17</sup>

This situation was to change at the end of the century. The history of the collection and disposal of state revenue in Trengganu in fact passed through several distinct phases. In the early period of the Sultanate the local lineage district chief collected what he could from the district and paid merely an annual tribute to the Sultan.<sup>18</sup> With the gradual extension of firmer royal control over these officials, and the subsequent appointment of the Sultan's own men from Kuala Trengganu to the positions of district chief, the ruler had greater control over the revenue of the state.<sup>19</sup> Thereafter the appointed district chiefs and other officials were held responsible for the collection of all revenue from taxes, farm rents, and other sources. They had thus become officials dependent on the ruler for their income: all revenue collected was forwarded to the royal coffers and the ruler doled out money to his officials for their maintenance. In this way all the nineteenth-century rulers, up to the time of Sultan Zainal Abidin III, centralized revenue collection and disposal under their direct control. However, Sultan Zainal Abidin III's reign marked the beginning of the third phase—a phase in which the ruler's grip over revenue was loosened. There was a

distinct shift as the officials who had long served strong rulers on an irregular 'salary' basis seized the opportunity provided by the accession of a young Sultan to strengthen their hold over the economy. In resorting to the pajak system which became the dominant method of revenue collection, the district chiefs preferred to rely on rents from tax-farms for their income, rather than arranging for the direct collection of revenue and the forwarding of it to the Royal Treasury. In this way they were able to collect payments from their assigned river systems and turn them to their own private uses; and they thus acquired control over their own independent sources of supposedly official income.<sup>20</sup>

This change in the position of the district chief—from that of a mere revenue collector acting on behalf of the ruler to that of a revenue holder with independent rights to revenue—cannot be explained merely by the fact of the accession of a young Sultan. A more significant reason was the emergence of new and powerful forces in the economy of the state. The district officials were engaged, in effect, in a concerted attempt to exploit the expanding trade in commodities. In the late nineteenth century there was an expansion of trade with Singapore, and the trade of Trengganu at the turn of the century exceeded that of the other states on the east

TABLE 2  
The Singapore–Kelantan/Trengganu/Pattani Trade, 1897–1901

	1897 (\$)	1898 (\$)	1899 (\$)	1900 (\$)	1901 (\$)
<i>Imports to Singapore from:</i>					
Kelantan	632,742	670,860	652,359	763,294	969,813
Trengganu	811,103	767,993	915,531	971,243	1,117,880
Pattani	262,990	336,439	447,070	381,035	480,998
<i>Exports from Singapore to:</i>					
Kelantan	439,782	297,570	366,290	518,506	903,258
Trengganu	470,394	553,323	512,499	689,912	906,099
Pattani	285,216	324,293	329,036	243,045	363,404

Source: CO 273/283: Swettenham to CO, 22 August 1902, ff. 37–39.

coast which were outside British control. This may be seen from the figures provided by the Import and Export Office, Singapore, for Kelantan, Trengganu, and Pattani between the years 1897 and 1901.<sup>21</sup> In addition to the fairly steady trade in commodities between Trengganu and Singapore, there was also considerable trade between the former and the northern ports, though figures for this old and established trade are difficult to obtain. In 1914 exports to Siam and Cochin-China were valued at \$146,483 and imports at \$55,491.<sup>22</sup>

From the beginning of the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin III in 1881, then, a much broader group of officials shared the state's wealth and made full use of the opportunities for procuring independent sources of state revenue. As has been seen in Chapter 2, the majority of these officials, in the late nineteenth century, were related to the ruler and only a handful were drawn from the other elements of the ruling class.<sup>23</sup> Each of these officials was assigned district revenue by the ruler—either in its entirety or in part—or a specified tax monopoly right over trade or business, such as the operation of an opium or gambling den, for his own personal gain.<sup>24</sup> Sultan Zainal Abidin III did not challenge, until much later, the right of his officials as holders of revenue. Unlike his predecessors, he did not insist that all revenue collected in the state be paid into the Royal Treasury and from there be distributed at his discretion to his officials. The new arrangement made possible the individual accumulation of wealth by the ruler and his officials and, at the same time, gave the Kerabat Diraja as a whole a greater share of the state's revenue than that which flowed to the other elements in the ruling class.

These holders of revenue rights no longer collected taxes from commodity trade as previous officials had done nor did they collect those articles previously under royal monopolies and sell them on the open market. Instead the pajak system and the monopoly system guaranteed them a growing income for, when combined, the two systems enabled them to tap the expanding trade of their districts. Monopoly farms were issued for such peasant commodity produce as coconuts, areca nuts, gambier, and buffalo and other hides. The produce of this category of farms was again subject to duty at the river mouth.<sup>25</sup> However, the major monopoly farms came from jungle produce. Clifford comments:

All jungle produce, such as getah, camphor, agilar, wood, rattans, etc., are recognised throughout the state as being the property of the various district

rajas; and all such articles have to be brought to the headquarters, and sold to the raja or to his agents at the price determined by them. Thus 'getah', which is the most valuable product yielded in any great quantities by Malay jungles, has to be sold by the people at \$25 per 'pikul' if of inferior quality, and at \$50 per 'pikul' if of the best kind. The prices now ruling in the interior of Pahang are \$50 per 'pikul' and \$150 per 'pikul' respectively, for inferior and superior 'getah'. Camphor is valued at \$20, \$25, and \$30 a 'kati' according to quality, as against \$60, \$70, and \$80 in Pahang. Gambier is sold by the basket of 5,000 pieces, the prices paid being 10 'kupang' in Trengganu currency, viz. \$2.50. In Pahang \$5 is the lowest paid for 1,000 pieces. Damar is also exported in considerable quantities from Trengganu, and this also has to be sold to the district 'rajas' at a uniformly low price. Kemuning wood, gum-benzoin, and ivory are similar perquisites.<sup>26</sup>

Compared to earlier district officials these revenue holders were *kuala* (river-mouth)-based rent earners and not, as before, tribute payers or collectors of revenue acting on behalf of the ruler. Thus they did not remit anything to the centre.

In the new system the weak merchant group, to which reference has been made, had its service functions to perform.<sup>27</sup> There was an established network of trading connections between the *kuala* areas and the interior. These merchants used established trading centres in the inland areas and together with the local population maintained the network of paths and bridges along which all kinds of produce were carried daily in every direction by thousands of peasants.<sup>28</sup> Many of the British Agents commented enthusiastically on the indomitable energy of the Trengganu Malay trader. To quote, for example, J. L. Humphreys:

Trengganu traders are skilfull [*sic*] and adventurous, and frequently acquire considerable fortunes. Most of the bridges, wayside wells, and resting places inland are the private work of such men. They frequently make the pilgrimage to Mecca: a rest-house for pilgrims in that city and at Jeddah have been erected by successful Trengganu merchants, and bear their names.<sup>29</sup>

Despite the presence of this enterprising Malay trading class, the district chiefs and other holders of river revenue displayed, when selling their rights, a strong preference for Chinese traders, and at the turn of the century most of the revenue farms were in the hands of Chinese farmers who controlled and collected revenue.<sup>30</sup>

These farms assured the lessor a steady and regular flow of income and saved him the task of organizing and maintaining his own system for the collection of revenue. The ruling class thus

developed a dependence of convenience on the revenue farmers. Sultan Zainal Abidin III himself found it a matter of great difficulty to meet the ordinary expenses of his household and often had to approach the various farmers for rents before they were due. On more than one occasion, before the lease of a particular farm had expired, the farm was re-let and earnest money was collected in order that funds might be raised. A similar situation existed among the district chiefs. The ruler feared offending his powerful vassals by attempting to control their excesses.<sup>31</sup>

There were other methods, too, by which the pajak system enabled cash to be raised. First, in cases where there were no immediate lessees of an established farm at a higher price, it was common to increase the export duty and to institute a second farm with the right of collecting the additional duty. The new farm operated simultaneously with the old one re-let at the former price.<sup>32</sup> Secondly, as holders of the right to collect revenue, members of the ruling class were in a position to obtain ready loans from the local traders. Merchant capitalists also took risks as usury capitalists. Many of the revenue farmers advanced loans to district chiefs and deducted the amount when making their regular payments; in 1914 the debts of the officials to the local traders amounted to not less than \$100,000.<sup>33</sup> Finally, it was common for the revenue farmer to offer bribes to stay in the business. Loans and other favours and rewards were given to officials and no farmer could expect to survive without them.<sup>34</sup>

The amount of income reaped from the farm rents was substantial. The authorities were anxious to avoid collecting small sums of money but were prepared to sell their revenue rights for a lump-sum payment; and since they lived from hand to mouth they were willing to mortgage the future revenue of the state whenever funds were needed.<sup>35</sup> Powered in part by the desire of the ruling class to search for additional income, the ramifications of the pajak system grew as new farms were leased before old ones were terminated or as taxes were increased on current farms and new ones instituted to collect them. In addition, entirely new farms were leased to collect revenue in areas never before taxed.

The machinery of the pajak system as developed during the period of expansion of trade with Singapore and elsewhere was thus extensive and virtually all trade was taxed. The list of farms in Appendix 6 will reveal the all-embracing character of the system.<sup>36</sup> This feature contrasted with an earlier period when pajak were

fewer in number and were exclusively a royal possession.

In the larger river systems, such as the Trengganu River, it was common to have several additional export farms on the tributaries. Hence, exports from the Telemong and Nerus, both tributaries of the Trengganu River, were taxed no less than four times before finally leaving the state.<sup>37</sup> Despite the burden of the *pajak* system, however, commodity trade increased, and indeed it was the gradual expansion of trade which sustained the farm system. The peasants were of course the main producers for commodity exchange. Some district chiefs attempted to capitalize on the increase and to collect revenue in areas outside their jurisdiction. In 1903 Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim, the official assigned to the Telemong district, issued to two Chinese a farm to collect taxes on *belacan* (prawn paste) and fish in the Chenering River area in Besut district. The fishing folk in that area refused to pay taxes to these revenue farmers on the grounds that the farm deed was not endorsed by the Sultan despite the fact that the deeds were not commonly so endorsed.<sup>38</sup> It was only in June 1912 that Sultan Zainal Abidin III insisted that all farm deeds should bear the state seal.<sup>39</sup> The real reason for their refusal, however, was that Besut was under the control of an established district chief and the act of Tengku Ngah Omar was an encroachment into another's territory.

While the official's right to issue farm deeds was limited to his assigned river system where he had a free hand to make agreements without reference to the Sultan, the latter, on the other hand, had more scope. In spite of the loss of a centralized revenue collection system, Sultan Zainal Abidin III was progressively able to expand his revenue over the course of his reign. In the early part of his reign his revenue was limited to that of the Trengganu River system from Kuala Telemong to the main river mouth and the small adjacent river of Ibai.<sup>40</sup> In his later years he demanded shares from sources of revenue which he had not previously tapped. He had in this manner taken over all export duty on tin from Kemaman district, acquired a share of the export duty on wolfram from Dungun district, from Tengku Abu Bakar bin Tengku Abdul Jalil, and resumed the entire export duty on pepper in Kemasik district when the Chinese gardens there became productive. In the last case, he promised a share to the Datuk Mata-Mata but he never paid him.<sup>41</sup>

A much better documented case of the expansion of royal revenue was his taking over of the production of local coinage, *pitis*, from the Chinese farmer who had previously held monopoly rights

over the minting of coins. Prior to the Sultan's take-over, the right to mint some of the varieties of local coins had been given to individuals in lieu of other remuneration. The Kapitan China minted a coin known as 'jokoh' which was used in the Chinese gaming houses. The coin also had commercial value in Kuala Trengganu and its immediate neighbourhood. The Jurubahasa and the Jurutulis—the Sultan's Chinese Interpreter and Chinese Scribe—also had rights to mint additional types of jokoh. The Sultan also gave similar rights to two of his consorts—Tengku Petri, his royal wife, and Cik Kelsom, the chief royal concubine. They were allowed to mint a stipulated quantity of *keping baru* (lit. 'a new coin') which provided them with an income of about \$700 each per month. In 1907 when the Sultan took over the production of coins from the Chinese farmer, the result was a competition between his coins and those of the farmer. The former's pitis were different in design and value. Nonetheless, the latter's coins had a larger circulation. The farmer was required by a bond made between the two parties to redeem his coins but the enforcement was delayed.<sup>42</sup>

The revenue farmer, like all the other members of the subject class, was subordinate to the ruling class. His working relationship with the officials was a delicate and precarious one. The element of risk in the breakdown of communication with the district chief was great. Many a trader went involuntarily into bankruptcy<sup>43</sup> not because of his inability to handle market forces but because of his inability to reach a working arrangement with the official. A detailed examination of several cases will show the inner workings of the pajak system and the subservient relationship of the lessee to the lessor. The ruling class had a firm grip on the farmer and often used the state's coercive machinery to extract income.

One common problem of the system was the inability of the revenue farmer to recover capital invested or advanced to the official. In 1913 Lim Kim Bee, a Trengganu-born Chinese, paid Tengku Abdullah bin Sultan Ali \$400 in advance to operate the spirit, *candu* (opium), and Chinese tobacco farm in Paka district for three years. Tengku Abdullah was a capricious man and, having received his payment, he then failed to confirm the grant of the farm. Recovery of the payment then proved extremely difficult. Tengku Abdullah kept putting him off by saying 'Wait, wait, we will pay you as soon as convenient'.<sup>44</sup> The money was recovered only after Lim had doggedly persisted in pressing Tengku Abdullah



and had appealed to the Sultan and the High Commissioner against the background of threats to his life. This particular case was only one of many similar ones in the state.<sup>45</sup>

The presence of several farms in the same district collecting taxes on similar produce was another common occurrence. Often the district chief, in his enthusiasm to raise funds, leased several similar farms. However, the problem was more acute when there was a change of chief. Rivalries developed between competing farmers in their attempt to gain official favour. The district of Paka offers examples of the difficulties posed by the existence of similar farms.

In 1911 a general export farm was issued to Awang Chenik for forest produce and *cengai* (*Balanocarpus heimii*, a local hardwood). Simultaneously, another farm was issued to Tiang Ho and Company, timber merchants of Singapore and Paka.<sup>46</sup> Both these farmers were at loggerheads and the conflict between them bred ill will in the district. Tiang Ho and Company had paid their rent in advance but in 1914 the government prohibited the export of *cengai*. The company suffered a considerable loss as it had imported labour and contractors and had given advances to various interested parties. It claimed losses of \$1,707.32 but the court decided to award it only \$373.06. The confidence of the trading community in the Paka River area, already eroded by the frequent change of district chief, was shaken by this incident.<sup>47</sup> Its problems had begun with Tengku Sulong, the Sultan's son-in-law, who was removed from office because of the heavy-handed manner in which he ruled. He divorced his wife, Tengku Ngah Aishah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III. She remarried and her second husband, Tengku Abdullah bin Sultan Ali, leased fresh farms, ignoring the ones in existence. Like his predecessor, he too was removed from the district because of the resentment of the local people; over 70 families were reported to be about to move away from the district. With his withdrawal the same process was repeated. New farms were let at the expense of those that had paid money for the right and the 1911 case was typical. Lim Kim Bee, who featured in the spirit, candu, and Chinese tobacco farm, was financially crippled by these frequent changes as he had paid for several farms.<sup>48</sup>

Using their advantageous position in the traditional political system, members of the ruling class were able to bear down on the revenue farmers. The difference between one case and another was merely a change in time, place, and names involved. In all cases official domination was obvious. This feature is further illustrated

by events in the Trengganu River basin which also experienced a multiplication of revenue farms like that which occurred in the Paka district previously mentioned. The export duty rights over certain commodities in the Trengganu River area were given to the Sultan's brother-in-law, Tengku Mohamed Yusof bin Sultan Mahmud Mustapha Shah, for the maintenance of his wife, Tengku Long binte Sultan Ahmad II, and himself. He collected revenue from the *pajak kecil* (minor export farm) which was known as the *pinang* (areca-nut) farm, since the principal item was areca nut. In 1900 Tengku Mohamed Yusof leased the farm to Tan Cheng Huat, and the chief item of duty was on *pinang kacit* at \$1.00 per pikul.<sup>49</sup> Four years later, in need of money, he issued a supplementary farm to Wi Cheng Hu of Kampung China for nine years. The main item of duty was 50 cents per pikul on *pinang kecil*.<sup>50</sup> The export duty on this particular article was subsequently raised to \$1.50. However, Wi Cheng Hu was the son-in-law of Tan Cheng Huat and manager of his interests; the two farms were therefore in the same hands. Problems arose when Tan Cheng Huat's lease expired in 1907 and the farm was transferred to Tuan Indut for six years, from 19 August 1907 to 15 June 1913.<sup>51</sup> Tuan Indut in turn transferred the farm to Mek Chai Hok, a Siamese woman trader.<sup>52</sup> At the end of 1907 there were two farmers with distinct rights to collect duties—an inconvenience for all parties, especially the payers of duties.

Additional complications arose when Tengku Mohamed Yusof died in 1907. With his death the Sultan transferred the right to collect the export duty to the Yang Dipertuan Muda as his own private perquisite. The latter allowed the two rival farmers to outbid each other for the farms which were to expire shortly, and after receiving money from both he then gave each of them separate leases promising to extend their rights. On 12 May 1911 he undertook to extend Mek Chai Hok's farm on the existing terms of \$1,500 per annum. She paid a sum of \$2,000 for his consideration. The following month her rival, Wi Cheng Hu, made a higher offer and paid \$3,000 for both the farms.<sup>53</sup> An agreement was signed between Wi Cheng Hu and the Yang Dipertuan Muda and the latter obviously intended to cancel the promise he had made earlier to Mek Chai Hok.<sup>54</sup> Proving to be an astute business woman, she then made a higher offer and was given both the farms. Although the documents showed that she paid \$3,000 per annum only, as her competitor had agreed to do, informed sources stated that she in

fact paid \$3,500 per annum. The Yang Dipertuan Muda then repudiated the agreement he had made with Wi Cheng Hu in June 1911 and, to cover up the new arrangement with Mek Chai Hok, he pre-dated her initial payment and obtained the royal seal through the Sultan's secretary, Haji Ngah Muhammad bin Haji Yusof, which gave it precedence over Wi Cheng Hu's agreement.<sup>55</sup>

This whole process of bargaining and counter-bargaining surfaced when See Teng See, a Singaporean Chinese trader who had lived in Trengganu for many years and had held a farm in Kemaman district, pressed his own claim. Apparently, he had financed Wi Cheng Hu who was his agent. He demanded his rights but his suit was rejected by the Sultan who suggested instead a return of the money at 12 per cent interest. See Teng See was adamant and maintained that he was a trader and not a money-lender. Numerous attempts were made to return the money with interest but they all failed to move him.<sup>56</sup> He persisted that he had a valid title and that, had his contract gone through, he would have made a tidy profit of between \$25,000 and \$30,000. Based on his estimates of profit he demanded compensation of \$20,000.<sup>57</sup> The Sultan was placed in an embarrassing situation and he offered to give See Teng See the farm after the present lease expired.<sup>58</sup> The episode of the pinang farm finally ended when See obtained the farm for two years from 2 July 1916 at \$2,900 per annum.<sup>59</sup>

The responsibility of the officials towards the revenue farm was limited. Once the farm was let and the money accepted, they considered their duty at an end and gave little or no assistance in enforcing the rights granted to the farmer.<sup>60</sup> On the other hand, they took every advantage of any failure on the part of the farmer to carry out his side of the agreement.<sup>61</sup> The lack of close supervision of the revenue farmer presented him with considerable opportunities to increase his profits by deceit. His cheating was sometimes exposed, but exposure was due more to the failure of the farmer to keep the officials sufficiently bribed than to the ability of the police to discover the fraud. The inability or the refusal of the farmer to meet the demands of officials often led to confiscation of property and, at times, to conviction.

In 1913 Towkay Tong won the monopoly of the kerosene farm for the whole state. By the agreement he had the right to sell kerosene at the price of \$2.50 per tin for three years. He paid a premium of \$4,000 and was also required to pay a monthly fee of \$1,000. In addition, he had to bear the cost of lighting the street

lamps and supplying 150 tins per month free of charge. One hundred and two of these tins were supplied to the Istana, twenty to the Yang Dipertuan Muda and the balance went to light the mosque, to the lighthouse and to selected recipients. The product was imported at a duty of 15 cents and Tong sublet the farm to various district agents.<sup>62</sup>

The profits he made in this way were substantial. He sold an average of 80 tins of kerosene of an inferior quality per day at a profit of between \$1.00 and \$1.50 per tin. Each of the tins should have weighed, if full, between 26½ and 27 *kati* (1 *kati* = 1½ lb.).<sup>63</sup> The farmer exploited the general public by opening every tin and removing part of the contents before re-soldering the tins. He managed to keep the eyes of the authorities shut by meeting their occasional monetary demands. In 1915, however, things came to a head when the government, in desperate need of finance, approached him for a loan of \$16,000. The sum was beyond his means and when he failed to meet the demand, the officials took the opportunity to seize his property, pretending that the swindle had just been discovered. There was, as is obvious in this case, a dubious relationship between the ruling class and the traders and when there was a breakdown in the mutual understanding the instruments of state were used to serve ruling class ends.<sup>64</sup>

Clearly the operations of the pajak system were crucial to the maintenance of the ruling class who controlled and gained from it. It did not always work smoothly as contending parties supported or opposed a particular farmer, but the system as such was universally accepted. The gaming farm offers an illustration of conflict between officials with vested interests who were bent on continuing the operations of the farm, and others who, for different reasons, wished to convict the farmer.

The Trengganu gaming farmer, Lim Bun Peng, was successful in winning the farm for a second time. He managed to outbid his rival, the Kelantan farmer. The farm was to be for two years for an annual payment of \$15,000 (he had previously held the farm at \$8,065 per annum). The main reason for that increase was the possibility of playing *Chap Ji Ki* as a lottery, as had been done in Johor, Kelantan, and elsewhere.<sup>65</sup>

The introduction of the lottery had disastrous effects. The lottery became very popular and there was an unusual rise in gambling fever among the Malay and Chinese communities in Kuala Trengganu. By November 1917—hardly seven months after the

renewal of the farm—there were visible signs of poverty, pawning of goods, pledging of children as debt-slaves, and an increase in crime.<sup>66</sup> It was common knowledge that some of the members of the State Council were habitual gamblers and supported the farmer. The method of reducing the odds against the officials was ingenious. The lottery had 12 numbers and the winning number paid 10 to 1. The Mentri would send his messenger to the farmer and ask, say, for 3 numbers. The latter, having rigged the game, would commonly give the winning number as one of the three. The officials, when the game was rigged, had a good chance of winning and the farmer was able to gain a useful ally by giving an undiscovered bribe.<sup>67</sup> In addition, there were the usual demands of other kinds when it was known that the farmer had a profitable contract. Loans, for example, might be taken by an official, and some of them were not recoverable as no written acknowledgement had been made.<sup>68</sup>

Under the protection of some officials, the farm continued operations despite the flagrant abuse of the terms of its contract, amongst which were the conditions that no Muslim was allowed to play and that the game was to be confined to the farm premises. Nightly, in fact, the scene was set for a crowd of between 100 and 200 Malays at Kampung China awaiting the results of the draw. A weak attempt was made by the State Secretary, the Tengku Bentara, who himself had an interest in the farm, to check the lottery operation but this was not followed up.

By February 1918 the local Chinese community and the Sultan had begun to feel the adverse effects of the game. The former suffered losses through the gambling of their womenfolk, the downturn in business and the increase in crime, and the latter found that the gambling of the younger members of the ruling class and the ladies of the Istana was expensive to him. Under the pressure of his financial difficulties, and acting on a petition from the Chinese community, the Sultan eventually decided to prosecute the farmer. His intention was to abolish the Chap Ji Ki as a lottery without reducing the high farm rent and without any claim to compensation by the farmer. Pressure was brought to bear on the Hakim to issue a decision along these lines, a fact which he later admitted. His judgment was given, he claimed, not independently but 'By order of government'.<sup>69</sup>

The State Council was far from unanimous in its approach to this decision and the gambling members maintained a judicious silence.

The Sultan's supporters, however, managed to persuade the Council to agree to convict the farmer for the violation of certain conditions of the contract and to penalize him by prohibiting the game in any form.<sup>70</sup> The case, of course, caught the attention of the town. Lampoons appeared between January and March 1918 implicating certain officials of high rank in the gaming farm, and another set of lampoons accused the Chinese merchants, who had earlier petitioned the Sultan, of making a joint collection for the purpose of bribing officials to secure the prosecution and conviction of the farmer.<sup>71</sup>

Caught in a web of intrigue, the farmer's once profitable venture was thus reduced to a valueless farm for which a high price had to be paid. He attempted to recover his losses by applying to the government for the return of \$3,000—the balance of the prepaid rent. The application was rejected and as a last resort he closed his farm but was then threatened with another criminal prosecution for breaking his contract. It was the British Agent in this case, who managed, through the Sultan, to secure the return of the farmer's advance, and tenders for a new farm were invited.<sup>72</sup>

Thus there existed an interdependence between the ruling class and the revenue farmer. On the one hand, the farm system provided the machinery for the collection of revenue for the former, and the trader was an easy source for loans, further exactions, and other favours. On the other hand, the system was a useful device through which a trader could make handsome profits. Statistics are difficult to obtain, but it is possible to gain some information which throws light on the subject.

In 1910, an export farm was issued for six years at a fixed annual rent. The farm covered such items as the export of fish and related produce. During that period the trade in fish was increasing substantially. In 1910 the value of that export to Singapore was registered at \$464,000 and in 1914 it had risen to \$781,000. The farmer and not the ruling class gained from the increase in trade as rents were fixed in advance.<sup>73</sup> There was a wide margin between the amount the farmer paid in rent and that which he collected in the form of duties, as can be shown roughly from revenue figures of the District Offices which gradually replaced the revenue farmers. The amount of the latter's profit is based on the assumption that the total sum of taxes he collected was the same as that collected by the District Offices and that there was little difference in the cost of operations of the two systems. Thus the Dungun revenue farmer

paid about \$141 per month but the District Officer who replaced the farmer collected \$1,286 per month. The same wide margin was recorded in the Paka River system where the District Officer collected \$8,000 per annum as against the farmer's rent of \$1,600 per annum and in Besut where the former collected \$2,363<sup>74</sup> per month as against the latter's rent of \$2,500 per annum. Besides profit obtained from taxes, the revenue farmers also gained huge amounts from monopoly farms which gave them the sole right to buy or sell a particular commodity. It was known that the revenue farmers who had a monopoly over jungle produce sold the produce on the open market and made a profit of between 100 and 200 per cent.<sup>75</sup> On the other hand, in 1916, the opium farmer who possessed the exclusive right to sell the product in the state paid rent amounting to \$33,600 while the government department in 1918 had net earnings of \$180,000. In short, the farm system converted the potential revenue of the state into profits for the farmers who paid rents to and did other favours for the ruling class members for the privilege.<sup>76</sup>

The ramifications of the *pajak* system in the economy of the state were extensive, and the changes in the details of the system reflected the changes in the economy as a whole. In addition to mining which was revived in the late nineteenth century and showed possibilities in the early decades of the twentieth century, the backbone of the economy was fishing and agriculture—the main occupations of the peasant-based society.<sup>77</sup> In the detailed breakdown of the trade between Trengganu and Singapore in terms of value for the years 1911–13, the figures show the importance of the state's peasant-based economy.

A glance at the schedule of the import and export revenue farms will convince the most sceptical of the extent of dependence of this farm system on the labour of the peasantry. As trade expanded more peasant produce was put on the market. Export duties were collected from a wide variety of commodities in the fishing industry, the mainstay of the peasant commodity economy, ranging from dried fish, *ikan bilis* (anchovies), and cuttle fish to belacan and pickled *kembong* fish. In addition, taxes were levied on agricultural produce such as pepper, gambier, and a variety of areca nuts such as *pinang kacit*, *pinang kusi lepong*, *pinang butir*, and *pinang merah* to name a few, on a wide range of jungle products, and on handicrafts and other peasant produce. With the exception of tin ore and pepper, all articles for export were produced and cultivated by Malays.<sup>78</sup>

TABLE 3  
Commodity Trade between Trengganu and Singapore,  
1911-1913

<i>Item</i>	<i>1911</i> ( <i>\$</i> )	<i>1912</i> ( <i>\$</i> )	<i>1913</i> ( <i>\$</i> )
1. Fish, dry and salted	577,986	571,718	673,396
2. Tin ore	457,086	485,201	403,594
3. Padi	265,403	198,295	221,991
4. Copra	225,708	240,380	315,981
5. Black pepper	160,351	93,382	157,752
6. Raw hides	20,948	31,685	29,523
7. Rattans	19,747	10,877	13,239
8. Damar torches	14,576	19,337	8,890
9. Coin and bullion	14,000	24,891	322
10. Areca nuts	13,866	—	5,024
11. Mats	10,058	—	19,484
12. Rice	9,011	—	—
13. Gambier	8,913	—	—
14. Curry ingredients	8,119	—	—
15. Borneo rubber	5,648	—	3,947
16. Wolfram ore	—	53,384	67,215
17. Sarung	—	—	11,942

Source: ART, 1913, draft, p. 4, in HCO 919/1914.

Note: Statistics on the exports of the Trengganu River system can be found in ART, 1911, draft, p. 1, in HCO 337/1913.

The pajak system placed considerable strain on the peasant economy. The greatest culprits were monopoly farms that gave the farm holder the right to buy specified produce at his own price. These farms forced the peasant to sell his produce at a low price which was often unprofitable to him.<sup>79</sup> The monopolistic buyers were often empowered to prosecute those who did not sell their produce at a price fixed by the former.<sup>80</sup> These farms restricted trade and in extreme cases its coercive mechanism forced the peasantry to give up cultivation.<sup>81</sup>

The profits of the farmer and the income of the ruling class came ultimately from the labour of the peasantry. All surplus produce from the peasant economy that went out of the state was taxed or



was the subject of forced sales to the tax collector. From the back of the peasant, so to speak, the farmer made substantial sums, while those assigned to particular districts were prepared to sit on the sidelines and collect rents from the farms. Details of the ruling-class earnings are difficult to obtain. It is known, however, that for the year 1912 Tengku Ngah Aishah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III earned from her district of Paka the sum of \$7,400 of which \$1,600 was derived from farm rents, \$3,000 from forest produce and other trade, \$2,000 from royalties on timber, and the balance from other sources. Tengku Long bin Tengku Ngah of Besut in that same year had an income of \$8,000, while Tengku Bentara of Setiu had only \$1,200, from pajak alone.<sup>82</sup>

While the pajak system was the most common method of tax collection, there were other state sources of income besides taxes on commodity trade from which members of the ruling class obtained their wealth. They had their hands on the pulse of the economy of the state and were quick to find new means of income by using their positions in the political system. The extension and proliferation of the old pajak system during the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin III was the first identifiable major response of that class towards the increased activity in the commodity trading sector of the state's economy. Its success as a lucrative source of income covered a period of about four decades beginning from the 1880s. However, in the late nineteenth century there were other signs that members of the ruling class were preparing to take advantage of the growing interest of outside capital in the state as they ventured into untapped areas of the changing economy. New state devices were created for them to profit from the investments of large business concerns in search of raw materials such as tin, wolfram, rubber, coconut, timber, and later, iron ore.

1. See H. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States of Trengganu and Kelantan', *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 1897, pp. 20-1; and H. Clifford, 'Life in the Malay Peninsula; As It Was and Is', *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, Vol. 30, 1898-9, pp. 384-5.

2. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States', pp. 15-16.

3. ART, 1913, draft, p. 2, in HCO 919/1914.

4. See for example Sharom Ahmat, 'The Structure of the Economy of Kedah, 1879-1905', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 43, Pt. 2, 1970, pp. 1-24; Wong Lin Ken, 'The Revenue Farms of Prince of Wales Island, 1805-1830', *Journal of the South Seas Society*, Vol. 19, 1965-6, pp. 56-127; and Carl A. Trocki, *Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs*

and the Development of Johor and Singapore, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1979, pp. 162-86.

5. A. P. Rubin, *The International Personality of the Malay Peninsula—A Study of International Law of Imperialism*, Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya Press, 1974, p. 188, fn. 19.

6. A. Hamilton, *A New Account of the East Indies*, Vol. 2, Edinburgh, 1727 (reprinted, London, The Argonaut Press, 1930), p. 83. Accounts written by eighteenth-century visitors to the state point to its importance as a trading centre on the peninsula. See Khoo Kay Kim, 'Kuala Trengganu: International Trading Centre', *MIH*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1974, pp. 16-30; and Shaharil Talib, 'Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Kuala Trengganu: A Historical Epoch of Unchanging Change', Workshop on 'Port States and State Ports in Southeast Asia', Department of History, University of Malaya, 1982, mimeo.

7. See SSR/3: Light to GG, 6 October 1787 (FWCP, 25 January 1788); SSR/3: Light to GG, 10 January 1788 (FWCP, 13 February 1788); and Mark S. Francis, 'Captain Joseph Jackson's Report on Trengganu, 1764', *Journal of the Historical Society University of Malaya*, Vol. 8, 1969-70, pp. 73-80.

8. SSR/3: Light to GG, 10 January 1788, encl. 4 (FWCP, 13 February 1788).

9. SSR/3: Light to GG, undated (FWCP, 6 February 1788).

10. See J. Dunmore, 'French Visitors to Trengganu in the Eighteenth Century', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 46, Pt. 1, 1973, pp. 145-59.

11. See *BP*, Vol. 2, Pt. 4, p. 147.

12. W. Medhurst, *Journal of a Tour through the Settlements on the Eastern Side of the Peninsula of Malacca*, Singapore, Mission Press, 1828, pp. 12-13.

13. For production estimates for the rest of Malaya see T. J. Newbold, *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca*, Vol. 2, London, John Murray, 1839 (reprinted, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 424-5. See also H. Malcolm, *Travels in South-Eastern Asia, embracing Hindustan, Malaya, Siam and China* ..., Vol. 2, Boston, Gould, Kendall and Lincoln, 1839, p. 105. Recent research points out that it was the east coast and not the west coast of Malaya that was the centre of mining. Until the mid-nineteenth century Trengganu was the most important tin-mining state (see Nicholas N. Dodge, 'Mineral Production on the East Coast of Malaya, in the Nineteenth Century', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 50, Pt. 2, 1977, p. 100).

14. Newbold, *op. cit.*, p. 60. See also Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir, Munshi, *Kisah Pelayaran Abdullah*, ed. Kassim Ahmad, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 50. For a more comprehensive list of Trengganu products exported in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries compiled from Chinese and Western sources see Jennifer W. Cushman and A. C. Milner, 'Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Chinese Accounts of the Malay Peninsula', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 52, Pt. 1, 1979, pp. 48-51.

15. G. W. Earl, *The Eastern Seas*, London, Wm. Hallen and Company, 1897 (reprinted, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 185.

16. For a comparison of trade figures for the east and west coast with Singapore between 1824 and 1846 see Wong Lin Ken, 'The Trade of Singapore, 1819-1869', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 33, Pt. 4, 1960, pp. 231-3.

17. ART, 1919, draft, p. 6, in HCO 1235/1920.

18. Haji Muhammad Saleh bin Haji Awang, *Sejarah Trengganu*, Kuala Trengganu, Mansor Printing Press, 1968, p. 56.

19. For a discussion of the expansion of the ruler's control over the districts see Chapter 2.

20. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States', pp. 15-17.

21. For trade figures between Trengganu and Singapore for the years 1910-14 see ART, 1914, draft, p. 7, in HCO 1021/1915. A more detailed breakdown of this trade between 1911 and 1913 can be found in ART, 1913, draft, p. 4, in HCO 919/1914.

22. For a detailed breakdown of this trade see ART, 1914, draft, pp. 7-8, in HCO 1021/1915. For a description of this junk trade see also CO 273/409: Young to CO, 3 February 1914, desp. 53, ff. 312-313.

23. See Chapter 2.

24. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States', pp. 15-16.

25. ART, 1913, draft, p. 2, in HCO 919/1914.

26. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States', p. 20.

27. See Chapter 2.

28. See ART, 1915, draft, pp. 22 and 37, in HCO 731/1916.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 15. For an account of the role played by indigenous traders in the traditional sea trade system of Trengganu reconstructed from oral histories see L. A. Peter Gosling, 'Contemporary Malay Traders in the Gulf of Thailand', in Karl L. Hutterer, ed., *Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast Asia: Perspectives from Prehistory, History and Ethnography*, Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia, No. 13, 1977, pp. 73-95.

30. CO 273/412: Young to CO, 8 October 1914, conf., f. 258.

31. HCO 923/1912: W. D. Scott to HCO, 5 July 1912, conf. Many traders were known to have held handwritten guarantees for farms which were to be granted when the current farms expired. See ART, 1914, draft, p. 3, in HCO 1021/1915.

32. HCO 337/1913: W. D. Scott to HCO, 25 February 1913.

33. ART, 1914, draft, pp. 2-3, in HCO 1021/1915.

34. HCO 999/1918: Report on Chop Ji Ki in Trengganu, 1917-1918, by J. L. Humphreys, undated.

35. ART, 1914, draft, p. 3, in HCO 1021/1915.

36. See pp. 238-40.

37. ART, 1915, draft, p. 15, in HCO 731/1916.

38. In May 1919 the two Chinese farmers sued Tengku Ngah Omar for the sum they had paid to him in 1903. For an account of the case proceedings see MBGM 72/1337.

39. In practice this requirement was not enforced. There were in existence many farms of which the Sultan had no knowledge (HCO 923/1912: W. D. Scott to HCO, 5 July 1912).

40. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States', p. 15.

41. Encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenues, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 123.

42. See M. C. ff. Sheppard, 'A Short History of Trengganu', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 22, Pt. 3, 1949, pp. 45-6. Later in the 1910s the Trengganu gaming farmer, too, had similar rights. The *pitis yokob*, which was half lead and half tin, was valued at 2½ cents. It was reported that there was at least \$6,000 worth of this coin in circulation (ART, 1913, draft, p. 1, in HCO 919/1914). For an account of coins in Trengganu see J. A. S. Bucknill, 'Observations upon Some Coins Obtained in Malaya and particu-

larly from Trengganu, Kelantan and Southern Siam', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 1, Pt. 1, April 1923, pp. 194-216.

43. CO 273/399: Young to CO, 25 June 1913, desp. 317, f. 480.

44. HCO 1325/1913: Lim Kim Bee to HCO, 23 September 1913. At around this time Tengku Abdullah was deeply in debt. He owed, for example, a firm the sum of \$2,000 for diamonds and was neither able to pay the price nor return the articles as they were no longer in his hands (see minute, E. A. Dickson, 16 November 1913, on HCO 1325/1913).

45. The money was finally repaid a year later by the Sultan who advanced the sum to Tengku Abdullah (see CO 273/410: Young to CO, 20 April 1914, desp. 195, f. 365; and HCO 1325/1913: E. A. Dickson to HCO, 4 March 1914). For other examples see notes made by H. Gild in MBGM 9/1333.

46. See ART, 1913, draft, p. 12, in HCO 919/1914; and enclosures in HCO 1092/1916. This file also contains a copy of the original farm deed issued to Awang Chenik dated 14 September 1911. The agreement sets out the terms of the contract, the items that could be taxed under the farm, and the amount of tax that could be imposed. There are a few such farm contracts in the files. For an example see Appendix 4, p. 236.

47. HCO 1092/1916: J. L. Humphreys to HCO, 1 June 1916, and enclosures 3A and 4A in this file.

48. HCO 1325/1913: E. A. Dickson to HCO, 4 March 1914, and minute of E. A. Dickson on this file dated 16 November 1913.

49. Encl. 3, Memorandum by C. N. Maxwell, 16 October 1915, in HCO 1371/1915, and Memorandum by J. L. Humphreys, 19 March 1916, in this file.

50. For a copy of this farm deed see encl. A, Memorandum by J. L. Humphreys, 19 March 1916, in HCO 1371/1915.

51. Tuan Indut was to pay Tengku Mohamed Yusof the sum of \$1,000 per annum. For a copy of the deed see encl. B, *ibid*.

52. HCO 1747/1913: Memorandum by E. A. Dickson, 16 November 1913.

53. HCO 1371/1915: Memorandum by J. L. Humphreys, 19 March 1916.

54. By this agreement Wi Cheng Hu was to pay the Yang Dipertuan Muda the sum of \$9,000 for the three years. He paid security money amounting to \$3,000. A copy of the farm deed can be found in HCO 1747/1913.

55. HCO 1371/1915: Memorandum by J. L. Humphreys, 19 March 1916.

56. HCO 1747/1913: Memorandum by E. A. Dickson, 16 November 1913.

57. HCO 1747/1913: Messrs Battenberg and Chopard to HCO, 25 February 1914.

58. HCO 1747/1913: Sultan Zainal Abidin III to HCO, 24 April 1914.

59. A copy of this farm deed dated 15 June 1916 can be found in SUK 300/1334.

60. See for example MBGM 9/1333: Notes made by H. Gild between 8 October and 17 December 1914.

61. HCO 1747/1913: Memorandum by E. A. Dickson, 16 November 1913.

62. ART, 1913, draft, p. 3, in HCO 919/1914.

63. CO 273/399: Young to CO, 4 June 1913, desp. 284, f. 302.

64. The handling of the opium farm is another example of the authorities using their power to cripple the farmer. See HCO 1264/1913: E. A. Dickson to HCO, 1 September 1913; and CO 273/400: Young to CO, 19 September 1913, desp. 467, ff. 278-280.

65. See HCO 999/1918: Report on Chop Ji Ki in Trengganu, 1917-1918, by J. L.

Humphreys, undated. For an idea of how the game was played in the Straits Settlements see G. T. Hare, 'The Game of Chap Ji Ki', *JSBRAS*, No. 31, July 1898, pp. 63-71.

66. HCO 999/1918: Report on Chop Ji Ki in Trengganu, 1917-1918, by J. L. Humphreys, undated.

67. CO 273/472: Young to CO, 11 April 1918, desp. 115, f. 29.

68. Some very high-ranking officials had taken loans from the farmer. Amongst them were the State Secretary, Commissioner of Lands, Mentri Besar, and Commissioner of Police. A list of both written and unwritten acknowledgements of loans is available in encl. 3 in HCO 999/1918.

69. HCO 999/1918: Report on Chop Ji Ki in Trengganu, 1917-1918, by J. L. Humphreys, undated.

70. Encl. 3, Supreme Court, Trengganu: Decision in criminal case No. 38, 9 April 1918, in HCO 999/1918.

71. Extracts of these lampoons implicating some senior officials are available in the files (encl. 5 in HCO 999/1918).

72. HCO 999/1918: Report on Chop Ji Ki in Trengganu, 1917-1918, by J. L. Humphreys, undated.

73. ART, 1914, draft, p. 17, in HCO 1021/1915.

74. ART, 1916, draft, paragraphs 11 and 12, in HCO 333/1917.

75. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States', p. 20. See also ART, 1913, draft, p. 2, in HCO 919/1914.

76. ART, 1918, p. 2, in HCO 824/1919.

77. See CO 273/188: Smith to CO, 25 July 1893, desp. 230, f. 597; and ART, 1911, draft, p. 2, in HCO 337/1913.

78. See Appendix 4, p. 236, and Appendix 5, p. 237. Similar rights were said to have existed in the other river systems (ART, 1914, draft, p. 9, in HCO 1021/1915).

79. ART, 1913, draft, p. 2, in HCO 919/1914. See also ART, 1915, draft, p. 8, in HCO 731/1916, which has an account of the monopoly in the Paka district.

80. CO 273/409: Young to CO, 16 February 1914, desp. 76, f. 393.

81. See CO 273/446: Young to CO, 13 July 1916, desp. 235, f. 40; CO 273/486: Young to CO, 20 January 1919, desp. 17, f. 81; and ART, 1918, p. 2, in HCO 824/1919.

82. Encl. 6, 11, and 12 in MBO 303/1336.



*Pitis Trengganu*

## *The Concession System*

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As with expanding commodity trade, which was taxed or turned into monopolies, the newly developing commercial agriculture and mining sectors were also milked for the benefit of the ruling class. In these major forms of economic activity, as in others, the political system was used by the ruling class as an instrument to give it control over resources, and in the late nineteenth century there were significant changes in the modes of control. These politically powerful ruling class capitalists developed the concession system in the period 1889–1910 as a means of profiting from the growth of production capital in the burgeoning plantation and mining sectors, and it became in the 1910s their most efficient instrument for maximizing their income.

Prior to the late nineteenth century, commercial agriculture and mining had been dominated by the Royal Family and the other elements in the ruling class who were closely associated with the development of these sectors of the state's economy at the level of usury and merchant capital. Successive rulers merely issued a *titah* (royal command) to their followers to develop an area which had mineral potential or to plant crops, such as gambier and pepper, which had commercial value. Such undertakings did not form the mainstay of economic activities in a state dominated by subsistence agriculture and fishing, but they contributed a substantial amount to the private income of the ruler and those whom he patronized.

The early nineteenth-century rulers profited immensely from mining in the state. During the reign of Baginda Omar, Trengganu was the leading exporter of tin on the east coast. He opened the tin mines of Bundi and Sungai Ayam in Kemaman district after appointing Burok bin Khatib Ismail, who had some knowledge of mining, as chief of that district. Burok and a Chinese headman, Tan Ah Pok, worked the mines and the capital was supplied by the ruler, who kept the profits to himself.<sup>1</sup> The tin was sold through Chinese middlemen, an arrangement that presented its own difficulties as the Sultan occasionally complained that he had been swindled by them.<sup>2</sup>

Similar methods of control were exercised over commercial agriculture in the period of merchant capital injection. Besides taxes and monopolies, the ruler and other members of the ruling class invested in agricultural produce with an eye to the commercial market. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the state had a reputation as a pepper-producing country.<sup>3</sup> In the early years of his reign, Sultan Zainal Abidin III ordered the Datuk Mata-Mata, the district chief of Kemasik, to open pepper plantations in that district.<sup>4</sup> They both invested capital in the development of the industry though the Datuk Mata-Mata never got his share of the profits from the Sultan.<sup>5</sup>

The common method used by the early rulers in mining and commercial agricultural investment was to issue a titah to the district chief who was responsible for looking after the interests of the ruler in his district and was usually given a small portion of the profits. This system was used more effectively in the nineteenth century after the subjugation of local-born district chiefs and their replacement by appointed officials sent from Kuala Trengganu.<sup>6</sup> However, this arrangement, through the royal command, between the ruler and the district chief, or the ruler and others, changed in the late nineteenth century. During his reign, Sultan Zainal Abidin III issued concession documents to other members of the ruling class besides the district chiefs, which cut across the latter's traditional spheres of revenue and influence. This change of state instruments marked the accommodation of the ruling class towards production capital whose presence began to be felt with the entry of large-scale plantation and mining concerns into the state.

The first such concession that can be traced in the records was issued by Sultan Zainal Abidin III on 30 July 1889 to his brother-in-law, Tengku Mohamed Yusof bin Sultan Mahmud Mustapha Shah of Riau-Lingga, and his wife, Tengku Long binte Sultan Ahmad II,<sup>7</sup> and it offers a clear example of the changing process. Tengku Mohamed Yusof and his wife were given mining and planting rights over Tebak in Kemaman. The document that gave them these rights was vague as compared with later concession deeds but evidently the concessionaires were given full powers to do as they pleased in the area. The concession was limited to the duration of the holders' lifetime.

For the next five years Tengku Mohamed Yusof tried to interest Chong Ah Kit, the Jurubahasa of Kemaman, to work the concession on a lease basis. Finally on 10 August 1894 he concluded

an agreement by which Chong Ah Kit was to hold certain rights over the concession for twenty-five years on condition that he paid the concession holders a 10 per cent royalty on minerals and agricultural produce. However, the lessee lacked the capital and experience to operate the concession on his own. He therefore acted as a broker, and tried, unsuccessfully, to interest Loke Yew, a well-known Chinese investor from Kuala Lumpur.

Four years after the abortive attempt to interest Loke Yew, hopes were raised again and a promissory note was signed on 29 July 1898 by which Chong Ah Kit was to pay Tengku Mohamed Yusof and his wife the sum of \$5,000 when a company was formed.<sup>8</sup> The earlier weakness of a poorly worded agreement was corrected when on 5 August 1898 Chong secured a much more precisely framed concession deed endorsed with the royal seal and Tengku Mohamed Yusof's signature.<sup>9</sup> However, failure was once again to confront Chong Ah Kit. He could not get developers to operate the concession and on 8 June 1905 he made yet another agreement which extended the deadline for the commencement of the undertaking by another five years.<sup>10</sup>

Chong Ah Kit was more fortunate the third time. This time he managed to interest Chew Woon Poh of Singapore, whose family had established trading relationships with Trengganu,<sup>11</sup> and who agreed to form a company with the help of other businessmen. By the new agreement the company was to pay half of the royalties to the government of Trengganu and the other half to Tengku Mohamed Yusof. Before serious operations could begin, however, Tengku Mohamed Yusof died in 1907 and his wife's death followed shortly afterwards. They had, by this time, been edged out of the concession by Sultan Zainal Abidin III who had in 1906 reissued the Tebak concession to the Yang Dipertuan Muda, and they never did receive any royalties from the company nor did they receive the sum of \$5,000 as promised. The money was instead paid to the Sultan.<sup>12</sup>

The Tebak concession of 30 July 1889 marked the break from the former method of opening mining and commercial agricultural land through district chiefs. The concession deed became the new instrument which empowered the concessionaire to mine or to plant commercial crops, and this first example represented a watershed in the development of devices used to open such lands. From that point on, the former methods became increasingly less important although they were to linger on for a considerable time. The Tebak



concession was followed by a flood of concessions issued by the Sultan, and for the next two decades there was an unbridled scramble to obtain such grants from the ruler.

Subsequent concession deeds showed a vast improvement over the poorly worded Tebak concession. The second concession to be issued, the Bundi concession in Kemaman district which was dated 3 September 1889 and issued to Chiah Ah Cham, became the standard outline on which all other concession agreements were framed, with only slight variations in the clauses.<sup>13</sup> The Bundi concession was essentially a mining and planting lease for sixty years with conditions attached. The clauses of the concession deed defined the government's, concession holder's, and lessee's rights. There was a working clause which required the lessee to develop the area within the next five years, failing which his rights were to be cancelled. The labour clause in this particular deed did not define in detail the conditions that were to govern terms of employment. It simply laid down that there must be a sufficient labour force to develop the area and that 20 to 30 coolies were considered insufficient. Chiah Ah Cham was given a free hand to import labour and he could also use local labour within the confines of the concession. The government insisted that only the local currency was to be used for the payment of salaries and that any disputes within the concession were to come under the jurisdiction of the Sultan. For development purposes certain import duties were waived. Thus, all materials required for machinery, buildings, and labour were exempted from duty. The import of opium, an essential commodity for the labour force, was permitted at a fixed tax of \$120 per chest. These rights as embodied in the deed covered a concession area of about 20,000 acres. Despite the extensive size, there were conditions designed to protect the local peasant. The lessee had to respect all currently occupied land. All exports from the concession were subject to a 10 per cent royalty which was payable once every five months. Finally, the deed also stated that any conditions not covered by the terms of the concession were to be controlled by state regulations.<sup>14</sup>

The rate of development of government institutions to control mining and commercial agriculture did not keep abreast of the rate at which concessions were issued. Broadly speaking, two distinct phases and two distinct types of concession may be identified. With the notable exception of the very first concession—issued, as seen earlier, to Tengku Mohamed Yusof—the first phase, beginning in 1889, was one in which concessions were issued by the ruler to non-

ruling class elements: to investors from outside Trengganu and to local Chinese investors.<sup>15</sup> These concessions were basically mining and agricultural leases, modelled on the Bundi concession, with a specific duration attached to them ranging from 30 to 99 years. In the second phase, which dominated the first decade of the twentieth century, concessions were issued primarily to members of the ruling class.<sup>16</sup> They were similar to the earlier concessions in form and, for the most part, in substance, but some of them differed significantly in one important respect—concessions granted to members of the Kerabat Diraja, were granted in perpetuity. Once the concession was issued the property could not revert back to the state, but was to remain as the estate of the concession holder and his heirs. Such concessions were referred to as *cap zuriat*. Normally, these Kerabat Diraja concessions overlapped areas previously granted, and the former non-ruling class concession holders were forced to make new arrangements with the new owners. Their former leases were cancelled or surrendered to the Sultan and new leases were made.

Prior to 1910—the date of the conclusion of a treaty agreement with Britain<sup>17</sup>—Sultan Zainal Abidin III had a free hand in the distribution of concessions, and there appeared a host of concession hunters, both local and from outside, seeking their fortunes. Most of these early concessions went undetected by the Singapore authorities which made it their business to keep a watchful eye on the Malay states bordering the Federated Malay States. However, a few were noticed and were a source of alarm to the High Commissioner, Sir Frank Swettenham, who was particularly concerned that no foreign power should get a foothold on the east coast Malay states to the north of Pahang.<sup>18</sup>

In the company of the many speculators and brokers, some of whom caused obvious discomfort to the Singapore authorities, there were a few *bona fide* investors. The biggest European companies to seek opportunities in Trengganu were Messrs Guthrie and Company and the East Asiatic Company. The former had by 1909 obtained three separate sixty-year leases made out initially to Chiah Ah Cham (1889), Tham Kay Chong (1896), and J. Anderson (1904).<sup>19</sup> Guthrie's had first shown an interest in the state as early as 1894 when one of its representatives met the Sultan and was assured by him that all investors would be protected. By 1904 they had paid large sums of money both to the existing concession holders and to the Sultan for the leases.<sup>20</sup> The East Asiatic Company, a Danish concern, was even more firmly established. The company had a

virtual monopoly of the east coast trade in cargo and passengers and was reputed to be wealthy and to have strong connections with the Siamese and Danish Royal Families.<sup>21</sup> Unlike Guthrie and Company which had its headquarters in Singapore, the East Asiatic Company was based in Bangkok, and was involved closely with the extension of the Siamese presence in Kelantan.<sup>22</sup> In Trengganu it was an early European pioneer in the plantation sector. It advanced substantial loans to the Sultan and other officials and had been prepared to spend a considerable sum obtaining agricultural leases in Kretai district in about 1908.<sup>23</sup>

The working of the Bundi and Sungai Ayam tin mines by Guthrie and Company and the opening of a large coconut estate in Kretai district by the East Asiatic Company were part of a general process of penetration by forces of production capital into Trengganu.<sup>24</sup> These individual investors and companies were the forerunners of the economic expansion that foreshadowed the extension of formal political control over the area by Britain. The development of commercial agriculture and mining on the basis of foreign capital also attracted local traders who usually relied on capital from Singapore to finance their projects. These non-ruling class elements belonged to the first phase of concession granting.<sup>25</sup>

The main sources of income to the Sultan and the officials from these early concessions were royalties amounting to 5 per cent on minerals and jungle produce, 2½ per cent on agricultural produce, and 1 per cent on *getah* (rubber), sago, and cotton. However, the possible expansion of the plantation and mining economy was closely watched by the ruling class. Their imagination was fired by the investment of capital in the opening of the Bundi and Sungai Ayam mines, the development of the Kretai plantations, and the general rush for concessions by those who were prepared to pay for them. The possibilities of foreign capital and expertise coming into the state were clearly recognized. Against this background of general expectations, the ruling class introduced major changes in the concession system which made its members the main concession holders and effectively forced those with capital to lease mining and planting rights from them. Under the new arrangement—the second stage of the concession system—investors usually dealt with the ruling class concessionaire rather than, as before, directly with the Sultan. By this method these politically oriented capitalists managed to graft themselves on to the back of accelerated economic growth.

In the brief period of four years, from 1906 to 1910, over twenty concessions were issued to members of the ruling class: fifteen to members of the Kerabat Diraja—the immediate family of the Sultan—and the rest to members of the Kerabat Am. Only one went to a Japanese physician named Dr Kondo, who was the royal court medical attendant.<sup>26</sup> The earlier Tebak and Sungai Mengkuang leases in which Chong Ah Kit and Chew Soon Hi, the father of Chew Woon Poh, had shown an interest,<sup>27</sup> were reissued on 26 February 1906 by the Sultan to his children—the Yang Dipertuan Muda and Tengku Besar Hapsah respectively. On the same day he also issued three concessions to his daughters. Tengku Nik Maimunah and her husband, Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim, were given two concessions—Chenderong and Sungai Cherol—in Kemaman district, while Tengku Wok Aminah obtained the Ulu Cherol concession in the same district. These concessions were followed a year later, on 18 February 1907, by two others—the Jabor concession in Kemaman, issued to the ruler's son, Tengku Sulaiman, and the Chemuak concession in Dungun district issued to the ruler's sister, Tengku Khadijah, and her husband, Tengku Abu Bakar bin Tengku Abdul Jalil.<sup>28</sup> This couple had previously held the Chemuak concession on a forty-year mining lease and had subleased their rights to a Singaporean trader, Lim Chuan Chian.<sup>29</sup> These seven grants launched the ruling class into the concession business—a venture that gave them royalties, premiums, ground rents, and occasionally, partnerships in companies.<sup>30</sup>

By 1910 the concessions possessed by the ruling class embraced an extensive part of the state's undeveloped mining and commercial agricultural land. These *cap zuriat* were formulated as a device, on the eve of the appointment of the first British Agent, to ensure that members of the Kerabat Diraja would have an independent source of income. The nature of the text of the documents granting the concessions brought the state into line, in the matter of land-ownership, with the other Malay states under British rule. The Singapore legal firm of Messrs Loughborough, Gedge, Nisbet and Drew had high praise for the local draftsmen who prepared the documents. The company expressed the view that the draftsmen ... appeared to have practically embodied everything which would protect the state against any claims by the lessees, other than a claim to develop the land, and ... a clause has been inserted that the company is not to exercise its rights in a playing manner, [which] ... gives the government all the rights

which it could enforce under the strictest clause, in any form of agreement which its legal advisers saw fit to adopt.<sup>31</sup>

Although the concession deeds embodied clauses defining the relationships between all parties, the actual working of the system favoured the concessionaires who used their political position to enforce their demands. The case of Lim Chuan Chian underlines the difficulties faced by the early investors. In 1905 he had obtained a mining and agricultural lease from Tengku Abu Bakar, the district chief of Dungun.<sup>32</sup> He paid a total of \$18,000 to the ruler and the chief as premium for their consideration. After two years, in 1907, Tengku Abu Bakar's lease rights were superseded by a concession in perpetuity made out to him.<sup>33</sup> In the meantime Lim Chuan Chian had formed a company and had begun mining wolfram and tin. Problems between the two parties soon emerged after the miner appealed to the Sultan to cancel, for the next five years, his required payment of export duties in order to help the company in its early stages. However, this request for tax exemption ran contrary to the interests of the district chief who had paid in advance to the Sultan \$1,500 for the export farm in Dungun. The threat presented by Lim Chuan Chian's request was met by some strong-arm tactics. Tengku Abu Bakar caused delays in shipping inspection and sent his retainers to the mines to cause what obstruction they could, by non-violent methods, to the mining operations. The relationship reached its lowest ebb when the miner's right to extract wolfram was challenged. Tengku Abu Bakar argued that the lease stated that Lim Chuan Chian could mine tin and not all minerals. With the threat of cancellation over his head, the miner made counter-allegations and attempted to show that the district official's share in the enterprise was limited to two shares and not four as was commonly believed.<sup>34</sup> There existed in the Dungun concession an air of uncertainty, as there was also in other concessions. The ruling class owner, as in other economic sectors, was in a stronger position than was the lessee. The situation grew more complex with the presence of the British Agent who was appointed, in part, as an honest broker between the two parties.<sup>35</sup>

In examining the details of the move by the ruling class into the concession business, one is struck by the sharp distinction between those titles held by the Kerabat Diraja and those held by members of the Kerabat Am or by others outside the ruling class. The former were owners of their rights in perpetuity while the rest were mere leaseholders. Unlike the grants to leaseholders, there was no clause

in the cap zuriat which required their holders to begin mining or plantation operations within a fixed time limit. The major involvement of the ruling class in the mining and plantation economy was designed to benefit the Kerabat Diraja element—the Ruling House itself—in the first instance, and only to a lesser extent the Kerabat Am members. The concession held by royalty covered carefully selected areas which had proven to be, or were believed to be, rich in mineral deposits. They covered approximately one-fifth of the total area of the state and contained more than three-quarters of the mining fields known at that time.<sup>36</sup> These concessions completely surrounded the rich Bundi grant and from there they extended in an unbroken line from the Pahang boundary to the Dungun River.<sup>37</sup> The aristocrats and the others who managed to obtain concessions directly from the Sultan,<sup>38</sup> especially after 1906, were left with the crumbs, as it were, since royalty had selected the most valuable land.

Members of the Royal Family did not have the capacity to develop their newly acquired properties on their own. This inability led to an abundance of brokers, option hunters, and concession seekers who were prepared to lease the concessions. Under the deeds held by the royalty they were required to pay neither premium nor ground rent to the state. The state fixed the export duties in these cap zuriat at a standard rate of 5 per cent on minerals and jungle produce, 2½ per cent on plantation produce, and 1 per cent on getah, sago, and cotton. In leasing their concessions, members of the Royal House ensured that the lessee would pay the state his share of the export duty and in addition would pay the lessors the same amount. The lessee was therefore double-taxed. In the case of import duties the lessee enjoyed the privileges given to the concession holder. He was exempted from paying duties on materials used for machinery, buildings, and labour. The rest of the items brought into the state were subject to tax based on the current rates, with the exception of opium on which duty was fixed at \$120 per chest.<sup>39</sup> In addition, the Kerabat Diraja obtained cash premiums and ground rents from the lessee.

Most of the pre-1906 leases issued by the Sultan to non-ruling class members, with the exception of those issued to Chiah Ah Cham, Tham Kay Chong, Ong Kay Joo, and J. Anderson, were revoked and new leases were signed with the Sultan according to the new terms.<sup>40</sup> Clearly the groundwork was being laid for the '... cultivated enrichment of a single family'.<sup>41</sup>



### 3. Cap Zuriat

Source: CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 13 May 1925, desp. 37, f. 203.

One section of the ruling class was missing in both the *cap kurnia* and the concession onslaught—the traditional Ulama families.<sup>42</sup> Their absence—whether deliberate on their part or on the part of the giver of such deeds—highlights the thorny question of land-ownership. The central issue was whether the Sultan, as the head of the Malay state, could issue grants, purporting to be gifts of personal property, because he was theoretically the owner of all soil. The Mufti and Haji Wan Sulaiman, the Sultan's two legal experts, admitted much later that the ruler had serious reservations about his power. Sultan Zainal Abidin III, they said, '... yielded only to the demands of his family with reluctance'.<sup>43</sup> Religious opinion did not dispute the challenge of the later British Advisers that the Sultan, in issuing such grants, had violated accepted property-ownership rights based on tradition. However, there is no evidence, except the absence of the Ulama in the rush for *cap kurnia* and concessions, to suggest that Ulama resisted the issuing of such grants by their ruler. Sultan Zainal Abidin III, for his part, overcame his religious scruples and came down in favour of his theoretical rights as a Malay ruler. The wording of the title deeds betrayed his spiritual discomfort as he gave way to material demands. J. L. Humphreys, the British Adviser, commented:

The repeated emphasis (very marked in the Malay original) of the expressions 'absolute property': 'valid and final gift and delivery': 'the full and perfect rights of ownership of any owner of property' suggests an uneasiness regarding the validity of these gifts, and a desire to remedy any weakness of the title by the strong language of its conveyance.<sup>44</sup>

The introduction of the concessions and the subsequent control by the ruling class of the lands granted, was the second response of that class to the changing economic situation in the state. The concession system was its most effective instrument, and it gave members of that class direct participation in the development of the plantation and mining economy. Sultan Zainal Abidin III was instrumental in triggering this unprecedented land grabbing when on a single day—26 February 1906—he issued five *cap zuriat* to his children covering an area of approximately 326,600 acres.<sup>45</sup> He could in theory have handed over the whole state in a single day as was proposed in 1901 by Bailey, an ex-manager of Punjam Gold Mining Company in Pahang, who offered him American protection in exchange.<sup>46</sup> However, in the years between 1906 and 1910, the Sultan, after considerable calculation, parcelled out another ten *cap*



zuriat to members of the Ruling Family and twelve leases to other members of the ruling class.<sup>47</sup>

For a brief period—in effect from 1910 to 1922—in spite of harassment by British officials, the ruling class used the concession system to capitalize on the penetration of production capital in the plantation and mining economy, and to draw additional private income from the changing economic situation. Income from concessions during this period outstripped other sources. Profits under the concession system were drawn rather more from mining than from commercial agriculture. The latter by its very nature was slow to grow and the industry did not gain sufficient momentum to alter the state's basic economic framework of subsistence agriculture. Although attempts were made to establish rubber plantations, these were too late to benefit from the rubber boom that had such an important effect for the FMS in the first decade of the century. The state in 1914 exported only 44 pikul of plantation rubber. There was a mere handful of rubber estates in this period and none of them had reached the production stage.<sup>48</sup> These estates could not compare with the big plantations of the FMS and Johor. Even by 1926 there were only two really big plantations, producing 34 per cent of the total rubber exports from the state.<sup>49</sup> The bulk of the rubber production came from smallholdings. In 1932 it was estimated that of the 260,000 acres under agricultural cultivation, only 48,050 acres were alienated for rubber of which 30,000 acres were under cultivation.<sup>50</sup> More success was achieved in developing the traditional coconut cultivation on a plantation scale. From the very beginning in the 1910s, there were several coconut plantations employing a mixed work-force of Chinese and Malays. These estates were located in the river systems of Kemaman, Kemasik, Kretai, Paka, and Trengganu.<sup>51</sup>

The mining industry, by contrast, continued to expand after 1910. In 1908 the value of tin exports to Singapore amounted to \$222,000 and the following year it rose to \$270,000.<sup>52</sup> By 1919 the mining sector contributed half of the total state revenue of \$762,455.<sup>53</sup> The expansion was shortlived, however, and by the end of 1920 the industry suffered a slump, similar to that experienced in other parts of Malaya.<sup>54</sup> This ended the first phase. Interest in the industry was to revive after 1927 but still with meagre results. Between 1927 and 1937 the state was subject to intensive prospecting by agents of powerful mining groups but they found little worth exploiting.<sup>55</sup> The decline of both the mining and commercial

agriculture sectors in the economy was reflected in the revenue figures for the state. In 1931 these sectors provided less than 9 per cent of the total state revenue.<sup>56</sup> The money that had flowed into the pockets of individual concession holders had come in the heady days of investment during the first decade of British presence in the state. In the second stage of investment, especially in the mining industry, colonial forms of control had managed to break the back of the concession system.

The principal obstacles standing between members of the ruling class and their income from concessions were the successive British Agents—the first of whom, W. L. Conlay, arrived in 1909. These officers opposed the efforts of the ruling class to exploit the inflow of foreign capital and expertise in the plantation and mining economy. Their constant scrutiny was a source of continuing irritation to those in power. On the other hand the establishment of the British Agency system also had its advantages. It brought in its train a host of other investors who were confident that their investment would be protected by British authorities.<sup>57</sup> The first decade or so of the British presence in the state was thus a period of rapid economic development set against the background of the conflicting interests of the ruling class members and the British officials, each of whom had their own definite ideas about where revenue derived from the private sector should go. The former clung to their late nineteenth-century initiative which had provided them with individual sources of income under the concession system, while the latter insisted on a central treasury into which all revenue should be centralized on a rational budget basis of revenue and expenditure.

In the first two years of the British presence broad procedures were introduced which seriously impaired the Sultan's right to issue concessions. Under treaty obligations imposed in 1910 the ruler agreed not to alienate more than 500 acres of mining land and 3,000 acres of agricultural land to foreigners without the High Commissioner's approval.<sup>58</sup> In the proceeding discussions held with the High Commissioner, Sir John Anderson, the Sultan had managed to secure for himself the right to alienate land to his own people beyond the area laid down for alienation to foreigners by the treaty, on the condition that such grants should contain a clause rendering them non-transferable except with the joint approval of the Sultan and the High Commissioner.<sup>59</sup> The concession holder therefore could not transfer his rights without the necessary approval.

Further controls over the operations of the concession system were introduced by Conlay, who in 1910 formulated guide-lines for the detailed conditions which might be imposed when parts of concessions were leased to foreigners. The Conlay Report became the corner-stone on which British policy towards the concessions was henceforth based. It recommended to the High Commissioner:

- a. That no special opium or other farm privileges should be conferred.
- b. That no magisterial powers should be granted.
- c. That export and other duties should be payable at the rates for the time in force, instead of at determined rates.
- d. That the duration of all concessions of indefinite area should not exceed ten years, at the expiration of which a fixed mining area, and a planting area bearing a fixed relation to the area actually under cultivation may be granted for 99 years, the remainder of the concession to revert to the government.
- e. That provision should be made for the determination of boundaries as well as for the payment of cost of survey, and that land rent should be reserved on the areas selected at the expiration of the concession period of ten years at the rates for the time being in force.
- f. That concessions should be limited to areas not exceeding a fixed number of square miles which was yet to be determined.
- g. That a mining labour clause and an agricultural cultivation clause should be embodied in concessions both for the concession period and the subsequent grant.<sup>60</sup>

The High Commissioner failed in his attempt to persuade the Sultan to embody these proposals in a decree, but they were used nevertheless as a means of checking those concession hunters who tried to secure concessions for the sole purpose of selling them as quickly as possible. The High Commissioner's expressed policy was to treat all bona fide companies liberally but he had no sympathy for companies that wanted to obtain a concession, work merely a portion of it, and float the remainder to subsidiary companies.<sup>61</sup> The thrust of British policy in the next decade was in the direction of exercising greater control over those concessions that had been issued to non-Trengganu subjects.

Generally, most of the concessions issued directly to foreigners, aristocrats, and court favourites by the Sultan were not developed in spite of the increased activity in the plantation and mining sectors in the 1910s. As will be seen, it was in concessions granted to royalty that most of such development took place. Its members,

more than any other social element of the ruling class, profited from production capital. As for the remainder of the concessions it can be safely assumed that non-royal concession holders took no real interest in their holdings after obtaining their leases from the ruler, or failed to raise the necessary capital and expertise, or found that initial investment failed to yield a satisfactory return. The proportion of unworked concessions was higher in the case of those held by aristocrats and court favourites than in the case of those held by foreigners. However, even those who did seek to develop their concessions had to confront, on the one hand, British officials who were determined to exercise greater control over their leases and, on the other, Trengganu officials who were always prepared to use state instruments to make as much money for themselves as possible.

One of the biggest foreign concerns was Guthrie and Company which by 1910 had acquired the Bundi, Sungai Ayam, and Sungai Sendok concessions.<sup>62</sup> The company was the foremost mining company in the state: in 1911 its two mines at Bundi and Sungai Ayam produced nearly 80 per cent of the tin exported from Trengganu.<sup>63</sup> These mines were worked on the lode-mining basis after an initial attempt at open-cast mining had proven ineffective.<sup>64</sup> By 1917 the company had exported a total of 85,000 pikul of tin valued at between \$5 million and \$6 million,<sup>65</sup> and yet had worked only 20 acres in its 40,000-acre Bundi concession and an even smaller area in the Sungai Ayam concession. The Sungai Sendok concession at this time was virtually untouched.<sup>66</sup>

The company's mines were managed by Europeans and its labour force of over 1,000 in 1913 consisted mainly of Kelantan Malays.<sup>67</sup> From the very beginning, in 1889, the company had to import virtually everything needed for the mines—machinery, building materials, food and labour—from outside the state. These were transported to the mines, about 35 to 40 miles up-river, by boats and dug-outs on a journey which took between two and five days depending on the season and the weather. The company chartered a steamship to maintain some form of communication with Singapore during the north-east monsoon. Internally it organized its own private mail communication to and from the concession. The absence of government action to establish an adequate infrastructure of communications and services forced the company to plough back the profits it earned from the mines.<sup>68</sup>

The concession deeds of the company provided that it should pay

duty of 10 per cent on all minerals exported. The money was collected by the district chief, Abdul Rahman bin Ishak (the *Datuk Sri Lela Diraja*), and forwarded to the Sultan. By 1916 the company had paid a total sum of \$450,000 to the ruler.<sup>69</sup> Payment of this kind brought into focus the lack of distinction, in a personal monarchy like that of Trengganu, between a ruler's personal income and the revenue of the state—a fact which worried British officials. In the absence of a Civil List or of regular Treasury procedures a ruler's income from whatever sources could be expended according to his own personal leanings on purposes of government, on the support of favourites or on private consumption.

Besides making its required payments under the leases, the company's success brought upon itself frequent demands from Trengganu officials. In 1913 the company complained that there was an attempt by Malays to squat on its land in Sungai Ayam on the ground, so they claimed, that they held a document issued by the Sultan.<sup>70</sup> Two years later the Bundi manager threatened to close the mines because the bores had been salted.<sup>71</sup> Such harassment of the company continued to recur in different forms. In 1916 there arose a dispute over the right of way between the Sungai Ayam mines and the newly established Kajang mines nearby, the latter being a mining concern owned by very senior Malay officials. On occasion, the district chief sent his agents to the company's mines and, exercising his right to judicial authority, extracted fines from the labour force whenever it was possible.<sup>72</sup> Against this background of minor irritation, officials highly placed in the hierarchy were contemplating more serious interference with the company's activities.

In 1917 the State Council, prompted by the discovery of the lucrative Kajang mine, decided to call upon the company to show cause why its Sungai Sendok concession, which had remained unworked, should not be revoked.<sup>73</sup> The driving force behind this move was the Yang Dipertuan Muda who had taken a great interest in the area. The British Agent did not oppose the plan and indeed supported the move to revoke that concession since the six-year 'no work' clause of the lease had long expired—in April 1910. The action of the State Council brought a storm of protest from the company. Petitions were sent to the British Agent, the High Commissioner (Sir Arthur Young), and the Colonial Office.<sup>74</sup> However, the company, on mature consideration and after consultations with its senior partner, the former High Commissioner,

Sir John Anderson, decided to accept the cancellation.

The annulment of the Sungai Sendok concession allowed the Yang Dipertuan Muda—by then the newly appointed Sultan—in January 1919 to approach the Agent through the Mentri Besar, the Datuk Sri Amar Diraja, seeking the exclusive control of prospecting rights in the area. The Agent succeeded in checking the take-over by the new Sultan. The Mentri Besar was informed that since the (former) Yang Dipertuan Muda '... had become Sultan and enjoyed more than ample allowances he should consider the desirability of ceasing his speculation in land'.<sup>75</sup> With the strengthening of British political control in the state the interference by the Trengganu officials in economic undertakings declined. Guthrie and Company in the 1920s was left alone to develop its mines in the remaining two concessions at Sungai Ayam<sup>76</sup> and Bundi.<sup>77</sup>

Another big mining concern in foreign Chinese hands was Ong Kay Joo's mining lease of 1889 in Paka.<sup>78</sup> In 1914 the original mining lease was revoked and mining titles were issued to two different companies which had earlier worked the lease.<sup>79</sup> The more important of these, the Wah Lee Kongs, had in 1914 over 250 Khek coolies and a private police force of 9 Sikhs and 7 Malays. At its height the company had a labour force of between 1,000 and 4,000 and its mining operations were on a scale comparable to that of Hong Fatt Mining Company in Kuala Lumpur.<sup>80</sup> By contrast the second company, the Jee Juan Kongs, had in 1913 only 30 Chinese coolies and could produce, for the second half of that year, only 30 pikul of tin. In 1916 these two mines paid export duty amounting to \$5,000 at the standard rate of 10 per cent.<sup>81</sup> However, by 1925 the tin reserves in this district were exhausted and the hopes of a rich tin find were soon dissipated.<sup>82</sup> Generally, the Trengganu officials did little to interfere in the Paka leases and the Sultan was content to collect his 10 per cent export duty on minerals.

The concessions acquired by Guthrie and Company and by Ong Kay Joo were the only successful pre-1910 concessions that continued to be held by non-members of the Trengganu ruling class. The other concessions in that category had been terminated by the ruler, as has been noted previously, and were reissued as *cap zuriat* to the Kerabat Diraja who then made separate arrangements with investors. There is one other set of pre-1910 concessions that must be mentioned. These were grants that were issued to the Kerabat Am and Orang Keistimewaan on a lease basis. The point that needs emphasizing is that the Trengganu officials adopted a

policy of non-intervention in these cases, as such concessions were issued primarily for the gain of the individual concerned. It was left to the ability and influence of the holder to extract as much as he could and in the manner he wanted from his concession. Generally, the Kerabat Am and Orang Keistimewaan were not successful in exploiting their concessions, although some did attempt to work them with foreign investors.<sup>83</sup>

The economic activities of the Kerabat Diraja element stood in sharp contrast to those of the Kerabat Am and the Orang Keistimewaan. More than the other groups in the ruling class, the Kerabat Diraja showed an aggressive determination to profit as much as possible during this period of accelerated economic growth in the mining and plantation sectors. They innovated and at times revived old methods, but always with the view of using their positions of office to advance their economic interests in one way or another. They thrived on the feverish atmosphere of anticipation of the time as they discussed ambitious plans for tapping the economic resources of the country.

Sultan Zainal Abidin III, of course, was extremely sensitive to any attempt by British officials to curtail his own powers; and he was particularly concerned that his children and others in the family should get the full benefit of all profits which might be derived from *cap zuriat*.<sup>84</sup> Time and again he reiterated that he was not prepared to surrender his plan to give each member of his family an independent source of income. He recognized that some restrictions were needed in order to regulate the concession system and he agreed to embody them in the treaty he signed with Britain. When it came to the practical implementation of his treaty obligations, however, he pleaded that exceptions must be made in the case of grants to his children.<sup>85</sup> The deliberate enrichment of a single family was thus the driving force behind the concession system—a fact which will become clear as attention is given to the activities of several members of that family in the development phase of the concession system.

The foremost owner of *cap zuriat* among the Royal Family was Tengku Muhammad bin Sultan Zainal Abidin III, the Yang Dipertuan Muda. In 1910 he had in his possession huge concessions in the Merang River system, Bukit Tawang (Trengganu River), Ulu Trengganu (Trengganu River), and Tebak (Kemaman River).<sup>86</sup> The main attraction for investors were the Bukit Tawang and Tebak concessions; the other two remained undeveloped.

The Bukit Tawang concession was prospected and mined by H. Gild. He represented the interests of A. G. Mackie and Campbell, a firm which was associated with the Tronoh mines in Perak, and was hailed as the first genuine miner in Trengganu after the appointment of the British Agent.<sup>87</sup> On 20 September 1911 Tengku Muhammad signed an agreement with Gild by which the former was to be paid \$500 per annum for allowing the company to prospect the area for a 2-year period. After this period the company could select an area of not more than 1,500 acres for mining on a 99-year lease. The agreement also provided that all profits from the sale of the lease or from mining were to be divided equally between the two contracting parties. The state (i.e. the Sultan) was to be paid 10 per cent export duties on minerals but Tengku Muhammad had the right to collect ground rent at the rate of 50 cents an acre for the first three years and thereafter at \$1.00 per acre.<sup>88</sup>

The British officials attempted to impose certain restrictions on the agreement when it was being drafted, but the Sultan rejected these proposals on the ground that the concession was too small in size. More significantly he argued that he wished his son to derive 'the full benefit of all rights granted to him under the deed of gift, in order that he may be independent and not always draw on his father for funds'.<sup>89</sup> The Sultan in this case, as in others pertaining to his family, was determined to have his way, and indeed he was remarkably successful in keeping the British officials at bay. The British for their part were cautious not to interfere too overtly with matters on which the Sultan had clearly made up his mind.

Gild began mining operations in November 1911 with 15 Chinese and 60 local Malay coolies.<sup>90</sup> His early efforts were unsuccessful as his mining coolies absconded and he did not find tin in economically worthwhile quantities.<sup>91</sup> In August 1912 a new agreement was signed which transferred a 300-acre mining block to Messrs McAlister and Company for the sum of \$50,000. Tengku Muhammad's share in the sale was \$22,000 and he also received ground rent of \$150 in advance for 1913.<sup>92</sup> The new owners, Bukit Tawang Hydraulic Mining Company Limited, had in April 1913, 2 European assistants and 50 Chinese coolies.<sup>93</sup> It was by far the biggest mining enterprise on the Trengganu River at this time.<sup>94</sup> The company's hydraulic mine did not remain in operation for long, however, and by the 1920s the records contain no mention of its existence.<sup>95</sup>

Tengku Muhammad's income from Bukit Tawang was neither



regular nor steady. The company's output was small and its profits consequently were negligible. He gained a substantial sum only on the occasion of the transfer in 1912. The same pattern was repeated in his *Tebak* concession. In this case the position was extremely complex as the concession was acquired by a company registered in Singapore named *Kemaman Limited* which had also obtained the *Sungai Mengkuang* concession owned by *Tengku Besar Hapsah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III*. Both concessions were located in *Kemaman* where it was estimated that five-sixths of the total area of the district was held by members of the Royal Family.<sup>96</sup> *Tengku Muhammad* and *Tengku Besar Hapsah* had made separate agreements with two different parties—*Chong Ah Kit* and *Chew Woon Poh*—who in turn transferred their leases to *Kemaman Limited*. Further complications arose when British officials insisted that the company must modify its terms to meet the conditions proposed in the *Conlay Report* if it wished the High Commissioner to ratify the agreement. After prolonged negotiations the final draft was presented to the Sultan who refused to sign on the ground that the terms contained in the agreement undermined the very purpose for which he had issued the *cap zuriat* to his children in the first place.

The ruler dragged his feet as proposal after proposal was submitted to him and it became clear that he was not prepared to abandon his position except under pressure. It was not until February 1913 that a compromise was embodied in a new agreement and finally ratified by the High Commissioner.<sup>97</sup> Basically, the new titles issued in the names of *Tengku Besar Hapsah* and *Tengku Muhammad* gave *Kemaman Limited* the right to select a total of 28,000 acres. From this area, 25,000 acres were for agriculture and 3,000 acres for mining. The leases were to be for the duration of 999 years and 99 years respectively. In the compromise, *Tengku Muhammad* and *Tengku Besar Hapsah* were each to own a maximum of 14,000 acres and the remainder of the land covered by the concession was to revert to the state. If less than 14,000 acres were to be selected within the holding of either person, the balance was still to belong to the owner in question, though this was to be subject to ratification in the future if the land was sold or otherwise transferred. Admittedly, the Sultan's formula forced him to prune the two *cap* to 14,000 acres each but more significantly he retained for both his children and their descendants the rights over quit rent and royalties as their private sources of income. The ruler's loss was in a sense the High Commissioner's gain but the latter failed to

secure additional revenue for the state as the company was unsuccessful in obtaining the capital it required.

The only real beneficiaries were Tengku Besar Hapsah, who received from the company a gift of \$10,000 (being the sum promised to her earlier by Chew Woon Poh who became a shareholder in Kemaman Limited), and Haji Ngah Muhammad bin Yusof, the Sultan's Secretary, who was guaranteed the sum of \$500 per annum for the duration of the title in recognition of his assistance in facilitating the negotiations between Chew Woon Poh and Tengku Besar Hapsah. Tengku Muhammad, by contrast, received no lump sum, and had to sacrifice both his claim to equal profits provided for in his 1906 agreement with Chong Ah Kit, and the shareholding promised him by Chong. His only hope of profit lay in his rights to royalties and rent—granted to himself and his sister—at the rate of 50 cents per acre of land actually taken for mining and \$1.00 for land taken up for agriculture; and these returns were dependent on the ultimate success of the company.

After such a prolonged period of negotiation the expectations of the company were, in the end, not to be fulfilled. In 1914, a year after it had acquired the titles, it had still not begun operations,<sup>98</sup> and three years later it maintained merely a single prospector, A. G. Coleman, in the area.<sup>99</sup> In 1918, a new company, Tebak Tin Fields Limited, replaced Kemaman Limited. It was managed by Coleman who by then had in his employ 600 Chinese coolies.<sup>100</sup> The company faced considerable problems, however. It could not manage its coolies and many were sacked.<sup>101</sup> Labour conditions were in any case extremely unsatisfactory. In 1937 it was remembered by the local population—whether correctly or not it is now impossible to say—that in the early years the manager used to nail Chinese coolies in their coffins while they were still alive because he thought that beriberi was an epidemic disease.<sup>102</sup> The company never really solved its labour problems and its production remained relatively low as compared with other big concerns such as Guthrie in Bundi and Sungai Ayam. In 1926 it had 120 coolies and produced 505 pikul of tin on a lode and alluvial basis.<sup>103</sup> For Tengku Muhammad and his sister in this particular venture, the results were thus to be disappointing.

There were five other huge cap zuriat—Sungai Ayer Puteh, Jabor, Chenderong, Sungai Cherol, and Ulu Cherol—in the Kemaman district. However, only the first three of them had mining companies in operation for any length of time during this period,

while the other two remained unworked and closed to developers. The three worked *cap zuriat* were not seriously challenged by British officials mainly because the Sultan had a strong interest in them.

The Sungai Ayer Puteh concession was technically in the hands of Sultan Zainal Abidin III but for a brief period he allowed his children, Tengku Sulaiman and Tengku Muhammad, and his court favourite, the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja, to deal with the property. Tengku Sulaiman was the first to issue a 65-year lease for mining and agriculture over an area of 9 square miles to Al-Habib Muhammad Amir bin Sayyid Hussien Al-Mufti.<sup>104</sup> Tengku Sulaiman was to share a percentage of the royalty and the proceeds from the sale of property with the lessee and the Sultan was to get his due from the usual export duties. The scheme did not in fact succeed and no profits were realized. Subsequent ventures in other parts of the concession, too, failed.<sup>105</sup>

Tengku Sulaiman was only eleven years old when he was granted the Jabor concession in 1907. In the 1910s he and his brother, Tengku Muhammad, devoted considerable effort in trying to secure a private fortune out of land and mines.<sup>106</sup> As a teenager he spent much of his time in Kemaman where the main economic development was taking place and his obvious lack of business acumen led the British Agent to suggest to the Sultan that he be given some basic training, in an official capacity, in the art of business.<sup>107</sup> In his enthusiasm, attracted by the amount of money in circulation in that district, he did apply for the post of District Officer to replace the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja.<sup>108</sup> But like everything else he did, there was a lack of purpose in his application and it was rejected.

Unlike the *cap zuriat* dealt with so far, the Jabor concession was not transferred into the hands of a single company. Rather, the area was split under a number of leases and disposed of to different parties. One was issued in 1908 to Sayyid Omar bin Salim Al-Attas, a Singaporean trader, who had great influence over the Sultan. He acquired a mining and agricultural lease over an area of 9 square miles for a period of sixty-five years. Tengku Sulaiman was to collect ground rent from him at the rate of \$1.00 for every 8.27 acres and divide the 10 per cent export duty on minerals between himself and the Sultan.<sup>109</sup>

In March 1910 Sayyid Omar was on the verge of selling his lease to Jaeger and Company of Singapore. Negotiations broke down, however, when Sayyid Omar demanded payment on the same terms as those he himself had agreed to with Tengku Sulaiman.<sup>110</sup> After

his death the executor of his estate, Salim Ta'ha Matar, managed, in 1921, to reach an agreement with Jabor Mining and Development Company Limited to exploit 3,000 acres for agriculture and 500 acres for mining.<sup>111</sup>

On 7 March 1910 a second lease—including 500 acres of agricultural land for a 99-year period—was issued by Tengku Sulaiman to Tham Kay Chong. Tham contracted to pay Tengku Sulaiman export duties fixed at 2½ per cent for rubber and 5 per cent for other agricultural produce. He began planting rubber almost immediately and in the 1930s his heirs managed a 200-acre rubber estate.<sup>112</sup>

Besides revenue earned from these leases, the Jabor concession was also well known for its jungle produce, especially cengai wood and rattan. There were a large number of Chinese wood-cutting huts in the area and cengai was floated down-river for export to Singapore where it fetched between \$36 and \$38 a ton.<sup>113</sup> In order to control this traffic of produce which came from the concession, Tengku Sulaiman appointed a local agent, Sayyid Osman, to manage his affairs relating to timber and other agricultural produce. The agent was ineffective and he was replaced by Sayyid Yahaya who was given wide authority to arrest and try all those who avoided paying the 10 per cent duty on timber. Another agent was also appointed with the specific task of collecting timber royalties.<sup>114</sup>

The timber trade became a thriving industry in Kemaman and Tengku Sulaiman went into partnership with Loke Chow Loh, a local trader and miner, to exploit the opportunity. Loke had won the Tengku's favour by advancing him loans in 1916, without conditions attached,<sup>115</sup> to a total sum of \$4,500. There is evidence to indicate that they worked vigorously for a short period to exploit timber resources within the concession, but in typical fashion the venture soon ended.<sup>116</sup> Loke's monetary investment in the loans, however, had earned him a friend in the royal circles. At one stage Tengku Sulaiman wished to mortgage the whole property to him for \$12,000 which he needed to purchase a house but the British Agent persuaded him not to proceed with the transaction.<sup>117</sup> Instead Loke was given a 25-year mining lease over 500 acres to be selected. In 1920 he selected 200 acres and was making a profit of \$1,000 per annum but was not required to pay export duties.<sup>118</sup> This laxity was a clear indication that friendship in the right circles had its own dividends.

Tengku Sulaiman lacked the stamina and will to carry through his objectives. He was determined to mortgage his property for a lump sum and on 5 November 1911, after failing on an earlier occasion, he mortgaged the property for forty years to Sayyid Hussein Ghalam Albukhorie of Telaga Panchor in Trengganu for a sum of \$10,000.<sup>119</sup> Under the terms of the agreement Sayyid Hussein had vast powers which included the right to collect and claim rents and other payments, arrest and try offenders, and issue forest passes and other licences. Tengku Sulaiman on the other hand retained the right to payment of premium and export duties at existing rates, though Sayyid Hussein was given the discretion to charge anything above these rates for his own profit. Sayyid Hussein formed a company to administer the concession.<sup>120</sup> Like Loke Chow Loh, he, too, was requested to advance a loan of \$3,000 to Tengku Sulaiman.<sup>121</sup>

The final cap zuriat in Kemaman was Chenderong which belonged to Tengku Nik Maimunah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III and her husband, Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim. It was located in Ulu Kemaman in an area of highlands with deep, narrow valleys running through it and was the least accessible of all the Kemaman concessions.<sup>122</sup>

The first prospector in the concession hired by the Bukit Peniti Tin Mining Syndicate was unsuccessful in locating anything worth mining<sup>123</sup> but the next prospector, Tan Wi Yan, from Melaka, struck a rich lode of wolfram ore. However, the latter faced considerable difficulties in defending his claim against unsympathetic British officials, competing interest groups, and cap zuriat holders who were quite prepared to allow each group to outbid the others and collect premiums. After considerable astute negotiation he succeeded in establishing a company which in April 1919 acquired all interests of the cap owners over the concession for a period of forty-five years, except for the 1,850 acres which had previously been assigned to himself. Tengku Ngah Omar and his wife were also made partners in the company with \$12,500 in \$10 shares;<sup>124</sup> thus they had an interest in the future prosperity of the company. More immediately, the ruler, his daughter, and son-in-law collected from competing companies monetary gifts amounting to \$77,500.<sup>125</sup>

The company began mining operations as early as 1917, when the scheme was first mooted. Its mining concern exploited wolfram from an open quarry on an outcrop which consisted of a vertical

pillar of ore. The working conditions were so abnormally favourable that little blasting or other expenditure was required for its removal. It was reputed that in the war years, when a ready market existed, the company's earnings were in the region of \$3 million.<sup>126</sup>

In Kemaman district, where the main thrust of economic development was to be found, only one of the Sultan's children, Tengku Wok Aminah, who possessed the Ulu Cherol cap zuriat, was unable, because of its remoteness, to convert her concession into a source of income. Outside this district there were several cap zuriat in the hands of members of the Kerabat Diraja who used their concessions in a similar fashion as instruments for the acquisition of a personal fortune; there were also other members who failed to take advantage of the economic growth of this period. Tengku Muhammad's failure in the Merang and Ulu Trengganu concessions has already been mentioned and in addition to these there also were failures in the Penyerang concession (Tengku Maimunah binte Sultan Ahmad II), the Paka concession (Tengku Maimunah binte Sultan Ahmad II), and the Kuala Duyong concession in Dungun (Tengku Woh binte Tengku Osman). Attention will be focused on three important and successful cap zuriat located in Chemuak (Dungun district), Ulu Paka, and Kretai which were owned respectively by three powerful district chiefs and their families: Tengku Abu Bakar bin Tengku Abdul Jalil and his wife Tengku Khadijah binte Sultan Ahmad II, Tengku Abdullah bin Sultan Ali and his wife Tengku Ngah Aishah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III, and Tengku Embong Musa bin Tengku Sulaiman.<sup>127</sup>

The Dungun River was the second important mining centre after Kemaman district. In 1913 it exported 133 pikul of tin ore and 1,808 pikul of wolfram to Singapore, of which over 90 per cent came from the cap zuriat owned jointly by Tengku Khadijah and Tengku Abu Bakar.<sup>128</sup> The latter was the district chief and he brought his political weight to bear on the lessee, Lim Chuan Chian, to extract as much income from him as he could (see p. 76).

The Chemuak concession was leased to Lim Chuan Chian in 1905 for the sum of \$18,000 but he ran into difficulties with Tengku Abu Bakar as soon as he began mining. The central issue was the interpretation of the mining clause in the lease. Tengku Abu Bakar insisted that the clause gave the lessee the right to mine only tin but Lim argued that he had the right to all minerals. The reasons for Tengku Abu Bakar's objections are not difficult to guess: he had known of the existence of wolfram through the German prospector,

Golan.<sup>129</sup> More importantly there had been a definite offer by a British company to mine the ore.<sup>130</sup> The prospect of more premiums encouraged Tengku Abu Bakar to order Lim to stop extracting wolfram. In defiance the latter smuggled wolfram out of the state hidden in tin bags but the scheme was soon uncovered and the unstable relationship between the two reached its nadir.<sup>131</sup>

Against the background of strained relations between the two parties the British officials kept their distance and hoped that Lim would surrender his former terms and sign a new agreement along the lines proposed by the British Agent, Conlay.<sup>132</sup> Lim had by 1910 invested \$300,000 in the mines and he had plans to promote a company with another Singapore merchant, Boon Kwang, who had earlier financed him to the extent of \$80,000.<sup>133</sup> These proposals were contrary to the guide-lines accepted by British officials who were against any scheme to form a parent company and float the remainder of the property to subsidiary companies. They refused to acknowledge that his lease gave him the right to transfer the property. Needless to say Tengku Abu Bakar also opposed him, but for different reasons. In spite of the opposition he went ahead and formed the Dungun River Concession Syndicate Limited and from April 1910 until November 1910 the company entered into serious negotiations with the Sultan and Tengku Abu Bakar. Both sides bargained hard as one side fought for liberal mining and planting terms and the other tried to secure as much income as possible from the company's undertaking. In the thick of the negotiations were the British officials attempting to moderate the demands of both sides.<sup>134</sup>

On 5 November 1910 a new agreement was concluded which superseded the 1905 lease.<sup>135</sup> The terms of the agreement were based on the Conlay framework and it gave the company 3,000 acres for mining (99 years) and 10,000 acres for planting (999 years). The gains to Tengku Abu Bakar and his wife were substantial. They were guaranteed ground rent, export duties which they divided with the Sultan, \$35,000 in cash in lieu of their 4 per cent partnership in the former lease and shares to the value of \$40,000 in the new company.<sup>136</sup> The first year's ground rent, amounting to \$400, went to Tengku Ali bin Alam Shah for his contribution in the negotiations<sup>137</sup> and the sum of \$35,000 was duly paid to the cap zuriat owners after a slight delay.<sup>138</sup> However, the company soon ran into problems again when it failed to float a company in London to extract wolfram in the district and thus was unable to provide

Tengku Abu Bakar and his wife the promised \$40,000 in shares in the company within nine months of the signing of the agreement.<sup>139</sup>

The position of the company after the failure in the London market was serious. It had paid the cap zuriat owners \$35,000 and was unable to keep the other terms of its contract. The British Agent observed that '... their position is very precarious depending as it does almost entirely on the goodwill of Tengku Abu Bakar who is a hard man of business'.<sup>140</sup> Fresh proposals were put to the owners through their spokesman, Haji Ngah Muhammad bin Yusof, at a meeting in Singapore in August 1911—a month before the September deadline.<sup>141</sup>

After some doubts as to whether Tengku Abu Bakar would accept these proposals, a Supplementary Agreement was signed on 24 November 1911 which provided for an extension of two years in return for a premium of \$2,000 per annum.<sup>142</sup> Finally in April 1912 the Dungun River Concession Syndicate Limited sold its rights to a London company known as Dungun (Trengganu) Wolfram Development Company. The new concern was to promote a larger company with greater access to capital to exploit the concessions;<sup>143</sup> in the meantime it began mining and planting operations. By the end of 1912 it had developed a 200,000 rubber tree nursery and by October of that year it had produced 105.35 pikul of wolfram ore.<sup>144</sup>

Financial difficulties were encountered once again in the early months of 1913. The company was unable to raise the necessary capital of £250,000 for development within the 1 September 1913 deadline as was required by the Supplementary Agreement of November 1911.<sup>145</sup> It was not able to impress such London financial groups as Vickers and Sons, and Maxims, despite a favourable report on the presence of wolfram by Messrs Osborne and Chappell.<sup>146</sup> Frantic petitions were written to the High Commissioner and to the British Agent requesting them to intervene on its behalf and approaches were also made to the Sultan with fresh proposals. The British authorities at this stage were exasperated by unfulfilled promises and decided not to intervene.<sup>147</sup> The British Agent argued that to recommend a further extension of leave was to encourage other promoters to make promises in the beginning which they would not be able to fulfil, in the hope of securing modifications later on.<sup>148</sup> The company was thus left to face the cap zuriat owners who had shown by earlier situations that they would be satisfied only by further compensation.



The records are silent as to what occurred on the 1 September 1913 deadline. Apparently the company made some form of deal with the Sultan and Tengku Abu Bakar and it continued its struggle to mine in 1914 under grave financial difficulties. In May 1914 it was reported that the company was exporting wolfram at the rate of 200 pikul per month and had monthly profits of \$2,000. However, even this amount was insufficient to recoup its previous investment.<sup>149</sup>

By April 1916 the company had turned the corner. In that month alone it produced 500 pikul as compared to the monthly average of 220 pikul for 1915.<sup>150</sup> It doubled its labour force from 500 in 1915 to a little over 1,000 in the following year.<sup>151</sup> The method of mining was lode extraction but little mechanical aid was used. The wolfram was separated from the rock by hand, and was transferred to the coast where it was loaded on to dug-outs and shipped. The British Agent's attitude changed with the increased output. Lim Chuan Chian was described as 'a capable and energetic miner'<sup>152</sup> and there was now nothing but praise for the undertaking. In July 1916, after a visit to the mine, the Agent remarked:

The mine is a wonderful example of Chinese management and efficiency. All supplies are brought from Singapore and polled [*sic*] up-river in dug-outs; a two day journey: the boats carry down the ore on the return journey. The labour force appeared contented and healthy. I inspected the hospital: there were 20 patients most of them suffering from mild fever.<sup>153</sup>

The Dungun wolfram mine, like the Chenderong mine in Kemaman, reaped huge profits during the war years. Both were assured of a regular market by the Colonial Agency which purchased the ore for Britain's war effort through its appointed agents, Sime and Darby.<sup>154</sup> Lim Chuan Chian made an estimated profit of \$6 million during this period.<sup>155</sup> However, when the British government stopped its purchases the company cut back its production and in 1924 the lease was cancelled for failure to pay arrears of rent and the property auctioned.<sup>156</sup>

There was another lease which was issued by Tengku Abu Bakar for 500 acres within the concession. The lessee, Wong Sin, did not find tin but he stumbled on a rich iron-ore deposit and sold his rights to a Japanese concern, the Nippon Mining Company, for \$50,000. In the 1930s this company became one of the foremost exporters of iron ore in the state.<sup>157</sup>

The late arrival on the scene of the Nippon Mining Company was a loss to Tengku Abu Bakar. However, overall the revenues earned

by the cap zuriat owners from the concession were substantial. By 1916, before the increase in production of the Dungun mines, they had earned a total of \$100,000 from premiums alone,<sup>158</sup> excluding the 5 per cent royalty on minerals and ground rent payable throughout the duration of the lease. The Sultan too obtained his share in the form of an additional royalty of 5 per cent.

Tengku Ngah Aishah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III and her husband, Tengku Abdullah bin Sultan Ali, who was the district chief of Paka, owned the Ulu Paka cap zuriat which was the second biggest concession outside Kemaman. They dominated the economic activities in the district and though, like all the other officials, they had neither the capital nor expertise to develop the concession themselves,<sup>159</sup> they took a keen interest in the development of mining activities by others. They, thus, were dependent on brokers, promoters, and miners. In their particular case it was Tengku Ngah Aishah more than her husband who took an active business role and whose interest went beyond the confines of her district and concession.

The Ulu Paka concession was the scene of activity for an unusual number of brokers. The first to arrive on the scene was Tan Yun Moi of Melaka in September 1910 but no business transaction resulted.<sup>160</sup> In the following month Tengku Ngah Aishah gave a sixty-year option to Tok Dagang Mat, a Kelantan Malay, for a premium of \$3,000 and the usual ground rent and royalties when the lease was developed.<sup>161</sup> For the next few years Tok Dagang Mat tried to promote a company with sufficient funds to develop the lease. Among those who were approached were A. W. Cashin and Lee Choon Guan of Singapore in August 1912. In all cases the potential clients withdrew either because the purchase price was too high or because the area on investigation proved to be insufficiently promising.<sup>162</sup> Tok Dagang Mat kept his investment going by maintaining a small labour force of ten Hailams to mine the area.<sup>163</sup>

Besides the option issued to Tok Dagang Mat, Tengku Ngah Aishah also drew some income from premiums when she issued option to other brokers.<sup>164</sup> Most of these were unsuccessful in securing finance, and the options lapsed, but Ong Huan Guan was an exception. He obtained a 500-acre mining option on 20 April 1916 on behalf of a Singapore financier, Ng Hong Guan. He paid a premium of \$1,000 and promised \$750 for prospecting rights and a further \$4,500 when the 500 acres were selected.<sup>165</sup> In addition there were the usual provisions dealing with ground rent and royalties.

His company was the most successful concern in the concession but it, too, ran into difficulties with the cap zuriat holders. These problems began to appear, as often happened in the case of other concessions, when a better offer was received from another quarter after the signing of an agreement.

Shortly after the conclusion of the agreement, Ng Hong Guan went into partnership with J. A. Russell and Company of Kuala Lumpur. In the meantime a Japanese company had made Tengku Ngah Aishah a substantial offer to purchase the whole concession on a lease basis as it was believed to contain tin in large quantities.<sup>166</sup> She was quick to see an opportunity and she demanded from Ng a *hadiah* (present) of the sum of \$15,000 as soon as she learnt that Captain J. A. Russell, representing the company, was in Paka. The reason for the present, she explained, was that the company had paid its first year's rent five months late and thus had committed a breach of their contract.<sup>167</sup> Alleged breaches of contract of this kind were often used by those in possession of concessions, and in earlier times application of political influence in the judicial sphere was also an effective method of raising money.<sup>168</sup>

On this occasion when the company refused to give in to her monetary demands, Tengku Ngah Aishah mounted a campaign to secure the revocation of the lease on the grounds that the company paid her \$50 short for royalties in 1917. The case was heard in court and on 12 June 1918 it was ruled that there was no violation by the company and she was ordered not to interfere in the mining operations.<sup>169</sup> The British Agent's cynical observation on this case summed up the methods that the cap zuriat owners used in their pursuit of income: 'Tengku Esah's [Aishah] attempt to squeeze him [Ng Hong Guan] after he had made a partnership agreement with Messrs J. A. Russel and Company of Kuala Lumpur was exceptionally impudent—even for a Trengganu chief'.<sup>170</sup> Even after the case was thrown out of the courts she did not stop her vendetta against the company. In January 1919 she complained that the company had, by deceit, exported tin from the district after paying her with a bad cheque, and she wanted the mines to stop work until the company had paid its debts.<sup>171</sup> This time her petition came against the backdrop of an Australian company's \$150,000 offer in premiums and the usual payment of royalties and ground rent.<sup>172</sup>

The last of the river systems outside Kemaman to be economically developed in this period was the Kretai. This river was controlled by Tengku Embong Musa bin Tengku Sulaiman, who was also the

State Treasurer, and he owned a huge cap zuriat which included all land on the right bank of the river. The concession attracted an established Danish concern, the East Asiatic Company, which, together with Guthrie and Company, were the only two big European concerns in the state before 1910.<sup>173</sup> The company was the earliest European pioneer in the plantation industry and for a long time maintained its position as the foremost planting concern in the state. The company's first economic foothold in the state was acquired on 18 May 1908 in the form of a 99-year agricultural lease for 3,500 acres from Tengku Embong Musa at a cost of \$6,768 in premium. The latter was also guaranteed ground rent of \$678.80 annually and royalties on agricultural produce amounting to 5 per cent which he was to share equally with the Sultan.<sup>174</sup> This concession differed from the other examples discussed in that it was essentially used for the plantation industry and not mining.

The success of plantation development in the Kretai River system was due eventually to the forceful manner in which the company went about its undertaking. By June 1910 it had planted 1,441 acres with coconut and wished to acquire further land for the cultivation of coconut and rubber.<sup>175</sup> On 15 August 1910 it secured a 99-year lease for another 3,500 acres, paying a premium of \$4,000. The ground rent in this case was increased to \$1.00 per acre.<sup>176</sup> In May 1911 a further 106 acres along the sea coast were taken up on terms similar to those of the 1910 lease.<sup>177</sup>

The company maintained a rapid pace of expansion. By 1913 it had planted 1,200 acres with rubber and 3,450 acres with coconut. It employed a labour force of 1,000 Kheks and in its early days it had as many as 3,000 Chinese coolies who were mainly Hailams.<sup>178</sup> Local Malay labour was also used in small numbers.<sup>179</sup> The infrastructure built by the company was well ahead of its time. It included residential and hospital facilities, a main tramway running through its leases and a rubber factory which in 1916 was producing 4,000 lb. of rubber per month.<sup>180</sup> By 1917 it had invested \$2 million in opening the plantations.<sup>181</sup>

The company was also involved, together with the Standard Oil Company, in an unsuccessful attempt to secure oil prospecting rights throughout the whole state and more particularly in the Dungun River basin,<sup>182</sup> and at different times it had submitted plans for the development of the areas between the Kretai and Paka Rivers and between the Kretai and Dungun Rivers.<sup>183</sup> Oddly enough it was the Sultan who opposed the latter scheme although the High

Commissioner was enthusiastic about it. The underlying reason for the objection was that the company did not offer immediate cash benefits to the Sultan nor to the cap zuriat owners in the area.<sup>184</sup>

In 1919 a company registered in Denmark, the *Akieseiskabet Det Ostasiastiske Industri Og Plantage Kompangi*, acquired a part of the East Asiatic Company's plantation holdings.<sup>185</sup> Until World War II these two Danish concerns dominated the plantation industry in Trengganu. In 1926 they produced 34 per cent of the total rubber exports of the state<sup>186</sup> and the 1930 figures for estates over 100 acres in size showed that the group held over 8,000 acres of plantation land. Their nearest rivals were the two Japanese companies (*Malay Rubber Company* and *Nanyo Bussan*) which held 1,226 and 1,047 acres respectively.<sup>187</sup>

The income earned by Tengku Embong Musa from the activities of the East Asiatic Company was considerable. The company was frequently a source of loans to members of the ruling élite<sup>188</sup>—a feature which explains the absence of quarrels with the local authorities. In addition considerable sums were obtained from premiums, rents, and royalties. There were other perquisites, too. In 1911, for example, Tengku Embong Musa received the sum of \$4,000 for giving the company a written promise, as State Treasurer, to ship tin ore from the state to Singapore. The Sultan was kept in ignorance of this arrangement as the deal was a personal one.<sup>189</sup> After Tengku Embong Musa died around 1920 his family continued to earn income from rents and royalties. In 1935 it was estimated that the properties were earning an annual income of \$5,711.75.<sup>190</sup>

The brief third phase of the concession system from 1910 to 1922 was, in general, marked by an accelerated inflow of production capital and expertise into the state on a scale not again to be matched before World War II. Foreign companies and individual entrepreneurs came in large numbers, hard on the heels of British officials who appeared after the 1910 Treaty engagement, but after a little more than a decade of investment and speculation the inflow of wealth slowed down as the mining and plantation industries were hit by the 1920 depression in tin and rubber prices.<sup>191</sup> For those twelve years, however, the tremendous proliferation of foreign companies, big and small, in the newly expanding economy of Trengganu laid the fortunes of the *Kerabat Diraja*. The network of concessions secured by its members in the late nineteenth century provided an instrument that they were able to use to obtain a share of the income from the capital that poured into the state. At the very

least the process showed a preparedness on the part of the ruling class to make full use of the opportunities that presented themselves and perhaps it was more than that; it had the hallmarks of a deliberately constructed plan. Early signs of foreign investment encouraged Trengganu's rulers to lock up the resources of the state in a concession system in which *cap zuriat* were issued to each individual member of the Ruling Family, and thereafter the *cap zuriat* holders were to make their own arrangements with investors. Leases were issued either for the whole concession or parts of it, and though, after 1910, the terms of the leases were often modified under pressure from British officials, the majority of companies were willing to submit to Malay demands. Their connivance enabled members of the Kerabat Diraja often to bypass the attempts of the British Agent, and the High Commissioner above him, to impose stricter guide-lines on the disposal of leases.

In this way the Royal Family secured private fortunes from premiums, ground rents, and royalties and at times were offered partnerships by the lessees. Frequently they went beyond the limits of fair play and exerted political pressure on the investors through the coercive apparatus of the state to secure payment. Despite the awkwardness of the situation from the companies' point of view, investors still kept coming in an endless stream. The setbacks they faced did not slow down the momentum of the mineral rush as speculators, miners, and others searched for a rich strike at the end of the fabled rainbow.

Sultan Zainal Abidin III was by no means excluded from a share of the income generated by the development of the mining and plantation industries.<sup>192</sup> In all the *cap zuriat* issued he was assured of royalties on minerals or agricultural produce. Under this arrangement, companies which leased land from the owners had to pay both the lessor and the Sultan. The usual export rates paid to each party were 5 per cent on minerals and 2½ per cent on agricultural produce. A similar arrangement was made in the second category of concessions, which were issued to the non-Kerabat Diraja elements of the ruling class, but these leases, as observed earlier, were not on the whole successfully exploited. In addition, the Sultan issued leases directly to foreign companies and individuals for land not included in the concession system. Messrs Guthrie and Company in Kemaman and Ong Kay Joo in Paka were amongst those with whom he dealt. From this category of lease the Sultan earned royalties at the full amount of 10 per cent for minerals

and 5 per cent for agricultural produce as well as receiving premiums and ground rents.

In the mining and plantation sectors the Sultan's income did not come only from these sources. He possessed a *cap zuriat*, like the other Kerabat Diraja members, in Ayer Puteh in Kemaman district, for which he appointed the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja his agent. In the late nineteenth century he also engaged in the purchase of Chinese pepper plantations in the Kemasik district jointly with Tengku Mohamed Yusof bin Sultan Mahmud Mustapha Shah and the Datuk Mata-Mata.<sup>193</sup> Similar projects were undertaken in company with other members of the ruling class. In 1909 the Sultan opened a 300-acre coconut estate at Batu Ampar in the Trengganu River valley, with Tengku Embong Musa, and shortly afterwards a rubber estate at Batu Lambong in the Nerus River system.<sup>194</sup>

The presence of British officials in the state after 1910 was certainly a hindrance to the economic activities of the Sultan and the Royal Family, but their occasional interference was not enough to arrest the concession movement. The Sultan managed to continue to control, by skilful manoeuvre, areas of land still held by him outside the pre-1910 concession system. British officials at times gave him little room for evasion but, broadly speaking, he managed to centralize land authorization in his hands. This was evidenced by the various leases issued within the *cap zuriat* after 1910. He showed considerable agility in defending the family's interest in their pre-1910 grants and at the same time he did not court further trouble with the British Agents by issuing more *cap zuriat* after 1910. Instead he circumvented the problem and henceforth issued only mining and agricultural leases on the terms recognized by British officials to members of his family.<sup>195</sup> There were also other measures he adopted to meet the dictates of the new political reality. In 1912 he ruled that all documents of transfer and leases must be written in Malay—two copies in *rumi* (romanized Malay script) and two copies in *jawi* (Arabic script)—and delivered to the government for ratification and registration.<sup>196</sup> This move was to ensure that he had a personal knowledge of all transactions in the state and to recover any advantage the High Commissioner might have had over him from the fact that companies frequently negotiated with Singapore and London authorities. He added force to this order when, in the same year, he ruled that all dealings in land within any concession should have his personal consent.<sup>197</sup> In the following year he introduced another regulation to enable the concessionaire

to bypass British officials and minimize their interference. At an interview he persuaded the British Agent then, W. D. Scott, to agree that there was a distinction between prospecting licence and lease and that in the former instance the High Commissioner's ratification was not required but merely his counter-signature.<sup>198</sup> (The prospecting licence provided immediate income to the Sultan.) This is not to say that he did not issue leases after 1910; post-1910 leases were issued in great numbers in fact, along the lines proposed by Conlay, in areas unoccupied by other concessions.<sup>199</sup>

Ostensibly to meet the growing demands of land application, a Land Office based on the Johor model was established in 1912 and was managed by a Commissioner of Lands, Tengku Chik Ahmad bin Tengku Abdul Rahman. From the very beginning this institution served the interests of the Kerabat Diraja. Tengku Ngah Omar and Tengku Embong Musa, both sons-in-law of the Sultan, were made on one occasion to confess in a crowded Joint Court session that they had falsely acquired valuable land in Kuala Trengganu through the Land Office. As they both were Ministers of the state this case caused a great sensation in the town; moreover, it was the first time that Kerabat Diraja members were tried publicly.<sup>200</sup> In fact the whole Department, from the Commissioner of Lands down to those responsible for demarcation, were involved in securing land for themselves or their interest groups. Frequently the discovery of rich lands led to litigation in which the Land Officers themselves were involved.<sup>201</sup> The ramifications of the ruling class's domination of the economy were indeed extensive. Even in such technical matters as surveys it was usual for the surveyors to map out areas of interest to them or to higher officials.<sup>202</sup>

After its establishment in 1912 the Land Office, in principle, was entrusted with the power to issue planting and mining leases to applicants. By 1916, however, it had issued leases in respect of only 940 acres of mining land and 1,500 acres of planting land to a total of nine applicants.<sup>203</sup> In fact more land was alienated outside the Land Office than through it by members of the Kerabat Diraja.

The concession system was a ruling class creation to take advantage of the penetration of production capital in the plantation and mining sectors. In the interim period between the expansion of the state's economy and the consolidation of colonial rule, the economic initiatives of the ruling class were protected and furthered by their control over the indigenous political system. The Sultan



was the main beneficiary of the concession system. He secured income from a variety of the sources in respect of all the leases issued within the state. The Kerabat Diraja, too, were able to tap the developing economy, as the Sultan did, but on a lesser scale, through partnerships, royalties, ground rents, premiums and, at times, forced loans. The aim of the Sultan was to ensure that each adult member of the Ruling House had his or her own independent source of income, and he thus secured the economic advancement of a single family, giving it a firm grip on the changing economy. Other members of the ruling class, the Kerabat Am and the Orang Keistimewaan, were less successful in exploiting the concession system. Their sources of wealth during this period were drawn from other sectors of the economy.

1. See ART, 1925, draft, paragraph 46, in HCO 46/1926.
2. See Baginda Omar to Bujal, 31 August 1849, and Baginda Omar to Baba Kamsin, 28 August 1849, which are Surat 3 and 5 in BOP.
3. See Chapter 3, pp. 48-9.
4. See encl. 7, Datuk Nara Wangsa to MBO, 27 June 1921, in MBO 303/1339.
5. Encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenues, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 123. Also involved in this particular scheme was Tengku Mohamed Yusof bin Sultan Mahmud Mustapha Shah (see HCO 460/1910: W. L. Conlay to Federal Secretary, FMS, 7 March 1910; and CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 17 March 1910, desp. 107, f. 415).
6. See Chapter 2, pp. 22-4.
7. MBO 616/1342: Memorandum by J. E. Kempe, undated.
8. For the full text of this agreement see encl. 3 in HCO 307/1910.
9. For the terms of this concession see HCO 307/1910: Surat Keterangan of Agreement dated 26 April 1906.
10. See encl. D in HCO 307/1910.
11. His father, Chew Soon Hi, had earlier obtained the Sungai Mengkuang concession in Kemaman from the ruler (see CO 273/363: Anderson to CO, 14 October 1910, tel., ff. 147-151).
12. MBO 616/1342: Memorandum by J. E. Kempe, undated.
13. See Appendix 7, pp. 241-3. A map of the area can be found as encl. 25 in CML 191/1347.
14. See Appendix 7, pp. 241-3.
15. See Appendix 9, pp. 246-52.
16. See Appendix 10, pp. 253-62.
17. See Chapter 7, p. 187.
18. E. Thio, 'A Turning Point in Britain's Malayan Policy', *The Historical*

*Annual*, Vol. 3, 1957, pp. 6-7.

19. See Appendix 9, pp. 246-52.

20. CO 273/446: Guthrie and Company to CO, 31 August 1917, ff. 468-474. This was part of the Singapore-based company's early investment initiatives on the mainland (see Sjovald Cunyngham-Brown, *The Traders—A Story of Britain's Southeast Asian Commercial Adventure*, London, Newman Neame, 1971).

21. See HCO 1494/1908: Beckett to FO, 24 September 1908; encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 132; and CO 273/399: Young to CO, 25 June 1913, desp. 317, f. 484.

22. L. R. Robert, 'Kelantan 1890-1939: Government in Transition', MA thesis, Jabatan Sejarah, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1973, p. 77, fn. 48.

23. The East Asiatic Company extended a loan of about \$78,000 in 1906 to the Sultan, Tengku Mohamed Yusof bin Sultan Mahmud Mustapha Shah, and the Datuk Mata-Mata to help them purchase a number of Chinese-owned pepper plantations in Kemasik. By 1910 the loan, after repayments, had been reduced to \$51,000 (CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 17 March 1910, desp. 107, f. 415). Loans were also extended to Tengku Omar, Tengku Ahmad (CO 273/363: Anderson to CO, 24 November 1910, desp. 432, f. 418) and Tengku Ali bin Sultan Alam Shah (CO 273/361: Anderson to CO, 21 April 1910, desp. 156, f. 159).

24. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 132.

25. The background of these investors and the nature of their concessions are set out in Appendix 9, pp. 246-52.

26. See Appendix 10, pp. 253-62.

27. See Appendix 9, pp. 246-52.

28. See Appendix 10, pp. 253-62.

29. See Appendix 9, pp. 246-52.

30. The full dimensions of this elite involvement in the mining and plantation economy of the state can be seen in Appendix 10, pp. 253-62.

31. CO 273/367: Loughborough, Gedge, Nisbet and Drew to CO, 8 October 1910, f. 384.

32. See Appendix 9, pp. 246-52.

33. See Appendix 10, pp. 253-62.

34. HCO 432/1910: J. Anderson to W. L. Conlay, 18 March 1910, draft.

35. See Chapter 7, pp. 177-87, for a discussion on the role of the British Agent.

36. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 132. For an example of cap zuriat conditions see Appendix 8, pp. 244-5.

37. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 133. See Map 3.

38. For an example of a lease obtained directly from the Sultan see Appendix 7, pp. 241-3.

39. ART, 1918, p. 10, in HCO 824/1919. See CO 273/363: Anderson to CO, 14 October 1910, tel., ff. 147-152, for an example of a lease agreement signed with a cap zuriat holder.

40. See Appendix 9, pp. 246-52, and Appendix 10, pp. 253-62.

41. ART, 1918, p. 10, in HCO 824/1919.
42. See Appendix 10, pp. 253-62.
43. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 145.
44. *Ibid.*, f. 134.
45. See Appendix 10, pp. 253-62.
46. For a copy of the American's attractive proposal see CO 273/274: Swettenham to CO, 20 November 1901, secret, encl. D, ff. 567-573.
47. See Appendix 10, pp. 253-62.
48. ART, 1914, draft, p. 15, in HCO 1021/1915.
49. ART, 1926, p. 12.
50. See ART, 1349 AH (28 May 1930-17 May 1931), p. 9; and ART, 1932, p. 9.
51. ART, 1913, draft, p. 15, in HCO 919/1914. For a list of estates in 1914 see ART, 1914, draft, Appendix C, in HCO 1021/1915.
52. CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 17 March 1910, desp. 107, f. 416.
53. See *The Bucknill Commission Report, 1918*, Singapore, Government Printing Office, pp. 24-5; and ART, 1919, draft, p. 4, in HCO 1235/1920.
54. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 142.
55. DID 45/1940: Memorandum on the Financial Situation in Trengganu, conf., G. A. C. de Moubray, 21 January 1940.
56. ART, 1931, p. 15.
57. CO 273/350: Anderson to CO, 14 July 1909, desp. 225, f. 260.
58. See article 4 of the Trengganu-Great Britain Agreement dated 22 April 1910 in Appendix 13, p. 273.
59. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, f. 203.
60. CO 273/362: Anderson to CO, 12 July 1910, conf., ff. 51-62. These proposals were designed to increase revenue for the state in the eventuality of it coming under stronger British control but in the meantime the conditions were felt to be sufficient to control those companies which were trying to secure concessions in order to sell them.
61. *Ibid.*, ff. 58-59.
62. Appendix 9, pp. 246-52.
63. In 1911 the total tin ore exports from Trengganu to Singapore amounted to 7,174 pikul (ART, 1911, p. 6, in HCO 337/1913).
64. CO 273/399: Young to CO, 25 June 1913, desp. 317, f. 486.
65. CO 273/466: Guthrie and Company to CO, 31 August 1917, ff. 468-469.
66. CO 273/461: Young to CO, 8 November 1917, desp. 327, ff. 278-279. Prior to 1913 the company attempted to work the Sungai Sendok concession on a tributary basis with Chinese miners. However, the output from the concession was extremely low compared to that of the other two concessions. In 1910 it produced only 7.5 pikul as compared to Bundi's 4,380 pikul and Sungai Ayam's 1,657 pikul.
67. CO 273/375: Young to CO, 21 November 1911, desp. 489, f. 543.
68. See CO 273/399: Young to CO, 25 June 1913, desp. 317, f. 486; and CO 273/466: Guthrie and Company to CO, 31 August 1917, ff. 469-470.
69. CO 273/459: Young to CO, 10 January 1917, desp. 11, f. 25.
70. CO 273/400: Young to CO, 25 November 1913, desp. 577, f. 615.

71. CO 273/425: Young to CO, 24 March 1915, desp. 131, f. 525.

72. CO 273/461: Young to CO, 24 December 1917, desp. 374, ff. 489-490. The involvement of the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja in the Bundi mines was a subject of the report of a Commission set up to enquire into certain matters in the state (see *The Bucknill Commission Report, 1918*).

73. See encl. 1, Trengganu Government Service to Guthrie and Company Limited, 6 August 1917, in CO 273/461; Young to CO, 4 October 1917, desp. 298, f. 128.

74. See HCO 1318/1917; and CO 273/466: Guthrie and Company Limited to CO, 31 August 1917, ff. 464-478.

75. CO 273/486: Young to CO, 18 February 1919, desp. 46, f. 378.

76. The Sungai Ayam concession was also sold by Guthrie and Company in 1934 to Tham Cheng Yan. He was the grandson of Tham Kay Chong who was the original concession holder in 1896 (encl. 23, Sisson and Delay to CLM, 14 December 1934, in CLM 190/1347). The Tham family continued to have a working interest in the concession, as well as in the state, after the sale to Guthrie and Company by Tham Kay Chong in 1903. However, after the purchase of the Sungai Ayam concession the fortunes of that family declined. The British officials found the Tham brothers masters in the art of procrastination and concluded that their mining concern was nothing but a 'moribund enterprise' (Journal of AAK, July 1937, in BAT 178/1937). In 1938 the family tried unsuccessfully to sell the concession for \$200,000. However, in 1941 they managed to sublease the mines to a Johor company for six years at a price of \$30,000 (encl. 85, 87A, and 91 in CLM 190/1347). The State Council ruled that the *Hijrah* (Muslim calendar) year was to be applied for the duration of the concession and announced that the sixty-year lease was to expire on 11 June 1957. The Tham family failed to reverse the decision. The files end in 1959 with an application for a search enquiry into the background of the concession by Sir H. S. Lee (see enclosures in CLM 190/1347).

77. In 1923 parts of the Bundi concession were sold to two separate companies. The first was the Bundi Tin Dredging Company with a capital of £85,000 and its headquarters in Melbourne. This company introduced the first dredge in the state. The second company was the Freda Company with a capital of \$500,000 and which was owned by Henggeler and Martin of Kuala Lumpur. This company carried out the lode-mining operations in a nine square mile area within the concession (ART, 1923, p. 9; and HCO 1007/1928: BA to HCO, 30 September 1928).

78. Appendix 9, pp. 246-52.

79. HCO 1417/1912: W. D. Scott to HCO, 12 November 1912.

80. See CO 273/409: Young to CO, 16 February 1914, desp. 76, f. 395; Journal of AAK, 1938, W. Cole; and MD 121/1937: R. C. S. Harris to CLM, 7 January 1940.

81. CO 273/459: Young to CO, 10 January 1917, desp. 11, f. 22.

82. Journal of AAK, 1925, J. V. Cowgill, p. 135.

83. The only person who gained from this concession was Dr Kondo who possessed a lease for over 16,000 acres in Kemasik. His profits did not come from actual development of the concession but from its subdivision and sale. In 1920 he sold it in three blocks to Tambusau Company Limited (Tokyo), Isamai Wakita, and Malay Rubber Company for \$100,000, \$50,000, and \$30,000 respectively. The deeds of transfer were destroyed as a result of the 1923 Tokyo earthquake (see Statutory Declaration by Isamai Wakita of Tokyo, 13 February 1924, in CLM (Mines) 340/1342).

84. CO 273/384: Young to CO, 27 February 1912, conf., f. 385.
85. CO 273/363: Anderson to CO, 26 October 1910, desp. 401, f. 287.
86. See Appendix 10, pp. 253-62.
87. HCO 95/1912: W. D. Scott to HCO, 21 October 1911. H. Gild had two and a half years' medical training in South Australia (*The Bucknill Commission Report, 1918*, p. 99). Prior to his arrival in Trengganu, he was the manager of the Lahat mines in Perak (CO 273/375: Young to CO, 20 September 1911, desp. 423, f. 152). For his work on the mines he was awarded a medal and the title 'Datuk' by the Sultan in 1914 (ART, 1913, draft, paragraph 68, in HCO 919/1914). He lived in Trengganu for a long period and operated as a merchant, miner, broker, and attorney in the business circles.
88. See encl. 1, Bukit Tawang Concession Deed, 20 September 1911, in HCO 95/1912.
89. HCO 95/1912: W. D. Scott to HCO, 21 October 1911.
90. *Ibid.*
91. See CO 273/384: Young to CO, 11 January 1912, desp. 13, f. 51; and CO 273/385: Young to CO, 20 March 1912, desp. 114, f. 94.
92. CO 273/387: Young to CO, 19 September 1912, desp. 440, f. 220. For a copy of the transfer agreement dated 29 August 1912 see encl. in HCO 1272/1912.
93. CO 273/400: Young to CO, 21 August 1913, desp. 407, f. 104.
94. ART, 1913, draft, paragraph 68, in HCO 919/1914.
95. In 1936 Sultan Sulaiman applied for and obtained a prospecting licence for 1,000 acres in the same area (BAT 1388/1936: CLM to SUK, 23 November 1936).
96. *The Bucknill Commission Report, 1918*, p. 25. See also Appendix 10, pp. 253-62.
97. See HCO 1581/1911 for the text of the Mengkuang and Tebak concessions dated 28 February 1913.
98. ART, 1913, draft, paragraph 57, in HCO 919/1914.
99. CO 273/461: Young to CO, 24 December 1917, desp. 374, f. 489.
100. *The Bucknill Commission Report, 1918*, p. 124.
101. Besides the labour problem, the company directors were also divided in their opinion as to the future of the concession. Chew Woon Poh wanted to sell out but Coleman tried to get outside finance to work the mines (encl. 1, A. G. Coleman to CLM, 14 November 1924, in LOT 306/1343).
102. *Journal of AAK*, April 1937, p. 9, in BAT 178/1936.
103. ART, 1926, p. 11. On 18 June 1926 Tebak Tin Fields Limited mortgaged part of its properties to Coleman for the sum of \$17,289.08 (LOK 208/1347) and in 1928 the company finally sold its lease to a Japanese, H. Ishihari, for the sum of \$85,000 (encl. 2, Sisson and Delay to CLM, 22 December 1928). Ishihari had large iron-mining concerns in Johor. His company, the Ishihari Sangyo Koshi Limited, established in Kemaman large iron and manganese mines (Kee Yeh Siew, 'The Japanese in Malaya before 1942', *Journal of the South Seas Society*, Vol. 20, 1965-6, p. 55).
104. For an outline of this agreement dated 19 September 1908 see HCO 467/1910: W. L. Conlay to Federal Secretary, FMS, 11 March 1910.
105. See, for example, the efforts of Captain R. W. Morris of SS *Hock Lee*, CO 273/362: Anderson to CO, 25 July 1910, desp. 285, f. 139; HCO 114/1912: W. D. Scott to Federal Secretary, FMS, 16 December 1910; and ART, 1913, draft, paragraph 62, in HCO 919/1914.

106. CO 273/446: Young to CO, 13 July 1916, desp. 235, f. 40.
107. CO 273/446: Young to CO, 6 March 1917, desp. 68, f. 328.
108. CO 273/446: Young to CO, 26 September 1916, desp. 308, f. 349.
109. HCO 821/1910: W. D. Scott to HCO, 4 November 1910.
110. See *ibid.* and CO 273/361: Anderson to CO, 28 June 1910, desp. 244, f. 590.
111. LOK 127/1349: G. A. C. de Moubray to Committee Chap Kerajaan Trengganu, 21 May 1929. The company was not a success and in the 1920s it did not invest capital for development (minute, J. L. Humphreys, 1 August 1923, on SUK 107/1341).
112. Encl. 1, Tham Cheng Yan to CLM, 3 December 1928, in CLM 193/1347.
113. See ART, 1913, draft, paragraph 65, in HCO 919/1914; and encl. 8, Extracts from G. J. Henbrey's Diary for August 1910, in HCO 821/1910.
114. See Surat Kuasa Sayyid Yahaya Penghulu Baluk, 25 November 1915, and Surat Kuasa Sayyid Yahaya, 15 February 1916, issued by Tengku Sulaiman in SUK 128/1334.
115. Encl. 2, Hutang-Hutang Orang Yang Berkenaan Atas DYMM Sultan Sulaiman, 7 September 1920, in SUK 527/1338.
116. CO 273/459: Young to CO, 6 March 1917, desp. 68, f. 328.
117. CO 273/459: Young to CO, 11 April 1917, desp. 110, f. 556.
118. Encl. 5, Sayyid Hussein Ghalam Albukhorie to SUK, 14 October 1920, in SUK 527/1338.
119. For the terms of the agreement see SUK 527/1338.
120. Journal of AAK, September 1924, J. V. Cowgill, p. 24. In the 1930s after the breakup of the concession system (see Chapter 7), a British-registered company, Tropical Plantations Limited, operated in the area. In 1935 it acquired about 5,000 acres of rubber land from smallholders. The prime backers in this scheme were Parry, a well-known rubber magnate, and his two sons. Later they formed the Jabor Valley Estates which was the largest rubber concern in the area. See minute, Pretty, 15 November 1935, J. E. Kempe to HCO, 30 October 1935, and Messrs Presgrave and Matthews to HCO, 7 November 1935, in HCO 1162/1935; and BAT 739/1936: N. R. Jarrett to HCO, 17 January 1937.
121. Encl. 5, Sayyid Hussein Ghalam Albukhorie to SUK, 14 October 1920, in SUK 527/1338.
122. Journal of AAK, July 1937, in BAT 178/1937; and encl. 1, Chenderong Concession, J. R. Neave, 19 September 1931, in CLM 194/1350.
123. CO 273/384: Young to CO, 24 January 1912, desp. 32, f. 171.
124. See encl. 9, Chenderong Concession, J. R. Neave, undated, in CLM 194/1350; and encl. 3A, Certified Copy of Demise of Lands to the Company, 10 April 1919, in CLM 213/1347.
125. See CO 273/473: Young to CO, 14 September 1918, desp. 254, f. 251; CO 273/471: Young to CO, 24 January 1918, desp. 46, f. 246; encl. 1, Busu bin Noh to SUK, 30 March 1921; and encl. 5, Keputusan Sah, 29 February 1920, in SUK 474/1339.
126. Journal of AAK, July 1937, p. 7, in BAT 178/1937.
127. See Appendix 10, pp. 253-62.
128. See CO 273/410: Young to CO, 18 March 1914, desp. 147, f. 162; and ART, 1913, draft, paragraph 67, in HCO 919/1914.
129. Encl. 15, Grigg to Fisher, 25 August 1936, in CLM 41/1936.
130. HCO 432/1910: J. Anderson to W. L. Conlay, 18 March 1910, draft.

131. HCO 553/1910: W. L. Conlay to Federal Secretary, FMS, 3 April 1910.
132. HCO 432/1910: J. Anderson to W. L. Conlay, 18 March 1910, draft.
133. See Statement of Lim Chuan Chian, 25 February 1910, enclosed in HCO 432/1910.
134. For the various phases of the negotiations see Memorandum submitted by Messrs Rowland and Allen, 31 March 1910, in HCO 553/1910; CO 273/362; Anderson to CO, 25 July 1910, desp. 285, ff. 139-141; and CO 273/362; Anderson to CO, 19 September 1910, desp. 359, ff. 427-428. For an outline revealing the claims of Tengku Abu Bakar, the company and the High Commissioner see also HCO 1313/1910: W. D. Scott to HCO, 1 September 1910.
135. For the text of this agreement see enclosures in HCO 1313/1910.
136. CO 273/446: Young to CO, 24 August 1916, desp. 275, f. 236.
137. HCO 1313/1910: Allen and Gledhill to HCO, 15 December 1910.
138. HCO 1313/1910: W. D. Scott to Roland Allen, 19 December 1910.
139. HCO 1313/1910: HCO to W. D. Scott, 4 November 1911.
140. CO 273/374: Brockman to CO, 24 July 1911, desp. 344, ff. 428-429.
141. CO 273/375: Young to CO, 2 October 1911, f. 229.
142. HCO 1313/1910: HCO to W. D. Scott, 4 December 1911.
143. See HCO 1313/1910: Dungun River Concession Syndicate Limited to W. D. Scott, 1 March 1912; and CO 273/386: Young to CO, 20 June 1912, desp. 272, f. 110.
144. See CO 273/388: Young to CO, 18 November 1912, desp. 563, f. 81; and HCO 362/1913: Sharpe Ross and Company to W. D. Scott, 6 August 1912.
145. HCO 362/1913: Allen and Gledhill to HCO, 11 March 1913.
146. HCO 362/1913: Allen and Gledhill to E. A. Dickson, 2 April 1913.
147. HCO 362/1913: HCO to E. A. Dickson, 1 May 1913, draft.
148. HCO 362/1913: E. A. Dickson to HCO, 13 April 1913.
149. CO 273/411: Wilkinson to CO, 15 July 1914, desp. 370, f. 281.
150. CO 273/445: Young to CO, 7 June 1916, desp. 186, f. 424. The total output in 1916 was about 256 tons as compared to the 1915 figure of 156 tons (CO 273/459: Young to CO, 5 April 1917, desp. 109, f. 521).
151. CO 273/446: Young to CO, 24 August 1916, desp. 275, f. 234.
152. CO 273/459: Young to CO, 5 April 1917, desp. 109, f. 521.
153. CO 273/446: Young to CO, 24 August 1916, desp. 275, f. 235. A few years later the company transported its raw produce down the coast by a light railway it built and maintained (encl. 15, Grigg to Fisher, 25 August 1936, in CLM 41/1936).
154. The British government gave every encouragement to the mining of wolfram (CO 273/471: Young to CO, 20 January 1918, desp. 57, ff. 303-306).
155. Encl. 15, Grigg to Fisher, 25 August 1936, in CLM 41/1936.
156. Lim Chuan Chian was a remarkable businessman who had the ability of surviving even when the odds were against him. Besides the mine, he had his business in Kuala Trengganu—he was the proprietor of Chop Teck Siang. He was also a revenue farmer and was a partner in the notorious opium farm (see Chapter 3 and CO 273/460: Young to CO, 7 May 1917, desp. 139, f. 34) and in addition he had planted a rubber estate of 490 acres. After his death his two sons managed the family interest. As for the mine, it remained closed for much of the 1920s and 1930s. However, with the arms build-up in Europe in the 1930s there was a renewed interest in the area (encl. 3, P. A. B. McKerron to BA, 21 October 1937, in CLM 234/1937). In 1937 the State Council opted in favour of the East Asiatic Company, which were 'old and tried friends', and gave them a mining licence (encl. 7 in CLM 234/1937).

157. The Nippon Mining Company began exporting its first extracts only in September 1930 (BAT 491/1935: CLM to BA, 24 March 1935). The company exploited the well-known Bukit Besi mine.

158. CO 273/446: Young to CO, 24 August 1916, desp. 275, f. 236.

159. CO 273/459: Young to CO, 10 January 1917, desp. 11, f. 22.

160. He wanted to occupy land for the cultivation of cassava and coconut (CO 273/363: Anderson to CO, 12 October 1910, desp. 389, f. 91).

161. Encl., Statement of Tengku Ngah Aishah's Concession, undated, in HCO 578/1912.

162. See HCO 578/1912: Allen and Gledhill to W. D. Scott, 13 March 1912; CO 273/387: Young to CO, 19 September 1912, desp. 440, f. 220; CO 273/388: Young to CO, 18 November 1912, desp. 563, ff. 75 and 79; and CO 273/388: Young to CO, 18 December 1912, ff. 342-343.

163. CO 273/409: Young to CO, 16 February 1914, desp. 76, f. 395.

164. For some examples see CO 273/375: Young to CO, 21 November 1911, desp. 489, f. 544; CO 273/375: Wilkinson to CO, 14 December 1911, desp. 536, f. 653; CO 273/384: Young to CO, 11 January 1912, desp. 13, f. 48.

165. For the text of the agreement see HCO 281/1918.

166. Tengku Ngah Aishah in fact endeavoured, unsuccessfully, to cancel this lease when she received this better offer. It appears that Ng Hong Guan was misled in the discussions into believing that he had the option for the whole concession and not merely, as Tengku Ngah Aishah later insisted, the right to select between 500 and 5,000 acres (encl. 1, Extract from Humphrey's Memorandum, undated, in HCO 281/1918).

167. Such demands on the investors were commonly made by the ruling class (CO 273/472: Young to CO, 11 April 1918, desp. 115, ff. 27B-28).

168. See Chapter 2, pp. 30-1, for a discussion on how the judicial instruments were used as a method to exact revenue.

169. See enclosures in MBGM 45/1336.

170. CO 273/473: Young to CO, 14 September 1918, desp. 254, f. 246.

171. SUK 22/1337: Tengku Ngah Aishah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III to Encik Da, Wakil Pesuruhjaya Kuala Paka, 23 January 1919.

172. See enclosures in SUK 684/1338 for the offer, and minute, J. L. Humphreys, 21 September 1920, on this file.

173. See Appendix 9, pp. 246-52, and Appendix 10, pp. 253-62.

174. For an extract of the deed see encl. 1-3 in CLM 137/1353.

175. See CO 273/361: Anderson to CO, 28 June 1910, desp. 244, f. 591; and CO 273/362: Anderson to CO, 25 July 1910, desp. 285, f. 137.

176. See encl. 1-3 in CLM 137/1353; and CO 273/363: Anderson to CO, 12 October 1910, desp. 389, f. 89.

177. See CO 273/374: Brockman to CO, 20 June 1911, desp. 292, f. 51; and CO 273/375: Wilkinson to CO, 14 December 1911, desp. 536, f. 655.

178. See CO 273/399: Young to CO, 25 June 1913, desp. 317, ff. 483-484; and CO 273/400: Young to CO, 21 August 1913, desp. 407, f. 105.

179. CO 273/362: Anderson to CO, 25 July 1910, desp. 285, f. 137.

180. For comments on the company's activities see *ibid.*; CO 273/399: Young to CO, 25 June 1913, desp. 317, ff. 483-484; and CO 273/446: Young to CO, 9 October 1916, desp. 329, f. 401.

181. HCO 1420/1917: J. L. Humphreys to HCO, 28 August 1917.



182. CO 273/363: Anderson to CO, 24 November 1910, desp. 421, f. 417. The company also carried out experiments in cattle breeding; it had a herd of 300 head (HCO 1827/1918: J. L. Humphreys to HCO, 16 November 1918). Attempts were also made to purchase certain pepper plantations in the Kretai River basin (CO 273/386: Young to CO, 21 August 1912, desp. 390, f. 465).

183. See HCO 1932/1916: J. L. Humphreys to HCO, 6 November 1916; and HCO 1420/1917: J. L. Humphreys to HCO, 28 August 1917.

184. See minute, J. L. Humphreys, 5 December 1917, on HCO 1420/1917; and Sultan Zainal Abidin III to HCO, 5 November 1917, enclosed in the same file.

185. HCO 423/1918: J. L. Humphreys to HCO, 20 August 1918.

186. *ART*, 1926, p. 12.

187. See List of Estates of 100 Acres and Over in Trengganu in 1930, enclosed in CLM 338/1349.

188. See note 23.

189. CO 273/384: Young to CO, 24 January 1912, desp. 32, f. 170.

190. Encl. 11, Note by A. T. Newbould, undated, in CLM 418/1353.

191. In 1921 Trengganu felt the effects of the depressed state of the tin market. Many of the leading tin mines reported losses. See minutes of H. C. Eckhardt, 20 April 1921, 21 January 1922 and 2 April 1922, on HCO 300/1921, and enclosures in the same file.

192. British officials often commented that the Sultan had a limited income and they expected him to have greater control over the collection and distribution of all sources of income (see H. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States of Trengganu and Kelantan', *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1897, pp. 15-16 and 21; and CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 17 March 1910, ff. 414-415).

193. Encl. 7, Datuk Nara Wangsa to MBO, 27 June 1921, in MBO 303/1339.

194. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, f. 214.

195. The High Commissioner was highly critical of the numerous concessions that were made out to the Royal Family. During a visit to Trengganu in October 1911 he made a reference to this subject to the Sultan and obtained the latter's tacit approval that, in future, only leases based on the outline proposed by Conlay would be granted (see minutes, A. Young, 6 March 1912, and J. L. Humphreys, 11 March 1912, on HCO 329/1912). In 1914, for example, the Sultan demarcated 2,000 acres for his son Tengku Ismail—a boy of only seven years of age—who had not previously been issued a cap zuriat. The land was half jungle and half cultivated (CO 273/411: Wilkinson to CO, 22 June 1914, desp. 342, f. 173).

196. See enclosures in HCO 1272/1912.

197. HCO 1417/1912: W. D. Scott to HCO, 12 November 1912.

198. HCO 1270/1912: W. D. Scott to HCO, 8 April 1913.

199. The large number of modified leases issued after 1910 in areas outside the pre-1910 concession network were an important source of the Sultan's income. In 1912, for example, he issued a lease to the rich and influential Ang Siah Im of Singapore which covered an area in the Nerus River system. (For the title of the deed see encl. 3, Sungai Nerus Concession, 22 June 1912, in HCO 1370/1912.) Another notable lessee was A. Christiansen who was a Danish national and had served in the Siamese navy (CO 273/373: Brockman to CO, 23 May 1911, desp. 225, f. 606). He subsequently transferred his lease to his friend, P. Johansen, who was another Dane from Bangkok. The new owner paid the Sultan \$2,000 in premiums and also undertook to pay ground rent and royalties. (For the terms of the lease see enclosure

in HCO 1533/1911.) The lessee established the Bukit Tengah Coconut Estate in an area outside Tengku Embong Musa's Kretai concession. By 1914 the company, after securing additional land, had 1,500 acres, of which 1,420 acres were under coconut cultivation (ART, 1913, draft, paragraph 50, in HCO 1919/1914; and ART, 1914, draft, Appendix C, in HCO 1021/1915).

200. Tengku Ngah Omar was the Chief Justice while Tengku Embong Musa was the State Treasurer (CO 273/427: Young to CO, 21 July 1915, desp. 326, f. 305).

201. CO 273/472: Young to CO, 11 April 1918, desp. 115, f. 27B; and ART, 1917, draft, paragraph 19, in HCO 1445/1918.

202. CO 273/473: Young to CO, 14 September 1918, desp. 254, f. 252.

203. ART, 1334 AH, draft, paragraph 26, in HCO 33/1917. Various British Agents tried to introduce reforms in the Department and at times even tried to control it but all their efforts failed. It was generally suggested that things would only improve with the appointment of a British Land Officer (HCO 543/1918: J. L. Humphreys to HCO, 21 March 1918).



*Ringgit Tiang*  
(Spanish Dollar)

## *Cap Kurnia: The Inland Penetration*

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THE third visible response of the ruling class to the changing economic forces in the late nineteenth century was its inland penetration to the basic unit of subsistence production—land.<sup>1</sup> This transformation of the ruling class from mere collectors of kuala-based pajak rents on the one hand, to controllers of the main mode of peasant production on the other, stands out as an important milestone in the expansion of their sources of wealth. Its members revived hitherto unused state land rights to absorb surplus agricultural produce through the exaction of agricultural tithes from the largely subsistence economy of the peasantry and to gain immediate profit through sales and leases of such land. There were others who attempted to work their newly acquired land on a commercial basis. The workings of the cap kurnia system manifested the penetration of a monied economy into the peasant economy. It marked the shift at the peasant level from production for essentially use value to production for exchange in the market. The accumulators of profit from this development were the ruling class.

Until the late nineteenth century, the basic livelihood of the Trengganu rakyat was relatively untouched by the ruling class. No direct agricultural taxes were levied by the kuala-dwelling officials nor was there a local landed aristocracy which could have made demands on the crops of the peasant cultivator. Apart from minor charges and services, such as court fines and kerah,<sup>2</sup> the major form of tax paid by the peasant was on surplus produce exported from the state. As a consumer he also paid tax when he purchased goods imported into the state.

The peasant production system was a self-sufficient one. The prime consideration was not so much to produce a surplus but rather to produce enough for the family cooking pot, to feed the immediate family and a few dependent relatives and friends. This fact of life was reflected in the Malay proverb 'Kais pagi makan pagi, kais petang makan petang'<sup>3</sup> (Whatever is scraped up in the

morning is eaten in the morning; and whatever is scraped up in the evening is eaten in the evening). The peasant's *kampung* economy evolved around the river, the forest, and a small area of land near his dwelling, from which he obtained his rice, fish, and other domestic requirements. Occasionally, if his needs were greater, he would collect jungle produce to barter for additional items that he needed. Generally, wet padi was cultivated on the plains and *huma* (hill padi) in the inland areas.<sup>4</sup> The peasant's life-style was grimly described by the British Agent in 1917 when he stated that 'The majority of the peasant and fisher classes—about 80% of the total population—are, in fact, poor, and possess little above the margin of subsistence: they are poorly fed, poorly housed and poorly clothed'.<sup>5</sup>

The peasant's landholding was not extensive. It was determined in part by his simple needs and by the wisdom of knowing that the accumulation of wealth attracted demands from others more powerful.<sup>6</sup> However, the main factor that limited the peasant's agricultural acreage was the very principle on which he claimed rights of tenure. The peasant held his right to land on the basis of continued cultivation of unoccupied or unclaimed land. Hence, given the absence of technological changes in the methods of agricultural cultivation, the average peasant holding was limited to about two acres.<sup>7</sup> During the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin III, this fundamental principle of peasant land tenure was threatened by the attempts of the ruling class to control the source of agricultural production. The latter used the hitherto unenforced Malay principle—that all land belonged to the ruler and that the cultivator was required to pay a tithe on his produce in return for his right to the use of the land.<sup>8</sup>

The new claims of the ruling class appeared in the late nineteenth century in the form of the *cap kurnia* which was in effect a deed of royal gift from the ruler, given either verbally or in a written document. Previously the ruler had issued such deeds on a limited scale to those who performed special favours for him.<sup>9</sup> They were in this sense truly gifts awarded by the ruler. By the late nineteenth century, however, these royal bestowals had become corrupted and were given increasingly as instruments intended for the maintenance of the ruling class. There appeared in this period an unprecedented surge by that class in large numbers into the countryside brandishing their newly acquired *cap kurnia*.

These *cap kurnia*, especially those that were in documented form,

clearly showed that the holder had property rights over the area indicated by the title, and the new owners were thus technically in a position to exact in practice from the peasant the tithes that hitherto had been more a matter of theory. The *cap kurnia*, in effect, had created, in a short space of time, a new landlord class.

These new titles went against the grain of accepted practice. They covered extensive areas, well beyond the cultivation possible through the efforts of a family unit. (Areas above 100 acres were not uncommonly given by the Sultan.) In short, there was a complete disregard for the customary principle of tenure based on continuous cultivation.

There were two types of *cap kurnia*.<sup>10</sup> The first and more common was awarded to a person and his or her heirs in direct succession and in perpetuity, and explicitly provided that no ground rent was to be paid by the title holder. The latter provision appears strange in a state where such rents had never been collected;<sup>11</sup> it was in anticipation of the possible introduction of colonial land taxes implemented elsewhere on the Malay Peninsula. The second type of *cap kurnia* gave the holder the express right to transfer the property outside the normal line of his heirs. This category had an obvious eye to the future commercial value of the land and gave the *cap kurnia* holders an opportunity to feather their nests on a large scale.

The new land-owners were not tillers of the soil; rather, they were now legally in a position to draw income from the labour of the peasant cultivators within their titles. The granting of the *cap kurnia* ownership of land, based on Malay *adat* which expressed that all land belonged to the ruler, had theoretically dispossessed the peasant cultivator, and effectively reduced him to a mere claimant of the trees and crops planted by himself and his family. He was no longer to be regarded as the owner of the soil he cultivated.<sup>12</sup>

The new land-owners, however, in order to turn the theory into practice, had first to establish a landlord-tenant relationship with the peasant cultivator working on the land granted. Where administrative control over the rural countryside was not highly developed this was not always easy to achieve, and in spite of isolated cases where *cap kurnia* holders were able to collect produce from their 'tenants', there is little reason to believe that the ruling class-subject class relationship based on the collection of tithes was extensively practised prior to the advance of the ruling class into the interior of the state in the 1920s. Until then the issue of *cap kurnia* grants was largely a matter of conferring documentary authority.

Usually the ruling class in relation to the peasant economy were merely pajak rent earners and not collectors of agricultural produce.<sup>13</sup> It was only in the third decade of the twentieth century when other forms of income became increasingly difficult to obtain that earlier grants of cap kurnia became the basis of serious attempts on the part of the 'landlords' to exact tithes from their subject peasants.

There existed a variety of local terms which referred to the payment of tithes. The more common ones were '*cabut*', '*pawah*', and '*bahagian*'. There existed also a variety of ways in which, if exacted, payment might be made. The payment of cabut ranged from the one extreme which favoured the tenant to the other which showed a bias towards the landlord. An account of the former system states that the payment of cabut was not based specifically on the crop. It goes on to say that:

At the time when the *chap* holder selects 10% of the trees, the whole of the crop from which [he selects] shall be his. He therefore gets considerably more than 10% of the crop as he obviously selects the best trees. On the other hand, his right continues only during the life of the trees, provided that the holder of the land from him has not wilfully destroyed them. The chapholder has no right to replace the trees if for instance they are struck by lightning. The position becomes gradually reversed, the chapholder from being the sole owner becoming lesser than lessee ... his rights being at last extinguished as the trees he has selected die off.<sup>14</sup>

However, the above-mentioned method of collection of cabut was not commonly practised. The cabut system operated generally in favour of the cap holder and the land did not pass into the hands of the cultivator. The more common method of the operation of the cabut relationship was described as follows:

The chapholder's right in the land continues in perpetuity in the event of the trees of his choice dying off or being destroyed he can replant or not as he pleases—if the trees of the tributor die off or are being destroyed his right in the land lapses and he may only replant on a fresh agreement of one-tenth with the chapholder. If the agreement was with the raja the land reverted to him.<sup>15</sup>

Under the cabut system it was usual for the peasant cultivator to pay one-tenth of his produce from tree crops to his landlord. However, the division of produce from padi fields was more favourable to the landlord. In this case the cap holder collected one-fifth of all padi reaped.<sup>16</sup> An even larger proportion of the produce

would be claimed by the landlord if he had made contributions of seeds, food, and other provisions.

The growth and development of the cabut system of landlord-tenant relations was a slow and arduous one. A partial insight into this process of capturing the roots, as it were, of the peasant agricultural production system can be traced with some difficulty in the documents, especially in the accounts given by various British officials, who in the course of their duty accumulated valuable material relating to land claims based mainly on oral tradition. Documents from the ruler's office also throw light on the process. Part of the corpus of literature was generated by the litigious nature of the Trengganu land-owner of whom it was said that if he could raise the necessary fees he would rarely admit defeat over land matters until he had taken his case to the highest court of appeal.<sup>17</sup>

The inland expansion of the ruling class began as a mid-nineteenth-century trickle during the reigns of Baginda Omar and Sultan Ahmad II before the floodgates were opened at the end of the century.<sup>18</sup> However, it was well into the twentieth century before the new owners met limited success in raising revenue from the land. They confronted stubborn peasants and British officials who stepped in to control their ambitions.<sup>19</sup> The majority of the cap holders drew tithes from the peasant subsistence economy, while others either leased or sold their land to developers for more immediate gains or encouraged the cultivation of rubber and other crops for the market as long-term investment. The rest were forced by government to surrender their claims, unless they could prove their effective rights. In the period of general expansion—prior to the arrival of the British Adviser and his supporting officials who slowed down this process—many of the ruling class members used their position in the political system to assert rights of ownership over the land. These vague rights rested on the claim of a royal gift by word of mouth of the ruler. There was little effective check on a member of that class who could claim that the ruler had verbally given him land. One such case will be illustrated below.

A well-documented account of property ownership was that of Tengku Abdul Rahim, the brother of Sultan Ahmad II, who lived during the reigns of Baginda Omar, Sultan Ahmad II, and Sultan Zainal Abidin III and died in about 1893. It is possible to reconstruct his estate because of the protracted appeals made by his distinctly eccentric son, Tengku Chik, to various government departments.<sup>20</sup> His constant petitions have left behind a substantial

corpus of documents which gives an excellent insight into the land-ownership of a leading member of the ruling class. It will be seen from Tables 4-6 that Tengku Abdul Rahim had distinct property rights over some areas, while in other areas his rights were uncertain and came under challenge and resistance when his sons attempted at a later date to enforce them.

TABLE 4  
Properties of Tengku Abdul Rahim  
bin Yang Dipertuan Muda Tengku Mahmud

<i>Description of Property</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Purchaser</i>	<i>Price (\$)</i>
1. Coconut dusun and padi land	Beladau	Datuk Sri Amar Diraja	7,400
2. Coconut dusun	Chendering in Kuala Ibai	Engku Haji Awang	500
3. Coconut dusun	Chendering in Kuala Ibai	Tahir bin Drahrman	500
4. Coconut dusun	Chendering in Kuala Ibai	Haji Ibrahim	500
5. Coconut dusun	Chendering in Kuala Ibai	Derahman bin Diman	200
6. Padi land	Chendering in Kuala Ibai	Mat Diah	200
7. Dusun, padi and <i>nipah</i> ( <i>Nypa fruticans</i> , a coastal palm)	Baruh Pa' Derahman in Gelugor	Engku Tuan Kechik	4,200
8. Padi land	Padang Mengkuang	Engku Tuan Indut	300
9. Padi land	Padang Mengkuang	Penghulu Tahir	1,000
10. Coconut dusun and padi land	Kampung Kubang Tangga in Sungai Rengas	Haji Tuan Kadzi	2,300



TABLE 5  
 Properties Claimed as Belonging to Tengku Abdul Rahim  
 bin Yang Dipertuan Muda Tengku Mahmud by Tengku Chik  
 bin Tengku Abdul Rahim

<i>Description of Property</i>	<i>Location</i>
1. Coconut dusun, banana, padi and others	Tapu <sup>1</sup>
2. Gambier dusun	Tanggal <sup>2</sup>
3. Kampung land	Kampung Lama
4. Kampung land	Kampung Bangsal
5. Kampung land	Kampung Padang, Tengku Chik
6. Kampung land	Kampung Engku Sar in Paya Bunga (in Kuala Trengganu) <sup>3</sup>
7. Coconut dusun, areca nut and others	Padang Mengkuang
8. Coconut dusun and others	Gong Krinsi in Gelugor
9. Padi land	Baruh Chuchok
10. Padi land	Alor Limbat <sup>4</sup>
11. Coconut dusun, areca nut and others	Pasir Tinggi, Telemong <sup>5</sup>
12. Coconut dusun and others	Alor Limbat <sup>6</sup>
13. Areca-nut dusun and fruit dusun	Pasir Nyior in Tersat <sup>7</sup>
14. Coconut dusun and others	Chendering
15. Kampung land	Kampung Balek Bukit <sup>8</sup>
16. Coconut and areca-nut dusun, <i>rotan saga</i> and others	Bari <sup>9</sup>
17. Coconut dusun	Chendering
18. Coconut dusun	Baran Chendering
19. Coconut dusun, areca-nut dusun and others	Belukar Gorek

Source: Encl. 9 in CLM 214/1348.

<sup>1</sup>There were several petitions by Tengku Chik relating to this land. According to him, his father had obtained a cap kurnia from Baginda Omar and he subsequently

instructed Tuan Mansor, the brother of Temenggong Telok Pasu, to clear the land and cultivate coconut and padi. Originally about fifteen people were involved in the scheme and each was paid \$15 to run a house and look after the property. Later Tengku Abdul Rahim brought in Chinese coolies to cultivate gambier. Since the time of the early settlers, about the middle of the nineteenth century, there had been a constant stream of newcomers who stayed on the property with the landlord's permission. They agreed to cultivate on the cabut system and paid one-third on all coconut trees planted, one quarter on all padi, and one-tenth on all cassava and other crops. In about 1930 they stopped making payments for some unknown reason. The petitions of Tengku Chik were not heeded. The Land Office earlier had cancelled the cap (see CLM 254/1349: Tengku Chik bin Abdul Rahim to Sultan Sulaiman, 4 June 1931; encl. 15 in CLM 214/1348; and encl. 1, Tengku Chik bin Abdul Rahim to SUK, 25 May 1948, in SUK 556/1948).

<sup>2</sup>The property was claimed by another and by 1930 it had reverted to jungle (see encl. 15 in CLM 214/1348).

<sup>3</sup>Initially the government resumed this property from the ex-Sultan Muhammad but much later it recognized that the estate of Tengku Abdul Rahim, too, had a valid claim. It offered Tengku Chik the sum of \$200 per acre for his four acres but this was turned down. Tengku Chik insisted that his father's property was much more extensive. He appealed to the Land Office and the files on this particular case end here (minutes, H. P. Bryson, 30 July 1929 and 2 February 1930, on CLM 149/1346).

There were several instances in which Tengku Chik's claims for town land were disputed by rival claimants (see CLR 207/1347: H. P. Bryson to CLM, 20 November 1928; encl. 16 in CLR 42/1352; CLR 44/1352: Decision of D. Headly, 11 September 1934; and encl. 43, Keputusan Mahkamah Tanah, 9 March 1937, in CLR 45/1352).

<sup>4</sup>Wan Embong, the rival claimant, stated that he had obtained a title from the Sultan's office (see encl. 15 in CLM 214/1348).

<sup>5</sup>There were reports that Tengku Ngah Omar did make an effort to get the kampung people to pay him cabut but they refused and he did not press them further (encl. 15 in CLM 214/1348).

<sup>6</sup>At least three attempts were made by Tengku Chik in 1930, 1940, and 1948 to get the Land Office to reconsider his claim to 150 acres in this area. On all three occasions his appeal was turned down (CLM 458/1940: Tengku Chik's claim in Alor Limbat).

<sup>7</sup>The area was under cultivation when Tengku Chik appeared. He appointed Penghulu Salleh, the local headman, to be in charge of the area and to collect cabut payments. The peasants absolutely refused to pay and nothing came of the matter (see encl. 15 in CLM 214/1348).

<sup>8</sup>In a statement Tengku Chik alleged that the lots in Kampung Balek Bukit had been bought by his father and over the years people had settled there, some with the permission and others without the consent of Tengku Abdul Rahim. However, the settlers in the area had an entirely different story. They expressed the belief that they had inherited the land *tapis menapis* (lit. 'sifted', inherited land) from their ancestors. The Collector of Land Revenue who investigated the case rejected the claim of Tengku Chik and upheld that of the local settlers. See statements of the various contending parties in CLR 74/1349: Tengku Chik versus Haji Wan Endut bin Othman and others.

<sup>9</sup>The government had previously rejected the claims of Tengku Ngah Omar over the area (see encl. 15 in CLM 214/1348).

TABLE 6  
Other Claims (Dated 1933)  
Made by Tengku Chik bin Tengku Abdul Rahim<sup>1</sup>

<i>Description of Property</i>	<i>Location</i>
1. Mining land	Bukit Kembang in Kemaman <sup>2</sup>
2. Dusun	Setiu <sup>3</sup>
3. Padi land	Tapu in Ulu Trengganu <sup>4</sup>
4. Dusun and padi land	Kampung Undang <sup>5</sup>
5. Fruit, coconut and areca-nut dusun	Kuala Telemong <sup>6</sup>
6. <i>Tanah kebenaran</i> (alienated land)	Tanggol (Batu Besar) in Ulu Trengganu
7. Tanah kebenaran	Tersat in Ulu Trengganu
8. Kampung land	Kuala Trengganu
9. Kampung land	Kuala Trengganu

Source: Encl. 8, Tengku Chik to Sultan Sulaiman, 29 August 1933, in CLM 70/1352.

<sup>1</sup>N. R. Jarett noted on 9 January 1934 that the lands were '... so scattered and the boundaries or titles, if any so difficult to identify and apparently so little known to the petitioner himself' (encl. 8, Tengku Chik to Sultan Sulaiman, 29 August 1933, in CLM 70/1352).

<sup>2</sup>This mining land, it was claimed, was a gift from the Sultan to Tengku Abdul Rahim who picked 500 acres from a 5,000-acre block (encl. 8, Tengku Chik to Sultan Sulaiman, 29 August 1933, in CLM 70/1352).

<sup>3</sup>Tengku Abdul Rahim was reputed to have expended capital to plant *rotan* (rattan) and other crops (encl. 8, Tengku Chik to Sultan Sulaiman, 29 August 1933, in CLM 70/1352).

<sup>4</sup>See Table 5, note 3.

<sup>5</sup>Tengku Chik demanded recognition of his rights over 1,000 acres in this area. However, he could not prove that the peasants had paid *cabut* to his father which was the basis of his claim. All the peasants asserted that they had no knowledge of Tengku Chik's rights and they claimed their individual lots as *tebas tebang* (lit. 'cleared land', cultivated) of their ancestors (see encl. 20, SO to CLR, 23 January 1934, in CLM 70/1352).

<sup>6</sup>In the 1920s Tengku Chik endeavoured to collect *cabut* in the areas of Kuala Telemong, Tanggol, and Tersat but he failed as the cultivators either refused to pay him or deserted the area (minute, D. Headly, 29 April 1934, on CLM 70/1352).

The properties listed in Table 4, which were mainly coconut *dusun* (orchards) and padi land, were sold by his eldest son, Tengku

Ngah Omar, prior to 1922.<sup>21</sup> It is unclear whether these cultivated lots were of the cap kurnia type but it is certain that Tengku Abdul Rahim did in fact own them as is evident by the sale of these lots. Tables 5 and 6, on the other hand, were two other lists of properties claimed by his son, Tengku Chik, who in some instances attempted to collect cabut from the peasants. In addition, Tengku Abdul Rahim left behind accumulated wealth of \$28,000 comprising jewellery, fine textiles, and ornaments.<sup>22</sup>

Tengku Abdul Rahim was typical of the ruling class landlords of his time. They acquired cap kurnia from the Sultan, or alleged that they had a valid right to the land, and launched themselves into the countryside to extract produce from the peasantry. Both his sons, Tengku Ngah Omar and Tengku Chik, were involved in this process. In many instances their claims were unclear and they traded on their social position to put the peasant to work for them.<sup>23</sup> However, enforcing the collection of dues was not easy, especially in areas which peasants had cultivated before the arrival of the landlord. On these occasions they defended their rights by not paying the cabut demands. In non-cultivated areas, the ruling class had to organize labour to develop commodity production for exchange in the market and come to some arrangement by which the produce was divided between the cultivator and the landlord. Two cap kurnia, those of Tengku Maimunah binte Sultan Ahmad II and Tengku Osman bin Tengku Salam, may serve as examples to show in detail the nature of the attempt by the landlords to secure dominance over the peasant cultivator.


In about 1870, Tengku Maimunah was given a cap kurnia by word of mouth from her father, Sultan Ahmad II.<sup>24</sup> On 10 July 1909 she persuaded her brother, Sultan Zainal Abidin III, to issue a documented title confirming her rights.<sup>25</sup> The property was located in Batu Hampar in the mukim of Pulau Manis, on the Trengganu River, and it initially covered over 200 acres.<sup>26</sup>

From the very beginning Tengku Maimunah organized labour on the cabut system to develop the land granted to her by cap. Her representatives called on the cultivators to settle on the property and the rest of the labour needed was recruited from the neighbouring kampung.<sup>27</sup> They planted coconut, areca nut, and padi and from the produce a share was given to the land-owner for her own consumption. The crop that was cultivated was to change over time. By the 1930s an attempt was made to plant rubber on a smallholding basis. However, the drive towards commercial exploitation of the

property was not intense. Even in the 1930s, after more than half a century of ownership, much of the cap area was still jungle: in 1937 only 67 acres were planted with rubber and coconut and 12.4 acres with padi. There were then 27 peasant cultivators, of whom 7 lived within the cap; 14 cultivated coconut and areca nut and the rest of the labour force planted rubber. Most of them operated on the pawah system. Tengku Maimunah provided the seeds and the land, while the cultivators provided the labour. She owned a few tree crops personally, either by paying for the labour or buying them from the cultivator. There was no standard proportion in which produce was divided between the land-owner and the tenant. In some cases the division was based on four parts—three to the cultivator and one to the cap holder; and in other cases the produce was divided equally between the cultivator and the cap holder. In the newly cultivated areas, around 1937, only a part of the crops were divided and there was no arrangement for the rest.<sup>28</sup>

In addition to the trees owned by Tengku Maimunah, there were 250 coconut trees and 220 areca-nut trees in the area covered by the cap. The largest individual holding had a total of 49 coconut trees and 70 areca-nut trees. The largest number of coconut trees owned by a single individual was 60, while the corresponding figure for the areca-nut tree was 104. The rubber trees were of recent cultivation and were in a poor condition. Some of the original cultivators had died and their rights over the crops went in the usual way to their heirs. By 1935 Tengku Maimunah had proceeded to acquire wholesale by cash payments the cultivators' rights,<sup>29</sup> a sign that the traditional landlord-tenant relationship was changing. The landlord was increasingly becoming not only the owner of the land but also the owner of the crops, and the tenant's former status as owner of the crops was gradually being eroded.

Tengku Maimunah had acquired an uncultivated lot which she developed with application, and she had some measure of success with the cabut system. The case of Tengku Osman and his heirs presented a contrary picture. On 14 February 1890 Tengku Osman was successful in obtaining from the Sultan a cap kurnia with the stated intention of planting coconut and other agricultural crops.<sup>30</sup> Unlike that of Tengku Maimunah, this particular cap was intended to be developed on a commercial scale. The cap covered a vast area at Batu Rakit in Marang district and the clauses in the title explicitly warned others not to interfere in the land which was declared to belong to Tengku Osman and his heirs in direct succession. During



## 4. Cap Tengku Maimunah


Source: Encl. 14A, Kawasan Chap Tengku Maimunah, Palau Manis, in LOT 71/1346.

the course of the cap's history from 1890 to 1938<sup>31</sup> the intentions of the cap holders were grandiose but the outcome was virtually nil.

When the cap was initially issued in 1890, parts of the area were already under cultivation with some of the lots having been established several generations previously. Even as late as 1938, most of the holdings in the cap were from the pre-1890 period.<sup>32</sup> Tengku Osman and his successors were typical landlords who lived in Kuala Trengganu and hardly appeared in the area. (There are references in the records to the effect that Tengku Osman and his son, Tengku Abdul Rahim, had houses at one stage or other in the area, but they certainly did not live there permanently.) The documents suggest that neither Tengku Osman nor his successors took any active interest in the property. This is not to say that his sons, Tengku Yusof and Tengku Abdul Rahim, did not make an occasional visit to the area, but Tengku Abdul Rahim showed little more interest than his father in the cap, while Tengku Yusof was known to have had no interest in *harta* (property).<sup>33</sup>

In the early years Tengku Yusof had shown slight interest in developing the property. He brought coconut seedlings from Pulau Redang to plant but the venture failed, as did his attempt to collect *cabut* from the peasants in the 1890s. They rejected his demands and in his prolonged absence from the area some of the trees he had claimed were deliberately destroyed by the peasants. However, it was Tengku Abdul Rahim rather than Tengku Yusof who, as an adult, was to frequent the cap. The peasants remembered him as coming there to play *makyong* (traditional dance theatre), while others stated that he went there to collect *cabut*. His visits were short and irregular, and he stayed at the *penghulu's* house. The *penghulu* was a relative of his and was entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that any new cultivators had the cap owner's permission to plant. It appears that he did not meet his commitments.

Like his brother, Tengku Abdul Rahim was not successful in collecting *cabut* from the cultivators. A few paid him but the great majority refused. However, there is other evidence to show that he did behave as the land-owner of the area. On two occasions he sold land on the *jualan ta'putus* (a form of sale agreement) basis to raise money for the survey of the area. Just as Tengku Yusof had done, he too attempted to plant coconut but the project failed due to poor soil conditions; only one tree survived. There was one instance when he reprimanded a representative of the Sultan, Tengku Haji



5. Cap Tengku Osman

Source: CLR 52/1357.



Hassan, for unwittingly collecting cabut in the area. Tengku Haji Hassan stopped his demands when Tengku Abdul Rahim produced his cap. Aside from these the latter did little else to exercise his rights over the area.

Generally, in the half century of this cap's history the original cap holder and his successors took little active interest. They made little attempt to force the cultivators to pay cabut, despite the fact that it was a serious offence to refuse to pay cabut when a demand was made by the owner. There is little evidence to show that the owners collected dues from the pre-1890 cultivators and there is little indication that the situation was any different for the post-1890 settlers. Many of the latter group, when interviewed by the Settlement Collector, were found to be unaware of the existence of the cap. Only a handful admitted that they had made prior arrangements with the owner to cultivate on the cabut system of payments. The owner obviously did not in general enforce his rights.<sup>34</sup>

The cases of Tengku Abdul Rahim, Tengku Maimunah, and Tengku Osman outlined above represent different individual attempts over several decades by members of the ruling class to control peasant commodity production. Taken collectively, however the ruling class domination of the countryside took on huge proportions. G. A. C. de Moubray, the Commissioner of Lands and Mines, estimated that in the late 1920s as many as 30,000 peasants in the Trengganu River system lived in cap areas and the majority of them lost their customary tenure rights and were forced to become tenants virtually overnight as these cap covered vast pre-cultivated areas.<sup>35</sup> He observed that in some extreme cases, especially in densely populated areas of the Trengganu River valley, as many as 50 per cent of the adult male population were under the cap holdings and were thus, at least formally, deprived of their customary rights and their cultivated land.<sup>36</sup> Subsequent British officials, too, confirmed this extensive intrusion into the countryside by the ruling class.<sup>37</sup>

In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the cap kurnia as a source of revenue was overshadowed by the ready income made available from pajak and cap zuriat. However, with the growing control of British officials over these two forms of income,<sup>38</sup> members of the ruling class increasingly relied on their cap kurnia as alternative means of income. The 1920s was the decade of great effort to extract surpluses and profit from the peasantry. It was in this period that Sultan Sulaiman, who possessed a 7,000-acre cap in

Kampung Alor Limbat, empowered the Datuk Penghulu Balai to plant rubber using peasant labour under the pawah system. By 1927 a total of 1,760 rubber trees had been planted but the pawah arrangement was not honoured. The peasants complained of unfair distribution of the cultivated trees by him. There were other problems too. The peasants were prohibited from improving their lot by planting other crops to supplement their incomes. They also faced considerable difficulty in collecting much-needed wood for their houses, fences and fuel from that area.<sup>39</sup> Peasants in other cap areas faced similar problems as the cap holders began reorientating peasant efforts from subsistence activities towards cultivation of rubber and other commercial crops. In 1916 Tengku Ismail bin Sultan Zainal Abidin III obtained peasant assistance to plant rubber and fruit trees in his Telemong cap on the understanding that a division would be made when the trees became productive. However, the bargain was not kept. By 1929 the land had been leased to some Chinese but the villagers got none of the proceeds.<sup>40</sup>

While some landlords took to developing their cap on a commercial basis directly with peasants under the pawah system, there were others who obtained their income by leasing their land-holdings. Tengku Nik Maimunah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III was most active in this manner. In 1911 she leased a 500-acre plot at Hilir Kuala Telemong to Chew Woon Poh for 99 years to develop the land. The lease, which bore a royal seal, was an arrangement by which Chew was to pay her quit rent, 1 per cent royalty on rubber, and 2 per cent royalty for all other agricultural produce.<sup>41</sup> A year earlier she had leased a huge 3,000-acre cap holding in the same district to Lam Loh for 90 years.<sup>42</sup> Clearly there was profit to be made through this method from cap holdings. In another cap area at Batu Burok she and her husband, Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim, initially attempted to develop the land in the 1910s by entering into a *perjanjian mulut* (verbal agreement) with the cultivators to divide the coconut trees planted on the basis that for every three trees planted two belonged to the cultivator and one to the land-owner. In the late 1920s, however, she sold the property without due regard to the rights of the cultivators.<sup>43</sup>

The remainder of the landlords simply extracted peasant surpluses from padi and dusun lands under cabut arrangements. Peasants of Kampung Terok in the mukim of Serada in the 1920s paid their dues to their land-owner, Tengku Hitam binte Tengku Muda Abbas, because they feared that they would be accused of

*derhaka* (treason). They did not resist these demands, although they had cultivated more than fifteen of the orchards since the mid-nineteenth century. Peasants in other areas, too, lived in fear of their landlords. Haji Embong bin Haji Abdullah, a well-known *tukang nikah* (marriage celebrant) in Kuala Trengganu, instilled fear of treason among the cultivators of Baroh in the mukim of Bukit Payong in the Trengganu River valley who had previously cultivated the area. From the date of the issue of the cap he prevented the peasants from planting dry padi in the area. As a result of his actions many of the peasants faced considerable difficulties. In 1927, Kampong Baroh Nyunyut, near his cap, which had many good dusun, was virtually deserted and this situation worked in his favour as all the five houses left in the kampung were occupied by his relatives. Uncertainty also prevailed in Kampung Serki Hulu in the mukim of Tapu in the Trengganu River system, where peasants had cultivated the land prior to the date of the cap in 1917. They were afraid to plant in the cap for fear of the landlord, although they were not explicitly prohibited by Tengku Dalam.<sup>44</sup>

The success or the failure of the cap holders to develop their properties had frightening implications for the people who usually possessed no such titles to their land and based their rights on the customary principle of continued cultivation. Some of the peasant cultivators did have documented titles as proof of ownership but the majority were without any titles.<sup>45</sup> The result of this ruling class invasion of the countryside was to threaten the basic right of tenure in the peasant agricultural system. There was thus a shadow of uncertainty in the state in the 1920s which laid the background for the peasant revolt of 1928.<sup>46</sup> The most disturbing feature of the cap kurnia method of distribution of land was that it was a gift in perpetuity and there was no clause which mentioned that continuous cultivation, the basis of property rights of the rakyat, should be the main principle of ownership.

Many of these cap kurnia involved land that had long been cultivated. These cultivators were reduced by the stroke of a pen or by the word of the mouth of the ruler to mere tenants on their soil, and in consequence there was a great number of people without land in these areas.<sup>47</sup> This practice of assigning areas which were already under cultivation underlines the conclusion that the whole process was an affair engineered by members of the ruling class for their own benefit. The burdens imposed on the rakyat were great even when these cap comprised uncultivated forest land. Such cap,

especially when three or four major ones existed in close proximity, quickly undermined the peasants' economy by depriving them of access to much-needed forest land and preventing them from seeking forest produce in these areas. Forest produce was essential in the kampung economy for food, building houses and fences, providing firewood and, occasionally, articles to barter for essential commodities. In addition, the tenant cultivator also faced the real possibility of a sale or lease by the landlord, and under a new owner, he might be subjected to a new form of cabut arrangement or even eviction from the land.<sup>48</sup>

The response of the individual peasant to the intrusion varied. Some of them refused to pay cabut, others deliberately spoil the crops of the landlord, yet others migrated from the area, but many more simply capitulated and worked for the landlord. The majority of the rakyat were *takut raja* (afraid of the raja) and did not claim their ancestral land but merely the value of their cultivation. They paid the price for their tenure rights. The whole process of inland penetration and consolidation by the ruling class was described by the Commissioner of Lands and Mines as '... rampasan harta rakyat yang amat besar'<sup>49</sup> (the greatest seizure of the people's property).

The inland intrusion of the ruling class members during the late nineteenth century was accompanied, as might be expected, by a significant expansion in their sources of revenue. They had previously skimmed off the economic surplus generated by the subject population through rent collection from the *kuala pajak* which were their traditional bases of income. However, the introduction of cap kurnia provided them with the possibility, though it was not to be fully exploited until the 1920s, of securing additional revenue in the form of rents from the peasant cultivator. The political system thus enabled surplus produce to be siphoned away from the peasant population into the hands of the ruling class. Other members of that class preferred quicker returns by disposing of their newly acquired peasant lands through sale and leases. These changes in the modes of private profit in a short period of time were dramatic. They were without doubt responses to the general expansion of capital—an expansion related to the growing interest of Britain in the state.

1. In Kelantan at the turn of the century there is evidence to indicate that its ruling class, too, was extending landholdings in the countryside (Clive S. Kessler, *Islam and Politics in a Malay State: Kelantan 1838-1969*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1978, pp. 63-72).

2. See Chapter 2, pp. 33-4, for a discussion on the sources of ruling class revenue.

3. Haji Muhammad Saleh bin Haji Awang, *Sejarah Trengganu*, Kuala Trengganu, Mansor Printing Press, 1968, pp. 54-5.

4. For the various methods of padi cultivation in Trengganu, see DID 9/1939: Annual Report on Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock for 1938, W. F. N. Churchill, p. 3.

5. ART, 1917, draft, paragraphs 24-25, in HCO 1445/1918.

6. See encl. 17, G. L. Ham to Chairman, Rice Committee, 25 January 1931, in CLM 144/1349.

7. This average was established in the late 1920s when an attempt was made to issue titles on traditionally occupied land. See ART, 1348 AH, p. 7; and encl. 8, BA to HCO, 13 December 1930, in CLM 144/1349.

8. For a discussion on the main principles of land tenure see Chapter 2, pp. 31-3.

9. See Chapter 2, pp. 31-2.

10. LOT 81/1932: R. E. Turnbull to CLM, 27 March 1932. For examples of cap kurnia see Appendix 11, p. 263.

11. See Chapter 2, pp. 31-2.

12. ART, 1913, draft, p. 15, in HCO 919/1914.

13. See Chapter 3.

14. See minute, G. A. C. de Moubray, 1 December 1928, on CLM 178/1348.

15. Encl. 1, H. R. Hughes Hallet to CLM, 26 June 1940, in CLM 75/1940.

16. Encl. 11, H. R. Hughes Hallet to CLM, 26 June 1940, in CLM 75/1940.

17. This particular trait of the Trengganu land-owner was a subject of comment of many British officials (see encl. 1, A. Glencross to CLM, 15 February 1939, in CLM 95/1939; and encl. 1, W. F. N. Churchill to BA, 12 February 1940, in CLM 97/1940).

18. An attempt will be made in Appendix 12, pp. 264-72, to throw some light on this process of inland penetration by the ruling class through the reconstruction of a list of cap kurnia holders with notes on the landlord-tenant relationship wherever possible.

19. See Chapter 7, pp. 202-6.

20. Minute, A. E. Coope, 29 December 1937, on BAT 1369/1937.

21. Encl. 8 in CLM 214/1348.

22. *Ibid.*

23. Minute, D. Headly, 29 April 1934, on CLM 70/1352.

24. Tengku Maimunah to CLM, 2 January 1929, enclosed in LOT 71/1346.

25. For a copy of the title deed see encl. 3 in LOT 71/1346.

26. See Map 4.

27. Encl. 10 in LOT 71/1346.

28. *Ibid.* Tengku Maimunah did not collect any produce from the padi planters who mainly cultivated *padi tugalau* (hill padi planted by way of dibbling).

29. See encl. 13, List nama mereka-mereka yang bertanam kawasan chap Tengku Maimunah, Kampung Hampar, Mukim Pulau Manis, 6 August 1935, in LOT 71/1346.

30. For the full text of the cap kurnia see Appendix 11, p. 261.
31. The case of Tengku Osman's cap was first heard in 1938 by the Settlement Collector, A. Glencross, and the final decision as to ownership was given by the Court of Appeal in 1940, after the Land Court Judges differed in their views (see encl. 6, Interview in the Land Office, Kuala Trengganu, by A. Glencross, 7 September 1938, in CLR 52/1357; and encl. 37, Keputusan Permohonan Appeal, Pejabat Mahkamah Appeal, Kuala Trengganu, 10 December 1940, in the same file).
32. See Map 5.
33. See the statements of the various contending parties in CLR 51/1357.
34. *Ibid.*
35. Encl. 1, G. A. C. de Moubray to SUK, 18 May 1928, in SUK 1376/1346.
36. Encl. 1, CLM to BA, 9 September 1928, in LOK 212/1347.
37. See for example the comments of A. J. Sturrock in encl. 3, A. J. Sturrock to MB, 2 September 1929, in CLM 286/1348; A. Glencross in encl. 1, A. Glencross to CLM, 15 February 1939, Annual Report of the Settlement Collector, 1938, in CLM 95/1939; and H. R. Hughes Hallet in CLM 75/1940; H. R. Hughes Hallet to CLM, 26 June 1940.
38. See Chapter 7.
39. See encl. 1, G. A. C. de Moubray to SUK, 18 May 1928, in SUK 1376/1346; and encl. 1, Datuk Sri Andika Diraja to SUK, 3 July 1927, in SUK 30/1346.
40. LOK 419/1347, Progress Report of the Trengganu Land Office, 1347 AH, by the Commissioner of Lands and Mines, 26 May 1929, p. 10.
41. Encl. 1, Tengku Nik Maimunah to BA, 10 November 1930, in CLM 22/1349; encl. 5, Memorandum by J. R. Neave, 12 January 1932, in CLM 240/1350; and encl. 5 in MBO 303/1350.
42. Encl. 5, Memorandum by J. R. Neave, 12 January 1932, in CLM 240/1350.
43. CLR 77/1348: Tanah Tengku Nik [Maimunah] binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III.
44. Encl. 1, G. A. C. de Moubray to SUK, 18 May 1928, in SUK 1376/1346.
45. See Chapter 2, pp. 32-3.
46. See Chapter 6.
47. Encl. 3, A. J. Sturrock to MB, 2 September 1929, in CLM 286/1348.
48. Encl. 1, G. A. C. de Moubray to SUK, 18 May 1928, in SUK 1376/1346.
49. *Ibid.*



*Ringgit Mata-bari*  
(Mexican Dollar)

## *The 1928 Peasant Revolt*

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THE 'real' historical experience of the Trengganu revolt cannot be grasped by purely descriptive accounts of Malaysian social history. Revolts in Malaysian history have been extensively studied as political events rather than as the outcome of social processes. There have been several papers and theses on revolts such as the Naning War in 1831,<sup>1</sup> the Perak revolt of Datuk Maharaja Lela in 1875-6,<sup>2</sup> the 1891-5 Pahang revolt,<sup>3</sup> the 1915 Tok Janggut revolt in Kelantan<sup>4</sup> and, more recently, the Trengganu Uprising in 1928.<sup>5</sup> Most of these essays have been written in isolation and little attempt has been made to compare these isolated events within an overall perspective. However, in recent years, several scholars have attempted to show some similarities and differences among these revolts. The prevailing observations were that all these revolts were anti-colonial and all, except the Trengganu case, were led by members of the ruling class.<sup>6</sup> It was pointed out that the Trengganu revolt was led by religious leaders.<sup>7</sup> It is precisely in this statement that a student with a good grounding in peasant studies will immediately recognize the clue that this revolt was something special. It was, from the actors' point of view, a rural-based social movement that involved 'socially shared activities and beliefs directed towards the demand for change in some aspect of the social order'.<sup>8</sup> This chapter will attempt to draw together the major societal changes of twentieth-century Trengganu and examine the reality of the peasants' experiences as they entered the modern world.

In order to proceed it is essential to bear in mind the pre-modern historical reality of the agrarian society, situated in the Trengganu River valley which is divided into two parts by the great Kelemong falls located about 40 to 50 miles inland from the Trengganu River mouth. Beyond the great rapids there are several streams which form the upper region of the Trengganu River valley. The country through which these rivers flow is exceedingly rocky and consequently rapids are a main feature in these tributary streams. However, the terrain changes below the Kelemong falls. Much of the suitable agricultural land is located in this section of the

Trengganu River system. It is for the most part flat land, although the hills which enclose the plain can be seen looming in the distance on either side of the valley.<sup>9</sup>

In the late nineteenth century, the population of this valley was estimated to be about 45,000, of which only 500 lived beyond the Kelemong falls. The rest were crowded in the lower portion of the river valley which made it one of the 'most thickly populated portions of the Peninsula'. The town of Kuala Trengganu and its immediate neighbourhood had a population of about 12,000, while about 33,000 people inhabited the area between the royal capital and the great rapids. The majority of the population in the Trengganu valley were agriculturalists who planted padi, maize, cassava, yam, gambier, coconut, sugar-cane, and different varieties of fruit. Padi was extensively cultivated and was by far the most important of these crops. Generally, three types of topography could be identified in the lower portion of the valley—swamps, plains, and hill slopes—and the peasant padi farmer had adapted his cultivation methods to the environment. Hugh Clifford estimated that in the 1890s about 10 per cent of the padi was cultivated in what he termed as 'irrigated lands' which were probably swamp, 60 per cent on 'plough land' on the plains which were in fact the *bendang* or *sawah* (wet padi fields) of the present, and 30 per cent on the hill slopes.

The Trengganu padi cultivator in the late nineteenth century produced two-thirds of Trengganu society's total rice requirements, which was estimated at 300,000 pikul. The remainder was imported from neighbouring Siam and Java. The peasant rice economy was subsistence in nature. The peasantry produced only a few thousand pikul in excess of their own requirements. It was recorded that the farmers consumed about 195,000 pikul out of their total production of 200,000 pikul.<sup>10</sup> The peasant's claim to the land lay in his continued cultivation of unoccupied or unclaimed land:<sup>11</sup> the great majority of the peasantry did not possess any documents covering their holdings which were commonly referred to as 'tanah tebang' or 'tanah waris'. The peasant in the Trengganu River valley in the late nineteenth century lived in an agrarian countryside where the state institutions were weak. The indigenous political system did not enforce any form of agricultural or land tax. At the village level the peasant could sell his holding, mortgage it, or bequeath it to his heirs without reference to the state machinery.<sup>12</sup> It was in such an agricultural setting that great societal changes occurred to which attention will be turned next.



The first of these major changes that affected the agrarian society in the twentieth century was demographic. The earliest official census compiled in 1911 showed that the Trengganu valley below the Kelemong falls had a total population of 100,000.<sup>13</sup> The population of Kuala Trengganu and its immediate vicinity was 16,137 (this included the areas of Trengganu town *hilir* (lower), Trengganu town *hulu* (upper) and Trengganu town *saberang* (across the river)). This meant a total of over 83,863 people lived in that densely populated area which Clifford in the 1890s had described as already overcrowded with about 33,000 people. A major drop in the population of the valley was noted in the next Census Report in 1921<sup>14</sup> where it was recorded that 66,135 lived in the whole Trengganu valley and more than 12,453 in Kuala Trengganu town. The general explanation given for this drop in population were outward migration, reduced immigration, and higher mortality and lower birth rates resulting from outbreaks of cholera, smallpox, and influenza.<sup>15</sup> In the next ten years the population increased to 95,860 (slightly short of the 1911 figure) for the whole of the Trengganu valley including the town of Kuala Trengganu.<sup>16</sup>

The increase in population in the first three decades of the twentieth century brought about several consequences. In 1895 the price of rice was a dollar for 8 or 9 *gantang* (1 *gantang* = 1 imperial gallon). But in 1915 a dollar would buy only 4 *gantang*.<sup>17</sup> In 1919 there was an acute rice shortage in the state and an estimated 10,000 people migrated to Kelantan and Pattani.<sup>18</sup> There were also reports from land officials that in the 1920s there was an increase in the incidence of peasant indebtedness that led the peasants to *gadai* (mortgage) their land in order to make ends meet. A change in land use was also experienced. R. D. Hill, a historical geographer, in his recent book noted that even in the 1890s there were some hints of population pressure on the land. This was evidenced by the observation that after padi had been harvested, other crops such as maize, cassava, and yam, which were generally recognized as poor alternatives to rice, were planted in the dry season. By the 1910s it was noticed that the peasants were using unsuitable coastal land for wet-padi cultivation. Even traditional grazing land was cultivated as Trengganu by that time had stopped exporting beef cattle to Singapore.<sup>19</sup>

The second societal change was economic. As land, labour, and produce came to take dollar value with the greater penetration of capital, other social classes in advantageous positions in the political

system of the larger Trengganu state, stood to reap greater benefit from this economic change. The indigenous ruling class, more than any other social class, made deep inroads into the peasant economy in the early decades of the twentieth century. They controlled the peasant means of production—land—through the receipt of *cap kurnia*. The ruler of Trengganu, Sultan Zainal Abidin III, issued *cap kurnia* to members of the ruling class as royal gifts. These documents in effect created, in a short space of time, a new landlord class in the Trengganu valley. By one account it was estimated that as many as 50 per cent of the adult male population lived in *cap* holdings and by another account as many as 30,000 people lived within the confines of these *cap*. The emergence of these new landowners, who were not tillers of the soil, has been documented elsewhere and need not be dealt with here. However, it is crucial to highlight some of the implications of this structural change on the agrarian society.

In the first place, it meant that as a result of the *cap kurnia* a substantial number of peasants in the Trengganu valley were reduced to tenants on land which they previously could sell, mortgage, lease, or hand down to their children. The loss of these traditional rights imposed rigidity on what was otherwise a flexible arrangement whereby a peasant had several options to recover from losses incurred through error of judgement in planting, natural disasters, diseases, or other factors. Even in non-*cap* areas large numbers of peasants, in the late 1920s, were mortgaging their land to raise cash. This meant that until their debts were repaid all produce from their land went to the mortgage holder.<sup>20</sup>

The second impact of these *cap kurnia* was that these new landlords in many instances demanded from the peasant the payment of *cabut*, *pawah*, or *bahagian* (forms of rent payment) as rent for the occupancy of the land. Usually amounting to 10 per cent of tree crops and as much as one-fifth of all *padi* reaped, these demands siphoned off a part of the surplus of the peasant's budget that had previously maintained his social position.

The third impact of the *cap kurnia* could be inferred from the state of uncertainty it created among the peasantry. Powerless to prevent his landlord from selling or leasing the land from which he eked out his meagre livelihood, the tenant cultivator was constantly under threat of being subjected to new *cabut* arrangements; neither was eviction only a remote possibility. In addition, some peasants in *cap* areas were forced to cultivate non-food crops for the market to

satisfy the demands of the landlord.<sup>21</sup> And finally the peasants were reported to be antagonistic to the cap owners for a number of reasons. Cultivators were deprived of their ancestral land by cap and were obliged to pay tithes to their new landlords, while others living outside the cap areas were denied access to their traditional cultivation areas on the orders of the cap owners. They were, in addition, forbidden to gather wood and other forest produce (the safety valve of the peasant economy) within the cap areas. These had been essential exchange commodities used to obtain cash and to barter for supplementary food supplies. The peasants of Alor Limbat, for example, were hostile to Sultan Sulaiman who had a 7,000-acre cap which encompassed tanah waris. They were kept out of the area, while the Sultan attempted to plant rubber. Some of the people who had planted the rubber for the Sultan on a pawah basis complained that they had been cheated of their rightful share by the Sultan's agent, the Datuk Penghulu Balai. Similar agrarian problems were to be found in other cap areas. At Sungai Besar, Tengku Chik allowed the peasants to cultivate huma within his cap but the planting of rubber considerably reduced the areas of possible cultivation. The peasants in this area were reported to be without surplus padi and had to wait another seven months for their crops to ripen. Furthermore there were no areas in the neighbourhood from which they could extract jungle produce. The best index of a thriving peasantry, as was noted in G. A. C. de Moubray's memorandum, was the number of dusun they had. In the Trengganu valley, in fact, there was a decline in the number of dusun as the peasantry faced uncertain times. The only dusun to be planted were developed by forced labour or on a pawah basis. The peasants had learned from their bitter experience of losing old dusun to the claims of the new landlords. On the eve of the 1928 revolt the Commissioner for Lands and Mines, G. A. C. de Moubray, grimly warned the ruling class that economic conditions in the Trengganu River system were similar to those in France and Russia before their respective upheavals.<sup>22</sup>

The third major change experienced by the Trengganu valley agrarian society as it entered the modern world was the expansion and consolidation of colonial administration in the countryside. This political change had its beginning with the appointment of W. L. Conlay as the first British Agent to Trengganu in 1910. Subsequently in 1919 a British Adviser, J. L. Humphreys, replaced the British Agent. Over the next couple of decades expansion of the

Advisory system of government in Trengganu meant that new rules, regulations, offices, and officials were introduced into the countryside.<sup>23</sup> The peasantry bore the brunt of this process of bureaucratic intrusion in several ways.

In the first instance, the peasant during the colonial period had to pay a variety of new taxes, fees, duties, and licences to the colonial government. In addition, the colonial state exacted less of its revenue in produce and raw labour and more in cash. The demands for cash payment over a wide range of human activities was an oppressive burden to the peasants. They resented having to make lengthy trips to government centres to register births and deaths or to obtain licences for marriages and divorces which cost \$2.00 and \$1.00 respectively.<sup>24</sup> They were also subjected to a variety of passes required, under the penalty of fines, for forest felling, collection of different types of jungle produce, planting of different types of crops, slaughtering of animals, and the carrying of weapons needed for personal protection against wild animals.<sup>25</sup> Under the new regulations peasants wanting to collect wood from the forest to repair their houses, *atap* (palm-leaf thatch) for their leaking roofs, or *daun ketupat* (a type of leaf) for cake-making, had to apply for three different passes.<sup>26</sup> Other government moves which greatly affected the daily lives of the people were the issue of land titles for all occupied land and the imposition of survey fees and annual land rent. The land legislation embodying these changes was introduced into a rural society which had never paid any form of taxes on crops cultivated or on land occupied.<sup>27</sup> The whole colonial revenue system was seen by the peasantry as an attempt to swindle them and to make the ruling class rich as they (the peasants) believed they derived little benefit in return from the colonial state.

The general complaint of the peasants was captured in verse form by a contemporary observer, Tengku Dalam Kalthum binte Tengku Wook Khazaki:<sup>28</sup>

604. Fasalnya itu menebas hutani,  
sangat susah rakyat di sini,  
mengambil pas titah sultani,  
itupun tidak sudah begini.
605. Sangat susah mereka segala,  
mengambil pas jadi gendala,  
dua tiga hari berulang di kuala,  
itupun payah berolih pula.

606. Pergi berulang beberapa kali,  
oleh mereka tiada perduli,  
sekarang telah muafakat sekali,  
hendak mengadap ke bawah duli.
607. Terkadang sekalian mengeraskan diri,  
menebas, menebang di hutan duri,  
kerana tiada belanja sendiri,  
pasnya lambat orang memberi.
608. Hingga diketahui di sini,  
perintah menangkap disuruh jalani,  
jadilah susah sekalian ini,  
tertahan pekerjaan beberapa zamani.<sup>29</sup>

Other colonial rules and regulations, too, made deep inroads into the social life of the peasantry. The colonial agricultural policy discouraged a sizeable segment of the peasantry from their traditional occupation as huma cultivators by prohibiting forest felling in the hope that they would switch to wet-padi cultivation. Not only did huma cultivators have to face the uncertainty of adopting an entirely new technique of padi cultivation, they also competed for the little land left in the interior suitable for wet padi.<sup>30</sup> Another colonial policy that was equally damaging was the forest policy which denied the peasantry access to the forest produce which was critical in the natural economy for raising additional income. The dependence of the peasantry on this source of revenue was clearly demonstrated when, as a result of the introduction of the forest policy in 1921, there occurred a loss of government export earnings from forest produce as compared to previous years when no passes were required. The peasantry was in no economic position to meet these new demands.<sup>31</sup>

Finally it must be remembered that the colonial government officials who accompanied the process of bureaucratic expansion were not drawn from the countryside; they were town dwellers and were unsympathetic to the peasantry. They executed their duties with little understanding and moderation. The common complaints by the peasantry were that these officials arrested those who reported births and deaths 24 hours late, jailed those who felled trees without licences and who could not pay the \$5.00 fine, and fined those who allowed their buffaloes to roam freely. Other forms of irritation were common. The peasants in dealing with government departments found it necessary to offer bribes in order to obtain good jungle land for padi cultivation or to overcome delays

in their applications. The officials were known to be absent from their departments for days at a time, and the consequent delays were expensive to the peasant. It cost him \$2.00 to travel and then he had to wait in government departments for a 20-cent forest pass.<sup>32</sup> Although corruption was openly admitted to be prevalent in the Land Office, only one arrest was made before 1928 and on that occasion the officer concerned was let off with a word of caution.<sup>33</sup>

The fourth societal change was in the direction of social differentiation that occurred within the agrarian society. Processes such as demographic increase, commercialization, and state centralization tended to impose serious constraints on the flexibility of the peasant's economy. The consequence of these processes was a move towards social downgrading. The peasant owners-operators were increasingly becoming tenant cultivators, landless peasants, and to an extent agrarian wage labourers in the agrarian society. This picture contrasted with the pre-modern situation which was less differentiated. Simultaneously, these processes too created a new landlord and bureaucratic class in the countryside. A distinct twofold rural agrarian class structure emerged in the first three decades of the twentieth century.<sup>34</sup> There existed a rural upper class consisting of bureaucrats and absentee cap kurnia landlords (both drawn largely from the traditional ruling class) and a rural lower class comprising peasants, tenant cultivators, landless peasants, and to a lesser extent wage labourers. The most serious implication of this major transformation was the lack of reciprocal relationships between the two social strata.<sup>35</sup> The expectations of the bottom class were not met by the top class who were perceived by the former as corrupt, rude, harsh, exploitative, and as representing the whim of the distant State Council.<sup>36</sup>

The final change was an ecological disaster that resulted from the havoc caused by the Great 1926 Flood that affected many parts of the Peninsula. It had a devastating effect on the Trengganu peasants' livelihood, causing serious loss of property and much suffering. Although not associated with the twentieth-century processes mentioned above, the event was perceived by its victims as a sign of a 'time out of joint'. The following two statements by contemporary observers illustrate the devastation caused by the Flood. In describing its fury in Trengganu, R. O. Winstedt noted that:

Rain fell in torrents and it is no exaggeration to say that the sun was not seen for over 10 days. The rainfall in December [1926] was 42.64 inches, which added to a rainfall of 42.07 inches in November gave a total of nearly

85 inches for two consecutive months. On the 28th [December 1926] the water in the river rose rapidly and on the 29th it was so high that the whole of the new road to Bukit Payang, constructed at a height above any previously recorded flood level, was under water to such an extent that one was able to take the largest sea-going motor-boats, drawing 4 ft, over and along the road for its whole length, and for miles on each side of it.<sup>37</sup>

The other contemporary observer, Tengku Dalam Kalthum binte Tengku Wook Khazaki, gave a graphic eyewitness account of the Flood which she recorded at great length in Volume Two of her 'Syair Tawarikh Zainal Abidin III'. Listed below are selections of her impressions:

38. Tiga hari tiganya malam  
hujan turun tiada berselam  
air bah sungai tenggelam  
negeri Trengganu hampirlah kalam.
57. Lima hari limanya malam  
cahaya langit semuanya kalam  
air mangkin bertambah dalam  
susah sekelian rakyat syah alam.
27. Pokok niur, pinang serta  
tidak dapat saya berkata  
tumbang di jalan merata-rata  
umpama dipalu dengan senjata.
39. Derasnya air bagai seligi  
rumah hanyut petang dan pagi  
kerbau, lembu apatah lagi  
rakyat sekelian banyaklah rugi.
61. Guruh berbunyi terlalu 'azmat  
seperti keadaan hari kiamat  
ada yang azab ada selamat  
membawa barang segala umat.<sup>38</sup>

The historical experience of the Trengganu valley agrarian society as it entered the modern world was no less traumatic and painful than that which other agrarian societies in South-East Asia were undergoing. Increasing population, commercialization, political centralization and other societal changes that resulted in traditional peasant movements in the vast plains of the Mekong Delta, Lower Burma and Central Luzon were taking place in the smaller Trengganu River valley.<sup>39</sup> Although these processes are conceptually distinct, they have no separate existence; it is only method-

ological convenience which isolates economic from political or social change. Indeed such revolts in South-East Asia are symptoms of agrarian societies undergoing major changes. The similarities do not stop here. The 1928 Trengganu revolt, like all other traditional revolts in the region, reflected the basic characteristics of a peasant society. For comparative purposes, the features of a peasant revolt could be studied by an examination of its shared beliefs, nature of leadership, institutional organization, and other general characteristics.

In its shared beliefs the Trengganu revolt represented a complex structure. In countries where peasant revolts were a common occurrence it is possible to distinguish several patterns based on its ideology. Thus in Java, for example, a scholar has identified messianic, Holy War, millenarian, nativistic, eschatological, and anti-tax revolts as some of the more dominant forms.<sup>40</sup> However, it is important to bear in mind that there is considerable variation in the ideology of a peasant revolt. It cannot be seen as homogeneous and typified in ideal type forms. The Trengganu revolt was no exception.

An examination of the 'socially shared beliefs' of those who participated in the Trengganu social movement will reveal several ideological threads. From the beginning the response of the Trengganu peasantry to these structural changes was expressed primarily in religious terms, as might have been expected in all peasant societies in which religion contains the fundamental values which give meaning to life.<sup>41</sup> There was a strong messianic element in this response. Rural religious leaders expressed the opinion that the deteriorating conditions in the countryside were omens heralding an early coming of the *Imam Mahdi* who, according to belief, would restore tradition and true faith.<sup>42</sup>

In the early stages of the struggle, the conflict in society was quickly redrawn on a moral basis between the people and the government. The two groups were divided into those who believed and followed the *Hukum Syariah* and the *kafir* (unbelievers), irrespective of whether they were Muslims or otherwise. The struggle was not merely an anti-British response but was broadly directed against all those who had not followed the *Hukum Syariah*.<sup>43</sup> In this way the supporters and followers of the movement were given religious and moral justification for the legitimacy of their cause while the opponents were perceived as *kafir* and *orang neraka* (people of hell). The culmination of this



mood was in the contemplation, in several documented instances, of the declaration of *Jihad* (Holy War).<sup>44</sup>

The movement had millenarian dreams as well, for it aimed to restore a social order which was held to have been upset. It sought to replace certain senior government leaders who were seen as having lost the legitimacy to hold office. The struggle was not seen as one of *derhaka*, as ruling class ideology had it, but merely a refusal to accept and obey a government that had lost its moral mandate to rule.<sup>45</sup> In the restoration, the 'illegitimate' leaders would be replaced by a new Sultan, *Wazir* (Chief Minister), and *Fakir* (Mendicant Priest) who would ensure that the state would never again be ruled by *kafir*. The new society would be one in which all land was to be deemed as God's land and the cultivator owned what he cultivated on the basis of *Hukum Syariah*. It would appear that landlords and tax collectors would be absent in the restoration of what the peasants perceived to be the *status quo ante*.<sup>46</sup>

The voice of the peasant leader proclaimed:

551. Hak Allah empunya harta,  
segala tumbuhan dimana melata,  
telah direzeki kepada kita,  
sekarang berfas sekelian rata.
552. Janganlah engkau takut dan ngeri,  
pergilah mengambil kayu terdiri,  
akulah bolih bantu memberi,  
jikalau dihukum perintah negeri.
553. Datang hendak berbuat olah,  
bukankah ini harta Allah?  
janganlah takut engkau membelah,  
walaupun sampai jadi berbalah.<sup>47</sup>

There were also nativistic, eschatological, and anti-tax ideas in this movement. Foreigners, especially British officials in the countryside, were seen as *kafir* and were treated with some measure of hostility. Throughout the six-year insurrection, beginning in 1922, several anti-foreign incidents were reported.<sup>48</sup> Similarly this period too was coloured by anti-tax incidents.<sup>49</sup> In July 1922 peasants in the Telemong River basin who refused to apply for Land Office permits for temporary occupation of land were hauled to the Second Magistrate's Court. In 1924 one of the leaders was arrested for encouraging the people not to pay government taxes. Other accounts will be provided shortly when the main chronological

developments of the revolt are dealt with. The final ideological element that could be traced was eschatological.<sup>50</sup> The 1926 Flood certainly upset the world view of agrarian society. Many perceived the event, as did Tengku Dalam Kalthum, mentioned previously, as a natural catastrophe announcing grave impending dangers.

Perhaps the point that needs to be made here is that the Trengganu revolt with its complex ideology differed most sharply from the other revolts studied in Malaysian history. The millenarian dreams, the messianic expectations, the eschatological beliefs, as well as the other elements, collectively voiced the 'dying wail'<sup>51</sup> of a social class being destroyed. Each of these identifiable threads in the intricate ideological profile of the revolt could be linked directly with one or more of the major societal changes experienced by the agrarian society outlined earlier. The peasant response to these changes contrasted markedly with the objectives of the Naning War and the revolts of Maharaja Lela (Perak), Tok Bahaman (Pahang) and Tok Janggut (Kelantan), which appeared more of contests between members of the ruling class for political power with the British presence complicating the events. This brings us to the second major distinction between the Trengganu revolt and the other revolts in Malaysian history. Like all other peasant revolts in South-East Asia, the Trengganu revolt was led by rural leaders, often religious, or those who were perceived as religious leaders.

In examining the nature of leadership of the Trengganu revolt several layers can be identified. At the village level the peasantry in this period of social unrest was led by village-based religious leaders who, as in other South-East Asian societies, provided the extra-local framework in crisis situations for peasant uprisings.<sup>52</sup> These local leaders—imam, khatib, bilal and even *haji* (people who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca)—were in a particularly strong position in rural Trengganu as the office of the *penghulu*, who in the past had both complemented and rivalled them, had been allowed to decay during the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin III. There were two other reasons which help explain the participation of the local religious functionaries. First, their position as leaders who belonged to the locality but who were able to deal with the traditional centre was threatened by the revival of the new colonial-appointed *penghulu* who dealt with the local community as creatures of the centre.<sup>53</sup> Secondly, the religious leaders were mainly local property owners<sup>54</sup> and they had good reasons for resenting the exaction of land rents and survey fees by the government.

In each tributary valley of the Trengganu River system men possessing 'exceptional qualities' emerged to lead others beyond the immediate confines of the village.<sup>55</sup> In the Sungai Nerus district Che Man Pendekar was, as his title suggests, an expert in Malay martial arts. Another such person in that district was Abdullah Jurukaka who was a *silat gayong* (a type of Malay martial arts) teacher. Similarly styled leaders in the Telemong district were Mat Zin bin Mat Min, Wok bin Mamat, Haji Zakariah bin Mohamed Hassan, and Abdul Hamid. The religious leaders from this district included Lebai Abdul Rahman (also known as Tok Janggut) and Haji Musa bin Abdul Ghani Minangkabau.<sup>56</sup> The former was reputed to be invulnerable while the latter actively preached against government injustices in various districts.<sup>57</sup> Similar qualities were to be found in the Sungai Berang district leaders, among whom were Engku Mat bin Engku Woh, Ismail Kuala Por, Abu Bakar Chenting, Lebai Hassan, and Haji Tahir. Finally, in the Tersat district Penghulu Salleh, a non-government official, stood out from among the others in that area.<sup>58</sup>

While religious and other village functionaries formed the main grid linking scattered local communities at the district level, the powerful Ulama elements provided a broader leadership uniting different riverine districts together.<sup>59</sup> In this period of social unrest there was a marked revival of the prestige of the Ulama. They had declined in importance in the indigenous political system as British political control asserted itself.<sup>60</sup> Tukku Sayyid Paluh, the leading Ulama in Trengganu, had strenuously advised the ruler against the increased presence of British officials but with his death in 1918 and the appointment of the British Adviser in 1919 the influence of the Ulama had been reduced. Shortly after the 1919 Treaty, the new British Adviser persuaded Sayyid Abu Bakar to continue his father's (Tukku Sayyid Paluh) role by assuming the post of Sheikhul Islam in the Religious Affairs Department.<sup>61</sup> The head of this department was Tengku Ngah Omar who had been appointed by Sultan Muhammad as *Pesuruhjaya Ugama dan Keadilan* (Commissioner of Religion and Justice). However, soon after their deaths in 1922 and 1923 respectively, the Religious Department came to be identified with the colonial administration.<sup>62</sup> The inability of the British Adviser to absorb the Ulama into the colonial structure contributed to the revival of hostility which was reinforced when the leading Ulama family lost its usual income as a result of British policy.<sup>63</sup> From the popular point of view, the Ulama were seen as

the only element in the ruling class not identified with commercial development and the colonial administration. The Ulama, as has been noted earlier, had not been involved in the late nineteenth-century concession hunting nor in the cap kurnia system.<sup>64</sup> They had, on the contrary, some religious reservations about the validity of these titles and gifts though they expressed their views openly only in the 1920s.

There were two Ulama leaders in the movement who might be described as charismatic figures. The first was Sayyid Sagap who was the son of Tukku Sayyid Paluh.<sup>65</sup> When his father was still alive, Sayyid Sagap formed an association in the *Hiliran* (downstream) district of the Trengganu River which clashed with another at Losong, but these two clubs were dissolved by the government.<sup>66</sup> After his father's death he continued the family's anti-British attitude and had a large and devoted following in Trengganu. He was believed to have inherited all the qualities of a saint, religious scholar, and teacher from his father. Like the other Ulama he acquired his wealth through trade and religion.<sup>67</sup>

The second Ulama, Haji Abdul Rahman Limbong (Haji Drahman), did not belong to any of the hereditary Ulama families. He was a student of Tukku Sayyid Paluh and an intimate of Sayyid Sagap<sup>68</sup> who built up a reputation for his sanctity, religious scholarship, and teaching. He was, in addition, a businessman with considerable interests in trading boats, rubber estates, padi land, coconut and fruit dusun, and houses.<sup>69</sup> He was reported by contemporary British officials to be a Gandhi-type leader, capable of rallying thousands of Malays who would stand ready to follow blindly his bidding.<sup>70</sup> A description of him written in 1922 gives a striking picture.

Haji Drahman is a small, dark, ascetic-looking Malay of about 60 years. He has a great reputation for sanctity and good works, and great influence—secular as well as religious—among the people of the middle of the Trengganu river. Unlike most of the Trengganu 'Saints' he is extremely charitable and does not use his influence for his personal profit; he devotes himself to religious teaching, agriculture, and devotional exercises.

Trengganu ignorance and credulity assign to him many of the supernatural powers attributed to the late Ungku Said of Paloh [i.e. Tukku Sayyid Paluh]; the growing body of superstition is no doubt carefully fostered by his disciples for their own advantage. A few specimens of their gospel may be given:

At Blandau a poor Malay asked him for charity. He replied—'Go into

my field and reap 100 *gantang* (gallons) of padi, but neither more nor less in order that I may not be long in the circulation of statutory alm'. The Malay could not resist the temptation and stole 10 *gantang* in addition. But every time he tried to go down stream his boat returned of its own volition to Haji Drahman's land-place, and he was compelled to confess his theft.

He called some Malays to work on clearing a path; they sent back word falsely, that they had pain in the stomach and could not come. They were immediately seized with genuine and violent pains until they went to work.

At Pulau Manis shrine (ten miles up the river), a month ago, in the presence of many witnesses he suddenly vanished, and in the same hour appeared to others of his disciples in Trengganu Town.

In short, he is—in the untranslatable Malay expression—*Kramat*, supernatural, thaumaturgic. And his followers have so turned his head with adulation that he now appears to believe in his own magic powers and a 'call' to preach a Tolstoyan doctrine of prayer and agriculture, the leading tenets of which are that the land belongs to the people, that Government claims on it are contrary to Mohammedan Law, and that Government itself is a superfluous vanity.<sup>71</sup>

These two Ulama, together with the district and village leaders, formed the leadership of the revolt. This structure contrasted sharply with the leadership pattern of the political conflicts between members of the ruling class that were endemic in traditional South-East Asia.


The third difference between the Trengganu revolt and the others studied in Malaysian history was in its organization. Like all other traditional peasant revolts in the region, the Trengganu revolt did not have any strong form of organization. The peasant societies of traditional South-East Asia were by their nature broken into small segments which did not develop any socio-political network within and beyond the village community. In a crisis situation the linkages that emerged from the grass roots were personal and informal, focusing around its leaders. The surau, mosque, pondok schools, and houses of local leaders as well as any open space were centres for gathering and decision-making. The Trengganu revolt lacked the established institutional machinery of the indigenous political system to mobilize support. The istana, *kota* (fort), and houses of the chiefs did not spearhead the revolt. Nor was this revolt able to use effectively such central command institutions as *kerah* and war service to mobilize the people. In addition, it could not promise rewards such as *kurnia* and *geliran* (titles) to induce participation.<sup>72</sup>

The only suggestion of a formal network was the existence of an organization known as Syarikat Islam. It has been suggested that a

Johor Sayyid attempted to recruit members in Trengganu. The police later recovered a list of 800 members registered in that organization.<sup>73</sup> However, the role of this organization was minimal in Trengganu as compared to its influence in rural Java.<sup>74</sup> In addition, the Syarikat Islam of Trengganu never had the same influence as comparable organizations in the region such as the Sakdal (meaning 'to accuse') in the Philippines<sup>75</sup> and Galon Athin ('galon' refers to a mythical bird of great strength, while 'athin' means 'association') in the Saya San rebellion of Burma.<sup>76</sup> These two associations, like the Syarikat Islam in Java, had their origins in urban centres and came to have great influence in the countryside. Such organizations are outside the creative experience of traditional peasant societies. For this reason the Sakdal and the Saya San rebellions have been considered by some as being of the transitional type, that is to say, midway between the traditional and modern revolts. The Trengganu revolt seen in its totality was more a manifestation of 'traditional' rural society in which 'modern' urban influences were less dominant.

The earliest hint of agrarian dissatisfaction showed itself in July 1922 when a number of peasants in the Telemong River area refused to apply for Land Office permits for temporary occupation of land.<sup>77</sup> Those arrested were defended by Haji Drahman who obtained a licence as *wakil* (power of attorney) for the accused. The proceedings of the trial illustrated the direct confrontation between the ideology of the peasants and that of the government. Haji Drahman impressed the prosecutor with a string of quotations from Arabic texts. He demanded that the government prove that the land in question belonged to the state. When the prosecution failed to respond, he concluded that all land was God's land and that the state thus had no right to collect fees. The case was dismissed.

The Land Office appealed successfully to the Supreme Court for a retrial. In the several days preceding the second trial, which was held on 31 October 1922, Haji Drahman was housed in the compound of Tengku Ngah Omar<sup>78</sup> who had been the heir apparent during the ex-Sultan's reign and the district chief of Telemong. Here, he spent much of his time, day and night, preaching to large gatherings on the merits of the case for the defence. The news of the impending confrontation had caught the imagination of the people and on the day of the trial the court and the surrounding area were packed by an estimated crowd of between 800 and 1,000 people, about half of whom had come from



6. The Trengganu Uprising: Areas Affected

the interior and the rest from Kuala Trengganu and its immediate vicinity. Some of them were armed and had come on the instructions of Haji Drahman. The Malay Magistrate, alarmed by the size of the crowd, locked himself in a room adjoining the court-house and the trial began only after the British Commissioner of Police had intervened and cleared the court-house of all except those actually involved in the case. Several Malays, carrying arms in the court-house disturbances, were arrested. At the trial Haji Drahman once again sought to outmanoeuvre the prosecution by appealing to points of religious law, and the case was then adjourned for a decision on 6 November.

In the meantime the police had laid charges against those who had carried arms in the court-house and tried to implicate Haji Drahman in the incident—an unwise move, for the attempted arrest of Haji Drahman almost flared into an open confrontation. The Commissioner of Police was pulled away by his assistant at the last minute after Haji Drahman had worked himself into a state of excitement known as *majzur*—‘the religious frenzy of the fighting Mohammedan inviting martyrdom’. The British Adviser, on mature consideration, decided to use the Sheikhu Islam, Sayyid Embong, to summon Haji Drahman. At the police enquiry the latter denied complicity and was advised that he should use his influence to prevent a crowd of his followers coming to the court for the next hearing. This order was obeyed and on 6 November the large crowd that attended the hearing was mainly drawn from Kuala Trengganu.

For the moment, Haji Drahman appeared to have been outmanoeuvred. However, a further opportunity of expressing his outrage presented itself when the case was once again postponed for another fourteen days. In order to frustrate the government’s desire to avoid a crowd, he planned the circumcision of a Chinese proselyte in Kuala Trengganu town to coincide with the date of the postponed hearing. These events were always celebrated with great enthusiasm and Haji Drahman hoped, under this plausible pretext, to crowd the trial by summoning a thousand Malays from the *Ulu* (upriver) to attend the ceremony. The conversion ceremony was planned on a large scale. The convert was to be taken in procession through the town, after which four buffaloes and four hundred fowls were to be slaughtered for the subsequent feast. The British officials once again avoided a confrontation on the eve of the hearing by cancelling his Wakil licence and prohibiting the holding of the circumcision and the feast in Kuala Trengganu town. It was



explained to a chastened Haji Drahman that these actions were necessary as a precaution against a possible breach of the peace.

The strength of Haji Drahman's potential influence was fully demonstrated in the circumcision ceremony which was held on the appointed date but at Pasir Tembakang, about six miles up the Trengganu River. Eyewitness accounts tell of Malays in their several hundreds gathered on a wide sandbank and boats full of others continuously arriving for the occasion. After the ceremony, the sources mentioned that the surface of the river was cluttered with dispersing boats which created an impressive scene. The British Adviser warned the High Commissioner that Haji Drahman's genuine sanctity and high character made him a more powerful leader than Kelantan's 'rustic bravo' Haji Mat Hassan (also known as Tok Janggut) and that the religious feelings of the more zealous Trengganu Muslims, both in town and country, might be more easily aroused than elsewhere. As for the future, the British Adviser hoped that Haji Drahman could be persuaded to serve the government in its dealings with the people as an official in the Religious Department and that the excesses of the peasants could be harnessed by putting them to work building new roads.<sup>79</sup>

The failure of the government to justify its policies convincingly in the '1922 Affair' allowed agrarian discontent to gather momentum. There rapidly developed in the interior of the Trengganu River system an organized network of resistance which initially was scattered but which, with time, became more coherent and widely based. In 1923 the people of the Telemong and Marang River valleys refused to participate in the government vaccination campaign. The *Pejabat Ugama* (Religious Affairs Department) was summoned to explain to the people that the project was not against their religion.<sup>80</sup> In the following year there occurred a number of anti-government incidents. Haji Musa bin Abdul Ghani Minangkabau was arrested and fined for encouraging the people not to pay government taxes.<sup>81</sup> Tok Janggut was cautioned by the Land Office for leading a group of cultivators in clearing forest land without permits.<sup>82</sup> An unsuccessful effort was made in July 1924 to reduce Haji Drahman's influence.<sup>83</sup> He had been actively involved in leading the peasants in Telemong—the heartland of the cap kurnia area—in resisting government interference in agrarian society. Under his leadership people refused to pay fees for forest passes, divorces, and marriages. Whenever government officials tried to enforce regulations their victims fled to Haji Drahman's residence

for protection,<sup>84</sup> and the prestige of the authorities suffered each time. On one occasion Haji Drahman publicly rebuked a forest guard who had approached him for an explanation of his anti-government activities. He refused to acknowledge the officer's greetings in front of a crowd of 300 students at Masjid Padang (in Telemong district) and became almost hysterical in defending his cause when he was pressed for an explanation.<sup>85</sup>

The next episode in the gathering movement of resistance was the '1925 Telemong Affair' which had elements of a mass movement deliberately organized as a show of strength against the government.<sup>86</sup> This incident differed markedly from the 1922 occurrence where the leaders were prepared to plead their case in court, which was in itself indicative of the fact that they accepted the legitimacy of the government and were concerned merely to seek a change in its policies. It also differed from the events of 1923 and 1924 which were in effect anti-government activities confined to isolated localities.

In the Telemong Affair a large number of Malays gathered, in the first two weeks of May 1925, at Kuala Telemong. They came from rivers as far away as Blimbing, Tersat, Berang and Nerus and each of them carried a gantang of rice, a woodman's axe, and a keris, as they had been called by their leaders to clear land in Telemong which had been declared by the government to be state land. The land was claimed by Tengku Nik Maimunah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III whose personal links with Haji Drahman have been previously mentioned. She possessed great influence in the Telemong district (once her source of revenue) and this was strengthened by the fact that she was the favourite daughter of Sultan Zainal Abidin III and a *Hajjah* (female pilgrim). The Land Office ignored her claims and issued documents of title to a number of Chinese in 10-acre lots. About 2,000 men were rumoured to have been enlisted for the task of clearing but only 300 were present at any one time. Half the villagers would leave their kampung to work for a few days and would then return home and be replaced by the other half. They were housed on the property of Mat Zin bin Mat Min, who was one of the local leaders, and they built five huts by the riverside and four smaller ones inland. Within the first week they had cleared more than 400 acres of land. At the work-site they spoke of mobilizing the whole state to declare a Holy War on the kafir and to restore the government to the hands of those who fa-

voured administering the state along the lines of the Hukum Syariah.

The government in its response to the challenge maintained its customary low profile. The Commissioner of Police, L. L. Wynne, immediately ruled out an open confrontation with the unlawful assembly because of the limited strength of the police force. He recommended instead to the Acting British Adviser, J. W. Simmons, that diplomatic methods be employed in dealing with the leaders. Tengku Nik Maimunah, who had made the peasants work for her by using the name of Haji Drahman, was strongly reprimanded by Sultan Sulaiman personally and she was ordered to put her claim officially to the State Council. An approach was also made to Haji Drahman through the head of the Religious Affairs Department, Tengku Bijaya, and the Mentri Besar. He was asked to explain his alleged involvement and urged to act in the future as an intermediary for the government. Once again Haji Drahman denied involvement in the incident, although his complicity was public knowledge, and he begged to be excused from working for the government.<sup>87</sup>

The affair ended as suddenly as it had begun and over the next two years there were only reports of minor incidents in which government officials were the objects of criticism.<sup>88</sup> In May 1927, however, the government launched an impressive programme of land legislation under which all land-owners were to be issued land titles and rents were to be collected.<sup>89</sup> The enforcement of this legislation and the pressure of *cap kurnia* triggered the outbreak of the open revolt in the following year. The catastrophic flood of 1926 had reduced the peasantry to desperate conditions and the new demands were the turning point of the movement.

There was massive opposition to the land legislation as peasants were genuinely unable to pay the fees required.<sup>90</sup> In addition, they were encouraged by village functionaries and the Ulama who preached that the regulations were those of the *kafir* and that anyone who paid rent was thus a *kafir*.<sup>91</sup> The peasant opposition to the legislation was manifested in different forms. Only a small proportion were able to pay the fees and some of them destroyed their land titles after payment in the belief that they need not pay again.<sup>92</sup> The majority of the peasants, however, refused outright to pay rent or to declare their property to the land officers.<sup>93</sup> A substantial number of them did *sandar* (pledge) their land either to Haji Drahman or to Sayyid Sagap in the hope that they would protect them.<sup>94</sup>

While opposition to the land scheme mounted, the government also met increased resistance in enforcing its other regulations. In April 1928 over thirty Malays were arrested by the District Officer of Kuala Berang for felling trees without a licence and fined \$5.00 each. The fines were paid by Haji Drahman.<sup>95</sup> Another fifteen Malays were fined in that month for allowing buffaloes to damage bridle paths. In Court, the accused stated that they were unaware of their crimes, but if the magistrate said they were guilty then they would admit their guilt.<sup>96</sup> There was a mood of defiance among the people as it was commonly asserted that the government could not arrest everyone for all the offences committed and eventually there would not be enough space in the jails for those seized.<sup>97</sup>

The first of a series of open confrontations with the government took place in mid-April 1928, deep in the interior of the Trengganu River system, at Tersat. From then on, for more than a month, there occurred in rapid succession a series of incidents as the conflict moved down-river towards Kuala Trengganu, eventually reaching a premature climax at Kuala Telemong on 21 May 1928 where the movement was checked after considerable 'blood-letting'.<sup>98</sup> This eventful month witnessed the growth of radicalism in the insurrectionary movement which had earlier been characterized by no more than a passive refusal to accept government regulations. As the movement took up a more aggressive posture it came gradually to aim at the overthrow of the government.

The outbreak of the revolt was signalled by a confrontation between three officials, who were investigating illegal felling, and a hostile group of 500 fully armed men at Kampung Pasir Nyior (Tersat). Penghulu Salleh, the local leader, informed the two forest guards and the 'demarcator' that the people were not prepared to follow the ways of the kafir and indicated that the Tersat villagers were prepared to defend their stand by force if necessary.<sup>99</sup> Shortly afterwards a police constable, a forest guard and a civilian were threatened at Kampung Maying (Tersat) by a group of 200 men who shouted, 'Seize and slay these men who have enlisted themselves on the side of the Infidels.' The three of them fled for their lives. Subsequent police reports indicate that these two villages were contemplating the declaration of a 'Holy War'. They were anticipating the arrival of British officials to give them the necessary provocation.<sup>100</sup>

Sayyid Sagap and Haji Drahman had given the village leaders the assurance that they would support the movement from behind the

scenes.<sup>101</sup> On this undertaking, the local leaders gathered people from Tersat, Berang, Sungai Besar, Telemong, and Dungun. When news of the Tersat assembly reached Kuala Trengganu the Sultan and his Ministers at first over-reacted. They feared an impending invasion of Kuala Trengganu and to avert it they appointed the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja and the Tengku Sri Nara, both of whom were known for their firmness and their personal courage, to meet the Tersat assembly.<sup>102</sup> On 23 April, a crowd of about 1,500 people met the Kuala Trengganu delegation at Tersat and submitted petitions to the government. Three of the local leaders (Penghulu Salleh, Lebai Hassan, and Abdullah Jurukaka) were invited to present their case in Kuala Trengganu.<sup>103</sup> These leaders distrusted the government and made an unsuccessful effort to contact the Ulama further down-river for advice.<sup>104</sup> When they failed to meet the Sultan as promised, a royal order was sent commanding their presence. After the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja had agreed that he would stand as hostage up-river, the men agreed to obey the summons. On 28 April Sultan Sulaiman met the people's representatives and promised them that he would personally travel up-river to hear their grievances.<sup>105</sup>

The British Adviser was reluctant to allow the inexperienced Sultan and his terrified Ministers to travel inland. He feared that they might easily give in to the crowd's demands and that the peasants might capitalize on the government's weakness by then invading Kuala Trengganu. The Mentri Besar, however, held firmly to the view that the meeting—between 'the Sultan and his people'—should be conducted without British officials being present. He argued that the British were neither *anak Trengganu* (Trengganu subjects) nor Muslims and thus did not qualify for the meeting.<sup>106</sup>

While the government was considering its course of action, the word had gone around in the interior, after the Tersat demonstration, that no taxes were to be paid to the government.<sup>107</sup> The peasants were thus under the impression that they had forced the government to concede to their demands. When it was heard that the Sultan intended to meet the people at Kuala Berang, Sayyid Sagap wrote a letter on 1 May addressed to the people at Tersat, inviting them to come down-river to negotiate. His message was read at the mosque after Friday prayers.<sup>108</sup> Some of the Tersat crowd had earlier disbanded and had gathered at Kuala Tanjung (below Kuala Berang) where they held daily discussions on the government's concessions.<sup>109</sup>



1. Sultan Zainal Abidin III ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Ahmad II (r. 1881-1918)  
(Courtesy *Abdullah Embong*)



2A. Sultan Muhammad ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Zainal Abidin III (r. 1918-1920)  
(*Courtesy Arkib Negara Malaysia*)




2B. Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alam Shah ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Zainal Abidin III (r. 1920-1942)  
(*Courtesy Arkib Negara Malaysia*)



2C. Sultan Ali ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alam Shah (r. 1942-1945)  
(*Courtesy Tengku Ismail bin Tengku Sa*)



2D. Sultan Ismail Nasruddin Shah ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Zainal Abidin III (r. 1945-1979)  
(*Courtesy Arkib Negara Malaysia*)



3. Salasilah Raja-Raja Melayu

This manuscript shows the genealogical lines of the Trengganu rulers. It came into the possession of the author in August 1983 through the kind courtesy of Tengku Ismail bin Tengku Su. It is part of a larger collection now deposited with the Main Library, University of Malaya.





4A. Datuk Sri Amar Diraja, Haji Ngah  
Muhammad bin Yusof  
(*Courtesy Haji Su bin Datuk Sri  
Amar Diraja*)



4B. Datuk Mata-Mata, Muhammad Ali  
bin Abdul Rahim  
(*Courtesy Haji Su bin Datuk Sri  
Amar Diraja*)



4C. Datuk Sri Lela Diraja, Abdul  
Rahman bin Ishak  
(*Courtesy Arkib Negara Malaysia*)



4D. Tengku Sri Indera Segara Besut,  
Tengku Long bin Tengku Ngah  
(*Courtesy Tengku Ismail bin  
Tengku Su*)



5A. Sultan Zainal Abidin III and his Royal Court in Bangkok  
(Courtesy *Haji Su bin Datuk Sri Amar Diraja*)



5B. Sultan Zainal Abidin III and his entourage in Egypt  
(Courtesy *Tengku Ismail bin Tengku Su*)



6A. Visit of the Governor-General to Trengganu  
(Courtesy Tengku Ismail bin Tengku Su)

6B. Some of the State Councillors during the reign of Sultan Sulaiman  
(Courtesy Arkib Negara Malaysia)





7A. The Trengganu Uprising of 1928: The victory parade  
(Courtesy Arkib Negara Malaysia)

7B. The Trengganu Uprising of 1928: Public humiliation for the vanquished as they are taken back to Kuala Trengganu  
(Courtesy Arkib Negara Malaysia)





8. J. L. Humphreys, MCS, CBE  
(Reproduction of an oil painting which hung in the Secretariat in Kuala  
Trengganu soon after the Second World War)  
(Courtesy *Tan Sri Dato' Haji Mubin Sheppard*)

Before going inland the Sultan sent another delegation into the interior to feel the pulse of the movement. The party of government and plain-clothes police officers persuaded Haji Drahman and Sayyid Sagap to accompany them. At Tersat they were almost attacked by a hostile crowd who only withdrew when they saw the two Ulama. Penghulu Salleh admitted to the delegation that he was the local leader of the Tersat demonstrators and explained that they were all poor men who could not afford to pay the government taxes.<sup>110</sup> Finally, on 3 May, after the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja had investigated the area of unrest, the Sultan and his party of senior Malay officials left Kuala Trengganu, and travelled upstream in eight motor boats.<sup>111</sup> That evening the Sultan was met in Kuala Berang by a huge crowd estimated at between 2,000 and 3,000. Many of them had arrived from different parts of the Trengganu River system in groups of a hundred or more.<sup>112</sup> A small portion of the crowd was armed, but the majority came merely out of curiosity to see the Sultan.<sup>113</sup> From 4 May to 5 May the Sultan heard the various deputations and promised to give their petitions his due consideration.<sup>114</sup> The Sultan clearly won this round. The feast provided by him was lavish and prayers were said for his well-being. After prayers, hundreds rushed forward to kiss his hand.<sup>115</sup> He magnanimously pardoned those who had threatened the police constable and forest guard at Tersat.<sup>116</sup>

However, there developed, in the two weeks following the Kuala Berang talks, a growing disenchantment among the people as the promised reforms were limited and did not resolve the central issues which had caused the long-standing social unrest. Shortly after the talks, a number of inland emissaries went to Kuala Trengganu to meet the Sultan and his Ministers once again. At two Council sessions British officials deliberately left most of the talking to the Mentri Besar and the people's representatives.<sup>117</sup> As a result of the meeting an *Itifak* (Order in Council) was passed which purported to redress some of the complaints of the peasantry. Its effect was limited, however. It merely allowed the people to clear jungle land for purposes of planting hill padi, which previously had been forbidden, and insisted that they must notify the District Officer so that he could visit the area and issue permits according to existing regulations and collect the fee.<sup>118</sup>

The *Itifak* failed to pacify the expectations of the peasantry. On 13 May the District Officer of Kuala Berang informed the people of the government's compromise plan but they left the decision to

accept or reject it to Penghulu Salleh of Tersat.<sup>119</sup> Two days later, when the District Officer approached a group of Tersat peasants and urged them to obtain passes as the padi-planting season was almost over, they refused to follow the *peraturan kafir* (regulations of the unbeliever).<sup>120</sup> At Kuala Berang on the same day, the Settlement Collector, H. P. Bryson, also noted similar discontent and was made to feel an unwelcome stranger. The people even refused to take the passes first and pay later. Some of those who had taken passes earlier wanted their names cancelled from the records as they did not want to appear to be government supporters.<sup>121</sup> The village functionaries announced that they would lead the people in a march to meet the Sultan at Kuala Trengganu as was the custom in the old days.<sup>122</sup> A number of people were considering the possibility of leaving the state altogether.<sup>123</sup>

The news of the intended march to Kuala Trengganu spread rapidly through the informal network of village leaders. They were urged (in some cases ordered) to collect their people and wait at different points along the route down-river. The leaders responsible for spreading the message were Abu Bakar Chenting in Tersat, Ismail Kuala Por in the stretch of the main Trengganu River between Kuala Berang and Kuala Telemong, Engku Mat bin Engku Woh in Marang, and Haji Tahir in Kuala Berang.<sup>124</sup> The last two were responsible for relaying messages to Haji Drahman, while Ismail Kuala Por and Lebai Hassan were to communicate with Sayyid Sagap.<sup>125</sup> Three leaders were also sent to Ulu Dungun who carried messages from the two Ulama.<sup>126</sup> All Haji and Sayyid of Dungun were advised to gather at Pulau Manis, a religious centre six miles from Kuala Trengganu, and the rest were to gather at Kuala Berang. All were exhorted to join the Malay side and not to die as a kafir on the side of the government. The situation had thus gradually become ripe for rebellion and an analogy was carefully drawn comparing Haji Drahman with a pregnant woman whose delivery must be attended by all the *bidan* (midwives) in the districts.<sup>127</sup> On 15 May, the day on which the government's compromise was rejected, Haji Drahman left Kuala Trengganu for Kemaman to muster support.<sup>128</sup>

The plan of the insurgents was first to seize the government outpost at Kuala Berang and then to move down-river, gathering in numbers from the neighbouring villages, to capture Kuala Telemong and Bukit Payong Police Station before launching a final assault on Kuala Trengganu.<sup>129</sup> The marchers carried with them

cooking vessels, bags of rice, clothing and whatever weapons they could muster.<sup>130</sup> As was common in movements of this kind the leaders were reputed to be invulnerable to rifle fire and harm from other sources.<sup>131</sup>

On the morning of 19 May about 200 men armed with *parang* (machetes), keris, spears, and guns from Ulu Dungun, Marang, Jerang, and Tersat gathered at the house of Ismail Kuala Por, just above Kuala Berang. They were later joined by another 400 men who had collected at the house of Lebai Hassan.<sup>132</sup> The District Officer of Kuala Berang, Wan Mahmud bin Wan Mohamed, was warned of the impending attack but he dismissed the unusual gathering as being merely for *kosik hantu* (spirit watching).<sup>133</sup> The local leaders, Ismail Kuala Por, Abu Bakar Chenting, and Lebai Hassan, made several unsuccessful attempts to persuade the District Officer and Police Sergeant, Abdul Rahman bin Datuk Pahlawan (the main objects of hostility in the area), to meet them outside the town where it was intended to capture them.<sup>134</sup> These efforts having failed, a crowd of 600 men seized control of the District Office, police station, and lock-up at around midnight on 19 May. The District Officer and the small police force evacuated the town without offering any resistance and fled down-river by boat to report the news.<sup>135</sup> The victorious crowd armed themselves on 20 May with the captured rifles and gunpowder taken from the police station and raised the red flag, signifying war, on the *gambang* (big raft).<sup>136</sup> On the morning of 21 May the crowd split into two parties, one of which headed in the direction of Kuala Telemong on foot while the other crossed to the opposite bank and moved towards Bukit Payong Police Station.<sup>137</sup>

The news of the attack on Kuala Berang caused alarm among the indigenous ruling class.<sup>138</sup> They perceived the attack as *derhaka*. There was general panic in the town. Immediately preparations were made for the town's defence. British officials sent cables to Singapore for reinforcements. A night curfew was imposed and an order was made restricting the carrying of arms to only those issued with government permits. It is significant to note, however, that the Ulama element was not represented in the list of those given permission to carry arms.<sup>139</sup> The town was lit throughout the night to keep vigil. All the available silat gayong experts were summoned to guard the palace.<sup>140</sup> The scene at the palace was vividly described by a member of the Royal Family in the following manner:



873. Masa tu konon mahkota negeri  
ke istana lama laki-isteri  
serta dengan putera-puteri  
hadir berhimpun suatu q-s-r-y.
874. Ramai tak dapat hendak kukhabar  
menjaga kota sultan mu'tabar  
dikelilingi makhluk berkelibar  
hari yang terang seperti gh-w-b-r.
875. Sangatlah takut ahli negeri  
istimewa segala perempuan bahari  
senyap segala pekan pasari  
malam jangan seorang dicari.
876. Pintu dikunci duduklah diam  
tiada melihat suatu bayang  
di dalam rumah malam dan siang  
semangat dada terbang melayang.<sup>141</sup>

After the success at Kuala Berang on 20 May, the peasants marched down-river on the morning of 21 May to meet with another group that had gathered at Kuala Telemong. The rendezvous was never kept. At 11.00 a.m. that morning a group of 200 men decided to attack on their own the government installations at Kuala Telemong. Armed with a few old muskets, keris, parang, swords and other weapons, they engaged a well-armed government police party of 25 men led by the ageing state warrior, the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja.<sup>142</sup> Tok Janggut, Mat Zin and Haji Zakariah advanced chanting the *ratib* (Muslim affirmation of faith), which, according to one observer, sounded like the noise of sea waves.<sup>143</sup> They walked right into the line of rifle fire from the government forces. When the noise and smoke had cleared, the invulnerable Tok Janggut was dead. Seven others died beside him in the field of fire, three others in the forest nearby, and another fell mortally wounded. The rest fled.<sup>144</sup> Like all other South-East Asian peasant revolts, when the invulnerable and invincible fell dead, the drama was over.

The police expedition sent earlier was recalled from Kuala Telemong on the same day as the shooting in order to strengthen the government forces against the possibility of an anticipated attack on Kuala Trengganu itself. The arrival of 50 FMS police reinforcements on the morning of 22 May provided further support. The next day the FMS police led by B. M. B. O'Connell went up-river in an unsuccessful pursuit of the principal leaders. On 25

May the Commissioner of Police, with written authorization from the Sultan, led another expedition inland in which he personally commandeered Haji Drahman's motor boat for moral effect. The party returned on 4 June after arresting Haji Zakariah, Ismail Kuala Por, Haji Tahir, Penghulu Salleh, Che Isa, Tok Mat Pitas, Abdullah Jurukaka, Abu Bakar Chenting, and Lebai Hassan.<sup>145</sup> A week later these leaders and several others were tried by a Special Tribunal consisting of six State Councillors, aided by the Acting British Adviser, W. M. Millington, and presided over by Sultan Sulaiman. There were twelve convictions, with prison sentences ranging from five to fifteen years, which for political reasons were served in Singapore. Penghulu Salleh and Leh bin Haji Drahman were acquitted by the Tribunal.<sup>146</sup>

The process of bringing the two Ulama, Haji Drahman and Sayyid Sagap, to trial was a more difficult task for the government. Both men wielded great influence and had therefore to be treated with respect. Haji Drahman, on the morning of the Kuala Telemong shooting, had left Kuala Trengganu, as he had done in the case of other major confrontations, and had made for Kemaman en route to Beserah, further south, where he had known sympathizers.<sup>147</sup> When the warrant for his arrest was issued, he left Beserah and travelled north to Pattani. On 25 May he returned to Kuala Trengganu and voluntarily surrendered to the surprised authorities who had not yet decided what to do with him should they succeed in arresting him.<sup>148</sup> Under detention, he pleaded for the government to show clemency to the rakyat. 'Why punish the up-country people?' he argued. 'If you tell them I am here they will be quiet at once.'<sup>149</sup> After some deliberation, it was decided to banish him to Mecca and to provide him with an allowance of \$50.00 per month for as long as he should reside there.<sup>150</sup> All the Malay officials were visibly afraid of him and refused to play host to him while he waited for a boat to take him to Singapore. They dared not place him in gaol and eventually it was decided to keep him in custody in the *Mahkamah Kathi* (Kathi's Court) where he was looked after by the Sultan's household. On 30 May 1928 he began his journey to Mecca where he stayed until he died on 16 November 1929.<sup>151</sup> The government could not implicate Sayyid Sagap, the other Ulama, as he had remained in the background during the revolt. He denied complicity and maintained that his family had always been loyal subjects of the Ruling Family.<sup>152</sup>

In the aftermath of the revolt, which cost the government \$9,200

to suppress,<sup>153</sup> the newly appointed British Adviser, A. J. Sturrock, introduced several measures aimed at improving the position of the peasantry.<sup>154</sup> In order to provide employment for peasants (as well as to keep their minds off subversive matters), a road construction scheme was started to link Kuala Trengganu with Kuala Berang. In the early months of the project, as many as 1,200 peasants were employed on a wage basis. This 22¼-mile stretch was completed in June 1931 at a cost of \$5,600 per mile and was used for relief measures to the interior, the general development of the area, and the maintenance of order.<sup>155</sup> The Survey Department was strengthened in order to hasten the settlement of the ruling class's cap kurnia claims, which impinged on the peasant economy, and to increase the efficiency with which land titles were issued to the peasantry, upon which the security of land tenure depended.<sup>156</sup> In order to reduce the tax and rent burden on the peasantry, a system of staggered collection of rents was introduced and an extension of time given for the collection of premiums and survey fees.<sup>157</sup>

Important administrative modifications were also made to the advisory system of government as a result of the revolt. The High Commissioner, Sir Hugh Clifford, appointed H. W. Thomson (the British Resident of Perak) to investigate and report on the revolt. Thomson's report called for a tightening of British control over the state machinery in Trengganu along the lines of the system operating in the FMS, in which the district, as an administrative unit, was under the executive control of a British District Officer.<sup>158</sup> Clifford, however, rejected the recommendation. He was reluctant to increase the staff of British officials and he wanted, as a matter of principle, to continue to use Malay officials, though bringing them rapidly under greater British supervision.<sup>159</sup> Following the High Commissioner's suggestions, Sturrock established a Land Court on which the Commissioner of Lands sat with a Malay Judge for the hearing of all cases connected with the ownership of land, with direct access to the Appeal Court on which the British Adviser had a seat. He also appointed members of the Malayan Civil Service as Collectors of Land Revenue in all districts with the exception of Paka and Dungun and replaced the Malay District Officer of Kuala Berang, who had been a cause of controversy, with an educated Perak Malay.<sup>160</sup> Finally, British officials were instructed to pay more serious attention to the building of a network of government penghulu and *ketua kampung* (village headmen) who were to be the crucial means of communication with the rakyat. These local

functionaries were to be under the direct control of the Commissioner of Lands and Mines and Collectors of Land Revenue.<sup>161</sup> One British official, observing the development of colonial consolidation through these grassroot institutions, minuted with glee, 'Slowlee, slowlee, catchee monkee'.<sup>162</sup>

After the revolt the peasantry continued to live in poverty, producing just enough to feed the family but seldom a surplus, with the spectre of starvation lurking never far behind in the background.<sup>163</sup> They resigned themselves to being the receivers of government policies. Their collective voice was broken, although there appeared the occasional individual who refused to shake the hand of the government official, flouted government regulations, refused to pay taxes, and wrote petitions of complaints to the government.

The years 1922 to 1928 were without doubt an eventful period in the history of the Trengganu River valley agrarian society. From the perception of the indigenous ruling class the revolt was *derhaka*. The colonial authorities on the other hand blamed Haji Drahman and, to a lesser extent, the other leaders for inciting the people. The peasants were seen as supposedly docile and passive spectators of history for which the impact of government regulations on the peasant economy constituted too 'trivial grievances' to provoke an uprising. Present-day writers have a different interpretation of the role of the leaders. They have seen the revolt as yet another in the tradition of anti-British revolts in the Malay states but it differed significantly from the others in that it was led by religious leaders. From the view of peasant history the revolt turned the spotlight on the peasantry as historical actors. Their dramatic but brief appearance on the centre stage was a manifestation of deeper social tensions as the agrarian society became increasingly absorbed into the colonial economy. They wanted to *mengadap* (to have an audience with the ruler) their ruler, as tradition permitted, to redress the imbalances. Increasing population, commercialization, state centralization, social differentiation, and finally a natural disaster brought peasant dissatisfaction to the surface. The internal anatomy of the conflict reflected the ideology, leadership, and organization of a peasant society responding to crisis situations.

1. Abdullah Zakaria bin Ghazali, 'Perjuangan Orang-orang Melayu Naning menentang Inggeris 1831-1832', *Jurnal Sejarah*, Vol. 15, 1977-8, pp. 12-25.
2. See for example M. A. Mallal, 'J. W. W. Birch: Causes of His Assassination', MA thesis, University of Malaya, Singapore, 1952; Abdul Talib bin Haji Ahmad, *Darah Mengalir di Pasir Salak*, Kuala Lumpur, Pustaka Antara, 1961; and Khoo Kay Kim, 'J. W. W. Birch: A Victorian Moralizer in Perak's Augean Stable?', *Journal of the Historical Society, University of Malaya*, Vol. 4, 1965-6, pp. 33-47.
3. Jang Aisjah Muttalib, *Pemberontakan Pahang 1891-1895*, Kota Bharu, Pustaka Aman Press, 1972.
4. See for example Haji Abdullah bin Amirah, *Riwayat Hidup Tob Janggut dan Peperangan di Kelantan*, Pulau Pinang, Sinaran, 1963; Ibrahim Nik Mahmood, 'The To' Janggut Rebellion of 1915', in W. R. Roff, ed., *Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 62-86; J. de Vere Allen, 'The Kelantan Rising of 1915: Some Thoughts on the Concept of Resistance in British Malayan History', *JSEAH*, Vol. 9, No. 5, 1968, pp. 241-57; and Khoo Kay Kim, 'The Beginnings of Political Extremism in Malaya 1915-1935', Ph.D. thesis, Jabatan Sejarah, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1973.
5. See for example Abdul Rahman bin Ishak, 'The Ulu Trengganu Disturbances, May (1928): Extracts from the Diary of Dato Seri Lela Di-Raja', *MIH*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1968, pp. 21-6; Mohamed bin Endut, '1928—Penderhakaan di Trengganu', BA (Hons.) exercise, Jabatan Sejarah, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1970; Noor Bee binte Kassim, 'The Trengganu Rebellion, 1928', BA (Hons.) exercise, University of Singapore, Singapore, 1972; Khoo Kay Kim, 'The Beginnings of Political Extremism', pp. 104-11; Abdullah Zakaria bin Ghazali, 'Kekacauan dan Kebangkitan Trengganu 1921-1928', MA thesis, Jabatan Sejarah, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1976; Abdullah Zakaria bin Ghazali, 'Haji Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Hamid (Haji Abdul Rahman Limbong) Trengganu', *MIH*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1976, pp. 21-31; Abdullah Zakaria bin Ghazali, 'Haji Musa bin Abdul Ghani: Peranannya dalam Kempen Anti-British di Trengganu', *MIH*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1977, pp. 32-6; Abdullah Zakaria bin Ghazali, 'Kebangkitan Trengganu 1928: Satu Perbincangan Mengenai Beberapa Tokoh dan Peranan Mereka', *Malaysia dari Segi Sejarah*, Vol. 9, 1980, pp. 55-73; and Abdullah Zakaria bin Ghazali, 'Agama dan Kebangkitan Anti-British di Tanah Melayu', in Khoo Kay Kim, ed., *Tamadun Islam di Malaysia*, Kuala Lumpur, Persatuan Sejarah Malaysia, 1980, pp. 124-34. See also Timah Hamzah, *Pemberontakan Tani 1928 di Trengganu*, Kuala Lumpur, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1981. Other writers have seen this uprising as a peasant revolt. See H. Sutherland, 'The Taming of the Trengganu Elite', in Ruth T. McVey, ed., *Southeast Asian Transitions: Approaches through Social History*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1978, pp. 71-80; and Usha Sanyal, 'The Trengganu Uprising in 1928', MA thesis, University of Kent, Canterbury, 1977.
6. Khoo Kay Kim, 'The Beginnings of Political Extremism', p. 111; and Abdullah Zakaria bin Ghazali, 'Kebangkitan-kebangkitan Anti-British di Semenanjung Tanah Melayu', in *Malaysia: Sejarah dan Proses Pembangunan*, Kuala Lumpur, Persatuan Sejarah Malaysia, 1979, pp. 91-103.
7. Khoo Kay Kim, 'The Beginnings of Political Extremism', pp. 106-10.
8. J. R. Gusfield, *Protests, Reform and Revolt; A Reader in Social Movements*, New York, J. Wiley, 1970, p. 1. Peasants, however, did not necessarily express their anger through broad-based social movements. A recent study on the Kelantan peasantry has established the significance of individual expressions of anger articu-

lated daily (see Shaharil Talib, 'Peasant Anger through the Ages: An East Coast Malay/Malaysian Peninsular Experience', paper presented at the Workshop on the Comparative Study of Peasant Unrest in Southeast Asia, Manila, The Philippines, April 1983, mimeo.). A similar pattern undoubtedly occurred in the Trengganu countryside.

9. H. Clifford, 'A Journey through the Malay States of Trengganu and Kelantan', *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 1897, p. 14.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-31.

11. Shaharil Talib Robert, 'Pemerintah dan Rakyat di Trengganu, 1881-1942: Suatu Kes Sejarah Petani', in *Malaysia: Sejarah dan Proses Pembangunan*, Kuala Lumpur, Persatuan Sejarah Malaysia, 1979, pp. 74-5.

12. See Chapter 2, pp. 32-3.

13. *ART*, 1915, p. 10; and HCO 260/1912: W. D. Scott to HCO, 18 March 1912.

14. HCO 581/1921: Preliminary Report on the Census of Trengganu 1921, Superintendent of Census, J. E. Nathan.

15. Minute, Superintendent of Census, J. E. Nathan, 8 September 1921, on HCO 581/1912.

16. *ART*, 1933, p. 10.

17. *ART*, 1915, p. 16.

18. Minute, Eckhardt, 22 July 1921, on HCO 581/1921.

19. R. D. Hill, *Rice in Malaya: A Study in Historical Geography*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 69.

20. See list of unregistered mortgage holders in LOT 378/1346.

21. See Chapter 5, pp. 128-9.

22. Encl. 1, G. A. C. de Moubray to SUK, 18 May 1928, in SUK 1376/1346.

23. See Chapter 7. For a specific study on the impact of colonial laws on the Kelantan peasantry see Shaharil Talib, 'The Colonial Legal Machine: An Instrument of Capitalist Penetration in the Malay Countryside', paper presented at a symposium on 'The Western Presence in Southeast Asia', Manila, The Philippines, January 1982, mimeo.

24. Encl. 40, Kenyataan Permohonan Orang-Orang Hulu, 6 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346.

25. See *ibid.*; encl. 42A, Pengaduan Dollah bin Muhamad, Kampung Chongak Batu, Hulu Dungun, undated, in SUK 1295/1346; and encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, ff. 80-81. See also H. P. Bryson, 'Note on Trengganu "Rising" in 1928: With Comments by W. F. N. Churchill', London, 12 January 1962, p. 3.

26. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, ff. 80-81; and encl. 24, the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja to SUK, 1 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346.

27. See Chapter 3.

28. For notes on her see Yusoff Hashim, 'Tengku Dalam Kalthum bte Tengku Wook Khazaki', *Jurnal Sejarah*, Vol. 14, 1976-7, pp. 56-61.

29. See Tengku Dalam Kalthum binte Tengku Wook Khazaki, 'Syair Tawarikh Zainal Abidin III', Vol. 2 (transliterated manuscript by Yusoff Hashim). Loosely translated, the verses read:

604. The reason was forest felling,  
the rakyat faced problems,  
as a result of forest passes,  
which caused difficulties.
605. The people suffered greatly,  
passes were difficult to obtain,  
it took 2 to 3 days of going to and fro,  
and yet they failed.
606. They went many times  
but they were ignored,  
they collectively agreed  
to meet the ruler.
607. Sometimes the rakyat ignored the regulations,  
they kept on jungle felling,  
they had to survive,  
the passes were delayed.
608. It is now known,  
that orders were made to detain them,  
hence the rakyat faced difficulties,  
their work came to a standstill.

30. In 1921 a regulation was enforced which prohibited the felling of forest which was more than seven years in age. The purpose of the legislation was to control huma and other non-permanent crops (encl. 4, J. L. Humphreys to HCO, 24 November 1922, in CO 717/61; H. Marriott to CO, 6 December 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, f. 34).

31. See LOT 59/1346: Memorandum by Acting Collector of Land Revenue 1, undated; encl. 1, H. P. Bryson to SUK, 28 May 1928, in SUK 1397/1346; and encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61; Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of G. A. C. de Moubray, undated, ff. 75-76.

32. The peasants submitted a number of petitions on their grievances to the authorities. See encl. 24, the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja to SUK, 1 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346; encl. 40, Kenyataan Pemohonan Orang-Orang Hulu, 6 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346; encl. 42A, Pengaduan Dollah bin Muhamad, Kampung Chongak Batu, Hulu Dungun, 5 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346; encl. 42C, Pengaduan Wan Ahmad, Kampung Kuala Chelah (Kelmin), 5 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346. See also encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61; Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of H. P. Bryson, 26 June 1928, ff. 63-66. For a broader study on the significance of these peasant letters in Kelantan see Shaharil Talib, 'Voices from the Kelantan Desa 1900-1940', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1983, pp. 177-95.

33. Encl. 4, J. L. Humphreys to HCO, 24 November 1922, in CO 717/61; H. Marriott to CO, 6 December 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, f. 43; and encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61; Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of Wan Mahmud, undated, f. 86. See also H. P. Bryson, 'Reminiscences of Thirty Years in Various Parts of Malaya (1921-1950)', London, 1963, pp. 6-7.

34. This pattern is common in twentieth-century agrarian societies. See J. M. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World*, New York, The Free Press, 1975.

35. For the implications of the loss of reciprocal relationship in South-East Asian societies see J. C. Scott, 'Exploitation in Rural Class Relations: A Victim's Perspective', *Comparative Politics*, July 1975, pp. 489-533; J. C. Scott, 'The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia', *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, November 1972, pp. 5-37; J. C. Scott, 'Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66, 1973, pp. 91-113; and J. C. Scott and B. J. Kerkvliet, 'How Traditional Rural Patrons Lose Legitimacy: A Theory with Special Reference to Southeast Asia', *Land Tenure Center*, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Reprint No. 125, 1975, pp. 511-40.

36. Encl. 1, Memorandum by G. L. Ham, 14 November 1932, in CLM 258/1350; and ART, 1348 AH, p. 16.

37. R. O. Winstedt, 'The Great Flood, 1926', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 5, Pt. 2, November 1927, pp. 308-9.

38. Tengku Dalam Kalthum binte Tengku Wook Khazaki, *op. cit.* Loosely translated, the verses mean:

38. For three days and three nights  
the rains did not stop  
the flood waters drowned the river  
the State of Trengganu almost disappeared.

57. For five days and five nights  
the sky was dark  
the flood continued to rise  
the people suffered.

27. Coconut trees, as well as areca-nut trees  
I cannot describe  
they fell haphazardly across the roads  
as if they were chopped.

39. The water flowed swiftly as a javelin in flight  
houses were continuously swept away  
what more buffaloes and cows  
the people's loss of property was great.

61. Thunder rolled across the skies  
as if the world was going to end  
some suffered, others who escaped  
managed to salvage their belongings.

39. J. C. Scott and B. J. Kerkvliet, 'The Politics of Survival: Peasant Response to "Progress" in Southeast Asia', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1973, pp. 241-68; Scott and Kerkvliet, 'How Traditional Rural Patrons Lose Legitimacy'; and J. C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977. A recent study of the peasantry in the Federated Malay States during the colonial period too confirms this picture. The only hint of widespread peasant discontent arose from the



effects of the Stevenson rubber restriction scheme which was introduced in November 1922. However, the colonial government acted promptly and avoided a confrontation. See Lim Teck Ghee, *Peasants and Their Agricultural Economy in Colonial Malaya 1874-1941*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 146.

40. Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Protest Movements in Rural Java*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 8.

41. Vittorio Lanternari, 'Nativistic and Socio-religious Movements: A Reconsideration', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 16, 1974, p. 487.

42. See encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Exhibit A, J. W. Simmons, 23 August 1925, f. 123. For the role of Imam Mahdi in Java see Sartono Kartodirdjo, op. cit., pp. 64-105. In the Philippines peasant leaders often took the image of Jesus Christ and they acted out the Second Coming (see David R. Sturtevant, *Agrarian Unrest in the Philippines*, Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asian Series No. 8, Ohio University Center for International Studies, Athens, Ohio, 1969, pp. 1-17). In Burma, U. Kelatha, a Buddhist monk, was prophesied to be the *Setkya Min* who was expected to halt the advance of British conquest through the occupation of the Palace of Mandalay. He and his eighteen followers failed in their enterprise (see E. Sarkisyanz, *Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1965, pp. 106-7).

43. See encl. 49, Hakim Kuala Berang to SUK, 15 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346; encl. 5, J. W. Simmons to HCO, 10 July 1925, in CO 717/61: H. Marriott to CO, 6 December 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, f. 56; and encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, file number 52432/28, ff. 7, 69, and 114-118.

44. For other cases in the Islamic world of South-East Asia see Sartono Kartodirdjo, op. cit., pp. 133-4.

45. This was the reply given by one of the followers who was asked if he intended to commit treason (encl. 31, Report Penghulu Ismail, 1 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346).

46. For examples of millenarian movements in this region see Sartono Kartodirdjo, op. cit., pp. 64-105, for Java; John A. Larkin, *The Pampangans: Colonial Society in a Philippine Province*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972, pp. 235-9, on the *Santa Iglesia* (Holy Church) and the role of Felipe Salvador in the Pampangan province of the Philippines; Robert Heine-Geldern, *Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia*, Cornell Data Paper No. 18, Ithaca, New York, 1956, p. 11, on the Myinmu rebellion of 1910 in Burma which reveals the cosmological beliefs of the Burmese Buddhist world; F. R. Hill, 'Millenarian Machines in South Vietnam', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 13, 1971, pp. 325-50, on the Cao Dai Movement of Lower Mekong in the 1920s and 1930s; and for Thailand see Charles F. Keyes, 'Millennialism, Theravada Buddhism, and Thai Society', *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1977, pp. 283-302.

47. See Tengku Dalam Kalthum binte Tengku Wook Khazaki, op. cit., Vol. 2. The passages generally mean:

551. This Earth belongs to God,  
 all of nature's wealth,  
 is gifted to man,  
 now we have to obtain passes,

552. Do not be afraid and terrified,  
go and take the wood,  
I will assist you,  
if the State arrests you.
553. They come to do harm,  
is this not God's property?  
do not be afraid to take action,  
even though there is trouble.

48. An essential idea in nativistic movements is that the world order of a particular society would be restored if the Europeans were removed from the scene. The case of U. Kelatha of Burma in 1897 has this quality (see Heine-Geldern, *op. cit.*, p. 11). For Javanese examples see Sartono Kartodirdjo, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-7.

49. See Scott, *The Moral Economy*, pp. 114-56, for instances in mainland South-East Asia, and Sartono Kartodirdjo, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-63, for the Javanese experience.

50. One of the beliefs in Burma was that the former King Chanyeyktha would be reborn in the shape of a youth who had the power to make smoke come out from his arms. Maung Tham, who was smoking a cigar when returning from the fields, was perceived as the man (Heine-Geldern, *op. cit.*, p. 11).

51. Barrington Moore, Jr., *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Great Britain, Penguin University Books, 1973, p. 505.

52. This point is made by H. Benda in 'Peasant Movements in Colonial Southeast Asia', *Asian Studies*, Vol. 3, 1965, pp. 420-34.

53. The colonial administration initiated a system of penghulu when it launched a land census in 1927 as a forerunner to land settlement (LOK 344/1347: Annual Report of the Commissioner Lands and Mines Department, 1346 AH, pp. 2-3; and encl. 3, G. A. C. de Moubray to BA, 14 July 1927, in LOT 802/1345).

54. In 1937 the Religious Affairs Department petitioned to the British Adviser that all their functionaries should be exempted from land rents. The Department compiled an exhaustive list showing individual landholdings (see enclosures in CLM 67/1353).

55. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61; Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, *conf.*, file number 52432/28, f. 7.

56. For details on Haji Musa see Abdullah Zakaria bin Ghazali, 'Haji Musa bin Abdul Ghani', pp. 32-6.

57. Encl. 1, Pejabat Agama to SUK, 26 April 1928, in SUK 1307/1346; encl. 49, Hakim Kuala Berang to SUK, 15 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346; and Datuk Sri Lela Diraja, 'The Ulu Trengganu Disturbances—May 1928', *MIH*, Vol. 12, No. 1, October 1968, p. 22.

58. For a description of some of the local leaders see Tengku Dalam Kalthum binte Tengku Wook Khazaki, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, verses 567-576.

59. For the importance of the Ulama element in the indigenous society see Chapter 2, p. 13.

60. ART, 1914, draft, p. 28, in HCO 1021/1915.

61. Encl. 4, J. L. Humphreys to HCO, 24 November 1922, in CO 717/61; H. Marriott to CO, 6 December 1928, *conf.*, file number 52432/28, f. 39.

62. ART, 1922, p. 12; and ART, 1923, p. 22. See also Mohamad Sarim Mustajab, 'Islam dan Perkembangannya dalam Masyarakat Melayu di Semenanjung Tanah

Melayu, 1900 sehingga 1940an', MA thesis, Jabatan Sejarah, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, 1975.

63. During the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin III various members of the family of Tukku Sayyid Paluh were assigned districts in the Trengganu River region as their sources of revenue (see Appendices 1-3, pp. 230-5). They lost these privileges in the 1920s. See Chapter 7, p. 192.

64. See Chapter 4, p. 79. There was at least one cap kurnia which was in the possession of Sayyid Sagap but in 1927, at the height of the unrest, he relinquished his claims in a court which was set up by the people (minute, G. A. C. de Moubray, 14 November 1928, on CLM 162/1347).

65. See Chapter 2, p. 13.

66. See SUK 1033/1342: Pemberitahu Kerajaan Trengganu, 14 January 1918; SUK 51/1336: Sultan Zainal Abidin III to Tengku Muhammad, 26 November 1917, and SUK to Sultan Zainal Abidin III, 7 January 1918; CO 273/410: Young to CO, 24 December 1917, desp. 374, f. 491.

67. CO 273/461: Young to CO, 24 December 1917, desp. 374, f. 491; and see also encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Statement of Omar bin Mahmud, undated, f. 118.

68. Interview with Haji Su bin Datuk Amar, 5 April 1975; and encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, f. 8. See also Mohamed bin Endut, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

69. For a breakdown of his assets and liabilities see encl. 2A and 2C, *Kenyataan Harta Haji Abdul Rahman*, in SUK 1442/1346.

70. Encl. 5, J. W. Simmons to HCO, 10 July 1925, in CO 717/61: H. Marriott to CO, 6 December 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, f. 49; and encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of G. A. C. de Moubray, undated, f. 76. British officials were rarely able to meet him or even to sight him. It was said that the mere sight of a kafir would send him into a religious frenzy (see Report of J. W. Simmons cited above, f. 46).

71. Encl. 4, J. L. Humphreys to HCO, 24 November 1922, in CO 717/61: H. Marriott to CO, 6 December 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, ff. 36-37. For more detailed notes on him see Abdullah Zakaria bin Ghazali, 'Haji Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Hamid', pp. 21-31. See also H. P. Bryson, 'Note on Trengganu "Rising" in 1928', p. 8.

72. See J. M. Gullick, *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya*, London, The Athlone Press, 1958, pp. 120-2.

73. Khoo Kay Kim, 'The Beginnings of Political Extremism', pp. 105-6.

74. Sartono Kartodirdjo, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-85.

75. David R. Sturtevant, 'Sakdalism and Philippine Radicalism', *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1962, pp. 199-213.

76. Scott, *The Moral Economy*, pp. 149-56.

77. The following account of the episode is taken from a report by the British Adviser (see encl. 4, J. L. Humphreys to HCO, 24 November 1922, in CO 717/61: H. Marriott to CO, 6 December 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, ff. 34-43).

78. Haji Drahman was closely associated with this family. In 1918, for example, Tengku Ngah Omar endowed a house at Kampung Padang Chik Kurus to him (encl.

5. Pesuruhjaya Ugama to SUK, 14 January 1940, in SUK 859/1345) and much later he borrowed the sum of \$1,500 from Tengku Ngah Omar's wife, Tengku Nik Maimunah (SUK 1442/1346: *Kenyataan Harta Haji Abdul Rahman*, undated).

79. See encl. in SUK 859/1345. Haji Drahan politely refused to associate himself with the Religious Affairs Department. He expressed that his teaching hours and methods could not coincide with the government routine (encl. 5, J. W. Simmons to HCO, 10 July 1925, in CO 717/61; H. Marriott to CO, 6 December 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, f. 50).

80. ART, 1923, p. 21.

81. Encl. 1, District Officer, Kuala Berang, to SUK, 10 June 1924, and encl. 6, SUK to District Officer, Kuala Berang, 10 July 1924, in SUK 1268/1342.

82. Datuk Sri Lela Diraja, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

83. Encl. 10, State Council Proclamation, 20 July 1924, in SUK 1269/1342.

84. Encl. 1, District Officer, Kuala Berang, to SUK, 10 June 1928, in SUK 1269/1342.

85. Encl. 7, Pejabat Hutan to SUK, 12 June 1924, in SUK 1269/1342.

86. Encl. 5, J. W. Simmons to HCO, 10 July 1925, in CO 717/61; H. Marriott to CO, 6 December 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, ff. 44-57.

87. *Ibid.*

88. See for example encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61; Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, ff. 31-32, 86, and 123.

89. Chapter 7, pp. 202-3.

90. Encl. 3, G. A. C. de Moubray to BA, 14 July 1927, in LOT 802/1345; and encl. 1, G. A. C. de Moubray to BA, 9 September 1928, in LOK 212/1347.

91. Encl. 1, Pejabat Ugama to SUK, 26 April 1928, in SUK 1307/1346; encl. 11, District Officer, Kuala Berang, to SUK, 22 April 1928; and encl. 49, Tuan Hakim Kuala Berang to SUK, 15 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346. H. P. Bryson makes the interesting point that the word 'kafir' was commonly on Malay lips when referring to Europeans. However, he never felt that the use of the word held any danger for him personally (see Bryson, 'Note on Trengganu "Rising" in 1928', p. 7).

92. LOK 344/1347: Annual Report, Commissioner of Lands and Mines Department, 1346 AH, p. 4; and BAT 671/1938: Diary of the Settlement Collector, Trengganu, March 1938, p. 1.

93. Encl. 3, G. A. C. de Moubray to BA, 14 July 1927, in LOT 802/1345.

94. Encl. 202, District Officer, Kuala Berang, to SUK, 25 June 1928, in SUK 1295/1346; encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61; Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, f. 64; and Datuk Sri Lela Diraja, *op. cit.*, p. 21. This method of resisting rent payment had its origins in 1915 when the government introduced a system of surveys. Some of the peasants pledged their land to Tukku Sayyid Paluh. The government for its own reasons called off the project but the peasants attributed the failure to complete the survey to the Ulama's intervention (encl. 13, H. P. Bryson to CLM, 27 June 1928, in SUK 1295/1346). In the period 1927-9 there were large areas handed over to Sayyid Sagap. The Land Office feared that compulsion was used by him as he stood to gain some very valuable *dusun* and *padi* lands. The British officials managed to persuade Sayyid Sagap to stop accepting such land (see encl. in LOT 21/1347; SUK 1261/1347; and Bryson, 'Note on Trengganu "Rising" in 1928', pp. 6-7).

95. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, f. 30.
96. *Ibid.*, ff. 63-64.
97. Encl. 31, Statement of Penghulu Ismail, 1 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346.
98. Minute, 15 July 1928, on CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, f. 2.
99. Encl. 2, Forest Guard, Kuala Berang, to District Officer, Kuala Berang, 20 April 1928, in SUK 1295/1346.
100. Encl. 3, Statement of Police Constable No. 81, 20 April 1928, in SUK 1295/1346; and Datuk Sri Lela Diraja, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
101. Encl. 32, Statement of Encik Salleh, 3 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346.
102. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, f. 124.
103. Encl. (unnumbered), Datuk Sri Lela Diraja to SUK, 25 April 1928, in SUK 1295/1346.
104. Encl. 18, District Officer, Kuala Berang, to SUK, 27 April 1928, in SUK 1295/1346.
105. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, ff. 35 and 81-82.
106. *Ibid.*, ff. 18-19.
107. *Ibid.*, f. 130.
108. Datuk Sri Lela Diraja, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
109. Encl. 31, Statement of Penghulu Ismail, 1 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346.
110. Datuk Sri Lela Diraja, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
111. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, f. 35. For the list of officials who accompanied the Sultan see encl. 33, Mentri Besar to SUK, 4 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346.
112. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja, 27 June 1928, f. 82.
113. *Ibid.*, Evidence of L. L. Mills, 24 June 1928, f. 36.
114. *Ibid.*, for the petitions see n. 32.
115. *Ibid.*, Evidence of the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja, 27 June 1928, f. 82.
116. *Ibid.*, Evidence of W. M. Millington, 22 June 1928, f. 22.
117. *Ibid.*
118. *Ibid.*, Exhibit D, f. 128.
119. Encl. 48, District Officer, Kuala Berang, to SUK, 20 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346.
120. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of Wan Mahmud bin Wan Mohamed, undated, ff. 68-69.
121. *Ibid.*, Evidence of H. P. Bryson, 26 June 1928, f. 65. Much later he wrote down his recollections of these events (see Bryson, 'Note on Trengganu "Rising" in 1928', p. 4; and Bryson, 'Reminiscences of Thirty Years', pp. 5-6).
122. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson,

30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of Wan Mahmud bin Wan Mohamed, undated, f. 72.

123. *Ibid.*, f. 69.

124. *Ibid.*, f. 70.

125. Encl. 1, Statement of Tuan Dalam bin Sayyid Ahmad, 7 June 1928, in SUK 1432/1346.

126. Encl. 141, District Officer, Dungun, to Mentri Besar, 28 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346. For details on the contents of these messages see encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of the Datuk Jaya Perkasa, undated, ff. 113-118.

127. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of the Datuk Jaya Perkasa, undated, ff. 113-118.

128. *Ibid.*, Evidence of W. M. Millington, 22 June 1928, f. 21.

129. *Ibid.*, ff. 22-23.

130. *Ibid.*, Evidence of Yusof bin Abdul Rahim, undated, f. 62.

131. *Ibid.*, Evidence of Wan Mahmud bin Wan Mohamed, ff. 70-72; and encl. 1, Statement of Tuan Dalam bin Sayyid Ahmad, 7 June 1928, in SUK 1432/1346.

132. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of L. L. Mills, 24 June 1928, f. 37.

133. Encl. 1, Statement of Tuan Dalam bin Sayyid Ahmad, 7 June 1928, in SUK 1432/1346.

134. *Ibid.*; see also encl. 1 (pt. 2), Statement of Tuan Dalam bin Sayyid Ahmad, 7 June 1928, in SUK 1432/1346.

135. See encl. 1, Statement of Tuan Dalam bin Sayyid Ahmad, 7 June 1928, in SUK 1432/1346; and encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of L. L. Mills, 24 June 1928, ff. 37-38.

136. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of the Datuk Sri Amar Diraja, undated, f. 51.

137. *Ibid.*, Evidence of L. L. Mills, 24 June 1928, ff. 46-47.

138. *Ibid.*, Evidence of W. M. Millington, 22 June 1928, ff. 21-24.

139. Encl. 71, SUK to Osman Pendekar, 22 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346.

140. Encl. 67, List Kenyataan Mereka yang Diberi Tiket Bersenjata kerana Menolong Pihak Kerajaan, 22 May 1928, in SUK 1295/1346.

141. See Tengku Dalam Kalthum binte Tengku Wook Khazaki, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2. Loosely translated, the verses mean:

873. At that time the Sultan and his wife,  
proceeded to the old palace,  
they were accompanied by the princes and princesses,  
they all gathered at the palace.

874. I cannot tell the numbers involved,  
who guarded the palace walls,  
a lot of people were assembled,  
there was a lot of noise and confusion.

875. There was fear among the people,  
especially the ladies,  
the town and market was quiet,  
no one could be seen at night.

876. All the doors were locked,  
no shadows were seen,  
they stayed at home night and day,  
in extreme fear.

142. For a short account of his career see 'Dato Sri Lela Diraja', *MIH*, Vol. 12, No. 1, October 1968, pp. 16-20.

143. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of Datuk Dalam, 25 June 1928, f. 55; encl. 1 (part 3), Statement of Tuan Dalam bin Sayyid Ahmad, 10 June 1928, in SUK 1432/1346; and the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja, op. cit., p. 24.

144. Encl. 1 (part 3), Statement of Tuan Dalam bin Sayyid Ahmad, 10 June 1928, in SUK 1432/1346; MBO 929/1346: Statement of the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja and the Datuk Pahlawan, 24 June 1928; encl. 78, Statement of the Datuk Panglima Dalam, 23 May 1928, and encl. 193, Report of the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja, in SUK 1295/1346.

145. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of L. L. Mills, 24 June 1928, f. 44.

146. CO 717/61: H. Marriott to CO, 20 September 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, f. 64; and Datuk Sri Lela Diraja, op. cit., p. 26. In 1930 six of the convicted were pardoned by the Sultan and allowed to return to the state (HCO 1040/1930: Hakim Mahkamah Besar to Majlis Ketua Gaol, Singapore, 16 August 1930).

147. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of L. L. Mills, 24 June 1928, ff. 40 and 45.

148. *Ibid.*, Evidence of W. M. Millington, 22 June 1928, f. 24.

149. *Ibid.*, Evidence of the Datuk Sri Amar Diraja, undated, f. 50.

150. Datuk Sri Lela Diraja, op. cit., p. 25.

151. *Ibid.*, p. 26; and encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of W. M. Millington, 22 June 1928, ff. 27-28.

152. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, Evidence of Sayyid Sagap bin Tukku Sayyid Paluh, undated, ff. 119-120. Sayyid Sagap re-emerged as a popular leader, after World War II, in Trengganu's anti-Malayan Union campaign.

153. Encl. 225, Ingatan, undated, in SUK 1295/1346.

154. Minute, S. Caine, 26 August 1929, on CO 717/68: Clifford to CO, 24 July 1929, conf., file number 62468/28, ff. 2-7; CO 717/61: H. Marriott to CO, 6 December 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, ff. 26-28.

155. *ART*, 1346 AH, p. 13; and *ART*, 1931, p. 5.

156. CO 717/61: H. Marriott to CO, 6 December 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, ff. 26-28.

157. Encl. 1, G. A. C. de Moubray to SUK, 23 August 1928, in SUK 401/1347;

and encl. 1, G. A. C. de Moubray to BA, 9 September 1928, in LOK 212/1347.

158. Encl. 1, Report on the Recent Disturbances in Trengganu, H. W. Thomson, 30 June 1928, in CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, ff. 11-12.

159. CO 717/61: Clifford to CO, 13 July 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, f. 80.

160. CO 717/61: H. Marriott to CO, 6 December 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, ff. 26-27.

161. See enclosures in CLM 396/1346.

162. Minute, H. P. Bryson, 22 September 1928, on CLM 396/1346.

163. The numerous reports made by government officials who visited rural Trengganu comment on the wretched conditions that existed there. See for example encl. 1, Memorandum, G. L. Ham, 14 November 1932; encl. 2, Commissioner of Police to BA, 20 April 1932; encl. 7, Notes on a Visit to Ulu Telemong in October 1933, A. L. Brise, undated, and encl. 8, Notes on a Visit to Ulu Telemong by State Engineer, P. Trump, October 1932, in CLM 258/1359; encl. 8, Notes on Tour to Ulu Berang and Ulu Tersat, A. L. Brise, 29 August 1933, in CLM 19/1352; CLM 270/1352: Report on a Visit to Ulu Trengganu, CLR, KT, 21 October 1933; encl. 17, Commissioner of Police to CLM, 30 April 1934, in CLM 229/1352; CLM 130/1937: Monthly Diary of Datuk Sansuran, District Officer, Ulu Trengganu, October 1936 to February 1937; CLM 169/1937: Report on a Visit to Ulu Trengganu, Assistant Malay Agricultural Officer, undated; ART, 1349 AH, p. 25; encl. 5, Report on Visit to Ulu Trengganu, Commissioner of Police, June 1933, in MBO 72/1352; and SUK 1397/1346: Report on Visit to Setiu and Ulu Besut, Tengku Long bin Tengku Ngah, 27 August 1928. For a brief account on the life-style of Trengganu fishermen on the eve of the Japanese Occupation see Raymond Firth, 'The Coastal People of Kelantan and Trengganu, Malaya', *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 101, No. 5-6, May-June 1943, pp. 193-205. For more recent studies on rural conditions in Trengganu see John Duewell and Hj. Osman bin Mohd. Nor, 'Socio-Economic Survey of Tenancy Patterns in Trengganu Padi Production', March 1971; Abdul Hamid bin Abdullah, 'Some Aspects of Rural Development in Trengganu, West Malaysia 1957-1969', MA thesis, Department of Geography, University of Malaya, 1971; and Zawawi Ibrahim, 'A Malay Proletariat: The Emergence of Class Relations on a Malaysian Plantation', Ph.D. thesis, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Monash University, Melbourne, 1978.



*Ringgit Tongkat*  
(British Trade Dollar)



## *Confrontation and Collapse*

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UNFETTERED by any constraints within Trengganu society, the ruling class reaped huge benefits through its use of the political system in a period of accelerated economic growth. Its members demonstrated great ability in developing and adapting existing institutions within the state apparatus to facilitate the task of tapping the wealth of different sectors of the economy and converting them into sources of personal income. Their command of resources was seen in the ramifications of the pajak system as applied to commodity trade, in the development of the concession system in the mining and plantation sectors, and in the imposition of cap kurnia on peasant producers. The control by these 'politically oriented capitalists' over the economy was to be challenged increasingly after 1910, however, by the reforming zeal of British officials who succeeded in establishing an advisory system of government amounting virtually to colonial rule. This external force was primarily responsible for breaking the traditional economic and political dominance of the ruling class.

The transformation of the political system from comparative autonomy to colonial control within the three decades after 1910—the year of the first Treaty engagement—heralded the collapse of the local leaders' political and economic might in the state. The reforming process, introduced and sustained by British officials, eventually undermined established Malay rule. This is not to say that the ruling class simply capitulated at the onset of British involvement in the state. Its resistance to change was great and was difficult to overcome. The ruling class fought tenaciously to contain the British threat and to preserve as much as possible of its political system and privileges in a changing environment. In the first ten years of the British presence, as will be seen, the ruling class did preserve its dominant position. The end result of these powerful reforming processes in the 1920s and 1930s, however, was that the newly imposed colonial bureaucracy left intact only the basic framework of the political system, within which the ruling class operated as a salaried class.

At the level of central government the erosion of ruling class domination was a consequence of British-inspired reforms that were introduced into the core sectors of government—especially in the fields of land, revenue, justice, and religion—and the specific measures adopted by British officials as part of their general reforms in revenue collection and distribution were, in time, to dismantle effectively some of the means by which the ruling class had been able to serve its own economic interests in the past. These measures were introduced by specialized committees set up in the 1920s and they whittled down the private earnings of the ruling class.

Britain's first official foothold in Trengganu following the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 was secured through the appointment of a Resident Agent. He arrived in the state on 14 July and formally accepted the '... transfer of all rights of suzerainty, protection and administration and control on the part of Siam to Great Britain'.<sup>1</sup> After several months Britain finally concluded her first treaty with Trengganu on 22 April 1910.<sup>2</sup>

The Treaty was not drafted without difficulty. The Sultan and the majority of his officials eyed the proceedings with suspicion; indeed with a mixture of fear and controlled anger. In spite of Siam's old claims to suzerainty, they had prided themselves as an independent Malay Sultanate, and they had viewed the presence of a British official as the thin edge of a wedge that would lead eventually to complete British control as had been accomplished elsewhere on the Malay Peninsula.<sup>3</sup> Recognizing this reality over the next ten years, Trengganu officials were to display shrewdness and diplomatic skill in warding off and containing the foreign threat until virtually the eleventh hour. In the meantime, while continuing to resist political control, they were happy enough to ride the crest of the new wave of economic expansion.

A British presence, of course, had already begun to establish itself before 1910. Under the terms of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1902 Britain and Siam had decided that Trengganu, together with the three other Malay states—Kelantan, Kedah, and Perlis—which combined to ring the FMS, should each accept a resident Siamese Adviser of British nationality whose advice on internal administration must be sought and carried out.<sup>4</sup> Kelantan, Kedah, and Perlis all submitted, under pressure, to this demand but Trengganu, by skilful procrastination and passive resistance, managed to avoid giving in for another eight years.

The High Commissioner, Sir Frank Swettenham, acting in

concert with Siamese officials, attempted many times in late 1902 and early 1903 to persuade the Sultan to accept an Adviser. On 15 October 1902 a delegation from Singapore arrived in Kuala Trengganu to prepare the way for the signing of a Siam-Trengganu Treaty drafted by Britain and Siam in concert. After several days of discussion it was abundantly clear that the Sultan was bitterly opposed to the signing of the treaty.<sup>5</sup> Hidden behind these general diplomatic protests were more specific fears. The Sultan was concerned that the proposed treaty did not provide enough assurance to guarantee the proper succession of his family. His officials, too, opposed the treaty which interfered in the current methods of government and limited their own authority. The Datuk Sri Andika Raja Perak, a member of the Singapore delegation, put his finger on the basic reason when he observed that the ruling class '... feared for their vested rights, their power, prestige, income and titles'.<sup>6</sup>

The reluctance of Britain, and to a lesser extent of Siam, to coerce Trengganu allowed the Sultan to avoid signing the treaty on the grounds, as he repeatedly argued, that it introduced radical changes into the administration of the state.<sup>7</sup> By the middle of 1903 the immediate danger of foreign domination had passed, although the Foreign Office continued to entertain the hope that the ruler, like those of Kelantan, Kedah, and Perlis, would eventually sign.<sup>8</sup> In fact no further action was taken until after the signing of the 1909 Treaty by which Siam transferred all her rights to Britain. In the interim period Trengganu alone, among all the other states affected by the first treaty, continued to enjoy her independence.<sup>9</sup>

When the news of the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty reached the Sultan he was thus perturbed. In a conversation with a merchant, August Katz, shortly after Britain had concluded the treaty, the Sultan broke out in a bitter tirade against the implications of the agreement.<sup>10</sup> He maintained that Trengganu was an independent state and that Siam possessed no rights in the state which it could hand over to Britain. In the discussion with the trader the ruler stigmatized the Siamese '... as thieves who were giving away what did not belong to them'.<sup>11</sup> He held that if Britain wanted to extend her protection over his state it could have approached him directly instead of dealing with Siam which had no such rights in Trengganu. The Sultan only learnt officially of the new treaty when he passed through Singapore on 21 May 1909 after attending the marriage of his eldest son to the daughter of the Sultan of Riau-Lingga.<sup>12</sup> He continued, at subsequent interviews, to protest against the actions

of both the Siamese and British governments.<sup>13</sup>

The first British Agent sent to Trengganu was W. L. Conlay of the FMS police force. He had been carefully selected by Sir John Anderson, who was the High Commissioner then, to examine the affairs of the state, to collect information on its administration, and to negotiate an appropriate treaty. It was hoped that he would also help the Sultan in his dealings with foreign traders.<sup>14</sup> The first official duty of Conlay was to accept the transfer of Trengganu from Siam in a public ceremony on 14 July 1909. The Sultan was visibly agitated during the entire proceedings and he requested time to reply to the British acceptance of the transfer of powers. After he had regained his composure he announced that he was unable to give immediate effect to the transfer and wanted time to deliberate on the terms of the proposed treaty between Trengganu and Britain before negotiating directly with the High Commissioner.<sup>15</sup> His reaction was reminiscent of the way in which he had handled the British threat seven years earlier.

It took Conlay about nine months after his arrival to negotiate a treaty with the Sultan. During these months the ruler gave much attention to the draft treaty. Anderson's proposed agreement was drawn on the same lines as the Johor and Pahang treaties but with one exception—it included a clause pertaining to concessions. Privately Anderson admitted that this clause was not expected to be accepted and that he was not really justified in pressing for it. The concession clause, which embodied what had been standard practice in Johor since 1906, gave the High Commissioner wide powers over the Sultan's right to issue land grants.<sup>16</sup> As could have been expected the clause proved to be one of the main stumbling blocks as it threatened a major source of income for the ruling class. At an interview with Anderson in Kuala Trengganu on 24 July 1909, the Sultan discussed in great detail the exact interpretation of the various clauses in the proposed agreement. He strongly pressed on Anderson the view that he should have a free hand in alienating land to his own subjects but agreed that these grants should contain a clause rendering them non-transferable except with the ruler's and High Commissioner's joint approval. It was decided at this interview that Conlay and the Sultan would work on the draft treaty and submit their proposals.<sup>17</sup> Finally in late 1909 the Sultan submitted his revised draft treaty and this was accepted in broad outline by Anderson.<sup>18</sup> However, it was still to be several months before the treaty was signed.

On 18 April 1910, Sultan Zainal Abidin III, accompanied by Conlay and the new British Agent, W. D. Scott, and about forty of his followers left for Singapore to sign the treaty. The significance of this act of capitulation after years of resistance was captured by Scott as he records the emotionally charged departure:

The departure of His Highness was very impressive. The greater number of the inhabitants of Kuala Trengganu had turned out to witness the Sultan's leave taking. His Highness on reaching the steps of the Istana, turned back and offered a solemn prayer for the welfare of his family and his people. The journey to the jetty was accomplished in dead silence. It was only when we embarked in the boats that the people found voice, and our passage from the shore to the ship was accompanied by the prayers of the people, punctuated by the boom of the guns.<sup>19</sup>

In Singapore some minor alterations were made to the Sultan's draft and on 22 April 1910 the signing took place in the presence of the Singapore Executive Council and the Trengganu officials.<sup>20</sup>

Under the terms of the treaty, which determined relations for almost a decade, the Sultan accepted British protection over the state and agreed to the appointment of a British Agent whose role, however, was limited at this stage mainly to tasks of a consular nature. The Sultan also undertook not to deal with any foreign powers except through Britain and not to grant any mining concession exceeding 500 acres or other land exceeding 3,000 acres to any person other than his subjects.<sup>21</sup>

The signing of the treaty confirmed the fears of the ruling class. The appointment of a British official to the state was soon followed by the attempted introduction of radical reforms into the political system which had been, until then, the major instrument used by the local officials for the accumulation of personal wealth. The presence of a British official was the first step in a process which was to lead to eventual control and domination by Britain. However, as will be seen, the position of the British Agent for the time being was weak and his lack of power and authority gave the ruling class an invaluable reprieve. For the better part of the next decade, its members were to continue unabated the economic initiatives started in the late nineteenth century. British officials had to wait another nine years before they succeeded in concluding a new treaty—on 24 May 1919—which strengthened Britain's hand.<sup>22</sup> In the period between the two treaties, on which attention will now be focused, the ruling class continued to guard its entrenched privileges as these

were challenged by successive British Agents anxious to control the nature, pace, and direction of political and economic reform.

The power and influence of the British Agents during the nine years of their existence were circumscribed by treaty and political considerations. They feared that Trengganu might come to reject British protection and that this would affect British relations with the other new states recently added to the Empire.<sup>23</sup> Their cardinal policy was therefore to walk warily in a state that had long resisted foreign domination. This is not to say that the British Agents merely acted out their roles as Consular Officers mediating on behalf of British subjects with Trengganu officials. The treaty clause dealing with concessions led them to meddle in the internal affairs of the state despite the High Commissioner's earlier assurances; and their appointment to the Joint Court in the state gave them the power to make their meddling effective.<sup>24</sup>

Their position was described as '... interference without authority'.<sup>25</sup> They gave advice freely but it was not easily or willingly accepted and executed.<sup>26</sup> Their pragmatic policy of 'moral suasion'<sup>27</sup> often carried little weight and, indeed, it was only by constantly visiting the Sultan and by worrying his officials that any of their suggestions were acted upon.<sup>28</sup> The typical reaction to the British Agent's reforming zeal was to delay matters until his proposals were dropped or until the Trengganu view was accepted.<sup>29</sup> In general the ruling class retained a relatively free hand in the internal administration of the state and managed, to a considerable extent, to keep the British in the dark with regard to the details of administration.<sup>30</sup>

Over nine years of confrontation the reforms achieved by the Agents were more in form than in substance. There was some change in the institutions of government but very little in its style. New departments were established to control and regulate the core sectors of government, i.e. land, finance, justice, and religion. More significantly, all these newly created departments were managed by the same social group—the natural ruling class—whose presence in the political system was rationalized and strengthened by the 1911 Trengganu Constitution.<sup>31</sup> The British Agent had little control over the granting of concessions to this group outside the treaty obligations, little knowledge about the issuing of pajak, and virtually none at all on the making of cap kurnia.<sup>32</sup>

The administrative changes that were introduced were modelled along those already adopted in Johor and to a lesser extent in Kedah

and the FMS.<sup>33</sup> Some of them preceded the appointment of a British Agent, but the main thrust of change came after 1919. In the judicial field, for example, there already existed a series of court rules which regulated the administration of justice. These rules protected the strong by insisting on the active involvement of the official class in all cases of importance. The concept of an independent judiciary was unheard of in Trengganu at that time and this practice was to continue, challenged occasionally by the British Agent after 1909. Although court-houses were built after the arrival of the Agent, there were still cases which were heard outside these offices. Even the court-rooms were not used strictly for hearing purposes only. Thus, in March 1918, when one of the Sultan's wives died, the court-house was closed for the purpose of making her coffin.<sup>34</sup>

In 1912 a Land Office was established which followed the lines of the Johor department. The office was managed by a Commissioner of Lands and its other officials included demarcators and surveyors. As has been seen elsewhere, the department was ineffective in meeting the primary objective of processing land applications. It was used instead by officials for their own interests.<sup>35</sup>

In 1913 a system of salaried District Officers was introduced, and a State Treasury was established to control the collection of all state revenue and to regulate all state expenditure.<sup>36</sup> The transformation of the traditional ruling class, whose members controlled independent sources of state revenue, to the position of a salaried Civil Service, whose members were dependent on the State Treasury for their monthly income, was in fact related to the growth of this department.

In May 1913 the Yang Dipertuan Muda issued a notice that all salaries were to be paid regularly at the end of each month. The notice promised that there were to be no more arrears in payment and instructed all offices to submit monthly reports on their accounts. A special notice was issued to all his *daging darah* (blood relatives) on the subject of revenue collection. He warned them that the offence, on their part, of not handing over all revenue collected would be punished.<sup>37</sup> He followed this initiative with another order in June 1913 that no payment was to be made from the Treasury without his authorization.<sup>38</sup> Another step in the direction of regulating salaries was the appointment in 1917 of a financial committee of three Mentri to draw up the estimates and a Civil List which was to be approved by the State Council. Any alteration in the Civil List had to have the endorsement of the State Council. It

was hoped that the introduction of this list would check the former practice whereby members of the Ruling House made frequent demands on the Treasury.<sup>39</sup>

The Treasury in 1909 was jointly managed by Tengku Embong Musa bin Tengku Sulaiman and Mat bin Abdul Rahman.<sup>40</sup> The department came under adverse criticism from several British Agents. According to C. N. Maxwell:

Treasury transactions are shrouded in an impenetrable fog in which the Treasurer himself has the haziest idea of his position. The Sultan and the Yang Di-Pertuan Muda and the members of council are in ignorance of book keeping and as long as their pressing needs are supplied, they are content to leave the details to the State Treasurer.<sup>41</sup>

In September 1915 the State Treasurer, Tengku Embong Musa, was ordered to leave the Treasury when he could not explain the discrepancy of nearly \$20,000 in the books.<sup>42</sup> He was replaced and in 1917 a finance committee consisting of the former Treasurer (Tengku Embong Musa), Tengku Chik Ahmad, and Haji Nghah Muhammad was appointed to assist the new Treasurer.<sup>43</sup>

The department was perpetually short of funds to meet its expansion programme and it was not uncommon for salary payments to be delayed interminably. In January 1914 the Treasury paid three months' arrears to most of the officials with exception of the District Officers whose income then was not fixed (and unpaid for the preceding ten months).<sup>44</sup> The subordinate officials in the Civil Service suffered most from delayed payments. At one stage the whole of the police force threatened to resign *en bloc*,<sup>45</sup> and in May 1916 it was reported that the lower salaried officials had to abandon their duties to eke out a livelihood by fishing or undertaking some other employment pending the resumption of payments by the Treasury.<sup>46</sup> There were other occasions on which these officials threatened to revert to the old ways of collecting their income directly from the subject class.<sup>47</sup> One irate driver registered his protest by pulling out the sparking plugs from the Sultan's car because he had not been paid for some months.<sup>48</sup>

Many attempts were made to secure outside loans to meet salary and other requirements but most of them failed.<sup>49</sup> Whatever money that came into the Treasury was immediately absorbed by the Sultan, the Yang Dipertuan Muda, and other members of the Ruling House before other commitments were met.<sup>50</sup> The expenditure of the state budget thus reflected the personal nature of government



and it was heavily biased towards the interests of the bureaucracy, especially those who were members of the Kerabat Diraja. In 1915 the state's revenue amounted to about \$183,000 of which the Sultan and the Royal Family absorbed 50 per cent, other personal emoluments 30 per cent, other charges 15 per cent, and public works 5 per cent.<sup>51</sup> Two years later the revenue increased to \$362,050 of which the Sultan absorbed \$75,500 and the Yang Dipertuan Muda \$11,916, increases of 16 per cent and 112 per cent over the previous year respectively. The total cost of the administration for that year amounted to 83 per cent of expenditure or 63 per cent of revenue.<sup>52</sup> Until the imposition of formal British political control in 1919 the ruling class continued thus to siphon off a huge proportion of the state's revenue.

Several officials were reprimanded, dismissed and even imprisoned by the Sultan when the British Agent drew attention to their activities. The long shadow of the Agent was most felt in the Joint Court where he sat together with the Malay Hakim in cases affecting British subjects.<sup>53</sup> The Yang Dipertuan Muda tried in vain several times to curb the power of this court.<sup>54</sup> Among the most notable cases in which the British Agent was involved against officials were those which led to the imprisonment of the Hakim, Wan Sulaiman bin Daud, for bribery;<sup>55</sup> the conviction and fining of the Sultan's grandson, Tengku Petra Haji, for assault;<sup>56</sup> the sentencing of Tengku Teh, a young aristocrat and relation of the Sultan, for stabbing the British Agent's orderly;<sup>57</sup> the charging of the Minister of Justice, Tengku Ngah Omar, on numerous occasions for a variety of matters;<sup>58</sup> the dismissal of the State Treasurer, Tengku Embong Musa, for embezzlement, and the banishment of Tengku Ali and Tengku Omar for assaulting the Hakim with a pistol.<sup>59</sup> These cases were successful only after the British Agent, in each instance, brought great pressure to bear on the authorities to act. The ruling class had never before been subjected to such impartial treatment, as they had formerly been protected by tradition from court action. However, although individual members of the ruling class were challenged by the actions of the Agent, their privileges as a whole remained intact.

The Sultan, in the face of British pressure, did take some steps to introduce reforms of his own. In October 1909 he made an important decision to delegate much of his power in the administration to the Yang Dipertuan Muda, who had already been involved in the government to a limited extent since 1907, and to a council of

young chiefs.<sup>60</sup> It was hoped that this council would be able to accommodate the British by introducing Western methods of administration.<sup>61</sup> The success or failure of the experiment depended primarily on the Yang Dipertuan Muda. The Sultan in the meantime entertained, with the greatest good humour, the remonstrations of the British Agent and in fact encouraged any conversations which did not commit him to immediate action.<sup>62</sup> He admitted in private to one British official that he realized the general necessity for reform but found it difficult to translate that realization into concrete measures.<sup>63</sup> He remained in the background towards the last years of his reign under a cloud of rumours that he was contemplating abdication in favour of his eldest son.<sup>64</sup> Successive British Agents tried on numerous occasions to involve him in the administration but when he was pressed for a decision his usual formula was 'I have not fully considered the matter'.<sup>65</sup>

From the very beginning the council of young chiefs floundered because of youth and inexperience. They offered the excuse that their own proposed reforms were either too arduous or 'ta boleh angkat' (impossible to execute).<sup>66</sup> Even the more established State Councillors had their own problems. They generally understood the necessity for reforms, showed great interest in the different schemes suggested by the British Agent and received his proposals with great politeness, but none of them would do any work which he could avoid.<sup>67</sup> The ruling class lacked a collective will to reform but its members did possess a strong individual will to protect and fight for their own interest.<sup>68</sup> As a class, they lacked complete unity. Many of them deeply distrusted each other. This was manifested, for example, in the way in which, when discussing administrative matters freely with the British Agent, they would immediately change the subject of conversation if another official arrived.<sup>69</sup> Some of the officials, especially the non-Kerabat Diraja chiefs, feared the Agent because he was identified with policies being followed in other Malay states which they saw as designed to suppress their group and to magnify the importance of the Sultan and his family.<sup>70</sup> There were others who watched with folded arms the general thrust of reforms and refused to be dragged into controversy about them.<sup>71</sup> Finally there was the small handful of men who actively supported the British Agent.<sup>72</sup> The failure of the whole experiment gave the British the excuse to put the state under more direct colonial control in 1919.

The immediate opportunity arose in July 1918 when the Sultan,

Yang Dipertuan Muda, Mentri Besar, and Tengku Chik Ahmad visited Singapore. At an official interview the High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Young, informed them of his intention to appoint a Commission to enquire into matters which had come to his attention relating to the administration in the state.<sup>73</sup> Sultan Zainal Abidin III withheld his immediate reply but promised that such a matter, which was of great importance to the state, would be formally considered by the State Council.<sup>74</sup> However, he could not ward off the pressure for long and on 6 September 1918 he received a high-level Commission led by Sir J. A. S. Bucknill<sup>75</sup> and empowered to enquire into:

1. The administration of Kemaman District of the State of Trengganu;
2. The administration of the Trengganu Gaol and the mortality amongst the prisoners;
3. The action of the Trengganu Police and the Trengganu Court in the case of a rape committed by Said Mohammed upon Tungku Selamah.<sup>76</sup>

The Commission's report, submitted in 1918, described the enormous control exercised by the ruling class over the political machinery of the state and referred to its inability to introduce reforms that had been considered desirable and necessary by past British Agents. The Commission recommended that administrative changes could only succeed through fundamental alterations in leadership and it suggested that the state should be put on the same footing as the other Malay states under British protection with the appointment of a British Adviser. The British Agent, the Commission felt, had lacked the authority to enforce his suggestions.<sup>77</sup>

Armed with the Commission's report, Young, in mid-December 1918, urged the Colonial Office to appoint a British Adviser.<sup>78</sup> The Colonial Office raised no objection; indeed many officials had long expressed such views in minutes on the British Agent's monthly reports.<sup>79</sup> In late 1918 the political situation in Trengganu was also somewhat more propitious for a move towards direct control with the deaths of the two most powerful opponents of British rule—Tukku Sayyid Paluh's on 6 September and Sultan Zainal Abidin III's on 25 November.<sup>80</sup>

In December 1918 the High Commissioner instructed the British Agent to raise the subject of the appointment of a British Adviser with the newly installed Sultan Muhammad and, at his own discretion, with members of the State Council also.<sup>81</sup> During the first three months of 1919 it became increasingly clear that the

Sultan, like his father, would not willingly be manoeuvred into signing a new treaty with Britain, and the ruling class for their part were uneasy at the prospect of a British Adviser whose advice must be accepted.<sup>82</sup> On 5 March 1919 the Mentri Besar announced that the Sultan and the State Council proposed as an alternative that would preserve the autonomy of the state, the appointment of a 'President of Council' who would be considered a Trengganu official and whose advice would be optional.<sup>83</sup> This compromise was not acceptable to Singapore and by the end of March the High Commissioner decided to exert pressure on the Sultan.<sup>84</sup>

Finally on 16 May 1919 the Sultan and a party of sixty-six, including four Mentri (the Datuk Sri Amar Diraja, Tengku Ngah Omar, Tengku Chik Ahmad, and Tuan Embong) belonging to the anti-British Adviser group and seven State Council members with similar inclinations, left for Singapore.<sup>85</sup> In the subsequent negotiations the Trengganu delegation attempted without success to introduce modifications into the proposed agreement—in particular a clause to the effect that the advice of the British Adviser would be mandatory if it was 'for the benefit' of the state. This would obviously have posed impossible questions of interpretation and the High Commissioner refused to accept the proposal; however, he assured the Sultan that if he disagreed at any time with the British Adviser he could appeal to the High Commissioner and if necessary to the Secretary of State.<sup>86</sup> The Sultan finally gave in and on 24 May 1919 the new treaty was signed.<sup>87</sup> It provided the framework for a series of reforms that effectively put Trengganu on the same footing, two decades later, as the other Malay states under British control.

The two most important statements in the new treaty were its preamble and clause 2. The former read as follows:

Whereas it is considered desirable by His Excellency the High Commissioner for the Malay states and His Highness the Sultan of Trengganu with the concurrence of his ministers that the state of Trengganu shall be administered on an improved basis ...

and clause 2 of the treaty which replaced its counterpart in the earlier treaty contained:

His Highness the Sultan of Trengganu will receive a British officer to be called the British Adviser who shall live within the State of Trengganu, and whose advice must be asked and acted upon in all matters affecting the general administration of the state and all questions other than those touching the Mohammedan religion....<sup>88</sup>

The text of the treaty effectively surrendered control over government to the British Adviser. Sultan Zainal Abidin III, who had remarked in 1903 that he '... earnestly hoped that during his life at least, no matter what might happen to his descendants after his death, the powers of government might be left in his hands',<sup>89</sup> was by his death spared the humiliation of subjugation as in the next two decades the British Adviser built what was, in effect, a colonial administrative system in Trengganu.

Within two days of the signing of the treaty, Young outlined to the Sultan the future policy of the state. The British Agent then, J. L. Humphreys, was to be appointed the first British Adviser; the Sultan's salary was to be reduced; the British Adviser was to assume responsibility for the regulation of the Land Office, Court, and Treasury; the future Assistant Adviser was to be appointed, and attached to the Supreme Court; other officials were to supervise the Public Works Department and Police Department; and estimates of expenditure were to be submitted for the approval of the High Commissioner. Finally, a penal code was to be drafted.<sup>90</sup>

In the Adviser's first year in Trengganu the pace of change greatly disturbed Sultan Muhammad. His own salary, which had been raised in 1919 to \$9,500 per month, was now reduced to \$3,500 per month—a figure more in proportion to the salaries earned by other Malay Sultans under British protection and to the revenue of the state.<sup>91</sup> This loss of salary and a general feeling of despair persuaded Sultan Muhammad to abdicate on 20 May 1920, almost a year after the appointment of the first British Adviser.<sup>92</sup> He was succeeded by his younger brother, Tengku Sulaiman, who was by all accounts a weaker figure and more readily amenable to British officials.<sup>93</sup>

Over the next two decades, under the guidance of the British Adviser, a colonial administrative structure was erected in Trengganu, modelled closely on that found in other parts of the Malay Peninsula.<sup>94</sup> In broad outline the British Adviser corresponded with the *Mentri Besar* on all matters; he sat on the State Council and consulted weekly with the Sultan on matters to be put to the State Council. In addition, he formed an Appeal Court with two Malay Judges (the *Mufti* and the *Mentri Besar*).<sup>95</sup> His duties, however, often went beyond this simple outline as he was constantly '... swamped out by a stream of multifarious current details'.<sup>96</sup>

In 1932 he was assisted by four seconded British officials with executive and administrative powers. These were the Commissioner of Lands and Mines, who was regarded as the British Adviser's

second-in-command, and the Collectors of Land Revenue in the Central (Kuala Trengganu), Eastern (*Jajahan Timur*), and Western (*Jajahan Barat*) Districts.<sup>97</sup> The last two held only administrative functions in their capacity as Assistant Advisers in their respective territories where they had the right of inspecting all government offices. It was also their duty to keep the British Adviser informed of the general state of administration and to bring to his attention any matters calling for his advice. They also sat jointly with the *Pesuruhjaya* (State Commissioner) of the respective Districts, *Barat* (west) and *Timur* (east), to form the High Court.<sup>98</sup> There were other seconded British officials of the Malayan Professional and Technical Services who were in executive control of the Police, Public Works, Medical and Survey Departments.<sup>99</sup>

Outside the areas controlled directly by British officials, Malay officials of the Trengganu Civil Service—the majority of whom were members of the old ruling class—continued to carry out the administration. All executive and legislative powers rested in the hands of the State Council subject to the ratification of the Sultan. The President of the Council was the *Mentri Besar* who was also the chief executive officer in the state. Besides the *Mentri Besar*, the 1932 State Council consisted of the State Secretary who was the government's official spokesman, the British Adviser, and fourteen other members. Other senior Malay officers with executive duties were the *Pesuruhjaya Barat* and the *Pesuruhjaya Timur*, Judge, and Superintendent of Marine and Customs.<sup>100</sup> There was also the large number of officers and clerks of the Trengganu Civil Service who manned the lower levels of the administration at the district and village levels.<sup>101</sup>

State Council meetings were held at least once a week and papers relating to matters on the agenda were circulated beforehand. The opinion of the British Adviser was obtained prior to the meetings. The Sultan, though not a member of Council, frequently attended its meetings. It was reported in 1932 that there was only one instance in which the local authorities had found it convenient not to ask for 'advice'. In general there was little need for the British Adviser to exercise the power of 'advice' under the treaty to override any adverse decision of the State Council,<sup>102</sup> since the Council recognized the necessity of concurring with his wishes which were made known in advance of meetings.

From this it is clear that the Adviser and his establishment were successful in imposing on the state a system of government which

gave them direct control over land, judiciary, and finance and to a lesser extent religion.<sup>103</sup> The transfer of political control from indigenous to colonial hands was an arduous and protracted process of confrontation and change. Buried in the records of the two decades before World War II, are many measures undertaken by British officials to break the stranglehold of the 'politically oriented capitalists' over the economy of the state. Their efforts were directed on the one hand to transforming the official elements in the indigenous political system into a salaried class—a civil service under the Adviser's ultimate control—and on the other to changing the non-official ruling class into dependants and pensioners of the State Treasury, receiving a variety of regulated monetary allowances and other privileges in place of their earlier unregulated perquisites.

The loss of political control by the ruling class had consequences for its economic domination. By means of a series of new specialized committees the British Adviser stripped the ruling class of its advantageous position with regard to pajak, concessions, and cap kurnia which had hitherto been their main source of income. They were thus transformed gradually into an official bureaucracy whose members drew salaries, allowances, annuities, and pensions from the State Treasury on a regulated and controlled basis.

In November 1919 the first of these committees was appointed: a committee of three to investigate and report on district administration and particularly on the revenue<sup>104</sup> which had been assigned by Sultan Zainal Abidin III in the late nineteenth century to certain members of the Ruling House and to other elements of the ruling class. These Raja Anak Sungai had enjoyed district revenues from merchant capital as private perquisites collected under the pajak system. Under this system, as has been seen, the district chief farmed out his right of collecting revenue from his district to a revenue farmer who paid him rent and provided him with other favours.<sup>105</sup>

The pajak system had been challenged initially by Tengku Muhammad, who was then the Yang Dipertuan Muda, in his attempts to centralize administration and revenue. In 1912 he announced the government's intention of taking over district administration and its revenue from the Raja Anak Sungai.<sup>106</sup> In March of the following year, acting on the advice of his personal Advisers, he summarily presented the proposal to the State Council at a special meeting in his office and successfully procured its approval without discussion.<sup>107</sup> The decision was conveyed to the

persons who were then enjoying such district revenues in a circular which announced that

On the 10th day of Rabi'l-akhir 1331 (19 March 1913), the State Council at a meeting in the office of the Regent resolved that all River Districts and the sub-districts of the State of Trengganu, now in the control of those persons who were granted an indulgence and permission by the Ruler, should revert to the control of Government; with a condition that as compensation there should be granted to such persons a *monthly pension*, according to the discretion of the Government under Regulations now in force or at any future time to be brought into force.<sup>108</sup>

The implementation of this decision was bedevilled with problems. The District Office system, introduced to centralize control over the district administration, was still very weak at the change of the treaty in 1919. There were only three newly appointed District Officers, in charge of the Kemasik, Paka, and Marang river systems respectively, while in the other areas the new District Officers were the former Raja Anak Sungai or their representatives. Many of these officials were untrained for their new responsibilities.<sup>109</sup> The second difficulty in making district revenue pass through the central Treasury, centred on the widespread resistance to the abolition of the old *pajak* system. Sultan Zainal Abidin III was reluctant to change a well-entrenched system of revenue collection which offered his officials considerable monetary favours.<sup>110</sup> However, by a series of measures he was able to reduce the number of *pajak* in the state from thirty-two in 1914 to eighteen in 1917.<sup>111</sup> The huge difference in revenue collection between that acquired from rents offered by *pajak* holders, and the amount collected directly by the District Officers after a particular *pajak* had been revoked, gave the central authorities enough reason to reduce the number of *pajak* in the state.<sup>112</sup> The final difficulty concerned the payment of compensation to the former district revenue holders. The government now collected revenue from the districts but it was still not in a financial position to meet its promises.<sup>113</sup> Much rancour was expressed by the former beneficiaries of district revenues but they were momentarily accommodated in their new appointments as District Officers on a salaried basis. On different occasions individual district chiefs approached the British Agent for his assistance in securing the promised compensation.<sup>114</sup> However, the government's undertaking remained unfulfilled until the advent of the British Adviser.



Shortly after the arrival of the first British Adviser, Tengku Long bin Tengku Ngah revived the matter of pensions and claimed that which was due to his late uncle, Tengku Chik bin Tengku Hitam (Besut). As a result of his appeal the British Adviser appointed the Revenue Committee to which reference has been made. In the meantime, pending the report, he went ahead with a plan to introduce a general revision of salaries for civil servants, a pension scheme, and a Civil List. Under the new scheme for which provision was made in the 1923 Estimates, the salaries of civil servants were to be regulated; pensions were to be provided for members of the Ruling Family (Ruling House Allowance), other elements of the ruling class (special pension), and former officials of the indigenous political system (pension).<sup>115</sup> The underlying political intention of the scheme was to give security of income and to preserve social status for the ruling class under colonial rule.

When the committee's report was finally submitted, after five years, to the State Council on 3 November 1924, its recommendations for compensation not surprisingly followed the pattern of allowances and pensions proposed by the British Adviser and provided for in the 1923 Estimates. The report took the view that the Yang Dipertuan Muda's promise could be substantially fulfilled by these allowances and pensions.<sup>116</sup> It classified the original grants of district revenue into four categories:

1. Grants for maintenance of members of the Ruling House: under this head come the revenues of Telemong, Merchang, Paka, Upper Trengganu and Brang. These grants in a proper Civil List would be represented by Ruling House allowances.
2. Grants for maintenance of government officials: under this head come the revenues of Setiu, Besut, Kemasik and Kemaman. These grants were in lieu of salaries.
3. Grants for maintenance of members of the Ruling House who were also officials i.e. combination of the first two classes: under this head come the revenues of Dungun and Kretai.
4. Grants for maintenance of a favoured person: under this head comes the Nerus grant. This grant in a proper Civil List would be represented by a Charitable Allowance.

It went on to conclude that:

The pensions and allowances already provided correspond to these four classes of maintenance; and although at the time of granting them it was not stated distinctly that they were given in place of the resumed District

revenues, they must nevertheless be held to represent in fact the promised pensions.<sup>117</sup>

The scheme that was introduced by the British Adviser, prior to the findings of the committee, included a much wider range of ruling class members. However, the persons affected by the resumption of these district revenues were also included in the general revision of salaries, pensions, and Civil List. Two members, Tengku Chik (Besut) and Tengku Besar Hapsah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III (Merchang), who had died in 1914 and 1916 respectively, were not included in the scheme. However, pensions and allowances were provided for the Tengku Bentara Dalam (Setiu), Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim (Telemong), Tengku Embong Musa bin Tengku Sulaiman (Kretai), the Datuk Mata-Mata (Kemasik), and the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja (Kemaman); Ruling House Allowances were provided for Tengku Abu Bakar bin Tengku Abdul Jalil (Dungun), Tengku Nong (wife of Sayyid Abu Bakar, Ulu Trengganu), Tengku Ngah Aishah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III (wife of Tengku Abdullah bin Sultan Ali, Paka), and Tengku Embong (Berang); a Charitable Allowance was provided for Che Teh (Nerus).<sup>118</sup>

It must be stressed that Charitable and Ruling House Allowances were not granted solely to replace district revenues. They were partly a substitute for monthly issues of stores known as *pelabur*, made to ladies of the Royal Household and including such items as candles, coffee, sugar, rice, and kerosene.<sup>119</sup>

The grouping of the district revenue holders under the Adviser's new categories brought a storm of protest from some of the former beneficiaries of these grants. In March 1925, after the circulation of the committee's report, a special meeting of the State Council was convened to hear the claims of interested parties. Their general argument was that the 1913 promise had not been fulfilled by the Ruling House and other Allowances. They pointed out that these benefits were given equally to others who had never enjoyed the indulgence of the district revenues and they should, in view of the promise, be granted a special pension in addition to their allowances to compensate for their loss of income. Tengku Ngah Aishah, for example, claimed the staggering sum of \$74,000 in arrears over a ten-year period for the loss of revenue from the Paka River system. It was argued against her and others, however, that had they still been in receipt of district revenues after the negotiation of the

treaty, they would certainly have been excluded from allowances and pensions granted under the advisory system of government. It was stressed that district revenues and pensions were merely two different forms of the same system of maintenance and that the two forms could not be simultaneously enjoyed.<sup>120</sup>

The most common claim put forward by these former district chiefs was that the pensions should be in perpetuity and inheritable. The main supporter of that view, and the most persistent claimant, was Tengku Long whose family had been in charge of the Besut district for several generations. He had succeeded his uncle, Tengku Chik, to whom the promise of a pension had been made, and he interpreted the resumption of direct control by the central authorities as a voluntary incorporation of a small state into a larger kingdom. However, his claim and others of similar type were dismissed on the grounds that the promise of 1913 was explicitly made to certain specific individuals and to them only, and that compensation thereafter was to be granted at the discretion of the government which intended in future to base its actions on the new formal regulations.<sup>121</sup>

Some of the arguments put forward by the British Adviser to support his firm stand might be open to question and can only suggest that he was determined to make the former revenue holders accept a *fait accompli*. He contended that in the six-year period before the change of the treaty in 1919 no claims had been advanced by the former beneficiaries and that the Yang Dipertuan Muda, as the author of the 1913 promise, did not take any steps, as Regent or as Sultan, to fulfil his undertaking. From this interpretation of the events of the period, he concluded that the expression of 1913 was either an error made in haste or was no more than a statement of intention which would have been settled, but for the arrival of the British Adviser, in the typical fashion by first ignoring and then forgetting the matter.<sup>122</sup> However, the evidence from the files shows that not only did the ex-district chiefs make several approaches for compensation to the British Agent and the Yang Dipertuan Muda but also that the latter, in at least one instance, reminded the State Council that it should consider the question of promised pensions and take steps to provide them when the government was in a financial position to do so. The incident would seem to indicate that the government, at that time, recognized the claims of those affected by the resumption of control and that for their part the former chiefs did not tacitly acquiesce in the

government's silence.<sup>123</sup> However, the British Adviser, by upholding the committee's report, managed to establish the general principle that the claims were met now by the grants of allowances and pensions and that any other form of political allowance was not necessary.

In 1925 the sensitive issue of compensation was finally settled when the State Council endorsed the committee's report without reservation. The government retained the right in future to revise or not, at its discretion, the scale of pensions and allowances.<sup>124</sup> In terms of loss of former earnings the ex-district chiefs were affected in different ways by the settlement. In 1913 Tengku Ngah Aishah (Paka) and Tengku Embong (Berang) lost revenue amounting to \$7,400 and \$1,500 per annum respectively.<sup>125</sup> The Datuk Mata-Mata (Kemasik) on the other hand, having invested heavily in the district, was financially crippled by the government's act.<sup>126</sup> In contrast to their former earning capacity these three individuals earned, under the new scheme of pensions and allowances, the sums of \$1,200, \$1,200, and \$3,720 per annum respectively.<sup>127</sup>

The provision of regular pensions and allowances was the first step in controlling the former excesses of the ruling class. More were to come as the British Adviser turned his attention to the other late nineteenth-century economic initiatives of this class. While the committee to investigate the resumption of district revenue was operating, another was set up, in October 1922, to investigate and report on concessions. This body was presided over by the British Adviser himself and it included the Datuk Sri Amar Diraja, the Tengku Sri Bijaya Raja, Haji Wan Sulaiman bin Daud, and the Datuk Sri Andika Raja.<sup>128</sup> The committee's recommendations gave the British Adviser grounds for resuming most of the huge concessions that the ruling class had acquired in the state.

British control over the concession system in the period between the two treaties, 1910-19, was largely determined by Article 4 of the 1910 Treaty which provided for the consent of the High Commissioner for all grants of mining land above 500 acres and agricultural land above 3,000 acres to non-Trengganu subjects. In addition, the High Commissioner subsequently secured from the Sultan the right to approve the transfer to foreigners of all concession lands in the above-mentioned category, British officials used these two instruments to regulate the growth of the mining and agricultural industries by imposing on foreign companies certain conditions for development. The High Commissioner gave his

ratification only when the companies were willing to accept these terms.<sup>129</sup> However, the bugbear of British officials were the huge pre-1910 cap zuriat which were in the hands of members of the Kerabat Diraja.<sup>130</sup> The British Agents in this period failed in their attempts to persuade the Sultan to cancel these concessions or to reduce their size.<sup>131</sup> They generally admitted that strong measures against cap zuriat were impossible without a closer form of British control than was provided for by the 1910 Treaty.

The British officials, in the first three years after the change of treaty in 1919, did not remain inactive. They laid the groundwork for their later assault on the cap zuriat. The first British Adviser, J. L. Humphreys, in March 1920, sowed the seeds of doubt in the minds of the concessionaires by submitting a report to the State Council hinting at the invalidity of these grants of land both under Islamic law and Malay custom and suggested an amicable surrender of the gifts of Sultan Zainal Abidin III in exchange for monetary compensation. He urged his views on the State Council members by stressing the injustices of the cap zuriat system, its probable illegality, and the potential danger it posed to the state. On the last point he referred to the disastrous lesson provided by Kelantan experience with the Duff Development Company.<sup>132</sup> In early 1921 he pressed the High Commissioner for the appointment of a British Commissioner of Lands and Mines and he asked particularly for an officer experienced in land matters to handle the delicate question of buying out the concessions.<sup>133</sup> Beyond this, he discouraged all applicants and intending prospectors by warning them of the doubtful validity of the concessions and he deliberately squeezed the concessionaires financially by refusing to increase their Ruling House Allowances.<sup>134</sup>

By 1922 the British Adviser had become more confident of implementing his programme of resumption. Sultan Muhammad had abdicated in May 1920 and the price of tin had dropped at the end of that year in the sudden slump that affected the rest of Malaya. By 1922 the high expectations of the cap zuriat holders were deflated. There were no prospectors, no demand for land and little revenue from the lands exploited. In this mood of despondency, J. L. Humphreys reopened the subject of resumption in September 1922, making definite proposals for the surrender of six cap zuriat (Tebak, Mengkuang, Ulu Cherol, Ulu Paka, Kanan Mudik Paka, and Chemuak). The basis for the negotiations between the government and concessionaires rested on the following principles:

1. That the validity of the grants under Muhammadan Law and Malay Custom was uncertain;
2. That the Trengganu Government should nevertheless, endeavour to fulfill the intention of the late Sultan in making these grants—the provision of adequate incomes for his family.
3. That in any case Government could not continue to acquiesce in locking up huge tracts of country in Concessions that remained a bar to the development and proper control of the state;
4. That the ideal solution was an amicable settlement—providing incomes for the concessionaires, opening the concessions for development, and avoiding the unpleasant inquiry into title that would otherwise be necessary.<sup>135</sup>

The proposals included, firstly, lump sum payments varying (in proportion to the estimated areas) from \$4,000 to \$12,000 to satisfy the more immediate consumption requirements of the concessionaires and, secondly, the payment of annuities to provide for the perpetual maintenance of the family line of the concessionaires.<sup>136</sup> The monthly instalments of annuities were to begin at the rate of \$200 and to rise on a sliding scale, according to the increase in state revenue,<sup>137</sup> to the maxima shown in Table 7 below:

TABLE 7  
Annuities Scheme

<i>Annual State Revenue</i>	<i>Compensation Payable</i>	
	<i>Per Annum (\$)</i>	<i>Per Mensem (\$)</i>
1. Less than \$1m.	2,400	200
2. \$1 - 1½m.	3,000	250
3. \$1½ - 2m.	3,600	300
4. \$2 - 2½m.	4,200	350
5. \$2½ - 3m.	4,800	400
6. \$3 - 3½m.	5,400	450
7. Above \$3½m.	6,000	500

Source: BAT 98/1938.

Serious work on the resumption of the cap zuriat began in October 1922 with the appointment of a committee to examine the

details surrounding the issue. In December of that year it submitted its findings, which fully endorsed both the principles for negotiation and the proposals of J. L. Humphreys. The committee went further and suggested that strict measures be adopted through the imposition of development clauses and the collection of survey fees on the concessions should negotiations with the concessionaires fail.<sup>138</sup> In view of the favourable reception of his September report, Humphreys applied in October for a loan of \$1 million for the capital expenditure involved in the resumption of the cap zuriat. While the loan was being processed, he deliberately encouraged State Council members to discuss the question of the invalidity of these cap and this emphasis on questions of legality eventually helped to erode the sacrosanct character of title deeds bearing the late Sultan's seal.<sup>139</sup>

The Concession Committee's initial negotiations in early 1923 were not successful. Some of the concessionaires, the ex-Sultan among them, refused to have anything to do with the committee, while others rejected outright the offers made to them or made greater, and clearly excessive, demands. Tengku Maimunah binte Sultan Ahmad II, for example, offered to surrender her Paka concession for the exorbitant sum of \$350,000 paid in cash.<sup>140</sup> In the middle of the year, however, resistance caved in. Two significant triumphs allowed the committee, before the end of the year, to negotiate settlement for another four cap zuriat.

The two major successes came within a day of each other. The first was the unexpected settlement with ex-Sultan Muhammad, who had been under considerable financial pressure since his abdication in May 1920. Humphreys insisted that he settle his debts, amounting to \$73,800, with the State Treasury. The whole of his pension allowance was withheld pending a settlement, and by May 1923 he had repaid \$38,350. The unpaid balance was settled in that month by the transfer to the government of over 50 acres of land near Kuala Trengganu town. The relief of this financial burden, after three years of pension deductions, made him more willing to come to terms with the larger matter of his concessions. A deciding factor which led to his changing his mind was his urgent need of money for a proposed pilgrimage to Mecca.<sup>141</sup>

The ex-Sultan refused to meet the Concession Committee but after several personal interviews with the British Adviser he agreed to a cash payment of \$150,000 without annuity for the surrender of the Tebak, Bukit Tawang, Marang, and Ulu Trengganu concessions

and the transfer of certain other mining and agricultural lands claimed by him in the Kemaman, Marang, and Trengganu river valleys. The total area surrendered on 25 June 1923 was estimated at 233,052 acres. Humphreys agreed to forgo annuities in preference for a lump sum settlement in this case because of the ex-Sultan's pension and his large income from other private sources. The latter left for Mecca shortly after the receipt of his money.<sup>142</sup>

On 26 June 1923, after lengthy negotiations, the Concession Committee signed the settlement agreement with the administrators of the late Sultan Zainal Abidin III's estate. Under the terms of the agreement the administrators agreed to the surrender of the Ayer Puteh concession as well as four other pieces of select mining land in the Paka, Dungun, Trengganu and Besut river systems for a lump sum payment of \$50,000. In this case annuities were commuted for a lump sum payment because of the large number of heirs involved in the estate, many of whom drew Ruling House Allowances.<sup>143</sup>

In the wake of these two settlements in June, there followed over the next two months, four other surrenders which ended a period of prolonged correspondence, interviews, and negotiations between the committee, the concessionaires and the British Adviser. The first three of these, Mengkuang, Ulu Cherol, and Chemuak, were the subjects of surrender agreements on 21 July 1923 and their former holders received payments of \$4,000, \$8,000 and \$12,000 respectively. The former holders of the Mengkuang and Ulu Cherol concessions received annuities which started on a sliding scale at \$2,400 per annum, while that of Chemuak received an annuity which began at \$3,600 per annum—two increments more. (The Chemuak concession contained the Japanese mining lease of 1,000 acres which paid an annual quit rent of \$1,000. This sum was lost by the concessionaires to the government.)<sup>144</sup> The fourth surrender, that of Ulu Paka, was agreed to on 6 August 1923 for the sum of \$10,000 and an annuity which began at \$2,400. Tengku Ngah Aishah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III, owner of the Ulu Paka concession, needed the money urgently for her pilgrimage to Mecca.<sup>145</sup>

By August 1923, after eight months of operations, the Concession Committee could boast of the resumption of nine cap zuriat and eight smaller areas, covering a total of 416,785 acres, for cash payments amounting to \$234,000 and four annuities costing the government \$10,800 per annum and rising on a sliding scale to a maximum of \$24,000 per annum.<sup>146</sup> There existed at this date six



other cap zuriat which were untouched by the Concession Committee. These included the Jabor, Kanan Mudik Paka, Chenderong, Sungai Cherol, Kretai, and Kuala Duyong (Dungun) concessions.

The Jabor concession was not settled until 8 November 1925, although the High Commissioner had urged Sultan Sulaiman in June 1920, shortly after his accession, to set the example first. The major obstacle in this concession was the Jabor Mining and Development Company Limited which had previously acquired mining and agricultural rights within the concession from the then Tengku Sulaiman. It refused to surrender its agreement in exchange for a new title from the Land Office without compensation.<sup>147</sup> In October 1925 the State Council endorsed the decision to pay the Sultan a lump sum of \$150,000, inclusive of \$50,000 to buy out the interest of the company, and no annuity. In the subsequent negotiations the company settled for the sum of \$25,000 which left the Sultan a balance of \$125,000.<sup>148</sup>

The last cap zuriat to be settled before the outbreak of the Pacific War was that of the Kanan Mudik Paka. Tengku Maimunah binte Sultan Ahmad II, described by J. L. Humphreys as an obstinate old lady, held on to her concession on the advice of her son, Tuan Dalam, although her relatives all favoured a settlement.<sup>149</sup> The Customs and Land Offices maintained pressure on her by insisting that she pay export duties on tin and survey fees. In 1927 she capitulated under protest and accepted the government's offer of either a lump sum payment of \$45,000 or \$12,000 with an annuity.<sup>150</sup> On 13 July 1927 she signed the surrender agreement and opted for the second alternative.<sup>151</sup>

The resumption of the Jabor and Kanan Mudik Paka concessions for \$162,000 added a total of 230 square miles to state land. The sum paid was a great drain on the state's finances but it was hoped that in time it would prove to be money well spent.<sup>152</sup> J. L. Humphreys, too, had earlier expressed similar optimism and noted in 1925 that the throwing open of these large areas of land resumed by the government through the Land Office had already produced a rush of applications for mining and agricultural land. He anticipated that the revenue collected from land rents and the extension of mining and plantation agriculture would in time meet the cost of the initial outlay.<sup>153</sup> In 1929, however, there were serious misgivings over Humphreys's proposition. It was calculated that the annual receipts from land occupied within these former concession areas were not in proportion to the purchase price.<sup>154</sup>

Although Humphreys dismembered the concession system, his successors in the 1930s did not complete the process by mopping up the remaining cap zuriat. With the advantage of hindsight it was recognized that resumption might not produce a sufficient increase in revenue to justify settlement. The official view was that resumption was desirable but had to be qualified according to expediency.<sup>155</sup> This is not to say that the owners of the remaining concessions—Chenderong, Sungai Cherol, Kretai, and Kuala Duyong (Dungun)—did not, from time to time, seek to negotiate with the government.<sup>156</sup>

The Chenderong and Sungai Cherol concessions were in the hands of the heirs of Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim. In 1931 the government was approached with an offer to surrender the concession for \$100,000, with the exception of 850 acres being mined for wolfram. The proposal was unsympathetically received, however.<sup>157</sup> The inheritors of the estate continued to earn a depleted income from the mining effort of Tan Yi Yan (Kemaman) Mining Lands Limited. Some of them opposed any move for settlement and attempted to sell or mortgage their rights to private companies.<sup>158</sup> In 1940 the Assistant Adviser, Kemaman, wanted to withdraw the concession in exchange for a mining title which would have put the area under the control of the Land Office, but the war intervened before anything was done.<sup>159</sup> This concession survived the war, and at the time of Malayan independence in 1957 the state was still in the process of negotiating with the concessionaires.<sup>160</sup>

The last cap zuriat to survive the onslaught was that of Kretai. In 1939, the Commissioner of Lands and Mines, W. F. N. Churchill, remarked that 'perkara ini sangat-lah kusut' (this matter is extremely complex), after years of trying for a settlement.<sup>161</sup> In 1934 the State Council took a stand and pruned down the size of the concession. It ruled that the late Tengku Embong Musa bin Tengku Sulaiman's rights in the cap had expired, except for 8,441 acres which had been rented to Kretai Plantations for ninety-nine years.<sup>162</sup> A year later one of the shareholders in the late Tengku Embong Musa's estate (the records do not give a name) approached the government seeking to sell her share of the concession but the British Adviser and the Commissioner of Lands and Mines were both of the view that they should not deal piecemeal with the shareholders but should negotiate for the resumption of the concession as a whole.<sup>163</sup> An offer was made to sell at the price of

\$120,000 but the government was not prepared to consider the proposal as it felt that the current rents paid by the East Asiatic Company, amounting to \$5,711.75 per annum, was too low and did not justify paying the shareholders the rates paid earlier. In addition, the shareholders were not unanimous in their wish to surrender the concession, as some of them drew more rents than others. The only advantage of a purchase, from the Land Office's point of view, would be to put the area on its records.<sup>164</sup>

By gradual steps, then, British control undermined the economic dominance of Trengganu ruling class. When J. L. Humphreys left his post as British Adviser in May 1925, he left behind a six-year trail of destruction of the economic privileges of the ruling class.<sup>165</sup> The system of district revenues, which had once been assigned as the private income of district chiefs, was absolutely eradicated and the promised compensation for loss of earnings was unfulfilled. Instead, Humphreys had pushed through a system of state pensions and allowances and he included these former district beneficiaries together with some other members of the ruling class under the same scheme. The second rude jolt received by the ruling class had been the destruction of the concession system which had once been a major source of private income from production capital in the form of partnerships, rents, premiums and other duties. The owner's former vast land estates were compensated by cash payments and annuities.<sup>166</sup> Only the Chenderong and Kretai concessions remained as the fragments of a formerly extensive system which once locked up three-quarters of the state's prime mining and agricultural land in the hands of the Kerabat Diraja.

Finally an attack was launched on the cap kurnia system, the ruling class's third economic initiative of the late nineteenth century.<sup>167</sup> This system had been left untouched by Humphreys. On investigation its ramifications proved more extensive than had first appeared, and were revealed only when British officials went into the field to process land titles. Removing these last privileges preoccupied British officials until the 1930s.

When legislation gave land titles in place of cap kurnia the ruling class landlords began to look to these land estates as a source of revenue to replace that lost from district administration and from concessions. The immediate result was to precipitate a major reaction from the peasantry.<sup>168</sup>

In 1927 steps were taken to place land administration on a more comprehensive basis.<sup>169</sup> British officials revised existing land

legislation and announced by an Istihar (State Council Resolution) an ambitious and far-reaching scheme to put the Trengganu peasant cultivator on the same footing as his counterparts in the Federated Malay States. The blueprint proposed to issue documents of title (free of premium) on all lands effectively occupied and cultivated for which there was no formal authority for occupation. The first stage of the plan to inject a measure of security and stability in the peasant's land tenure began in May 1927 with a *bancian* (census) of all traditionally occupied land.<sup>170</sup>

Specific measures were also undertaken, as part of the general reform drive, to break up large landholdings in the state.<sup>171</sup> British officials had been extremely critical of the cap kurnia system and demanded its immediate abolition.<sup>172</sup> As a result of their pressure a 'Naskah Kasar Istihar Ketetapan Hak Tanah' (Rough Draft Proclamation of Land Settlement Rights) was prepared. The Istihar outlined specific procedures for land-owners of 100 acres and above, mostly cap kurnia holders, to obtain new titles under the Land Enactment. An official with a characteristically British sense of wry humour observed that the Istihar could be translated to read as 'Draft of Insulting (*kasar* = rough) proclamation!'.<sup>173</sup> There was justice in his remark as the Istihar in its essence was aimed at disentangling the stranglehold the cap kurnia had established over the basic unit of agricultural production, land.

There was considerable opposition to the proposed Istihar when it was presented to the State Council. Some of the State Councillors raised legal arguments against certain sections which they felt were in conflict with the Hukum Syariah. However, the Commissioner of Lands and Mines, G. A. C. de Moubray, claimed that he had won their approval and carried through the Istihar by quoting 'Minhaj Et Talibin'.<sup>174</sup> The Istihar, entitled 'Berkenaan dengan ketetapan hak tanah luasnya 100 ekar atau atas' (Relating to land rights of 100 acres and above), was passed by the State Council on 6 January 1928 and soon came to be referred to simply by its volume number—Istihar 27/1346.<sup>175</sup>

Under the Istihar landlords were given a year (until 5 January 1929) to show proof of ownership, after which the land would be declared state land. The fundamental aim of the Istihar was not the total eradication of the cap kurnia system as had been the case with district revenues and concessions, but the cancellation of those claims which were vaguely defined and the reduction of the legitimate ones to the barest minimum by issuing land titles only in

respect of areas which were then under cultivation by the authority of the cap holder, that is to say, the cultivated areas prior to the date of the cap were to be put in the possession of the cultivator while the uncultivated areas were to be declared state land and thrown open for public application. In the cultivated areas where the cap claimant could not prove a landlord-tenant relationship, documents of title were issued in favour of the peasant cultivator.<sup>176</sup>

The Istihar outlined several stages for the implementation of this policy. In the first stage Land Officers were empowered to issue a notice calling upon the cap holder to submit plans of the area claimed, a statement of areas under cultivation, and a deposit for survey fees. In the next stage, the Land Officer proceeded to determine the rights with or without the presence of the claimant and made his recommendations as to the issue of titles and as to the area to be declared state land. In the third stage the cap holder was handed a copy of the findings and was given time to appeal to the Land Court. After a period of time, in the final stage, titles were issued and all documents were bound under penalty to be surrendered. Land for which a title was not issued was notified as state land in the government gazette.<sup>177</sup>

The practical implementation of the various stages of the Istihar was painfully slow as the Land Officers went out in the field and confronted entrenched interests. In order to expedite the issue of titles, the State Council on 3 August 1928 appointed a special committee comprising the British Adviser, *Mentri Besar*, and *Datuk Biji Sura* (a High Court Judge) to administer the Istihar.<sup>178</sup> At this meeting the State Councillors commented on the harmful effects cap kurnia had on the peasant economy and insisted on swifter action to control the system.<sup>179</sup> The Cap Committee, however, proved unable to make much headway and it was disbanded a year later.

After September 1929 the State Council heard all outstanding cap kurnia cases.<sup>180</sup> As might have been expected, the Council soon became the bulwark of the ruling class interest and it managed to bring the cap kurnia project temporarily to a halt. A deadlock arose over the interpretation of the Istihar. It was argued that it did not give power to cancel cap kurnia which had been issued to the recipient and his descendants in perpetuity. The opposite view was championed by the British Adviser, A. J. Sturrock, who argued that the Istihar did not allow any exceptions over any types of land claims of 100 acres and above. He maintained that if the claimant

did not follow the terms of the Istihar his property should be declared state land.<sup>181</sup>

In practice, British officials had comparatively little difficulty in cancelling undocumented cap kurnia claims which came to the Council's attention.<sup>182</sup> The biggest obstacle proved to be those claimants who possessed documents and whose cases in consequence often dragged on for years as their rights were investigated. One of the main controversies concerned the issue of land rents, as some of the cap kurnia explicitly provided that the holder was exempted from such payments.<sup>183</sup> A previous Commissioner of Lands and Mines had wished to withdraw such privileges but in 1932 it was found inexpedient to deny the validity of a statement authenticated by the royal seal.<sup>184</sup> The government honoured those cap that explicitly provided for rent exemptions as long as the land was held in the direct line of succession. In rare cap kurnia which were allowed to be transferred, new titles were issued and rents collected, and the same applied in the cancelled cap where the claimant was permitted to select a smaller portion of the cap area.<sup>185</sup> However, the question of rents continued to plague British officials. The State Council became virtually the Court of Appeal as many of the cap owners asked for rent exemption and their requests were often met, contrary to the decisions reached by the land officials.<sup>186</sup>

It was generally admitted that, after more than a decade, the Istihar had been unsuccessful. Cap kurnia continued to pose a major obstacle to rapid land settlement, and while it was true that many cap were withdrawn for failure to comply with the Istihar, there were still many more under investigation and each year new cap came to the notice of the authorities. In 1938, for example, five cap were under investigation and in 1940 seven cap were cancelled.<sup>187</sup>

On the eve of the Pacific War there were still areas of land which had managed to remain unaffected by the Istihar. The Settlement Collector, H. R. Hughes Hallet, summed up the state of affairs in mid-1940 as follows:

Chap holders and persons who profess to hold chaps (there are government officials who to this day collect 'rent' from large tracts of land over which they profess to hold chaps which have never been produced: it is not surprising therefore that these persons are highly obstructive when settlement reaches these areas and even go to great lengths of 'losing' inconvenient minute papers) invariably assume that the land is their own. The actual cultivators are of course given this impression and often do not claim

their ancestral land because they are 'takut raja': they will, however, claim the value of their cultivation.<sup>188</sup>

The surviving remnants of the old *cap kurnia* system were a testimony to the resilience of the ruling class as it coped with the administrative pressure of the British Advisers and their establishment. These fragments could be found in *cap* untouched by land administration, and in *cap* areas reduced in size to cultivated plots and exempted from rents under the new titles as in the old. Continued cultivation was insisted on, however, as a pre-condition for ownership. Some minor concessions were also given to claimants of cancelled *cap* who were given first option to select a smaller portion in the area. The continued existence of these rights stood in marked contrast to the destruction of the district revenue and concession systems.

Looking back over the thirty-year period of what was, in effect, the consolidation of colonial rule in Trengganu before World War II, the recurring theme is one of two adversaries engaged in continuing conflict. The events that shrouded the abortive 1903 Treaty and the more successful 1910 and 1919 Treaties were an impressive testimony of ruling class adaptability to changing circumstances. It was impossible to resist the British advance altogether, but the skilful handling of it enabled some of its more uncomfortable pressures to be resisted for a time. However, after the 1919 Treaty the heavy hand of the British Adviser and his officers was increasingly felt as they set out to create a reformed administration. The full strength of the advisory machinery was pitched against the late nineteenth-century economic advances of the ruling class, and though the struggle was vigorous, the British officials in the end dismantled the economic system that that class had created. Even so, although their old personal sources of income were obliterated, save in a couple of *cap zuriat* and a handful of *cap kurnia*, by the reforming zeal of British officials, the ruling class was not destroyed. Instead, the ruling class, incorporated in the newly imposed bureaucracy, was able to find new vigour and fresh opportunities under the advisory system of government as its *salariat*.

1. CO 273/350: Anderson to CO, 3 August 1909, desp. 245, ff. 352-353. Under an earlier treaty concluded in 1902 Britain had acknowledged Siamese rights in the states of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengganu. However, by a new treaty signed in 1909 Siam transferred all its rights in these four states to Britain.

2. See Appendix 13, p. 273.

3. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, f. 206.

4. See for example L. R. Robert, 'Kelantan 1890-1939: Government in Transition', MA thesis, Jabatan Sejarah, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1973.

5. Sultan Zainal Abidin III in his conversations with Sir Frank Swettenham stoutly defended the state's independence from Siam and went to great lengths to explain why he rejected the treaty. For an account of the series of interviews see CO 273/284: Swettenham to CO, 20 October 1902, secret, ff. 121-204. The subject of Siamese influence in the state has not been seriously studied. It seems clear, however, that as far as the internal administration of the state was concerned the local officials were completely in charge. See memorandums on the subject in Robert, 'Kelantan 1890-1939', pp. 245-65, and F. A. Swettenham, *An Account of the Origin and Progress of Siamese Influence in the Malay Peninsula 1785-1882*, Singapore, 20 February 1882.

6. The Datuk Sri Andika Raja was regarded by Swettenham to be one of the ablest Malays in the Peninsula. He and Tengku Chik Malacca, who had considerable influence on the Sultan and his Mentri Besar, were specifically brought by Swettenham to prepare the way for the signing of the treaty (CO 273/284: Swettenham to CO, 20 October 1902, secret, ff. 121-123).

7. For the text of the ruler's reply to Swettenham see encl. 2 in CO 273/293: Swettenham to CO, 30 April 1903, f. 847.

8. CO 273/302: Paget to Taylor, 24 October 1903, Private, f. 33.

9. In 1903 Kelantan accepted a Siamese Adviser (Robert, 'Kelantan 1890-1939', pp. 90-1) and in 1905 Kedah accepted a Financial Adviser from Siam. See Sharom Ahmat, 'Transition and Change in a Malay State: A Study of the Economic and Political Development of Kedah 1879-1923', Ph.D. thesis, University of London, June 1969, p. 195.

10. Encl. 1 in no. 69, Wood to Beckett, 5 April 1909, in *FOCP/21*, pp. 79-80.

11. *Ibid.* The Sultan went on to produce a quantity of books and documents to prove the state's independence of Siam.

12. CO 273/350: Anderson to CO, 27 May 1909, conf., f. 110.

13. See for example CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, f. 208.

14. CO 273/355: Anderson to CO, 20 April 1909, f. 273; and CO 273/350: Anderson to CO, 14 July 1909, desp. 225, f. 260. For Conlay's letter of appointment listing his responsibilities and his letter of introduction to the Sultan, see CO 273/350: Anderson to CO, 14 July 1909, desp. 225, ff. 264-270.

15. CO 273/350: Anderson to CO, 3 August 1909, desp. 245, f. 353.

16. CO 273/350: Anderson to R. E. Stubbs, 28 July 1909, Private, f. 364. For the text of the draft treaty see CO 273/350: Anderson to CO, 14 July 1909, desp. 225, ff. 271-277.

17. For an account of the conversation held on 24 July 1909 see CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, ff. 203-204; and CO 273/350: Anderson to R. E. Stubbs, Private, ff. 364-368.

18. CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 2 February 1910, f. 172. In March 1910 the



ruler submitted an official version of his amendments to the draft treaty (CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 17 March 1910, desp. 109, f. 424). The British officials did not hurry the Sultan. In March 1910 the Sultan, the Datuk Mata-Mata, and Tengku Ali bin Alam Shah made approaches for a loan from Singapore to repay their huge debts to the East Asiatic Company (CO 273/361: Anderson to CO, 21 April 1910, desp. 156, f. 159). Anderson advanced the Sultan a loan of \$50,000 and much later gave a loan of \$6,250 to the Datuk Mata-Mata (HCO 2036/1915: A. M. Pountney to HCO, 22 September 1915; and HCO 2157/1915: Under Secretary, FMS to HCO, 9 March 1917). The loan to the Sultan paved the way for the quick signing of the treaty in the following month.

19. CO 273/361: Anderson to CO, 28 June 1910, desp. 244, f. 588.

20. CO 273/361: Anderson to CO, 27 April 1910, desp. 160, f. 183.

21. See Appendix 13, p. 273.

22. Under the 1919 Treaty a British Adviser replaced the British Agent. The former had wider powers in the administration: his advice had to be asked for and acted upon by the local officials on all matters excepting those touching religion and custom. For the text of the treaty see Appendix 14, pp. 275-6. The treaty brought Trengganu in line with the other Malay states under British protection.

23. Minute, J. Robinson, 12 September 1909, on CO 273/350: Anderson to CO, 19 August 1909, tel., f. 420.

24. Prior to the signing of the treaty the High Commissioner assured the Sultan that Britain had no intention of interfering in the internal administration of the state. He qualified his statement, however, by expressing that he would not interfere in the domestic affairs as long as they were conducted satisfactorily (CO 273/350: Anderson to CO, 27 May 1909, conf., f. 111). This expression later justified Britain's intervention in the state.

25. CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 2 February 1910, f. 173.

26. *The Bucknill Commission Report, 1918*, Singapore, Government Printing Office, p. 33.

27. Minute, J. Robinson, 7 November 1914, on CO 273/412: Young to CO, 8 October 1914, conf., f. 257.

28. Minute, W. D. Scott, 25 May 1912, on HCO 508/1912.

29. CO 273/445: Young to CO, 7 June 1916, desp. 186, ff. 430-431.

30. See CO 273/411: Wilkinson to CO, 15 July 1914, desp. 370, f. 282; and HCO 859/1914: E. A. Dickson to HCO, 23 June 1914.

31. See Chapter 2, p. 11.

32. HCO 609/1913: E. A. Dickson to HCO, 4 May 1913.

33. The Sultan, in his conversation with the British Agent, on many instances indicated his desire to adopt models of administration from other parts of the Malay Peninsula under British control (see CO 273/375: Young to CO, 2 October 1911, f. 228; and CO 273/444: Young to CO, 12 January 1916, desp. 7, f. 269).

34. CO 273/472: Young to CO, 11 April 1918, desp. 115, f. 30. For a detailed account of the consolidation of colonial controls over the judiciary see Heather Sutherland, 'The Transformation of the Trengganu Legal Order', *Journal of South-east Asian Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1980, pp. 1-29. For a more general outline of the development of legal institutions during the colonial period see Mariati binte Abdul Ghani, 'Sejarah Perundangan di Negeri Trengganu', I.L.B academic exercise, Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1979.

35. See Chapter 4, p. 103.

36. CO 273/399: Young to CO, 4 June 1913, desp. 284, f. 304. In the following year the government approved the payment of \$142 per month to District Officers (CO 273/410: Young to CO, 20 April 1914, desp. 195, f. 369). This sum was reduced a few months later to \$100 (CO 273/411: Young to CO, 8 June 1914, desp. 308, f. 29). Several other central departments were established in this period of burgeoning bureaucracy. In 1912 a Religious Affairs Department was created to administer religion and the Syariah Courts. The first Commissioner of Religion was Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim. Other officials included the Sheikhu'l Islam (Head of Department), his assistant, Mufti, Kathi, and *Nadzir al Masjid* (Superintendent of Mosques) (Mamat Adam bin Taib, 'Struktur dan Organisasi Pentadbiran Hal Ehwal Ugama Islam Trengganu', BA (Hons.) exercise, Jabatan Pengajian Melayu, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1970, pp. 7-8). Two years earlier the postal system was introduced with Tengku Kazaki bin Tengku Abu Bakar in charge (CO 273/372: Anderson to CO, 22 February 1911, f. 368). For other reforms in this direction see also Chan Su-Ming, 'Kelantan and Trengganu, 1909-1939', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 38, Pt. 1, 1965, pp. 183-90; and J. de V. Allen, 'The Ancien Regime in Trengganu, 1909-1919', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 43, Pt. 1, 1968, pp. 23-53.

37. CO 273/399: Young to CO, 25 June 1913, desp. 317, f. 489.

38. CO 273/399: Young to CO, 17 July 1913, desp. 353, f. 649.

39. ART, 1917, draft, paragraph 28, in HCO 1445/1918.

40. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, f. 218.

41. ART, 1914, draft, p. 1, in HCO 1021/1915.

42. As the State Treasurer, he earned a salary of \$150 per month but he appeared to be living beyond his means as he was continuously borrowing. In mid-1914 he took a loan of \$3,000 at 24 per cent interest per annum and was in the process of negotiating another for \$5,000 on his house (CO 273/411: Wilkinson to CO, 15 July 1914, desp. 370, f. 286). He had apparently dipped his fingers into Treasury funds but the Sultan refused to believe the allegations until the British Agent proved the scandal to him. The Agent compiled his own statistics of the state's revenue and expenditure and compared them with those provided by the State Treasurer. The former thus proved that there were great leakages of revenue under custom duties, land, mines and court revenue. In the export duties of tin and wolfram alone there was a shortage of nearly \$20,000 in the Treasurer's figures (see CO 273/426: Young to CO, 2 June 1915, desp. 252, ff. 401 and 404; CO 273/427: Young to CO, 21 July 1915, desp. 326, ff. 302-303; and CO 273/428: Young to CO, 16 December 1915, desp. 470, ff. 407-408).

43. ART, 1919, draft, in HCO 1235/1920.

44. CO 273/409: Young to CO, 16 February 1914, desp. 76, f. 394.

45. CO 273/401: Young to CO, 24 December 1913, desp. 628, f. 218.

46. CO 273/445: Young to CO, 7 June 1916, desp. 186, f. 430.

47. CO 273/411: Wilkinson to CO, 15 July 1914, desp. 370, f. 280. The District Officer of Kemasik, for example, in January 1915 simply deserted his post. He explained to the British Agent that he had not been paid for several months and he had decided to leave his office after being deserted by his police because of salary arrears. He had maintained the police by using his own funds. In Kuala Trengganu over the last two months he besieged the Treasury daily for the money due to him (CO 273/425: Young to CO, 9 March 1915, desp. 100, f. 386).

48. CO 273/400: Young to CO, 19 September 1913, desp. 467, f. 280.

49. Senior officials made many efforts between 1913 and 1914 to raise loans

ranging from \$25,000 to \$50,000 from Guthrie and Company, Singapore chettyar money-lenders, H. Gild (a miner), and other Singapore merchants (see CO 273/400: Young to CO, 25 November 1913, desp. 577, f. 613; CO 273/410: Young to CO, 20 April 1914, desp. 195, f. 372; CO 273/411: Young to CO, 8 June 1914, desp. 308, ff. 27-28; and CO 273/411: Wilkinson to CO, 22 June 1914, desp. 342, ff. 169-171).

50. In May 1916 it was reported that the Sultan and the Yang Dipertuan Muda in the previous two months had taken from the Treasury the sum of \$5,000 and \$1,200 respectively on the first day of each month. Whenever there was an obstacle in the collection of revenue the lower-grade officials remained unpaid (CO 273/445: Young to CO, 7 June 1916, desp. 186, ff. 429-430).

51. For a more detailed breakdown of expenditure see ART, 1915, draft, pp. 1-4, in HCO 731/1916.

52. ART, 1917, draft, paragraph 2, in HCO 1445/1918.

53. Outside the four walls of the Joint Court the British Agent admitted that he was powerless to penetrate the workings of the officials (CO 273/425: Young to CO, 9 March 1915, desp. 100, f. 388).

54. Besides constantly interfering in the decisions of the Joint Court, the Yang Dipertuan Muda in June 1914 issued an order forbidding the issue of wakil to the Malay lawyers who were nearly all non-locals. It was suspected that the ruling class feared their presence which might encourage cases to be brought against them. The British Agent stubbornly resisted this action and finally managed to get the order changed (see CO 273/411: Wilkinson to CO, 22 June 1914, desp. 342, ff. 174 and 282).

55. See Chapter 2, p. 30.

56. Tengku Petra Haji belonged to a group of young aristocrats who frequented the streets at night and sometimes assaulted Chinese rickshaw coolies. In this particular case the British Agent pressed for a trial in spite of the procrastination of the police. The verdict of the Joint Court caused a great sensation in a packed court-house (CO 273/445: Young to CO, 4 April 1916, desp. 102, ff. 103-105).

57. CO 273/460: Young to CO, 7 May 1917, desp. 139, f. 34; and CO 273/460: Young to CO, 19 June 1917, desp. 183, f. 223.

58. Tengku Ngah Omar was the Minister of Justice and Religion. In August 1914 he was ordered to pay the sum of \$796 by the court as compensation to Che Mat for goods he had falsely confiscated (CO 273/412: Young to CO, 22 September 1914, desp. 472, f. 119; and CO 273/425: Young to CO, 24 March 1915, desp. 131, ff. 526-527). In May 1915 he was involved with Tengku Embong Musa in a sensational court case involving town land (see Chapter 4, p. 103).

59. The Hakim approached the British Agent for help in the assault case. The latter saw the Sultan and pointed out the extreme seriousness of the offence. As a result of this action the Sultan appointed a special court to hear the case (CO 273/459: Young to CO, 6 March 1917, desp. 68, ff. 328-328A).

60. See Chapter 2, pp. 16-17. On February 1913 the Sultan went a step further in strengthening the authority of the Yang Dipertuan Muda. He empowered the latter '... to issue orders and directions, to decide matters with justice, to make and enforce rules and laws and to make arrangements for the service of the state of Trengganu, its territories and dependencies generally'. This royal decree was endorsed by the State Council (HCO 368/1913: Sultan Zainal Abidin III to HCO, 31 March 1913). The British officials regarded this appointment with reservations. For the time being, however, the High Commissioner was not prepared to raise any objections as it was

learnt that the Yang Dipertuan Muda was to be trained for the post of Sultan (minute, A. Young, 26 April 1913, on HCO 368/1913; E. A. Dickson to HCO, 26 March 1913).

61. CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 17 November 1909, desp. 345, ff. 396 and 400.

62. CO 273/425: Young to CO, 24 March 1915, desp. 31, f. 529. For the personality of the Sultan see Chapter 2, p. 16.

63. CO 273/412: Young to CO, 17 November 1914, desp. 545, f. 482; and CO 273/425: Young to CO, 24 March 1915, desp. 131, f. 529.

64. CO 273/410: Young to CO, 20 April 1914, desp. 195, f. 369; and CO 273/411: Young to CO, 8 June 1914, desp. 308, f. 29.

65. CO 273/425: Young to CO, 24 March 1915, desp. 131, f. 529.

66. CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 2 February 1910, f. 173.

67. CO 273/425: Young to CO, 19 January 1915, desp. 22, ff. 131–132. There was, however, some praise for individual officials on the little reform that was undertaken (ART, 1919, draft, in HCO 1235/1920).

68. In December 1913 it was reported that the officers of the state did nothing except that which they thought might bring them individual profit. The decision on, and even the discussion of, matters of any importance was postponed as each attempted to thrust the responsibility on the other (CO, 273/409: Young to CO, 3 February 1914, desp. 53, ff. 313–314).

69. CO 273/411: Wilkinson to CO, 15 August 1914, desp. 414, ff. 462–463.

70. CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 2 February 1910, f. 173.

71. The Ulama element of the ruling class was particularly hostile to the British. See Chapter 6 for the reaction of this group.

72. There was at least one member of the leading Ulama family who favoured British rule. He was Ungku Sah (Abdullah) bin Zainal Abidin, nephew of Tukku Sayyid Paluh, who was in charge of municipal functions around Kuala Trengganu. On the eve of his death he summoned the Agent, made all his eleven sons sit in a row, and lectured them on the advantages of British rule. He charged them with protecting the Agent when he was gone (CO 273/373: Brockman to CO, 23 May 1911, f. 612). Other pro-British officials included Tengku Kazaki bin Tengku Abu Bakar who was in charge of the postal services (CO 273/384: Young to CO, 28 February 1912, desp. 70, f. 419).

73. CO 273/473: Young to CO, 14 September 1918, desp. 254, f. 249.

74. CO 273/474: Young to CO, 23 December 1918, desp. 348, ff. 471–475 and 480–481.

75. He was the Chief Justice of the Straits Settlements. The other members included H. Marriott (Acting Colonial Treasurer, Straits Settlement) and F. M. Elliot, who was the head of the legal firm of Messrs Rodyk and Davidson and a member of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements (*ibid.*, f. 469).

76. *The Bucknill Commission Report, 1918.*

77. *Ibid.*, pp. 32–4. The general observations of the Commission summarized the reports of past British Agents. (CO 273/486: Young to CO, 20 January 1919, desp. 17, f. 79).

78. CO 273/474: Young to CO, 23 December 1918, desp. 348, ff. 468–470.

79. CO 273/474: CO to HCO, 2 April 1919, draft, f. 483. See for example minute, J. Robinson, 7 November 1914, and Lewis Harcourt (Secretary of State), 16 November 1914, on CO 273/412: Young to CO, 8 October 1914, *conf.*, f. 257.

80. Shaharil Talib Robert, 'The Trengganu Ruling Class in the Late Nineteenth Century', *JMBRAS*, Vol. 50, Pt. 2, 1977, pp. 29 and 43.

81. CO 273/474: Young to CO, 23 December 1918, desp. 348, f. 470.

82. CO 273/486: Young to CO, 12 March 1919, desp. 81, f. 532.

83. CO 273/487: Young to CO, 14 April 1919, desp. 122, ff. 59-60.

84. Sultan Muhammad informed the British Agent on 11 March and again on 12 March that he supported the State Council's decision. The Agent suspected that the Mentri Besar and Tengku Chik Ahmad were behind the scheme to block the advance of Britain (*ibid.*). See also CO 273/487: Young to CO, 4 June 1919, conf., f. 273; and CO 273/487: Young to CO, 24 June 1918, desp. 243, ff. 430-431.

85. CO 273/487: Young to CO, 4 June 1919, conf., f. 274.

86. For an account of the discussions in Singapore see CO 273/487: Young to CO, 4 June 1919, conf., ff. 274-276. Local sources confirm that negotiations in Singapore were tense (see Tengku Dalam Kalthum binte Tengku Wook Khazaki, 'Syair Tawarikh Zainal Abidin III', Vol. 1 (transliterated manuscript by Yusoff Hashim), verses 666-745).

87. Some sections of the community took the date of signing as a good omen because it corresponded to the 24th day of the lunar month of Shaaban in the Muslim calendar (*ART*, 1919, draft, p. 36, in HCO, 1235/1920).

88. For the text of the treaty see Appendix 14, pp. 275-6.

89. CO 273/293: Swettenham to CO, 25 February 1903, secret, f. 442.

90. CO 273/487: Young to CO, 4 June 1919, conf. ff. 276-277.

91. *ART*, 1919, draft, p. 6, in HCO 1235/1920. One of the first acts of the Adviser was to tighten the control over the Treasury. In 1920 special sanctions were introduced for expenditure exceeding \$500 and supplementary and special votes had to have his signature and those of two other members of government (*ART*, 1920, p. 2, in HCO 530/1921). There were other major differences between the ruler and the British Adviser (see CO 537/797: F. S. James to CO, 30 December 1919, conf., ff. 9-19).

92. CO 717/2: Guillemard to CO, 31 May 1920, tel., ff. 403-407. It was reported that his abdication was received by the Mentri and State Councillors '... with a feeling of relief, and in any case nothing is known of the ex-Sultan's character or career to make the abdication a matter of regret' (CO 717/2: Guillemard to CO, 10 June 1920, conf., ff. 422-424). From the local point of view, however, the events leading to the ruler's abdication and the appointment of his successor sent tremors through Trengganu society. This is brought out in detail by Tengku Dalam Kalthum binte Tengku Wook Khazaki, 'Syair Tawarikh Zainal Abidin III', Vol. 1 (transliterated manuscript by Yusoff Hashim), verses 822-1029. The installation of the new Sultan was announced by an *Istihar* which was issued to all District Offices and mosques (SUK 524/1338: SUK to Pesuruhjaya Timur, 21 May 1920; and MBO 366/1338: *Istihar*, 21 May 1920). The ex-Sultan went to reside in Singapore where he continued to earn a Ruling House and motor-car allowance and even a special allowance for staying in Singapore. The Adviser insisted that he repay the state the sum of \$34,450 which he had previously borrowed (encl. 23 in SUK 673/1338).

93. Sultan Sulaiman was installed on the same day—20 May 1920—on which his brother abdicated, as was required by the custom of the state (CO 717/2: Guillemard to CO, 31 May 1920, tel., ff. 403-407). The Adviser tried to install another younger brother of Tengku Muhammad's who was then only a boy, but he failed. If the Adviser had succeeded, he would have had stronger control over the state (Haji Su

bin Datuk Amar, 'Tawarikh Hidup Haji Ngah Mohammad', 6 May 1975 (unpublished). This attempt is verified by British records (see CO 537/797: F. S. James to CO, 30 December 1919, conf., ff. 22-23). At a special meeting the ruler's salary was fixed at \$4,000 per month. The High Commissioner was not happy that the Sultan should receive an income less than that of his brother and hence the cut in the latter's salary. However, he thought that the ruler could be helped in other ways (HCO 1242/1920: J. L. Humphreys to HCO, 29 May 1920; and minute, Guillemard, 3 June 1920, on this despatch). The new Sultan was given a special gift of \$5,000 and unsettled bills amounting to \$7,500 were paid up. The state also subsequently paid his other debts (see minute, J. L. Humphreys, 8 June 1920, on HCO 1242/1920; and enclosures in SUK 527/1338).

94. For an overview of the administrative structure of the state during the period of the British Adviser see Chan Su-Ming, op. cit., pp. 190-6; and Alberto C. Morales, 'The Development of the North-Eastern States of Malaya, 1909-1941', MA thesis, Department of History, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 1960.

95. CO 717/88: Clementi to CO, 7 November 1932, file number 92300/32, pt. 3, conf., ff. 11-13. In 1924 the status of the British Adviser was raised when his office was ranked as a staff appointment (CO 717/35: Guillemard to CO, 19 March 1924, conf., ff. 167-173).

96. Encl. 9, A. E. Coope to CLM, 10 October 1938, in CLM 9/1938.

97. *ART*, 1932, p. 3.

98. The Assistant Adviser, Besut, and the Assistant Adviser, Kemaman, as these officials were usually called, were technically in communication with the office of the Malay State Commissioners of Jajahan Besut (Barat) and Jajahan Kemaman (Timur) respectively. However, it appears from their monthly diaries that they frequently acted quite independently. They had a wide range of activities outside their offices, from hunting elephants and tigers in the hills of Besut to the tracking of tin thieves in the ulu of Kemaman, and from demonstrating to the peasants how to plant padi to the uprooting and dismissal of village headmen whom they felt were not performing their duties. In addition, they seemed to comment on the immense amount of paperwork they had to clear in their offices. The diaries of these officials leave us with an invaluable field account of their roving commissions and how life was at the local level. See, for example, the monthly diaries of the Assistant Adviser, Besut, for the year 1935 in BAT 196/1935 and the monthly diaries of the Assistant Adviser, Kemaman, for the year 1935 in BAT 199/1935. See also BAT 1105/1936: Memorandum on the duties of the Assistant Adviser Kemaman, M. C. ff. Sheppard, undated. Recently one of the more remarkable Assistant British Adviser Kemaman has penned his recollections of his service there in the 1930s. See Tan Sri Dato Mubin Sheppard, *Taman Budiman: Memoirs of an Unorthodox Civil Servant*, Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., Kuala Lumpur, 1979.

99. *ART*, 1932, p. 3.

100. See *ART*, 1932, p. 3; and memorandum by C. C. Brown dated 30 October 1930 in CO 717/88: Clementi to CO, 7 November 1932, file number 92300/32, pt. 3, conf., ff. 10-15.

101. A comprehensive list of the officer and clerical staff members of the government is available in the annual estimates that were drawn up by the Treasury and supervised by the British Adviser (see, for example, Trengganu Estimates for 1341 AH in CO 717/30: Guillemard to CO, 18 September 1923, desp. 62, ff. 449-539).

102. Memorandum by C. C. Brown on 'The Working of the Advisory System in Trengganu', 30 October 1932, in CO 717/88: Clementi to CO, 7 November 1932, file number 92300/32, pt. 3, conf., ff. 10-15.

103. The constant interference by British officials in the Religious Affairs Department has been part of a wider study. See Mohamad Sarim Mustajab, 'Islam dan Perkembangannya dalam Masyarakat Melayu di Semenanjung Tanah Melayu, 1900 sehingga 1940an', MA thesis, Jabatan Sejarah, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, 1975.

104. Encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenues, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 124.

105. For a discussion of the pajak system as a source of revenue to the ruling class see Chapter 3.

106. CO 273/399: Young to CO, 25 June 1913, desp. 317, f. 485.

107. Encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenues, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, ff. 120-121.

108. Ibid. The notice was sent to the twelve owners of district revenue. See Appendix 3, pp. 234-5.

109. CO 273/486: Young to CO, 18 February 1919, desp. 46, ff. 376-377. For the Letter of Appointment of one of these District Officers outlining his duties see SUK 93/1335: Jabatan Maha Tinggi Kerajaan Trengganu, 6 February 1917. The general comment of the various British Agents was that these District Officers were incapable of shouldering their responsibilities. The District Officer of Kretai, Tengku Omar (half brother of Tengku Embong Musa bin Tengku Sulaiman), for example, was described as a weak character who slept all day and habitually gambled all night (CO 273/399: Young to CO, 25 June 1913, desp. 317, f. 485; and CO 273/461: Young to CO, 24 December 1917, desp. 374, f. 480). There were also others like the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja who was described as an 'officer of the old type' (CO 273/459: Young to CO, 10 January 1917, desp. 11, f. 250). This is not to say that there were no officers of sound calibre. The District Officer of Besut, Tengku Long, that of Paka, Tuan Mandak, and that of Kemasik, Che Da (son of the Datuk Mata-Mata), were singled out as promising officers. The transformation of the post of District Officer was only completed in 1925, except in Besut, where all the appointments were unrelated to the former Raja Anak Sungai (encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenues, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 121).

110. See Chapter 3. The Sultan found it difficult to abolish the pajak system as the government was too dependent on its rent to pay for the cost of the administration and in addition he feared offending those members of the ruling class who derived their income from the pajak rents (HCO 923/1912: W. D. Scott to HCO, 5 July 1912, conf.).

111. ART, draft, paragraph 9, in HCO 1445/1918. The Sultan in June 1912 announced that all pajak in future should carry the state seal and gave notice in August 1914 that they should operate on a two-year basis (see Chapter 3, note 39). These measures were designed to control the pajak system and not to abolish it. The eradication of the system was a slow process. In 1915 the statistics showed that over half of the state revenue came from pajak rents and that a portion of these rents

did not go to the Treasury but instead went directly to the owner of the farms (ART, 1915, pp. 2 and 8, in HCO 731/1961). However, the state gradually took control over the pajak and when they expired most of them were not renewed; the revenue was then collected by the District Officer (ART, 1916, draft, paragraphs 11 and 12, in HCO 333/1917).

112. See Chapter 3, pp. 61-2.

113. ART, 1913, draft, p. 8, in HCO 919/1914.

114. In April 1913 Tengku Embong Musa, who was the district chief of Kretai, was given to understand by the Yang Dipertuan Muda that he would receive \$100 per annum as compensation for the loss of his district revenue (CO 273/400: Young to CO, 21 August 1913, desp. 407, f. 105). The most vocal district chief was Tengku Chik bin Tengku Hitam who threatened to revert to the old methods of collecting his income if compensation was not paid to him. In order to placate his immediate demands, the Yang Dipertuan Muda authorized him to draw nine months' salary and to pay himself from any revenue he could collect in Besut (CO 273/411: Wilkinson to CO, 15 July 1914, desp. 370, ff. 280-281).

115. Encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenues, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, ff. 124-125. For the pension and allowance scheme in the 1923 Estimates see CO 717/30: Guillemard to CO, 18 September 1923, desp. 62, ff. 520-522.

116. Encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenues, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 125. Some of the letters of correspondence of the Committee with the owners of district revenue who sent in their claims for compensation are in MBO 303/1339.

117. Encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenues, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, ff. 125-126.

118. *Ibid.*, f. 125. For a list of other members of the ruling class who enjoyed these allowances and pensions from the state see CO 717/30: Guillemard to CO, 18 September 1923, desp. 62, ff. 520-522.

119. Encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenues, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 125.

120. *Ibid.*, ff. 126-127. Tengku Ngah Aishah claimed that in 1912 she drew an income of \$7,400 (see encl. 6, Tengku Ngah Aishah to Majlis Komite Kerajaan Trengganu, 28 May 1921, in MBO 303/1339).

121. Encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenues, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, ff. 127-128. Tengku Long's claim can be found in encl. 11, Tengku Sri Indera Segara to Majlis Komite Kerajaan Trengganu, 16 July 1921, in MBO 303/1339. He stated that he lost an income of about \$8,000 per annum by the government's action.

122. Encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenues, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, ff. 122-123.

123. See note 114. It is significant to note that in the list the Yang Dipertuan Muda



sent to the State Council in January 1916, he included compensation to the families of deceased district revenue holders.

124. Encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenues, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, ff. 128-129.

125. See encl. 6 and 13 in MBO 303/1339.

126. HCO 2157/1915: C. N. Maxwell to HCO, 12 October 1915.

127. For the complete list of pensions and allowances earned by the twelve former beneficiaries of district revenue see Appendix 15, p. 277.

128. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 144.

129. See Chapter 4, pp. 81-2.

130. For a list of these concessions see Appendix 10, pp. 253-62.

131. CO 273/428: Young to CO, 16 December 1915, desp. 470, f. 407; and encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 135.

132. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 141. The Duff Development Company had acquired a huge concession from the Sultan of Kelantan and the subsequent advisory government was confronted with considerable difficulty in cancelling its rights.

133. The British Adviser specifically asked for W. E. Pepys who had valuable land experience at Pasir Puteh in Kelantan and the High Commissioner's Office went to extreme lengths in urging the Chief Secretary, FMS, to meet his request (see enclosures in HCO 201/1921).

134. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, ff. 140-141. In addition concessionaires were turned down when they asked permission from the British Adviser to negotiate with companies (minute, J. L. Humphreys, 12 September 1920, on SUK 684/1338).

135. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, ff. 142-143.

136. *Ibid.*, ff. 143-144.

137. See BAT 98/1938.

138. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 144.

139. *Ibid.*, ff. 144-145. The larger part of the loan was used for public works, surveys, and town improvement (minute, 7 April 1924, on CO 717/35: Guillemard to CO, 7 February 1924, desp. 7, f. 30).

140. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 146.

141. *Ibid.*, ff. 146-148.

142. *Ibid.* The agreement that was signed, as with the others, was a short document outlining its terms. Copies of the ex-Sultan's surrender agreement can be

found in encl. 4B in BAT 660/1935; SUK 924/1341; and encl. B in SUK (Committee Timbangan Concession) 7/1341.

143. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, ff. 146-147. See also agreements in encl. 4A in BAT 660/1935; encl. A in SUK (Committee Timbangan Concession) 7/1341; and encl. 9 in SUK 875/1341. The administrators paid the sum of \$6,000 to the Datuk Sri Lela Diraja who had previously developed the concession (encl. 4 in SUK 1085/1341).

144. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, ff. 148-149. For the surrender agreements of these concessions see SUK (Committee Timbangan Concession) 7/1341.

145. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 149. See also encl. 3, Tengku Ngah Aishah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III to SUK, 29 July 1923, in SUK 1117/1341.

146. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 151.

147. Encl. 1, J. W. Smith to SUK, 13 September 1925, in SUK 503/1344.

148. Encl. 5, State Council Meeting, 28 October 1925, in SUK 503/1344. See also encl. 1 in BAT 660/1935; and CLM 194/1350: Ruling House and Other Large Concessions, J. R. Neave, 1 February 1933.

149. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 150.

150. See the extremely strong letter she addressed to her nephew, Sultan Sulaiman, condemning the government's efforts to resume her concession (encl. 1, Tengku Maimunah to Sultan Sulaiman, 15 September 1926, in MBO 242/1345). See also encl. 3 in the same file for her letter of acceptance.

151. For the text of the agreement see encl. 3 in BAT 660/1935.

152. ART, 1926, p. 14.

153. Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, desp. 33, ff. 152-153.

154. The Commissioner of Lands and Mines, G. A. C. de Moubray, cited the example of the Jabor concession which was purchased at \$150,000 but whose rental roll was only \$3,500 (CLM 299/1348: 'Note on the Return on the Capital Expenditure Involved in Acquisition of the Concessions', G. A. C. de Moubray, 12 December 1929). See Appendix 9, pp. 246-52, for the payments and annuities the government paid in resuming the Royal House concessions. The payment of annuities continued until the family line of the original concessionaire died out.

155. Minute, A. L. Brise, 12 December 1932, on CLM 194/1350.

156. The exception was the Kuala Duyong (Dungun) concession. There is no further information in the records consulted beyond the fact that it was issued in favour of Tengku Woh binte Tengku Osman by Sultan Zainal Abidin III. See Appendix 10, pp. 253-62.

157. Encl. 9, 'Chenderong Concession', J. R. Neave, undated, in CLM 194/1350.

158. Encl. 24, A. B. Cobden-Ramsay to BA, 19 April 1941, in CLM 602/1940.

159. Encl. 1, AAK to CLM, 16 June 1940, in CLM 377/1940. See also minute, G. A. C. de Moubay, 16 November 1940, on the same file.

160. The file on the negotiations was not open for examination but is listed in the archival records under CLM 81/1949: 'Surrender of Sungai Ayam and Chenderong Concessions Negotiations for ...'.

161. Minute, W. F. N. Churchill, 15 January 1939, on CLM 418/1353.

162. Minute, J. E. Kempe, 30 September 1936, on CLM 419/1353.

163. See minutes, A. T. Newbould, 7 March 1935, and C. C. Brown, 19 March 1935, on CLM 418/1353.

164. See minutes and enclosures in CLM 418/1353 and CLM 322/1940. The East Asiatic Company continued operating its estates on the old leases issued by Tengku Embong Musa.

165. For a flattering account of Humphreys's personality, reforms, and other deeds written by a local eyewitness, see Hajjah Wok Eshah binte Haji Nik Idris, *Syaer Tuan Humphreys*, Kampung Daik Trengganu, Matbaah al Ahliyah, 1928, in Ramlah Hamid, 'Syaer Tuan Humphreys: Satu Kajian Teks', BA (Hons.) exercise, Jabatan Sejarah, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1978.

166. See Appendix 16, p. 278.

167. See Chapter 5.

168. See Chapter 6.

169. The first land enactment was passed in 1918 but it was more for the purpose of preserving unfelled timber than for the recording of occupation or claims. This was followed under the advisory system of government by a Registration of Deeds Enactment (1923), Settlement Enactment (1924), and Land Enactment (1926). However, this legislation did not provide a comprehensive solution to the problems of the settlement of all occupied lands in the state (see CLM 158/1351: Report on the Land Office for the year 1932; and encl. 25, Report on Land Office for the year 1939, in CLM 578/1939).

170. The second stage followed the *bancian* with a rapid preliminary demarcation of all lands claimed and the issue of provisional titles based on such demarcation. The final stage was survey and settlement on which the permanent indefeasible titles under the Land Enactment (1926) was issued. In 1929 a new Settlement Enactment was passed to give legislative muscle to the 1927 *Istihar*. However, this bold plan failed because of frequent changes of Commissioners of Lands and Mines, the lack of finance and the litigious nature of the Trengganu peasantry (see CLM 158/1351: Report on the Land Office for the Year 1932; encl. 1, Memorandum by Superintendent of Surveys, 13 July 1931, in CLM 96/1350; enclosures in CLM 198/1352; and encl. 1, W. F. N. Churchill to BA, 12 February 1940, in CLM 97/1940). In 1938 a renewed attempt was made, with the introduction of a new Settlement Enactment, to resolve the problems of land administration. Under this enactment the Land Office no longer issued a provisional title but proceeded to issue indefeasible titles after certain provisions for objections had been met. Plans were also drawn for an improved Land Enactment (encl. 25, Report on Land Office for the Year 1939, in CLM 578/1939; and encl. 1, 'A Note on Malay Peasant Land Tenure', P. A. B. McKerron, 30 September 1937, in CLM 394/1937).

171. There was no fixed policy towards large landholdings prior to 1927. Some of them were bought back by the government as part of the resumption policy towards concessions. See pp. 195-202.

172. Encl. 3, A. J. Sturrock to MB, 2 September 1929, in CLM 286/1348.

173. See pencilled comment by an anonymous British officer on LOK 8/1347: Naskah Ishtihar Ketetapan Hak Tanah, undated.

174. Encl. 1, 'Notes on the Trengganu Legal System', G. A. C. de Moubray, 20 December 1927, in CLM 266/1346.

175. For an extract of the Ishtihar see Appendix 17, pp. 279-80. See also MBO 420/1347 for its Malay version.

176. See Appendix 17, pp. 279-80.

177. See *ibid.* and LOK 8/1347: CLR to CLM, undated.

178. Encl. 2, Ketetapan Meshuarat Am, 26 August 1928, in SUK 1376/1346.

179. *Ibid.* See also encl. 1, G. A. C. de Moubray to SUK, undated, in the same file in which G. A. C. de Moubray submitted a memorandum entitled 'Peraturan Berkenaan Cap' stressing the hardships caused by cap kurnia on the peasant cultivator. In areas densely cluttered by cap kurnia he outlined a six-point policy to the land officials which aimed at emphasizing the problem of peasants' lack of land (see encl. 1, G. A. C. de Moubray to BA, 9 September 1928, in LOK 212/1347).

180. Encl. 2, G. A. C. de Moubray to BA, 17 September 1929, in CLM 286/1348.

181. Encl. 3, A. J. Sturrock to MB, 2 September 1929, in CLM 286/1348.

182. It is not intended to go into the details of the various cap claims and how they were settled as this has been done elsewhere. See Appendix 12, pp. 264-72.

183. Chapter 5, p. 116. The question of land rents was not only confined to cap titles. Even in cases where the ruling class had acquired land titles under the Land Enactment the Land Office found it extremely difficult to get them to pay their rents. See, for example, encl. 1, Muhammad Hashim to CLM, 1 April 1931, in CLM 337/1349, which contains a list of individuals who were in arrears.

184. LOT 84/1932: R. E. Turnbull to CLM, 27 March 1932.

185. *Ibid.*

186. See minutes, J. E. Kempe, 22 January 1936 and 6 February 1936, on BAT 698/1935. Sultan Sulaiman, for example, obtained a firm commitment from the State Council on 24 July 1928 that his and his wife's landholdings would be exempted from land rents (LOT 252/1344: Surat Itifak Meshuarat Am, 24 July 1928). See also the decision reached in the case of Tengku Abdul Jalil (enclosures in CLM 426/1350). There was one petition in which the claimant, Tengku Maimunah binte Sultan Ahmad II, requested that the rents collected from the cancelled areas of her cap by the state be remitted to her. However, the land authorities were cautious in extending the privileges of land rent exemptions as it would lead the government into endless trouble in future, and the petition was rejected (minute, A. T. Newbould, on LOT 71/1346).

187. See encl. 1, A. Glencross to CLM, 15 February 1939, in CLM 95/1939; and encl. 11, H. R. Hughes Hallet to CLM, 26 June 1940, in CLM 75/1940.

188. Encl. 11, H. R. Hughes Hallet to CLM, 26 June 1940, in CLM 75/1940.



*Duit Ayam*  
(Singapore Merchant's Token)

## *Conclusion*

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THE ancient Trengganu social order built through the centuries was propelled into the modern world of production for market value by capitalist penetration and the colonial state. Its passage into the twentieth century was hurried by dynamic forces which reconstituted its social life to serve the laws of profit and productivity. This book isolated and brought into focus several interdependent themes related to the underlying historical process of changing epochs.

The late nineteenth-century ruling class extended, modified, and revived traditional rights in order to extract personal incomes from the growing money economy. The revenue farm system, for example, was used to cover the flow of virtually all goods and services in and out of the state. A second initiative was the adoption of the concession system which firmly placed in the hands of the ruling class, control over the incipient plantation and mining sectors of the economy. A third move was the revival of ancient agricultural rights (from the peasants' point of view, the creation of new obligations) through the network of *cap kurnia*, through which this privileged group managed to extract an economic surplus from the otherwise subsistence agricultural economy of the peasantry.

The ruling class used with advantage the traditional political machinery and its coercive apparatus to gather personal wealth in these ways from the expanding economy. It locked itself into the market system and accumulated considerable fortunes over a brief period through rents from *pajak*; royalties, premiums, ground rents, and partnerships from concessions; earnest money, forced and ready loans from eager business groups; and agricultural tithes, land leases, and sales of peasant lands. The lion's share of the newly generated wealth was absorbed by the *Kerabat Diraja* element of the ruling class whose members controlled the bestowal of state privileges. A smaller proportion of the income was distributed among their political partners, the *Kerabat Am* and the *Orang Keistimewaan*. By contrast, the *Ulama* element of the upper class failed to acquire state rights from the Sultan during the period of economic boom. The favoured elements gained most of their earnings from

the short but rapid burst of mining and plantation development and to a lesser extent from pajak and cap kurnia.

The economic responses of the ruling class which contradicted the ambitions of colonial rule were short-lived as they were soon challenged and brought under control by the colonial overlords. After a series of treaty engagements Britain was able to establish a reformed administration which dismantled the various devices by which the ruling class had been able to serve its economic interests in the past. The second major response of this class was in fact directed against the imposition of colonial rule. Its weapons were procrastination, protest, and passive resistance. Although these expressions of political conflict were not the central theme of the study, there is ample evidence to indicate that it came after the economic initiatives of the late nineteenth century. This feature is important. It revises the generally accepted view that the political response of the privileged minority was adopted for political reasons—in particular in order to preserve the integrity and independence of Malay rule in the state. In fact, and in spite of appearances, its confrontation with the colonial power was not directed solely to guaranteeing the state's Malay character but rather to defending and safeguarding the huge economic stakes that had already been acquired by skilful use of the traditional political system.

A striking feature of the ruling class's development during this period, however, was its inability to convert itself into a distinctly identifiable group creatively preoccupied with economic activities. It maintained a dual position—mixing political office with economic activity; but in its pursuit of wealth it appears merely as a consuming class rather than a genuinely entrepreneurial class. These 'politically oriented capitalists', to whom reference has been made,<sup>1</sup> failed to invest in income-generating activities of the kind which would constitute the fundamental characteristics of the entrepreneur; rather, they used their political rights to obtain wealth merely for consumption. As Hugh Clifford observed in 1898, the dominant classes accumulated wealth so that they '... might go abroad dressed gaily in bright silks, might fare sumptuously, might have constant supply of money to waste upon the gaming tables and upon other pleasures and might fool away their days in ease and luxury'.<sup>2</sup> This characteristic pattern of consumption was reflected under colonial rule in the establishment's struggle to obtain privileges from state revenue, but without utilizing its wealth to further productive

activity. Moreover, the main thrust of colonial policies in dismantling the ruling class's traditional political and economic rights effectively checked any hope of the future growth of an entrepreneurial class emerging from the old social hierarchy.

The peasantry found itself in quite a different situation in the face of British expansion. Increased use of money as a medium of exchange, consolidation of colonial administration, and demographic changes had adverse effects on the peasant economy, which resulted eventually in agrarian conflict and in the abortive rebellion of 1928, led by Ulama and directed against both ruling class privilege and colonial rule. The movement did lead immediately to the introduction of some limited reforms in the rural areas but little else was done subsequently in the 1930s to reduce rural poverty. The appropriation of Trengganu continued unabated.

It is worth commenting further, by way of conclusion, on the experience of the reconstituted social order during the last decade before the Pacific War, when Colonial rule was firmly entrenched. Relics of the old ruling class found, ironically, their future and security in the very administrative system that forced them to give up not only the economic advantages gained earlier, but also their former political control of the state. The newly created colonial state machinery drew in the 1930s its bureaucratic élite from that class. Although some members were deliberately retired by British officials, the composition of the original ruling class remained essentially intact under the reformed administration, where it found new vigour and fresh opportunities.

In this period remnant members of the ruling class jealously guarded their special position in the bureaucracy. They made continuous demands for special privileges. Besides their regular government salaries, many senior chiefs drew Ruling House allowances, annuities, and special pensions from the government as compensation for loss of former revenues. These pensions and salaries constituted substantial amount of the state's expenditure. In 1926, for example, such payments amounted to 14.9 per cent and 43.2 per cent respectively of a total expenditure of \$1,067,878. Eleven years later, from an estimated revenue of \$2½ million, more than \$1 million was committed to expenditure on personal emoluments and pension charges.<sup>3</sup>

The senior Malay chiefs had seats in the State Council, which was the central decision-making and executive body in the advisory

system of government. Many of the pre-colonial chiefs continued to hold appointments and there were a few younger replacements before World War II.<sup>4</sup> The 'old gang', A. T. Newbould, the Commissioner of Lands and Mines, reported, possessed much influence in the state and they distrusted their younger counterparts.<sup>5</sup> Within the State Council, the pre-colonial Jumaah Mentri continued to exist and was used in part to further class interests. Its members earned a temporary allowance of \$50 per month.<sup>6</sup> In 1937 the Sultan wished to appoint an additional member to this body and to increase the allowances of all its members. However, the British Adviser opposed the move, reminding the Mentri Besar of an earlier decision to phase out allowances which were considered redundant. He instructed the State Treasurer to abolish these allowances in the following year's Estimates but later acknowledged defeat when it was discovered, too late, that this allocation had been slipped in. The allowances continued to be paid until the war.<sup>7</sup>

The Trengganu Civil Service, which was largely a British creation, was divided into the *pegawai* (officer) and *kerani* (clerical) classes.<sup>8</sup> The heads of the various administrative departments were drawn from senior Malay chiefs who were usually members of the State Council. These chiefs stubbornly resisted the appointment of any British official to act in a superior capacity over them. It was with great difficulty that the British Adviser persuaded the State Council to appoint a British Public Works Director, Commissioner of Police, and Commissioner of Lands and Mines in the early 1920s. A compromise was reached in each instance by which these British officials held joint appointments with their Malay counterparts until such time as the chiefs were qualified to act on their own.<sup>9</sup> A similar situation occurred in 1937 over the appointment of a British Legal Adviser.<sup>10</sup>

The attitude of 'Trengganu for the Trengganese'<sup>11</sup> was also reflected in the middle levels of the Civil Service. The State Councillors who controlled recruitment were opposed to the appointment of foreigners—Malays and non-Malays alike—to the service. Their stand was in opposition to that of the British Adviser who placed emphasis on the quality of cadet officers,<sup>12</sup> and argued that the search for Trengganu Malays of proper birth to fill positions often led to under-qualified appointments. The weak Trengganu school system provided a major share of civil servants and the remainder, usually younger members of the ruling class, were educated at the Malay College in Kuala Kangsar, and King



Edward VII School in Taiping.<sup>13</sup> Many members of the Ruling House<sup>14</sup> and sons of senior civil servants<sup>15</sup> were groomed in the service, although some had doubtful records. The clerks of the establishment were usually drawn from the petty bourgeoisie of Kuala Trengganu.<sup>16</sup> Some of the proposed candidates for the Civil Service had very poor school records,<sup>17</sup> and in 1936 the British Adviser was forced to introduce a General Order which laid down that no persons dismissed from any government service should be re-employed except under the special sanction of the Sultan in Council. This measure was intended to avoid the repeated re-appointment of officers who had been dismissed for dishonesty from other appointments.<sup>18</sup>

The fundamental reason for the strong resistance to opening up the Civil Service was that it provided job opportunities for senior members of the old ruling class and a future for the younger generation of that class. The characteristic of the administration maintained the essence of the traditional relationship between prince and peasant. Even within the Civil Service the bureaucratic lines of hierarchy were merged with traditional relationships. The expressed wish of a social superior was too often a command to the subordinate. In 1935, for example, a case occurred which illustrated this feature. In that year, all the ferrymen at Kuala Besut were observed to have bought a small Trengganu flag for 10 cents from the Customs Office. On investigation it was found that that department had a stock of flags on hand and the local officers had been instructed to dispose of them to any member of the public who wished to buy.<sup>19</sup> In executing the wish of their superiors these officers insisted that the ferrymen buy the flags on pain of losing their licences to ply the river. This crude relationship between the administrators and the public was a persistent feature of the colonial period.

The colonial administration thus offered to the restructured ruling class a salaried position, power, and status. In addition, its entrenchment in the government machinery allowed its members to acquire special privileges—both administrative and extra-administrative. This social class was thus in an advantageous position to check, shape, and execute legislation affecting its own interests. In 1928, the British officials contemplated the collection of rents on town lands which were long overdue. They wished to increase the general revenue collection and to correct past imbalances in which revenue collected mainly from the rural areas was

spent largely on the towns. The proposed scheme was temporarily shelved, however, as it was believed that members of the State Council, who owned considerable town lands, would oppose the project.<sup>20</sup> In another case of biased land legislation, the interests of the State Councillors were made manifest when they legislated to prohibit the sale of 'Mukim land' (most of which was owned by peasants) to non-Malays, but expressly excluded rubber lands from that provision.<sup>21</sup> Needless to say, the ruling class and richer Malays were the owners of rubber lands.

The new salaried class, by virtue of its political position and its social connections, was able to maintain its continued interests in land even after the collapse of its former forms of domination. Under the colonial land administration, ruling class applications for commercial (agricultural and mining) lands were always favourably received. At times, individual officials would send their people to occupy land without Land Office authority and would then present the British officials with a *fait accompli*. In such cases the latter felt they had little alternative but to issue proper titles.<sup>22</sup> The Land Office also found it particularly difficult to collect land rents from these upper class people.<sup>23</sup> Those officers who did insist on payments were subjected to different forms of intimidation.<sup>24</sup>

In the mining sector of the economy, too, the privileged few had a special position. The general policy of the colonial government was to favour miners who had capital and working experience<sup>25</sup> but this policy was compromised as exemptions were frequently made for 'good citizens'<sup>26</sup> who were not ordinary applicants.<sup>27</sup> Sultan Sulaiman maintained an active interest in prospecting and mining, as his father had done, despite the protests of British Advisers who saw such an involvement as necessarily speculative in character and therefore unbecoming for the Sultan of a state.<sup>28</sup> In 1936 and 1938 he applied for prospecting licences for mineral exploration in Bukit Tawang in Ulu Trengganu, Ulu Sungai Bel and Dungun respectively.<sup>29</sup> (These undertakings were unsuccessful in locating viable finds.) He ventured keenly also into oil prospecting. In 1933 he rushed his representatives to Dungun when he heard of a reported oil strike there; however, it turned out to be a false report.<sup>30</sup>

There were other ways in which the redefined ruling class was able to tap privileges from the state revenue. The British Advisers' tight budgeting efforts in the 1930s were frequently upset by the inclusion in the Estimates of trivial matters. In 1936 the British Adviser, J. E. Kempe, hoped that the 1937 Estimates would

concentrate on a few large and important projects but another official warned him from past experience that '... the peculiar character of this state can be relied upon to produce a crop of small and harassing minor works which will require detailed attention and effort: such things as weddings etc. ..., coronations and sequels'.<sup>31</sup> The British officials had to give consideration to the ruling class in the implementation of a variety of loans. Kempe found that Trengganu was a singularly unusual state where "'exceptions" and "khas" (special) occur at every turn'.<sup>32</sup> Indeed the state government was riddled during the colonial period by claims of the ruling class—government officials and others outside the government service—for special privileges.<sup>33</sup>

In the countryside, the economic position of the great mass of Trengganu society, the agricultural toilers, remained unimproved.<sup>34</sup> The undertaking of the colonial state after the 1928 rebellion to relieve the appalling conditions of the peasantry remained merely a pious hope. Peasants continued to live under the long shadow of the agrarian élite, being affected not only by the vestiges of the late nineteenth-century *cap kurnia* system<sup>35</sup> but also by the newer forms of land titles that had appeared under the colonial administration. The *pawah* system of landlord-tenant relationship remained intact and determined the production and consumption patterns of the peasantry. The Collector of Land Revenue, Kuala Trengganu, in 1935 noted that landlords in the densely populated areas on the lower reaches of the Trengganu River let their lands on the following lopsided basis:

The crop from the better land is divided into two and even five shares (3) to the owner and (2) to the cultivator. In a good year the cultivator by selling his half share of the crop, will just get back a sum equal to the cash equivalent of the work he and his family have put into the land. This would not have been so bad if the owner was incapable of cultivating the land himself but in many cases the owner is a 'Darat Malay' quite capable of cultivating his own land. In such cases the potential output of two people is halved. Another result of this system is that the cultivator is unwilling to grow too good a crop for fear that the owner will demand a bigger share next year.<sup>36</sup>

The peasantry were subjected, in addition, to an inequitable taxation system which, as some British officials admitted, provided in return only the minimum of services.<sup>37</sup> The greater proportion of the state's expenditure was absorbed in maintaining and expanding the colonial bureaucracy which now included the co-opted ruling

class. As a result of the report made by a senior Agricultural Officer in 1928, a small Agricultural Department was established in 1930. It was recognized from the start that, although the Department would confer great benefits on the peasants, it could not be made into a paying concern from the point of view of additional revenue.<sup>38</sup> The government's unwillingness to spend money because of its other commitments forced the Department to rely on the unsatisfactory system of borrowing the services of the State Agricultural Officer of Kelantan, who annually visited the state and gave advice on the small experimental schemes started under the plan.<sup>39</sup> There was no lack of plans to improve peasant agricultural production but the government failed to meet its responsibilities with the full-blooded thoroughness that was needed and many of these blueprints were shelved.<sup>40</sup> A similar situation existed in the Irrigation Department which was established as late as 1939. In the next two and a half years it spent nearly \$95,000 on office equipment and staff training and only a meagre \$20,000 on actual construction work. It shelved irrigation projects which had an estimated cost of \$20.00 per acre as this was considered too excessive for an irrigation scheme.<sup>41</sup>

An inherent contradiction of the new historical epoch dominated by capital and the colonial state is that it widened the gap between the privileged minorities and producing masses. In the voice of the devout working man who toiled 'The tender of money was met with the comment "Apa Guna" [What was its use]'.<sup>42</sup>

1. See Chapter 2, pp. 35-6.

2. H. Clifford, 'Life in the Malay Peninsula; As It Was And Is', *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, Vol. 30, 1898-9, p. 385.

3. See ART, 1926, p. 6; and DID 45/1940: The Financial Situation in Trengganu, G. A. C. de Moubray, 21 January 1940, conf.

4. ART, 1346 AH, p. 13; and ART, 1348 AH, p. 16. For the list of State Councillors in 1931 see BAT 1174/1937: Tengku Wok bin Tengku Besar to SUK, 29 August 1937.

5. Encl., A. T. Newbould to G. E. J. Gent, undated, in CO 717/122: T. S. W. Thomas to CO, 17 March 1937, conf., file number 51786/36, ff. 36-37.

6. Encl. 1, Resident Commissioner, Trengganu, to Chief Secretary, Malayan Union Government, 31 July 1946, in MU 288/1946, conf.

7. See encl. 2, N. R. Jarrett to MB, 30 October 1937, in BAT 1065/1937; and minute, P. A. B. McKerron, 15 November 1937, on the same file.

8. Encl. 1, List of Government Officers Showing their Appointments during the Japanese and Thai Regimes, undated, in SUK (SCAO) 90/1945.

9. See enclosures in HCO 130/1921.
10. Minute, N. R. Jarrett, 21 December 1936, on BAT 1365/1936; and enclosures in BAT 1033/1937.
11. Encl. 2, Minutes of the Conference of Seconded Officers held at the Residency, Kuala Trengganu, on Friday, 27 December 1935, in CLM 267/1354.
12. BAT 747/1938: A. E. Coope to Malayan Establishment Officer, 27 August 1938. See also the arguments put forward by the State Councillors in their rejection of a Chinese applicant from Negri Sembilan (minute, Mohd. Kasim, 23 March 1931, on CLM 283/1348). The only areas in which foreign Malays were present were in the Survey, Land and Forest Departments and this caused concern to the Councillors (encl. 9, Minutes of Christmas Conference of Seconded Officers, 1940, in CLM 529/1939).
13. Minute, J. E. Kempe, 14 May 1935, on BAT 541/1935.
14. Sultan Sulaiman's younger brother, Tengku Ismail, and his three sons, Tengku Ali, Tengku Abdul Aziz, and Tengku Abdul Rashid, were all engaged as cadet officers (see minute, C. C. Brown, 17 June 1934, on CLM 71/1353; minute, J. Falconer, 3 August 1938, on CLM 208/1938; and minute, Sultan Sulaiman, 15 December 1938, on BAT 1353/1938).
15. For example the sons of the State Commissioner, East, and his counterpart in the West were found places in the administration (see CLM 80/1937: Kemaman Land Office Report for the Year 1936, M. C. ff. Sheppard; and BAT 259/1935: C. C. Brown to MB, 16 February 1935). See also the dispute that arose over the appointment of Che Da Abdul Rahim who was the son of the Judge and son-in-law of the Mentri Besar. He had failed his clerical examinations but aspired to be promoted into the pegawai scheme (see enclosures in BAT 1292/1936).
16. Encl. 9, Minutes of Christmas Conference of Seconded Officers, 1940, in CLM 529/1939.
17. Minute, J. E. Kempe, 8 September 1935, on BAT 966/1936.
18. Minute, J. E. Kempe, 15 August 1936, on BAT 978/1936.
19. Minute, W. A. C. Goode, 1 June 1935, on BAT 196/1935.
20. CLM 377/1346: G. A. C. de Moubray to BAT, 2 April 1928.
21. Encl. 5A, Minutes of Christmas Conference of Seconded Officers, 1939, in CLM 529/1939.
22. See for example the case of the Mentri Besar and that of the ex-Sultan Muhammad in encl. 2, H. P. Bryson to CLM, 3 February 1930, in CLM 279/1348; and minute, unsigned, 18 March 1935, on LOT 81/1345.
23. Minute, Mohd. Hashim, 21 October 1925, on LOT 252/1344.
24. For example, a higher official would instruct his righthand man to submit a petition to the government blackening the name of the officer (CLM 227/1348: H. P. Bryson to CLM, 10 January 1930).
25. Minute, L. Rayman, 26 January 1930, on CLM 32/1348.
26. Minute, Collector of Land Revenue, KT, 26 April 1938, on CLM (Mines) 25/1938.
27. MD 216/1940: W. F. N. Churchill to BA, 7 July 1940.
28. MD 190/1937: N. R. Jarrett to MB 24 March 1937.
29. See LOD 47/1938: CLM to SUK, 17 January 1938; and BAT 1388/1936: A. T. Newbould to SUK, 23 November 1936.
30. Encl. 1, N. R. Jarrett to HCO, 12 June 1939, in CLM 29/1352.
31. BAT 698/1936: W. H. Lindsay to BA, 3 June 1936.

32. Minute, J. E. Kempe, 1 August 1935, on BAT 915/1935.

33. See also the problems created in administering exemptions of house assessments for Kerabat Diraja members, enclosures in BAT 938/1935; for car loans, BAT 1104/1937; and car licences, enclosures in BAT 414/1935.

34. This is borne out by numerous reports on the countryside made by colonial officials in the 1930s. See Chapter 6, note 163.

35. Chapter 7, pp. 205-6.

36. Encl. 4, Memorandum by CLR, KT, 10 March 1935, in CLM 312/1353.

37. Encl. 17, Commissioner of Police to CLM, 30 April 1934, in CLM 229/1352.

38. Minute, G. L. Ham, 28 November 1930, on CLM 139/1349.

39. Encl. 1, Memorandum by G. L. Ham, 13 June 1931, in CLM 62/1350; and BAT 1151/1936: N. R. Jarrett to BA, Kelantan, 10 February 1937.

40. Minute, C. C. Brown, 26 January 1935, on CLM 201/1352.

41. DID 11/1941: Activities of the Drainage and Irrigation Department, Trengganu, undated.

42. ART, 1349 AH, p. 25.



*Ringgit Bunga*  
(Straits Settlements Dollar)

# Appendices

## APPENDIX 1 Raja Anak Sungai, 1882

<i>District</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Relationship to Sultan</i>
1. Kemaman	Tengku Muda	Uncle
2. Kijal	Tengku Muda	Uncle
3. Kemasik	Muhammad Ali bin Abdul Rahim (Datuk Mata-Mata)	Orang Keistimewaan
4. Kretai	Tengku Embong Musa	Nephew
5. Paka	Tengku Chik Pengiran	Elder sister
6. Dungun	Tengku Bukit	Great-aunt (her nephew, Tengku Muda, was her representative)
7. Merchang	Tengku Petra of Singapore bin Tengku Said of Lingga	Singapore Kerabat Diraja
8. Marang	Tengku Mohamed Yusof bin Sultan Mahmud Mustapha Shah (The Tengku Panglima Besar)	Brother-in-law
9. Ibar	Sultan	
10. Tributaries of the Treng- ganu River:		
(a) Nerus	Tukku Sayyid Paluh	Brother-in-law
(b) Telemong	Tengku Musa	Great uncle
(c) Ulu Treng- ganu (above Kelemong Falls)	Tengku Chik Pengiran	Elder sister

<i>District</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Relationship to Sultan</i>
(d) Between Kelemong Falls and Kuala Telemong	Abdul Rahim bin Musa	Orang Keistimewaan
(e) Berang	—	—
11. Setiu	Tengku Mahmud bin Tengku Dalam	Cousin
12. Kluang	—	—
13. Besut	Tengku Chik Tepok	Great uncle

Source: Encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenues, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, ff. 117-118.



APPENDIX 2  
Raja Anak Sungai, 1909

<i>District</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Relationship to Sultan</i>
1. Kemaman	Abdul Rahman bin Ishak (Datuk Sri Lela Diraja)	Orang Keistimewaan
2. Kijal	Tengku Mohamed Yusof	Brother-in-law
3. Kemasik	Muhammad Ali bin Abdul Rahim	Orang Keistimewaan
4. Kretai	Tengku Embong Musa	Nephew
5. Paka	Tengku Abdullah bin Sultan Ali of Singapore	Son-in-law
6. Dungun	Tengku Abu Bakar bin Abdul Jalil Tengku Chik bin Tengku Long	Brother-in-law n.a.
7. Merchang	Tengku Petra of Singapore bin Tengku Said of Lingga	Singapore Kerabat Diraja
8. Marang	Yang Dipertuan Muda	Eldest son
9. Ibar	Reported not assigned	
10. Tributaries of the Trengganu River:		
(a) Nerus	Tengku Kazaki bin Tengku Abu Bakar	Son-in-law
(b) Telemong	Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim	Cousin and son-in-law
(c) Ulu Trengganu (above Kelemong Falls)	Sayyid Abu Bakar (Tuan Embong)	Ulama

<i>District</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Relationship to Sultan</i>
(d) Between Kelemong Falls and Kuala Telemong	—	—
(e) Berang	—	—
11. Setiu	Tengku Mahmud bin Tengku Dalam Datuk Kaia Lela Wangsa	Cousin n.a.
12. Kluang	Tengku Mahmud bin Tengku Dalam Datuk Kaia Lela Wangsa	Cousin n.a.
13. Besut	Tengku Chik bin Tengku Hitam Tengku Long bin Tengku Ngah	Kerabat Am Kerabat Am

Source: CO 273/351: Anderson to CO, 22 September 1909, desp. 303, ff. 218–221.  
n.a.—not available

APPENDIX 3  
Raja Anak Sungai, 1913<sup>1</sup>

<i>District</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Relationship to Sultan</i>
1. Kemaman	Datuk Sri Lela Diraja	Orang Keistimewaan
2. Kijal	Datuk Sri Lela Diraja	Orang Keistimewaan
3. Kemasik	Muhammad Ali bin Abdul Rahim (Datuk Mata-Mata)	Orang Keistimewaan
4. Kretai	Tengku Embong Musa	Nephew
5. Paka	Tengku Abdullah bin Sultan Ali of Singapore	Son-in-law
6. Dungun	Tengku Abu Bakar bin Tengku Abdul Jalil	Brother-in-law
7. Merchang	Tengku Besar Hapsah	Daughter
8. Marang	Yang Dipertuan Muda	Eldest son
9. Ibar	—	—
10. Tributaries of the Trengganu River:		
(a) Nerus	Cik Teh binte Abu Bakar	Non-royal wife
(b) Telemong	Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim	Cousin and son-in-law
(c) Ulu Trengganu (above Kelemong Falls)	Sayyid Abu Bakar (Tuan Embong)	Ulama
(d) Between Kelemong Falls and Kuala Telemong	—	—

<i>District</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Relationship to Sultan</i>
(e) Berang	Tengku Embong	Grandson (an infant)
11. Setiu	Tengku Mahmud bin Tengku Dalam	Cousin
12. Kluang	—	—
13. Besut	Tengku Chik bin Tengku Hitam and Tengku Long bin Tengku Ngah	Kerabat Am

*Source:* Encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenues, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44; Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 122.

<sup>1</sup>The district revenues were shared between the husband and wife. Hence, sometimes the district is listed under the wife's name, especially in the cases of the Sultan's sisters and daughters. See for example SUK 299/1334: Yang Dipertuan Muda to SUK, 5 January 1916.

## APPENDIX 4

Pajak Kechil, Kuala Trengganu, 23 February 1907

Seal of Tungku Besar  
bin Sultan Mahmud.

The document was made in Trengganu on the tenth day of Muharam, 1325. (23 February 1907)

I, Tungku Besar bin Almerham Sultan Mahmud Muthafar Shah, with my wife Tungku Long binte Almerhum Sultan Ahmad, have given to Tuan Indut bin Tuan Muda and his heirs, the export duty farm at the Kuala on the articles set out below, for six years; from 10 Rejab 1325 (19 August 1907) for 6 complete years.

Tuan Indut and his heirs undertake to pay me and my wife and heirs, \$1,500 per annum, that is a total of \$9,000 for 6 years.

The dutiable articles are:-

		\$	¢
Pinang rachik	per pikul	1	00
Pinang kusi lepong	" "	-	50
Pinang kusi benar	" "	-	25
Pinang merah	per 10,000	-	50
Tin	per pikul	-	50
Tin ore	" "	-	25
Red rubber	" "	2	00
All other rubber	" "	1	00
Black pepper	" "	-	50
Hides	" "	-	50

Tuan Indut has paid me and my wife \$1,000 of the payment aforesaid: the balance must be paid to me and my wife, when Tuan Indut takes possession of the farm, by monthly payments of \$100, until the \$9,000 has been paid in full.

Whoever, (if anyone), evades payment of the above duties, commits an offence, in the fullest sense, against us.

To make this valid and clear the seal of my name is put at the head of this document.

Source: Enclosure 10B in HCO 1371/1915.

APPENDIX 5  
Extract of Kuala Trengganu Export and Import  
Farm's Schedule of Duties, 1912

## Export:

		\$	¢
Dried fish	per pikul	—	40
Miscellaneous	" "	—	20
Bilis fish	" "	1	00
Cuttle fish	" "	1	00
Belachan	" "	—	40
Budu-pickled fish	per jar	—	15
Copra	per pikul	—	40
Coconuts	per 1,000	1	50
Kajangs	per 100	1	50
Sacks made of matting	per 1,000	1	50
Grass mats—small	per 1,000	3	00
Grass mats—large	per 1,000	6	00
Split rattans	per 100 rolls	1	50
Rotan gesok	per 1,000 pieces	1	00
Rotan batu	per 1,000 pieces	—	70
White mats	per score	—	30
Kembong fish pickled	per 20 jars	2	00
Kerisi fish pickled	per 20 jars	2	00

Half duties to be charged on the above articles if imported and transhipped at Kuala Trengganu. No duties to be collected on articles not intended for trade.

## Imports:

		\$	¢
Piece goods and kain kachi (cutch)	per 100 pieces	3	00
Thread	per bale	3%	
Tobacco bakul	per basket	1	00
Tobacco pikul	per pikul	3	00
Tobacco in tins	per tin	—	50
Kerosene oil	per case	—	15

Source: CO 273/384: Young to CO, 28 February 1912, desp. 70, f. 418.

APPENDIX 6  
Revenue Farms, 1914

<i>Farm and Name of Farmer</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Terms</i>
1. Pajak Kuala Trengganu. Export and import duties farm, Kuala Trengganu. Ang Siah Im, Chop Hup Teck Seng.	6 years from 1 Jan. 1912	Total consideration \$174,000. \$10,000 was paid on signing of lease. Balance to be paid in 72 monthly instalments.
2. Pajak Kuala Kecil. Minor export and import duties farm, Kuala Trengganu. Sian and Mek Chai Hok.	3 years from 15 June 1913	Total consideration \$6,000. Sum of \$4,250 was prepaid. Balance to be paid at rate of \$48.52 per month.
3. Opium and candu farm. Ang Siah Im, Chop Hup Teck Seng.	5 years from 1 March 1912	\$10,000 paid prior to lease. To pay \$1,800 monthly.
4. Spirit farm (no. 1). Soon Hee.	3 years from 23 Aug. 1912	\$2,200 per annum.
5. Spirit farm (no. 2). Ang Soon Huat, Chop Hup Teck Seng.	4 years from 3 Sept. 1913	\$4,000 paid on signing which covered 4th year's rent. To pay \$333.33 per month for 3 years.
6. Kerosene farm. Boon Teck, Boon Hoey, and Lim Chu Tong.	3 years from 18 April 1912	\$16,000 per annum. Sum of \$5,000 prepaid. Balance at \$1,000 per month.
7. Gambling farm. Wee Beng Siang.	3 years from 16 June 1912	Total consideration \$22,500. Sum of \$12,600 prepaid. Balance in monthly payments.
8. Pawn-broking farm. Meh.	3 years from 16 July 1912	\$1,600 per annum.

<i>Farm and Name of Farmer</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Terms</i>
9. Sungai Nerus export duty farm. Lim Chee Im.	4 years from 24 Jan. 1913	\$600 per annum.
10. Gambier farm. Tan Chai Hock.	1 year from 10 Nov. 1913	\$800.
11. Boat licence farm. Tan Chin Hin.	1 year	\$1,200, paid in advance.
12. Kemaman export and import duty farm.	2 years from 11 Jan. 1914	\$4,412.50 per annum.
13. Kemaman gambling farm at Bundi. Low Teck.	3 years from 19 May 1911	\$500 per annum.
14. Dungun export and import farm. Keng Tiang.	2 years from 21 Oct. 1914	\$1,700 per annum.
15. Paka tin-ore duty farm.	5 years from 7 Feb. 1911	\$12,600 per annum. The whole amount was paid in advance.
16. Paka export and import duty farm.	3 years	\$1,600 per annum.
17. Paka gambling farm.	3 years from 11 Nov. 1912	\$500 per annum. The whole amount was paid in advance.
18. Paka turtle egg farm.	1 year from 1914	\$400.
19. Kretai export and import duty farm.	No particulars	No particulars.
20. Kretai gambling farm. Chee Keng.	3 years from 14 Aug. 1912	\$1,500 per annum. The whole amount was paid in advance.
21. Kemasik export and import duty farm. Soon Hee.	1 year	\$12,000.

*(continued)*



## APPENDIX 6 (continued)

<i>Farm and Name of Farmer</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Terms</i>
22. Setiu export and import duty farm. Ah Liew.	2 years from 5 Dec. 1913	\$1,300 per annum.
23. Besut export and import duty farm.	No particulars	No particulars.
24. Kuala Ibar ferry farm.	No particulars	No particulars.
25. Kemaman gambling farm. Jurubahasa Ang Kiat.	1 year	\$720.
26. Kemaman pepper farm. Kee Soo.	3 years from 2 Feb. 1911	\$1,000 per annum. \$500 paid in advance.
27. Turtle egg farm. Janbu Bong Kok and Haji Awang.	1 year	\$1,100.
28. Redang Islands to the <i>Batin</i> and the <i>Jurukerah</i> .	1 year	\$850.
29. Turtle ketapang. Haji Awang.	1 year	\$1,100.
30. Setiu.	1 year	\$600.
31. Perhentian Islands and Besut.	No particulars	No particulars.
32. Sungai Marang. Gan Keng Guan.	No particulars	No particulars.

Source: ART, 1914, draft, Appendix A in HCO 1021/1915.

## APPENDIX 7

Bundi Concession, 3 September 1889

This is a document showing clearly and truthfully an Agreement, duly sealed, made in the State of Tringanu at seven o'clock on Monday the 7th day of Moharam in the year of the Hegeina 1307 with truth and certainty this document of agreement is made between us His Highness Sultan Zeinal Abidin (son of the late Sultan Ahmad) ruler of the State of Tringanu and all its provinces, districts, dependencies and territories, after consultation duly concluded with the chiefs and officials of the Country, on our side for ourself our heirs and successors or our executors or administrators of our first part and Chia Ah Cham his heirs successors and assigns executors and administrators of the second part. And we two parties irretrievably and mutually agree to what is set forth in the the four articles written here below viz:—

*Article first.* For our side Sultan Zeinal Abidin for ourself our heirs and successors or our executors or administrators concede and grant unto Chia Ah Cham his heirs successors and assigns, executors and administrators, for mining, the lands which in the district of Kemaman are known as Tanah Bandi and Bukit Bandi and all places for mining therein which may contain tin, gold, silver, coal or any mineral whatsoever in that place. The boundaries of the lands of Bandi and Bukit Bandi abovenamed are on the up country or up river side, Sunghie (i.e. the river) Chendrong passing thence on into (the river) Sunghie Burong and continuing or following on until reaching Bukit (hill) Bandi on the seaward or down river side the boundary is by following down stream the water of the (river) Sunghie Charol to Palox Jinnang and thence back on land across again to Bukit Bandi so as to entirely finish and include it. NOW whatever it pleases Chia Ah Cham according to his thinking, his heirs, successors and assigns executors and administrators to do which will produce revenue to the country, and which will give profit he can with full power do in and upon the abovementioned land. Notwithstanding this if Chia Ah Cham his heirs successors and assigns executors and administrators shall not commence work in fair manner within 5 years then this document of agreement shall be broken and the lands above mentioned and also this document of agreement shall be returned to us or to our heirs or successors, and shall be released from the possession of the said Chia Ah Cham his heirs successors and assigns executors and administrators. But if Chia Ah Cham his heirs successors and assigns executors and administrators does work as stated herein upon the said land verily and in truth we acknowledge for ourself our heirs and successors that we have for certain given and handed over unto Chia Ah Cham his heirs successors and assigns executors and administrators the said mining lands of Bandi together with the hills

thereof, as stated for the term of (60) years from the date of our sealing this document. And we Sultan Zeinal Abidin agree that in or upon the abovenamed lands no one other person can work for gold, silver, tin ore or any other ores or precious stones such as diamonds, emerald, rubies, anything whatsoever; that is to say that only Chia Ah Cham his heirs successors and assigns executors and administrators can work there. Nevertheless Chia Ah Cham must in working bring in a fair number of men and moreover he must not stop any of the work that brings forth income and if Chia Ah Cham works in that place in a playing sort of way such as bring [*sic*] in only 20 or 30 coolies or ceases to work, it will be in our power to take back the place named.

*Article Second.* Chia Ah Cham, his heirs successors and assigns executors and administrators has concurred in and accepted what has been set forth in Article the first. And he accepts from Sultan Zeinal Abidin the concession of the lands for mining and planting on the terms set above and undertakes to pay the Royalty or duty and that the same should be paid willingly when due the royalty or duty agreed to be paid being on Tin, one pikul out of every ten pikuls and as regards gold, silver, coal or any other kinds of minerals and precious stones, such as diamonds, emeralds, rubies or anything else which Chia Ah Cham takes from or finds upon or in the said land of all these, if ten be found one of them that is in kind, is to be for royalty or duty to Sultan Zeinal Abidin, or upon valuation of the price thereof one tenth shall be paid as Royalty or duty but not more. And Chia Ah Cham regularly once every five months will without fail pay the duty or Royalty abovenamed.

*Article Third.* And we Sultan Zeinal Abidin for ourself our heirs successors &c grant unto Chia Ah Cham his heirs successors and assigns executors and administrators full power and right to gather and collect people on the lands abovenamed and to build houses, sheds and buildings or any places they may choose within the said boundaries only not do so on places that may be occupied by people already there; and they may also make roads from place to places other than through the places of people already there and Chia Ah Cham can use timber and stone of any use for his work, and he can also use the rivers for any purpose in his work in the said places and he can put up pumps or engines or machinery so as to make the work of mining easy and not troublesome and they can make mines under ground and upon the ground and can dig into or excavate the hills, and can crush rocks or stones and can take up from the rivers all stream tin which is in the rivers. And moreover on all tools or implements or materials for buildings or machinery or men employed by them or on coolies brought by them into these lands there shall be no duty or tax. And when the Royalty or duty on any gold, silver, tin, coal or minerals or any precious stones such as diamonds, emeralds or rubies has been paid Chia Ah Cham is guaranteed that the same can be exported.

UPON opium duty must be paid to us our heirs successors &c at the rate of \$120 per chest of opium. The two items spirits and gambling belong to the state. We give the said Chia Ah Cham the right to take into these places European labourers or workmen, or Malays or Chinese or Klings or Siamese, and Chia Ah Cham can put in any person or persons of any other nationality to work there. And Chia Ah Cham can enter into partnership or working with any persons.

*Article fourth.* Chia Ah Cham his heirs successors and assigns executors and administrators shall not sell the ground comprised in the said Bandi and Bukit Bandi Concession; (i.e. outright or in perpetuity being only a lease for a specified term) and Chia Ah Cham undertakes to pay the duty upon opium imported at the rate of \$120 per chest of opium and as to the matters of gambling, and spirits and Chinese and Java tobaccos and other goods imported Chia Ah Cham will follow the customary law of the Country of Tringanu. As regards currency or coin used for paying expenses of work upon the said concession, Chia Ah Cham must not use the currency or coin of other countries but must use the coin or currency of the State of Tringanu. In case of any disputes arising between the servants or coolies upon the said concession and the people of the Country on the said concession, Chia Ah Cham agrees to submit such disputes to the decision of Sultan Zeinal Abidin, and Chia Ah Cham for himself, his heirs, successors, and assigns, executors and administrators agrees to give effect and observance to the stipulations set forth in the foregoing four articles and will not depart in any way from any of them. And we Sultan Zeinal Abidin for ourself our heirs successors &c. also in the same way cannot depart in any way from giving effect and observance to the agreements on our part set forth in the foregoing four Articles and therefore, and now we have impressed our seal hereupon, and Chia Ah Cham has put his signature hereupon as guarantees to both parties to this agreement and this has been done in truth and openly and clearly before all the Chiefs and Officials of the Country.

Signed by

(sd) Chia Ah Cham

Witnesses

Syed Hassan bin Achmad

Mohamed Yusop bin Tunkoo Mahamood.

#### TRANSLATION

of a document in Malay (Arabic) Character from the Sultan of Tringanu, granting to Chia Ah Cham mining rights in the district of Sunghie Bandi, Kamaman in the State of Tringanu.

## APPENDIX 8

Jabor Concession, 18 February 1907

Document made in Trengganu on Monday the fourth day of Muharram, 1325 (18th. February 1907).

We Sultan Zenalabidin, Ruler of the State of Trengganu and its dependencies, hereby give and deliver over to Tengku Sleman bin Zenalabidin and vest him with the ownership of the land of the Pinang, Jabor, and Puteh Rivers, on the left side going upstream of the Kemaman river, to be the absolute property of him and heirs and descendants, in perpetuity, by a valid and final gift and delivery.

The boundaries of the land are defined as follows:

Downstream, the sea-shore on the left side entering the mouth of the Kemaman river;

Upstream, the Mengkuang river;

Land-side, the Kuantan boundary;

River-side, the left bank going upstream of the Kemaman and Cherul rivers.

Tengku Sleman hereby accepts and takes possession of the land within the aforesaid boundaries.

He and his heirs are empowered to possess and occupy the land, hills and rivers within these boundaries with the full and perfect rights of ownership of any owner of property, in perpetuity, without any hindrance or restriction and without any payment of land rent to Government, the land having become the absolute property of Tengku Sleman.

The same rights shall be exercised by transferees or attorneys of Tengku Sleman, or their heirs, legatees, attorneys, agents, and partners, following whatever terms are allowed or granted by Tengku Sleman.

The Government duty on articles exported from this area is fixed as follows;

On all minerals and mining produce,	... ..	5 per cent;
On all forest produce such as timber, ratan, etc.	... ..	5 per cent;
On pepper, gambier, copra, and other agricultural produce,	... ..	2½ per cent;
With the exception of rubber, sago and cotton, the duty on which is	... ..	1 per cent.

The duty is payable in kind or ad valorem

As regards articles imported into this area the duty on Opium is \$120 a chest (\$3 a ball); on Javanese and Chinese tobacco and all other articles duty follows the laws and regulations of Trengganu at any time in force.

Gaming and Spirit revenues are the property of Government; they may be taken at such time as Government thinks fit.

Because the aforesaid is valid and clear we Sultan Zenalabidin of Trengganu have impressed our seal above.

Source: Encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44; Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, ff. 157-158.

APPENDIX 9  
Non-ruling Class Concessionaires, 1889-1910

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Terms</i>	<i>Approximate Size</i>	<i>Export Duties</i>	<i>Import Duties</i>	<i>Rent Per Annum</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
1. Chiah Ah Cham <sup>1</sup>	Bundi, Kemaman	(a) 60 years from 3.9.1889 (b) Work to begin within 5 years (c) Labour clause	19,850 acres	10% on minerals, timber, and jungle produce	Opium \$120 per chest Exemption on machinery	Nil	Mining and planting
2. Tham Kay Chong <sup>2</sup>	Sungai Ayam, Kemaman	(a) 60 years from 8.7.1896 (b) Work to begin within 6 years	n.a.	10% on minerals	Opium \$120 per chest Exemption on machinery	Nil	Mining and planting
3. Ong Kay Joo <sup>3</sup>	Paka	(a) 30 years from 29.5.1899 (b) Work to begin within 8 months (c) Not less than 100 coolies (d) Prohibition of transfer or sale	n.a.	10% on minerals	Opium \$120 per chest Gambling and spirit farm rights According to state regulations	Nil	Tin mining

4. J. Anderson <sup>a</sup>	Sungai Sendok, Kemaman	(a) 60 years from 11.7.1904 (b) Work to begin within 6 years (c) Not less than 30-40 coolies	30 sq. miles	10% on minerals	Opium \$120 per chest Exemption on machinery According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting
5. Lim Chuan Chian <sup>b</sup>	Chemuak, Dungun	(a) 40 years from 16.6.1905 (b) Work to begin within 2 years	38,900 acres	10% on tin	Opium \$120 per chest	Nil	Tin mining
6. Chong Ah Kit <sup>c</sup>	Tebak, Kemaman	(a) 60 years from 27.9.1906	35,000 acres	1½% on minerals and jungle produce, 2½% on agricultural produce, 1% on getah, sago, and cotton	Opium \$120 per chest According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting

(continued)



## APPENDIX 9 (continued)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Terms</i>	<i>Approximate Size</i>	<i>Export Duties</i>	<i>Import Duties</i>	<i>Rent Per Annum</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
7. Sayyid Omar bin Salim Al Attas <sup>7</sup>	Sungai Jabor, Kemaman	(a) 65 years from 5.2.1908 (b) Work to begin within 6 years	9 sq. miles	1½% on minerals and jungle produce, 2½% on agricultural produce, 1% on getah, sago, and cotton	Opium \$120 per chest According to state regulations	8½ cents per acre paid to Tengku Sulaiman bin Sultan Zainal Abidin III	Mining and planting
8. Chew Woon Poh <sup>8</sup>	Sungai Mengkuang, Kemaman	(a) 99 years from 6.4.1908 (b) Work to begin within 3 years	27,000 acres	1½% on minerals and jungle produce, 2½% on agricultural produce, 1% on getah, sago and cotton	Opium \$120 per chest Exemption on machinery According to state regulations	\$1,500 to Tengku Hapsah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III and \$500 to the Datuk Sri Amar Diraja, to begin 5 years after operations	Mining and planting

9. East Asiatic Company <sup>9</sup>	Kretai	99 years from 18.5.1908	3,500 acres	2½% on all agricultural produce	According to state regulations	\$678.80	Agriculture
10. Al-Habib Muhammad Amir bin Sayyid Hassan Al-Mufti <sup>10</sup>	Sungai Puteh, Kemaman	65 years from 19.9.1908	9 sq. miles	5% on minerals, 2½% on plantation produce, and 1% on getah, sago, and cotton	Opium \$120 per chest According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and agriculture
11. R. W. Morris <sup>11</sup>	Sungai Ayer Puteh and Sungai Paloh Jenang, Kemaman	Mining 50 years from 22.11.1910. Agriculture 75 years from 22.11.1910	Mining 500 acres; Agriculture 2,500 acres	10% on minerals, 2½% on rubber, 5% on other agricultural produce	Exemption on machinery According to state regulations	\$1 an acre on mining and 50¢ an acre on agriculture	Mining and planting

(continued)

## APPENDIX 9 (continued)

Name	Location	Terms	Approximate Size	Export Duties	Import Duties	Rent Per Annum	Purpose
12. East Asiatic Company <sup>12</sup>	Sungai Ranggon, Kretai	99 years from 14.8.1910	Rubber 2,000 acres; Coconuts 1,500 acres	2½% on rubber, 5% on other agricultural produce	According to state regulations	Rubber land 10¢ an acre for 5 years and then \$1; coconut land 19¢ an acre for 99 years	Planting
13. Habib Muhammad bin Hassan Al-Hadi	Batu Burok, Kuala Trengganu	In perpetuity from 24.10.1909	500 acres	According to state regulations	According to state regulations	Nil	Planting

n.a.—not available

Source: This list was compiled from two outlines provided by the British Agent: CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 4 January 1910, conf., ff. 2-17; and ART, 1911, Appendix 1, in HCO 337/1913. Other details were obtained from a wide range of archival sources including files of the British Adviser, Trengganu, High Commissioner's Office, and Commissioner, Lands and Mines Department.

<sup>1</sup>For a copy of the Bundi concession deed see Appendix 7. Chiah Ah Cham initially worked in partnership with Tham Kay Chong (see below) but later sold his rights to J. Anderson (see Journal of AAK, July 1937, in BAT 178/1937; and encl. 1, Guthrie and Company to CLM, 22 November

1928, in CLM 190/1347). These three individuals, through a series of transactions, had transferred some of their shares to Guthrie and Company by 1904. For an outline of the main developments see encl. 11, Guthrie and Company to CLM, 27 December 1928, in CLM 191/1347.

<sup>2</sup>He was a son of a Kemaman *tosukay* and won the concession through the services of Tengku Mohamed Yusof bin Sultan Mahmud Mustapha Shah and the Mentri Besar. They were promised a commission for their favour but Tham failed to keep his side of the bargain (see LOK 331/1349: Sungai Ayam Concession, undated; and CO 273/384: Young to CO, 24 January 1912, desp. 32, f. 169). On 2 December 1896 Tham Kay Chong

issued a Declaration of Trust to T. Scott and J. Anderson who were partners of Guthrie and Company and on 28 February 1903, when the company was floated on the stock exchange, the Sungai Ayam concession was cited as one of its assets (see encl. 11, Guthrie and Company to CLM, 5 November 1930, in CLM 190/1347). A copy of the map of the area can be found in encl. 57 in CLM 191/1347. For a brief outline of the deed see CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 4 January 1910, conf., f. 16.

<sup>3</sup>This concession deed can be found as encl. 3 in HCO 560/1910. Ong Kay Joo was not a local-born Trengganu Chinese. However, he had at least two wives in Trengganu and a brother who inherited the concession when he died in China (see encl. 3, Memorandum of Agreements relating to Ong Kay Joo's Concession at Paka, in HCO 1417/1912).

<sup>4</sup>He was the former Siamese Consul and played a crucial role in obtaining for Guthrie and Company the Bundi and Sungai Ayam concessions. He paid the Sultan \$5,000 for the Sungai Sendok lease (CO 273/461: Young to CO, 8 November 1917, desp. 327, ff. 281-282). The full text of this deed can be found enclosed in HCO 306/1910.

<sup>5</sup>He was a Singaporean trader and had considerable dealings with the

state even before he arrived there in 1903. The Sultan was approached with the view of forming a company to mine. A concession in the Dungun district was granted on the condition that the district chief had a share in the company. The Sultan and Tengku Abu Bakar, the district chief, were paid \$8,000 and \$1,000 respectively and a promissory note for \$9,000 was made to the latter (HCO 432/1910: J. Anderson to Conlay, 18 March 1910, draft). The concession area had earlier been issued to Tengku Abu Bakar on 16 September 1902 to mine for 40 years and plant for 99 years (HCO 1313/1910: The Dungun River Concession Syndicate Ltd. Agreement of 5 November 1910). For a brief outline of this concession see CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 4 January 1910, conf., f. 13.

<sup>6</sup>He had a long interest in this concession which went back to 1889 when Tengku Mohamed Yusof bin Sultan Mahmud Mustapha Shah, who then held the concession, attempted to interest him. However, in 1906 the latter's rights were cancelled by the Sultan who then issued the concession to the Yang Dipertuan Muda. Under these circumstances Chong Ah Kit concluded an agreement with the new owner. For a short outline of the agreement see CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 4 January 1910, conf., f. 12.

## APPENDIX 9 (continued)

<sup>7</sup>Sayyid Omar was a Singaporean trader who obtained this concession through Tengku Sulaiman bin Sultan Zainal Abidin III. He was described as a 'shrewd and clever Arab ... who had great influence over the Sultan' (HCO 821/1910: W. D. Scott to HCO, 4 November 1910). For a copy of this agreement see CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 29 January 1910, conf., ff. 150-154.

<sup>8</sup>This concession had first engaged the attention of Chew Soon Hi, the father of Chew Woon Poh, in 1900 when the Sultan authorized him to mine tin and to plant within the next four years. He failed to meet his commitment and his son applied to take over. By this time the concession had been issued to Tengku Besar Hapsah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III. In the negotiations the Sultan's secretary, Haji Ngah Muhammad, played an important role. For his services, he was promised the sum of \$500 per annum for the duration of the lease (CO 273/363: Anderson to CO, 14 October 1910, tel., ff. 151-152).

<sup>9</sup>The concession was concluded between Tengku Embong Musa bin Tengku Sulaiman, the district chief of Kretai, and the company. For an outline of the deed see CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 4 January 1910, conf., f. 9.

<sup>10</sup>This concession was another one owned by Tengku Sulaiman bin Sultan Zainal Abidin III who leased it to Al-Habib Muhammad Amir. For the full text of this agreement see HCO 467/1910: Sungai Puteh Concession.

<sup>11</sup>Tengku Sulaiman had an earlier interest in this concession. He was obliged to give way to his elder brother, the Yang Dipertuan Muda, after the failure of his venture with Al-Habib Muhammad Amir. Captain R. W. Morris of the *SS Hock Lee* was forced under some dubious circumstances to conclude an agreement with the Yang Dipertuan Muda by which the latter was to have a half share in all profits (see CO 273/362: Anderson to CO, 25 July 1910, desp. 285, f. 139; and CO 273/363: Anderson to CO, 12 October 1910, desp. 389, f. 91). For the full text of the agreement see HCO 114/1912: Bukit Jenang Concession.

<sup>12</sup>This was the second lease obtained by the company from Tengku Embong Musa. They paid him \$4,000 as premium and there was an increase in the ground rent to \$1.00 per acre. Besides this increase, the other terms of the concession were similar. An extract of this deed is in CLM 137/1353.

APPENDIX 10  
Ruling Class Concessionaires, 1906-1910

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Terms</i>	<i>Approximate Size</i>	<i>Export Duties</i>	<i>Import Duties</i>	<i>Rent Per Annum</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
1. Tengku Muhammad bin Sultan Zainal Abidin III <sup>1</sup>	Tebak, Kemaman	In perpetuity from 26.2.1906	55,000 acres	5% on minerals; 2½% on agricultural produce; 5% on jungle produce; and 1% on cotton, gutta, and sago	Opium \$120 per chest	Nil	Mining and planting
2. Tengku Muhammad bin Sultan Zainal Abidin III <sup>2</sup>	Bukit Tawang, Sungai Trengganu	In perpetuity, date not available	20,000 acres	n.a.	n.a.	Nil	Mining and planting
3. Tengku Muhammad bin Sultan Zainal Abidin III	Merang	In perpetuity; date not available	64,700 acres	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Planting

(continued)

## APPENDIX 10 (continued)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Terms</i>	<i>Approximate Size</i>	<i>Export Duties</i>	<i>Import Duties</i>	<i>Rent Per Annum</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
4. Tengku Muhammad bin Sultan Zainal Abidin III	Ulu Trengganu, Sungai Trengganu	In perpetuity; date not available	88,300 acres	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5. Tengku Besar Hapsah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III <sup>3</sup>	Sungai Mengkuang, Kemaman	In perpetuity from 26.2.1906	27,000 acres	5% on minerals and forest produce; 2½% on agricultural produce; and 1% on gutta, cotton, and sago	Opium \$120 per chest According to state regulations	Nil	n.a.
6. Tengku Nik Maimunah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III and Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim <sup>4</sup>	Chenderong, Kemaman	In perpetuity from 26.2.1906	51,400 acres	10% on minerals; and 5% on all produce planted	Opium \$120 per chest According to state regulations	Nil	n.a.

7. Tengku Nik Maimunah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III and Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim <sup>5</sup>	Sungai Cherol, Kemaman	In perpetuity from 26.2.1906	150,000 acres	5% on minerals; 2½% on agricultural produce; and 1% on gutta, sago, and cotton	Opium \$120 per chest According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting
8. Tengku Wok Aminah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III <sup>6</sup>	Ulu Cherol, Kemaman	In perpetuity from 26.2.1906	42,000 acres	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Mining and planting
9. Tengku Sulaiman bin Sultan Zainal Abidin III <sup>7</sup>	Jabor, Kemaman	In perpetuity from 18.2.1907	128,000 acres	5% on minerals and jungle produce; 2½% on agricultural produce; and 1% on gutta, sago, and cotton	Opium \$120 per chest According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting

(continued)



## APPENDIX 10 (continued)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Terms</i>	<i>Approximate Size</i>	<i>Export Duties</i>	<i>Import Duties</i>	<i>Rent Per Annum</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
10. Tengku Khadijah binte Sultan Ahmad II and Tengku Abu Bakar bin Tengku Abdul Jalil <sup>a</sup>	Chemuak, Dungun	In perpetuity from 18.2.1907	38,900 acres	n.a.	n.a.	Nil	Mining and planting
11. Sultan Zainal Abidin III	Ayer Puteh, Kemaman	In perpetuity, date not available	48,700 acres	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
12. Tengku Ngah Aishah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III	Ulu Paka, Paka	In perpetuity from 27.9.1907	24,300 acres	5% on minerals and jungle produce; 2½% on agricultural produce; and 1% on getah, sago, and cotton	Opium \$120 per chest According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting

13. Tengku Maimunah binte Sultan Ahmad II <sup>9</sup>	Penyerang, (Kanan Mudik Paka) Paka	In perpetuity from 5.6.1910	31,400 acres	5% on minerals and jungle produce; 2½% on agricultural produce; and 1% on getah, sago, and cotton	According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting
14. Tengku Woh binte Tengku Osman <sup>10</sup>	Kuala Duyong, Duyong, Dungun	In perpetuity from 21.5.1908	1,000 acres	5% on minerals and jungle produce; 2½% on agricultural produce; and 1% on getah and cotton	According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting
15. Tengku Embong Musa bin Tengku Sulaiman <sup>11</sup>	Kretai	In perpetuity from 1908	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Planting

(continued)

## APPENDIX 10 (continued)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Terms</i>	<i>Approximate Size</i>	<i>Export Duties</i>	<i>Import Duties</i>	<i>Rent Per Annam</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
16. Tengku Chik bin Tengku Hitam and Tengku Nong binte Tengku Muhammad Sayyid	Anka and Kernal river, Besut	65 years from 6.3.1908	n.a.	10% on minerals, timber, and jungle produce; 2½% on agricultural produce	According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting
17. Tengku Petra bin Tengku Muhammad Sayyid <sup>12</sup>	Sungai Plakat and Ruah, Besut	65 years from 2.1.1908	n.a.	10% on minerals, timber, and jungle produce; 2½% on agricultural produce	According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting
18. Tengku Long bin Tengku Ngah	Sungai Besut and Plakat, Besut	99 years from 14.6.1908	10,000 acres	10% on minerals, timber, and jungle produce; 2½% on agricultural produce	According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting

19. Tengku Kazaki bin Tengku Abu Bakar <sup>13</sup>	Sungai Nerus, Kuala Trengganu	45 years from 10.7.1910	500 acres	10% on minerals	According to state regulations	Nil	Mining
20. Tengku Hasan bin Tengku Salim	Sungai Payoh, Kemaman	99 years from 14.2.1910	50 acres mining and 1,500 acres agriculture	10% on minerals; 2½% rubber and other agricultural produce	According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting
21. Tengku Ali bin Sultan Alam Shah of Singapore <sup>14</sup>	Sungai Perlis, Dungun	99 years from 6.12.1910 Work to begin within 3 years Minimum labour of 100 coolies	500 acres mining and 2,000 acres agriculture	10% on minerals; 2½% on rubber; and 5% on other agricultural produce	According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting
22. Tengku Chik bin Tengku Abdul Rahim	Sungai Keban, Kemaman	99 years from 27.8.1910	2,000 acres	According to state regulations	According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting
23. Tengku Chik bin Tengku Abdul Rahim	Sungai Patong, Kemaman	65 years from 1.2.1910	1,000 acres	According to state regulations	According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting
24. Tengku Chik bin Tengku Abdul Rahim <sup>15</sup>	Tebak, Kemaman	99 years from 27.8.1910	To select not more than 3,000 acres	According to state regulations	According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting

(continued)

## APPENDIX 10 (continued)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Terms</i>	<i>Approximate Size</i>	<i>Export Duties</i>	<i>Import Duties</i>	<i>Rent Per Annum</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
25. Tengku Omar bin Tengku Osman and Tengku Fatimah binte Tengku Osman	Sungai Chemurang, Dungun	99 years from 6.12.1910	3,000 acres	10% on minerals; 2½% on rubber; and 5% on other agricultural produce	According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting
26. Tengku Hitam bin Tengku Ngah (Besut) and Tengku Hitam binte Tengku Ngah (Trengganu) <sup>16</sup>	Sungai Darah, Besut	65 years from 22.10.1910 Work to begin within 6 years	n.a.	10% on minerals; and 5% on agricultural produce	According to state regulations	Nil	Mining and planting
27. Dr Kondo <sup>17</sup>	Kemasik	20 years from 27.12.1908 Work to begin within 5 years Renewable for another 75 years	6,000 acres	2½% on agricultural produce	According to state regulations	Nil	Planting

n.a.—not available

Sources: This Appendix was compiled from two lists obtained in encl. 2, Report on the Resumption of Trengganu Ruling House Concessions, J. L. Humphreys, 26 March 1925, in CO 717/44; Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 132A; and ART, 1911, Appendix 1, in HCO 337/1913. Other sources used are mentioned in the notes below.

<sup>1</sup>The full text of this concession could not be located in the files. On 27 September 1906, Chong Ah Kit leased this area from the Yang Dipertuan Muda (see Appendix 9) and he undertook to pay the owner royalties on minerals, jungle and agricultural produce, cotton, *gutta*, and sago. In addition, he had to pay a similar amount of royalties to the state—that is, the Sultan (see CO 273/363: Anderson to CO, 18 October 1910, conf., ff. 240–241). There is some doubt over the extent of the acreage: one source puts it as high as 100,000 acres (ART, 1917, draft, paragraph 23, in HCO 1445/1918).

<sup>2</sup>This concession was first leased by the owner to H. Gild who was assisted by some Perak miners. A copy of this agreement is found in HCO 95/1912: W. D. Scott to HCO, 12 December 1911.

<sup>3</sup>For an outline of Tengku Besar Hapsah's deed see CO 273/363:

Anderson to CO, 18 October 1910, conf., ff. 238–239. She leased the concession to Chew Woon Poh on 6 April 1908 and was guaranteed royalties and ground rent. See Appendix 9.

<sup>4</sup>For an outline of this deed see encl. 12, Translation of Chenderong Concession in CLM (Mines) 68/1938.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, encl. 12A. A copy of the deed is available in SUK 213/1347. The Land Office, much later, was convinced that the Chenderong and the Cherol concessions covered the same area. They could not explain why two concessions were issued on the same day with differing rates on royalties. Encl. 9, Chenderong Concession in CLM 194/1350.

<sup>6</sup>For the date of issue see encl. G in SUK (Committee Timbangan Concession) 7/1341.

<sup>7</sup>See Appendix 8.

<sup>8</sup>The deed is to be found in SUK (Committee Timbangan Concession) 7/1341.

<sup>9</sup>See encl. 1, W. D. Scott to Under Secretary, FMS, 2 February 1912, in HCO 329/1912, which has the full text of this concession.

<sup>10</sup>Her concession and that of Habib Muhammad bin Hassan Al-Hadi

APPENDIX 10 (*continued*)

(see Appendix 9) were the only two deeds in perpetuity given to members outside the Kerabat Diraja group. The relationship of Tengku Woh binte Tengku Osman to the Kerabat Diraja was by marriage. She married Tengku Ali bin Sultan Alam Shah of Singapore (CO 273/373: Brockman to CO, 23 May 1911, desp. 255, f. 615). In any case these two concessions were small in area. In some of the above-mentioned concessions granted in perpetuity, information on the export and import duties was not available. However, it seems likely that they were similar to the other deeds held by members of the royalty.

<sup>11</sup>Tengku Embong Musa's concession rights could not be traced in the files. However, it is certain that he possessed some form of rights as all leases made to the East Asiatic Company, the earliest of which was in 1908, were signed between him and the company (see Appendix 9). The Annual Report for 1917 mentioned that he held a concession in that district for 20,000 acres in 1910 (ART, 1917, draft, paragraph 23, in HCO 1445/1918). The area of the concession covered all land on the right bank of the Kretai River (encl. 12, Memorandum by A. T. Newbould, 12

September 1936, in CLM 418/1353).

<sup>12</sup>In 1912, after the death of Tengku Petra bin Tengku Muhammad Sayyid, the concession reverted back to the ruler (HCO 1270/1912: W. D. Scott to Under Secretary, FMS, 27 August 1912).

<sup>13</sup>For a copy of this deed see SUK 1063/1346.

<sup>14</sup>A copy of this deed is found in HCO 399/1911. Earlier, in 1901, he was involved in the Redang concession. His wife, Tengku Woh binte Tengku Osman, was the owner of the Kuala Duyong, Dungun, concession. See note 10 above.

<sup>15</sup>For a copy and rough map of this concession see SUK 173/1334.

<sup>16</sup>See SUK 243/1334 which contains a copy of this deed.

<sup>17</sup>He was the only Orang Keistimewaan who possessed a concession in the pre-1910 period. For a brief summary of the deed see CO 273/360: Anderson to CO, 4 January 1910, conf., f. 7. There is evidence to suggest that the area was much larger than indicated. See LOK 344/1347: Annual Report of the Commissioner of Lands and Mines Department, 1346 AH, p. 14.

Cap Tengku Osman, 23 Jamadil-Akhir, 1307 AH  
(14 February 1890)

Hajrah al-nabi salla illahi-alaihi wassalam seribu tiga ratus tujuh tahun pada dua puluh tiga haribulan Jamadil-akhir hari Ithnain pukul delapan pada masa itu-lah kebawah Duli Yang Di-pertuan Besar kurniakan surat serta chap kepada Tengku Osman bin Tengku Salam kerana menyatakan di-dalam-nya darihal tanah daerah Bukit sabelah pantai itu tanah raja maka Tengku Osman pohonkan kepada ke-bawah Duli hendak membuat dusun bertanam nyior dan lain-lain-nya maka ke-bawah Duli pon kurnia akan tanah itu kepada Tengku Osman maka Tengku Osman pon milik serta di-perintah akan tanah yang tersebut itu dengan tentu sangkat perenggan-nya sabelah mata hari naik sangkat mengabang besar (...) hingga sampai kepada anak chuchu dengan selama-lama-nya kepada Tengku Osman maka sekarang jangan-lah siapa-siapa haru dan kachau pada tanah yang tersebut itu di-atas Tengku Osman dan waris-waris keturunan-nya serta-serta barang di-dalam surat damikian-lah kita kurnia-kan tanda keterangan dan kenyata'an sah dengan nyata-nya.  
Intami-al-kalam.

Source: CLR 52/1357: Kawasan Chap Tengku Osman, Batu Rakit.  
Note: (...) has been erased.



APPENDIX 12  
Cap Kurnia Holders

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Approximate Size (acres)</i>	<i>Cap</i>
1. Tengku Dalam and Tengku Hitam	Sungai Amas, M. Kuala Nerus	n.a.	2,000	n.a.
2. Tengku Maimunah binte Sultan Ahmad II	(a) Peratok Batu, <sup>1</sup> Sungai Marang	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	(b) Batu Hampar, <sup>2</sup> M. Pulau Manis	1909	200	Yes
3. Tengku Khadijah binte Sultan Ahmad II	Kampung Batu Lambor, <sup>3</sup> Sungai Nerus	1911	100	Yes
4. Sultan Zainal Abidin III	Naga Kanan Mudik, <sup>4</sup> Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	3,000	No
5. Tengku Muhammad bin Sultan Zainal Abidin III	(a) Gong Kapas <sup>5</sup>	n.a.	100	n.a.
	(b) Bukit Ayam, <sup>6</sup> Ulu Kemaman	n.a.	n.a.	Yes
	(c) Kuala Kejir, Ulu Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	Yes
	(d) Gong Merawang, Kuala Marang	n.a.	n.a.	No
	(e) Marang	n.a.	n.a.	No
	(f) Tebuan, Ulu Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	No
	(g) Ayer Penapu	n.a.	n.a.	No
	(h) Bukit Besar, <sup>7</sup> Kuala Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
6. Tengku Dalam and Tengku Wok Aminah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III	Sungai Ular Kanan, <sup>8</sup> Mudik Sungai Trengganu, M. Kuala Telemong	29.8.1918	1,656	Yes

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Approximate Size (acres)</i>	<i>Cap</i>
7. Tengku Sulaiman bin Sultan Zainal Abidin III	(a) Bukit Besar	n.a.	100	n.a.
	(b) Kampung Alor Limbat <sup>9</sup>	n.a.	7,000	n.a.
8. Tengku Nik Maimunah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III and Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim	(a) Hilir Kuala Telemong <sup>10</sup>	n.a.	500	No
	(b) Kuala Telemong, <sup>11</sup> M. Telemong	n.a.	3,000	n.a.
	(c) Batu Burok <sup>12</sup>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	(d) Bukit Kubang Jambu <sup>13</sup>	1887	n.a.	Yes
9. Tengku Ismail bin Sultan Zainal Abidin III	(a) Pulau Babi, Kanan Mudik Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	(b) Telemong <sup>14</sup>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	(c) Belara <sup>15</sup>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
10. Cik Teh binte Abu Bakar	(a) Tanjong Awol, Kanan Mudik Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	(b) Merabang Bakong, <sup>16</sup> M. Batu Rakit	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
11. Cik Aishah	Paka <sup>17</sup>	n.a.	1,000	n.a.
12. Tengku Hitam binte Tengku Muda Abbas	(a) Kampung Terok, <sup>18</sup> M. Serada	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	(b) Hutan Banaw, M. Bukit Payong	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	(c) Kuala Berang <sup>19</sup>	17.12.1910	3,175	Yes
13. Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim and Tengku Chik bin Tengku Abdul Rahim	(a) Tapu Kiri, <sup>20</sup> Mudik Sungai Trengganu, M. Kuala Telemong	n.a.	3,000	No
	(b) Sungai Besar <sup>21</sup>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	(c) Bukit Balek <sup>22</sup>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

(continued)

APPENDICES  
APPENDIX 12 (continued)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Approximate Size (acres)</i>	<i>Cap</i>
14. Tengku Chik Abdul Jalil bin Tengku Ismail	(a) Raja Wali, <sup>23</sup> Dungun	27.3.1912	10	Yes
	(b) Sungai Buaya, Dungun	n.a.	64.5	n.a.
	(c) Bemban, Dungun	n.a.	125.5	n.a.
15. Tengku Sri Indera Segera, Besut	Padang Luas, <sup>24</sup> Besut	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
16. The Tengku Panglima Muda	Kemaman <sup>25</sup>	1904	n.a.	n.a.
17. Tengku Dalam	Kampung Serki Hulu, <sup>26</sup> Tapu, Sungai Trengganu	1917	n.a.	Yes
18. Tengku Wok	Bemban and Kaljin, Sungai Dungun	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
19. Tengku Embong	Pak Pilih, Kampung Berang, Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
20. Tengku Zaharah binte Tengku Sulong	Lungai, <sup>27</sup> M. Kampung Nerus, Sungai Trengganu	19.5.1918	1,164	Yes
21. Tengku Nik binte Tengku Ngah	Kampung Lengai, M. Belara, Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
22. Tengku Teh binte Tengku Chik Muda	Pulau Manis, <sup>28</sup> M. Serada, Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
23. Tengku Wok binte Tengku Osman	(a) Padang Mengkuang, M. Bukit Payong, Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	(b) Seberang Takir <sup>29</sup>	20.10.1920	15	Yes
24. Tengku Embong bin Tengku Ngah	Pantai Ali, Kiri mudik Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Approximate Size (acres)</i>	<i>Cap</i>
25. Tengku Embong bin Tengku Mohamad	Batu Lumbor, <sup>30</sup> M. Belara, Sungai Trengganu	1918	348	n.a.
26. Tengku Nik binte Tengku Sulaiman	Bukit Surau, Kiri mudik, Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
27. Tengku Musa	Pulau Babi, <sup>31</sup> M. Manir, Sungai Trengganu	18.11.1894	6	n.a.
28. Tengku Yusof bin Tengku Othman	Parang Pendik, <sup>32</sup> Setiu	1896	n.a.	n.a.
29. Tengku Yeop	Tebakang, <sup>33</sup> Alor Limbat, Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	No
30. Tengku Embong bin Tengku Wok	M. Bandar, <sup>34</sup> Kuala Trengganu	1907	n.a.	n.a.
31. Tengku Jusoh	Bukit Buchu, <sup>35</sup> Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
32. Tengku Osman bin Tengku Salam	M. Batu Rakit, <sup>36</sup> Marang	14.2.1890	n.a.	Yes
33. Datuk Sri Amar Diraja, Cik Atikah, and Towkay Sing Hoe	Tapu, Kiri mudik Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
34. Sayyid Sagap	Kampung Pasir Simpul, <sup>37</sup> Ulu Telemong	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
35. Datuk Penghulu Balai	M. Bandar, <sup>38</sup> Kuala Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	No
36. Datuk Panglima Perang (Yusof bin Musa)	Pak Pilih, <sup>39</sup> Kampung Berang, Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	1,080	n.a.

(continued)

APPENDICES  
APPENDIX 12 (*continued*)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Approximate Size (acres)</i>	<i>Cap</i>
37. Haji Embong bin Haji Abdullah, Kampung Tanjong, Kuala Trengganu	Baroh, M. Bukit Payong, <sup>40</sup> Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
38. Tuan Embong bin Dalam	Tanjong Awal, Kiri Mudik Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
39. Hajjah Kelsum binte Haji Daud	Bukit Belat, M. Bukit Payong, Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
40. Haji Wan Long bin Abdullah, Duyong	Tepusi, M. Kampung Nerus, Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
41. Engku Ngah bin Long	Tanjong Awal	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
42. Tuan Mamat bin Tengku Wok and Tuan Long bin Tengku Ahmad	Getam, Kanan Mudik, Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
43. Wan Embong bin Su and Haji Ibrahim	Tok Kulim Alor Lambat, M. Bukit Payong, Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
44. Wan Awang bin Muhammad, Haji Wan Hitam bin Haji Embong, Haji Wan Ali bin Haji Wan Ibrahim, and Kechut binte Haji Wan Ali	Bukit Sana, M. Bukit Payong, Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
45. Tuan Bharu bin Tengku Embong, Chabang Tiga	Chepoh, Kanan Mudik Sungai Trengganu	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
46. Nakhoda Man and Mek Kelsom	Baka Tinggi, <sup>41</sup> Kemaman	1910	n.a.	n.a.

M.—Mukim

n.a.—not available

Source: The basic outline of this list is located in LOT 235/1347: Register Perjalanan Settlement, Kawasan Chap, undated. However, the Register is incomplete and other sources from the National Archives were used to get a clearer picture.

<sup>1</sup>She claimed that the land was given to her by word of mouth from her father, Sultan Ahmad II. An attempt was made to obtain a title from her brother, Sultan Zainal Abidin III, but this was not followed through. Later, in about 1912, she transferred the property to her nephew, Tengku Ismail. The cultivators were instructed to pay a portion of their produce to him. However, it is certain that Tengku Ismail did not exercise his rights as a landlord, although he did visit the area at least once, when he was very young (see minute and enclosures in CLM 175/1346).

<sup>2</sup>LOT 71/1346: Chap Tengku Maimunah binte Sultan Ahmad, Batu Hampar, Naga, Mukim Pulau Manis.

<sup>3</sup>Part of this area had been under mixed cultivation of fruit and coconut trees prior to the issue of the cap in 1911. The peasant cultivator claimed the land as tanah waris while others had purchased their plots from previous owners. However, Tengku Abu Bakar, the husband of Tengku Khadijah, had overruled their traditional rights and claimed the whole area under the cap he held from the Sultan. He was unable to make effective his claims and as a result many of the cultivators did not pay cabut to him. Only a few of them who had settled in the area after 1911 admitted that they had planted rubber on the pawah system with the permission of the land-owners (see the statements of the various cultivators in CLR 362/1348).

<sup>4</sup>There was no title over this vast area, except that the claim of the Sultan was based on a special order made by himself. The land had been extensively cultivated under huma before the order was issued but at the time of the report in 1926 it had declined. In the late 1930s there was talk, by the administrators of the late Sultan's estate, of planting rubber (see encl. 1, CLM to SUK, undated, in SUK 1376/1346; and encl. 1, A. C. Coope to CLM, 19 February 1939, in CLM 100/1939).

<sup>5</sup>See encl. 1 in MBO 420/1347.

<sup>6</sup>See statement by Tengku Muhammad bin Sultan Zainal Abidin and others, 25 June 1923, in SUK 924/1341. This statement contains a list of the properties of the Yang Dipertuan Muda.

<sup>7</sup>In the 1930s this area was under the control of Long bin Muda Raja Gong Kapas, a representative of the ex-Sultan, Tengku Muhammad. A group of people approached him to *tumpang* (squat) on the land and he gave them permission to plant padi and other crops. The arrangement was verbal and no conditions were made for planting (see LOT 81/1345: Statement of Che Long bin Muda Raja Gong Kapas (or Bukit Besar), 9 April 1928).

<sup>8</sup>For a copy of this cap title see encl. 1 in LOT 75/1346.

<sup>9</sup>Encl. 1, G. A. C. de Moubray to SUK, 18 May 1928, in SUK 1376/1346.

<sup>10</sup>See encl. 1, Tengku Nik Maimunah to BA, 10 November 1930, in CLM 22/1349; encl. 5, memorandum by J. R. Neave, 12 January 1932, in CLM 240/1350; and encl. 5 in MBO 303/1350.

<sup>11</sup>Encl. 5, Memorandum by J. R. Neave, 12 January 1932, in CLM 240/1350.

<sup>12</sup>CLR 77/1348: Tanah Tengku Nik [Maimunah] binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III.

<sup>13</sup>The actual date of this cap kurnia is uncertain. However, in about 1887 she sold her rights over the two lots of padi land and one lot utilized for dusun cultivation to Haji Hussin. A copy of this cap jual-beli is found in CLR 225/1348.

<sup>14</sup>In the 1930s the peasants challenged Tengku Ismail's rights over the area. The case was heard in the Land Court but no action was taken to settle the property

claims in this area until the matter was raised again in 1935 (see minute, 11 February 1935, on LOT 102/1935). However, matters rested much the same. The Settlement Collector, Trengganu, could only wish, in 1938, that the government had earlier purchased the rights of Tengku Ismail. This action, he felt, would have saved '... an immense amount of time of successive Collectors of Land Revenue, Settlement Collectors, Commissioners of Lands and Mines and British Advisers as well-as countless subordinates'. Many of the pieces of land in this cap area were the subject of Land Court hearing and many had gone to the Court of Appeal (see BAT 671/1938: Diary of Settlement Collector, Trengganu, June 1938, p. 2).

<sup>15</sup>Part of this land was planted with rubber under the pawah system while the rest was sold (see CLR 2/1350: Lim Ann Sew and Chua Lian Eng versus Tengku Ismail bin Sultan Zainal Abidin).

<sup>16</sup>She claimed that the property was a kurnia to her from the Sultan when he was about twenty years of age. It was given to her by word of mouth as was the practice in those days. She got people to grow coconuts under the pawah system of three trees to the cultivator and one to herself (LOT 293/1346: Cik Teh binte Abu Bakar, Kampung Dalam Kota Trengganu, to CLR, 9 November 1927 and 9 December 1928).

<sup>17</sup>Encl. 1, BA to MBO, 24 December 1927, in MBO 559/1346. For a list of her other properties see encl. D in SUK 485/1352.

<sup>18</sup>See Encl. 1, G. A. C. de Moubray to SUK, 18 May 1928, in SUK 1376/1346.

<sup>19</sup>See encl. 2 in SUK 1392/1346.

<sup>20</sup>The claim over this land went back to the days of their father but there were no documents nor any evidence that they had any dealings in the property (see CLR 24/1349: Keputusan Mahkamah Tanah, 12 September 1930).

<sup>21</sup>Encl. 1, G. A. C. de Moubray to SUK, 18 May 1928, in SUK 1376/1346.

<sup>22</sup>Tengku Chik bin Tengku Abdul Rahim claimed a vast area in this locality on the grounds that it once had belonged to his father. There were other rival claims, including that of the ex-Sultan Muhammad (see minutes dated 19 November 1932 and 11 December 1933 on CLR 74/1349).

<sup>23</sup>The three areas he had, covered about 200 acres. However, only a portion of the cap was cultivated under coconut and rubber. As the territorial chief of the district he ordered the peasants to cultivate for him but there were also instances in which he gave some of them permission to cultivate the land under the pawah system (see CLM 252/1348: Chap Tanah Tengku Chik Abdul Jalil bin Ismail; encl. 26, Tengku Chik Abdul Jalil bin Ismail to SUK, 22 April 1933, in CLM 426/1350; and LOD 62/1939: CLR, Dungun, to CLM, 11 February 1939).

<sup>24</sup>His claim over the land was vague. The Commissioner of Lands and Mines was uncertain of the locality of the claim (see encl. 1, Tengku Sri Indera Segara to SUK, 21 January 1928, in SUK 1063/1346).

<sup>25</sup>At the death of the Tengku Panglima Muda, his retainer, Abdul Rahman bin Ishak (Drahman), took over the land and gave it to his close associates. This act led the peasants to abandon their holdings (see encl. 2, Statement of CLR, Kemaman, 22 November 1928, in CLM 170/1347).

<sup>26</sup>Encl. 1, G. A. C. de Moubray to SUK, 18 May 1928, in SUK 1376/1346.

<sup>27</sup>She did not exercise her rights over the property. In 1936 her children attempted to get cultivators to live there and work the land. However, they ran headlong into problems with the Land Office which had long deemed the land to be state land (see encl. 5, P. A. B. McKerron to BA, 16 February 1937, in CLM 241/1936; BAT

174/1937: Engku Habib bin Sayyid Abdullah to SUK, 8 June 1936; and minute, P. A. B. McKerron, undated, on LOT 344/1936).

<sup>28</sup>This cap area had been cultivated before the gift was made (encl. 1, G. A. C. de Moubray to SUK, 18 May 1928, in SUK 1376/1346).

<sup>29</sup>In 1920 a title was issued which recognized that the land had been given to her by the late Tengku Bulat binte Tengku Ismail. Evidently part of the area was cultivated and she attempted to buy the cultivators' rights back. She also attempted to collect rent but not the produce of the peasants. These rents were less than \$1.00 for each person. Her efforts to control the land generally failed as some of the peasants refused to pay rent, claiming their plots to be tanah waris, while others were prepared to acknowledge that they had planted with the permission of the former owner but were unaware that Tengku Wok had acquired the cap. Apparently Tengku Wok's uncle, Tengku Abu Bakar, and his wife, Tengku Khadijah binte Sultan Ahmad, too had some interests in the property (see CLR 240/1348: Cik Kiah binte Hitam and Others versus Tengku Wok binte Osman).

<sup>30</sup>Tengku Petra was the original owner of the cap. When he died, Sultan Zainal Abidin III transferred the property by word of mouth to Tengku Embong, who had married Tengku Petra's widow. In 1935 there were seventeen people working on the land with Tengku Embong's permission to plant and reside there. A portion of the cap was also leased to a Chinese (see LOT 452/1934: Kawasan Chap Sultan Zainal Abidin, 1331 AH, Tuntutan Tengku Embong; and minutes dated 3 March 1936 and 15 March 1936 on this file).

<sup>31</sup>See encl. 2, Surat Atifak Meshuarat Am, 17 December 1929, in CLM 260/1348.

<sup>32</sup>The area was largely covered with *rotan saga*. There were conflicting claims over the right to extract this produce. In 1917 Tengku Yusof claimed that he had cultivated the rotan in the area and that the Tengku Bentara, the district chief, was encroaching on his work by collecting the produce. A few of the peasants in the area admitted that they worked under the instruction of Tengku Yusof, while others claimed that they worked for the Tengku Bentara. There was at least one peasant who asserted that he had previously collected the rotan to make *bingkai* (frames) and other such products without having to ask permission until Tengku Yusof stopped him. In 1930 Tengku Yusof reappeared after a long absence and attempted to get the peasants to work for him on the mere promise of paying them 20–25 cents a day as wages. They refused (see SUK 60/1335: Tengku Yusof bin Tengku Othman to SUK, 18 January 1917, and DO, Setiu to SUK, 24 February 1917; encl. 3, CLR, Besut and Setiu to CLM, 18 January 1931, in CLM 200/1349).

<sup>33</sup>This cap is mentioned in CLM 95/1939: Chap Tengku Yeop at Tebakang, Alor Limbat.

<sup>34</sup>This cap kurnia covered an area in Kuala Trengganu town. The 1907 cap merely confirmed existing rights in the area. Tengku Embong claimed that he had inherited the property from his uncle, Tengku Endut bin Tengku Nik. He built shop lots in the area and rented them at 5 cents per mensem in the 1920s. Some of the tenants did not pay rent, while others claimed that they had bought the lots from him outright (CLR 99/1348: Case of Tengku Embong versus Haji Mat Amin bin Mohamad and others).

<sup>35</sup>Minute dated 1 October 1925 on LOT 107/1344.

<sup>36</sup>CLR 52/1357: Kawasan Chap Tengku Othman, Batu Rakit. A copy of the cap is also available in this file.

<sup>37</sup>Sayyid Sagap's claim covered an extensive area stretching from Kampung



Pasir Simpul on the Telemong River into Ulu Telemong. However, many of the peasants in that area claimed the land as tanah waris. In 1927 Penghulu Mamat fought the case for the peasants in a local court hearing and as a result Sayyid Sagap relinquished his claim. The local court was apparently not one of the government institutions and was set up by the local community to hear the conflicting claims (CLM 162/1347: Chap Sayyid Sagap, Ulu Telemong). See also minutes, G. A. C. de Moubray, dated 14 November 1928 and 11 December 1928 on this file.

<sup>38</sup>The claim goes back to the days of Sultan Ahmad II who was reported to have given the land to the Datuk Penghulu Balai I, and his subsequent waris had built kampung houses in the area. However, in the 1920s there were conflicting claims. Some of the people in the area admitted tenancy, while others claimed the property as one of inheritance (see encl. 2, Report on a Land Case—Wan Mamat versus Datuk Balai and Others, by J. E. Kempe, 30 December 1924, in CLM 222/1348).

<sup>39</sup>In around 1927 the property was partially cultivated with rubber trees and the Datuk Panglima Perang, together with some Chinese towkay, were reported to be making sales to different people (see encl. 1 and 2 in CLM 189/1347).

<sup>40</sup>See encl. 1, G. A. C. de Moubray to SUK, 18 May 1928, in SUK 1376/1346.

<sup>41</sup>Their cap was made out specifically to plant coconut, areca nut, and other produce with the condition that the property remained in their family line as long as it was cultivated. However, a year after the issue of the cap the land was issued to another person as cultivation had not begun (see LOK 82/1347: Chap Nakhoda Man and Mek Kelsom, Baka Tinggi, Kemaman).

## APPENDIX 13

Trengganu—Great Britain Treaty,  
22 April 1910

Agreement to determine certain matters concerning the relations between the Mighty Government of Great Britain and the Government of Trengganu, a self-governing Malayo—Muhammadan State.

Made between the representative of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, His Excellency Sir JOHN ANDERSON, G.C.M.G., Governor of the Straits Settlements and High Commissioner for the Federated Malay State, on behalf of His Majesty.

And His Highness Sultan ZAINALABIDIN, who possesses and administers the Government of Trengganu and all its dependencies, for himself and his heirs to succeed him as Sultan in accordance with Malay custom in the Government of Trengganu.

## ARTICLE I

His Majesty the KING of Great Britain and His Highness the Sultan of Trengganu hereby agree that mutual help shall be rendered by the two Governments.

So also in the mutual delivery of offenders or persons accused or convicted of any offence, in accordance with arrangements to be made between the two Governments.

It is also agreed that both parties shall abide strictly by the provision of this document.

## ARTICLE II

His Majesty the KING of Great Britain declares that he only desires to place a British Officer to reside in Trengganu to be an Agent with functions similar to those of a Consular Officer.

His Highness the Sultan of Trengganu undertakes to receive this Officer and to provide free of cost a piece of land in his country on which to build a house for the occupation of such Officer.

## ARTICLE III

His Majesty the KING of Great Britain undertakes on his part to protect the Government and the State of Trengganu and all its dependencies from attacks by foreign enemies, and for this and other similar purposes the officers of His Majesty's Government shall at all times be allowed free access to the seas and territories of Trengganu and its dependencies and to employ proper means of opposing such attacks.

## ARTICLE IV

His Highness the Sultan of Trengganu hereby agrees that without the knowledge and consent of the British Government he will not make any treaty, deal in or correspond on political matters with or send envoys to any foreign Government, interfere in the politics of any Malay country or grant any mining concession exceeding 500 acres or other land exceeding 3,000 acres in area to any person other than natives and subjects of Trengganu.

It is also agreed that should any cause arise requiring political correspondence between His Highness the Sultan of Trengganu and any foreign Government, such correspondence shall be conducted through the British Government on whom His Highness the Sultan of Trengganu depends for help and for the settlement of any matter between the Government of Trengganu and the foreign Government.

The last preceding clause does not refer to non-political correspondence or visits of a friendly nature or the like.

IN WITNESS whereof His Excellency SIR JOHN ANDERSON, G.C.M.G., and His Highness the Sultan of Trengganu have set their respective seals and signatures.

Dated at Singapore, this twenty-second day of April in the year 1910, corresponding to the eleventh day of Rabial-Akhir in the year 1328.

Sd. John Anderson

Seal of the Governor and  
Commander-in-chief S.S. and  
Labuan and High Commissioner  
for the F.M.S. and Brunai.

Malay Seal and  
Signature of the  
Sultan of Trengganu.

Witness

Sgd. T. Perriot,  
Major General  
Commanding Troops, S.S.

Witness

Signature of Tunku  
Ngah in Malay

Sgd. F. Belfield,  
Attorney General, S.S.

Signature of Tunku  
Khaizahkir in Malay.

Source: CO 273/361: Anderson to CO, 27 April 1910, desp. 160, f. 189.

## APPENDIX 14

Trengganu-Great Britain Treaty,  
24 May 1919

Agreement between His Majesty Government and the Government of Trengganu dated 24 May, 1919.

Whereas it is considered desirable by His Excellency the High Commissioner for the Malay States and by His Highness the Sultan of Trengganu with the concurrence of his Ministers that the State of Trengganu shall be administered on an improved basis and whereas His Britannic Majesty's Government is bound by Treaty stipulated to protect the said State and to assist its Rulers:

NOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between His Excellency Sir ARTHUR HENDERSON YOUNG, G.C.M.G., K.B.E., Governor of the Colony of the Straits Settlements and High Commissioner for the Malay States, and His Highness Sultan MUHAMMAD of the State of Trengganu, that Article II of the Agreement of the 22nd April, 1910, made by His Excellency Sir JOHN ANDERSON, G.C.M.G., on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government and His Highness Sultan ZAINAL-ABIDIN of Trengganu, shall be repealed and the following article substituted therefor:

## ARTICLE II

"His Highness the Sultan of Trengganu will receive and provide a suitable residence for a British Officer to be called the British Adviser, who shall live within the State of Trengganu, and whose advice must be asked and acted upon in all matters affecting the general administration of the country and all questions other than those touching the Muhammadan Religion.

The cost of the British Adviser with his establishment shall be determined by His Excellency the High Commissioner and shall be a charge on the Revenues of Trengganu.

The collection and disbursement of all Revenues of the country shall be regulated under the advice of the British Adviser".

It witness whereof His Excellency Sir ARTHUR HENDERSON YOUNG, G.C.M.G., K.B.E., and His Highness the Sultan of Trengganu have set their respective seals and signatures.

Dated at Singapore this 24th day of May, 1919, corresponding to the 24th day of Sha'aban, 1337.

Seal of  
High  
Commissioner

ARTHUR  
YOUNG

Seal of  
Sultan

MUHAMMAD bin  
ZAINALABIDIN

Witness  
H. Marriott,  
J. L. Humphreys.

Witness  
Omar bin Abdulrahim  
(Tengku Ngah)  
Abu Bakar bin Abdulrahman  
(Tuan Embong)  
Ahmad bin Abdulrahman  
(Tengku Chik)  
Muhammad bin Yusup  
(Haji Ngah)

Source: Encl. 1 in CO 273/487: Young to CO, 4 June 1919, conf., ff. 280-281.

APPENDIX 15  
Schedule of Pensions and Allowances, 1924

<i>Name of River</i>	<i>Name of Recipient</i>	<i>Amount Monthly (\$)</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Setiu	Tengku Bentara Dalam	200	Subsistence allowance
		200	Pension Died 1339 A.H.
Besut	Tengku Chik	Nil	Died 1332 A.H.
Telemong	Tengku Ngah Omar	200	Subsistence allowance
		200	Pension Died 1341 A.H.
Merchang Dungun	Tengku Hapsah	Nil	Died 1335 A.H.
	Tengku Abu Bakar	200	Subsistence allowance
Paka	Tengku Aishah	100	Pension
		100	Ruling House allowance
Upper Trengganu	Tengku Nong	50	Ruling House allowance
Kretai	Tengku Embong Musa	200	Subsistence allowance
		200	Pension Died 1339 A.H.
Nerus	Che Teh binte Abu Bakar	118	Charitable allowance
Kemasik	Datuk Mata-Mata	200	Subsistence allowance
		110	Pension
Berang	Tengku Embong	100	Ruling House allowance
Kemaman	Datuk Sri Lela Diraja	200	Pension

The total of the Allowance and Pensions is \$2,378 monthly, and \$28,536 annually.

Source: Encl. 1, Report on the Resumption by the Trengganu Government of Control over the River-Districts and Their Revenues, J. L. Humphreys, 10 April 1925, in CO 717/44: Guillemard to CO, 6 May 1925, desp. 33, f. 130.

APPENDICES  
APPENDIX 16  
Ruling House Concessions: Payments and Annuities,  
1923-1939

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Date of Surrender</i>	<i>Payment (\$)</i>	<i>Annuities</i>
Ex-Sultan Muhammad	Tebak Bukit Tawang Marang Ulu Trengganu Other mining and agricultural lands	25.6.1923	150,000	Nil
Sultan Zainal Abidin III	Ayer Puteh Four other mining lands	26.6.1923	50,000	Nil
Tengku Besar Hapsah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III	Mengkuang	21.7.1923	4,000	Yes
Tengku Wok Aminah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III	Ulu Cherol	21.7.1923	8,000	Yes
Tengku Khadijah binte Sultan Ahmad II	Chemuak	21.7.1923	12,000	Yes
Tengku Ngah Aishah binte Sultan Zainal Abidin III	Ulu Paka	6.8.1923	10,000	Yes
Sultan Sulaiman	Jabor	8.11.1923	150,000	Nil
Tengku Maimunah binte Sultan Ahmad II	Kanan Mudik	13.7.1927	12,000	Yes
Tengku Ngah Omar bin Tengku Abdul Rahim	Chenderong and Sungai Cherol	) ) ) )		
Tengku Embong Musa bin Tengku Sulaiman	Kretai	) ) ) )	Unsurrendered	
Tengku Woh binte Tengku Osman	Kuala Duyong (Dungun)	) )		

Istihar 27/1346

Be it known unto all here present and others.

All persons having claims to the ownership of land of 100 acres or over in extent are required to produce to the Commissioner of Lands within one year from the date of this proclamation full particulars of their claims together with an estimate of the acreage and two schedules viz:

1. a schedule of improvement which has been made on the land prior to the claimant's ownership.
2. a schedule of improvements carried out subsequent to the claimant's ownership.

2. Any persons refusing or neglecting to produce particulars as above within the stipulated period of one year will be debarred thereafter from making any claim, and the land in question is liable to be regarded by the Government as State Land.

8. In cases in which it is established that any land claimed is covered by a 'deed of royal gift' (Chap Kurnia) and the claimant has carried out the terms of such deed, the land court shall investigate the boundaries of the land and shall determine what areas are to be excluded from it by reason of improvements carried out prior to the date of royal gift, such as planting of padi by means of rotatory planting, broadcast sowing or ploughing, and shall settle all interests in the land created by the deed other than absolute ownership.

At the time of hearing by the Land Court a Surveyor will be in attendance to whom will be pointed out the places where boundary stones are to be planted and the boundaries to be surveyed. A plan will then be prepared showing the extent of the land contained in the deed of royal gift or such lesser area as may be selected, together with the boundaries of any parts of the land which may have been let or leased or otherwise disposed of for a period of more than three years.

9. The judgement of the Land Court shall contain a correct surveyed plan together with a schedule of all rights and interests created by the deed of gift: this document shall be deemed to be a temporary document of title issued under the Land Enactment and transactions under that Enactment may be registered upon it. The judgement of the Court so given may not be disputed by any person present at the hearing or to whom notice of the judgement has been given, except by way of appeal; but it may be disputed by persons who are able to prove that they were unaware of the hearing until after the date of judgement. When however the land has been included in a settlement area and the ownership of all land has been determined throughout the area, the judgement of the Land Court will be of full and



final effect and can no longer be impugned by anyone.

10. In cases in which any such land or any part of it has been given out on annual rent, long lease tribute or any other disposition, but without any written deed of rent, lease or tribute, the Land Court may order a suitable deed to be made and registered, and if such an order be not carried out within the appointed time, the Court may substitute for such deed a deed executed in accordance with its own judgement.

11. In any case in which a 'deed of royal gift' is established but the terms have not been carried out by the claimant, the claimant's interest will be recognised in only such portion of the land as has been improved by himself or by his agents.

12. In cases where no deed of royal gift exists, but there is a deed of transfer or it is proved that the claimant holds the land by heredity or by purchase or by ancient tenure or by purchase from a holder by ancient tenure, and if in any such event the conditions of tenure have been fulfilled, the claimant may claim so much land as may be improved by himself or his agents, and in addition may claim three times as much land as has been so improved, such additional land to be separated from lands in which any other party may have an interest within the claim. Such additional land will be liable to premium and to conditions as to its length and breadth as laid down by Government Rules.

13. In cases where there is no deed of gift and the claimant has not fulfilled the conditions of tenure, all his rights and interests will be quashed.

6 January 1928.

By Command  
State Secretary,  
Trengganu.

*Source:* Encl. 7 in CO 717/61: H. Marriott to CO, 6 December 1928, conf., file number 52432/28, ff. 59-61.

## Glossary

- Adat*: Custom
- Ablul-bal-wal'aqd*: A ceremonial body involved especially in coronation arrangements
- Anak gahara*: Son of a royal wife
- Anak Trengganu*: Trengganu subjects
- Atap*: Palm-leaf thatch
- Babagian*: A form of agricultural tithe
- Balai*: Audience-hall
- Bancian*: Census
- Barat*: West
- Belacan*: Prawn paste
- Bendang*: Wet padi fields
- Bidan*: Midwife
- Bilal*: Caller of prayer times
- Budak Raja*: lit. 'Raja's Youth'; retainers
- Cabut*: A form of agricultural tithe
- Candu*: Opium
- Cap*: Seal
- Capakuan*: Land titles showing original claim
- Cap jual-beli*: Land titles showing sale
- Cap keputusan*: Land titles settling cases of disputes
- Cap kurnia*: Deed of royal gift
- Cap zuriat*: Concessions given to members of the royalty and their heirs in perpetuity
- Cengai*: *Balanocarpus heimii*, a local hardwood
- Daerah*: District
- Daging darah*: Blood relatives
- Daulat*: The concept of divine majesty which combined indigenous, Indian and Arabic traditions
- Daun ketupat*: A type of leaf for cake-making
- Derhaka*: Treason
- Diat*: Blood price

- Dusun*: Orchard  
*Fakir*: Mendicant Priest  
*Gadai*: Mortgage  
*Galon Athin*: An organization involved in the Saya San rebellion of Burma (from the words '*Galon*' meaning a mythical bird of great strength and '*Athin*' meaning association)  
*Gambang*: Big raft  
*Gantang*: A measure of capacity equivalent to one imperial gallon  
*Geliran*: Title  
*Getah*: Rubber  
*Hadiab*: Present  
*Haj*: Pilgrimage to Mecca  
*Haji*: One who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca  
*Hajjah*: A female pilgrim  
*Hakim*: Judge  
*Hari Raya*: End of fast celebration  
*Harta*: Property  
*Harta pusaka*: Heirloom  
*Hijrah*: Muslim calendar  
*Hilir*: Lower; hence *biliran*, downstream  
*Hukum Syaria*: Religious law  
*Hulu*: Upper; hence *ulu*, up-river  
*Huma*: Hill padi  
*Ikan bilis*: Anchovies  
*Imam*: Vicar  
*Istihar*: Proclamation or Resolution  
*Istana*: Palace  
*Itifak*: Order in Council  
*Jajahan*: District  
*Jasa*: Loyal service  
*Jawi*: Arabic script  
*Jihad*: Holy War  
*Jokoh*: A local coin used in the Chinese gaming houses  
*Jualan ta' putus*: A form of sale agreement  
*Jumaah Menteri*: Cabinet of ministers  
*Jumaah Pangkuan*  
*Negeri*: Council of Regency

<i>Jurubahasa:</i>	Interpreter
<i>Jurutulis:</i>	Scribe
<i>Kafir:</i>	Unbeliever
<i>Kampung:</i>	Village
<i>Kapitan China:</i>	Leader of the Chinese community
<i>Kasar:</i>	Rough
<i>Kathi:</i>	Religious magistrate
<i>Kati:</i>	A weight of 1½ lb.
<i>Keping baru:</i>	lit. A new coin
<i>Kerabat Am:</i>	Aristocracy
<i>Kerabat Diraja:</i>	Royalty
<i>Kerah:</i>	Corvée labour
<i>Kerani:</i>	Clerk/clerical
<i>Keris:</i>	Malay dagger with a straight or wavy blade
<i>Ketua kampung:</i>	Village headman
<i>Ketua-ketua:</i>	Chiefs
<i>Khatib:</i>	A prayer leader
<i>Kongsi:</i>	Company
<i>Kosik bantu:</i>	Spirit watching
<i>Kota:</i>	Fort
<i>Kuala:</i>	River-mouth
<i>Kurnia:</i>	An act of royal grace
<i>Madrasah:</i>	Religious school
<i>Mahkamah Kathi:</i>	Kathi's Court
<i>Majzup:</i>	The religious frenzy of the fighting Mohammedan inviting martyrdom
<i>Makyong:</i>	A traditional dance theatre
<i>Mengadap:</i>	To have an audience with the ruler
<i>Mentri:</i>	Minister
<i>Mentri Besar:</i>	Chief Minister
<i>Mesyuarat kerajaan:</i>	State Council
<i>Mufti:</i>	Jurisconsult
<i>Musim tutup kuala:</i>	The season when the river mouth is closed
<i>Nadzir al masjid:</i>	Superintendent of mosques
<i>Naib:</i>	Deputy
<i>Naib Mentri Besar:</i>	Deputy Chief Minister
<i>Nipah:</i>	<i>Nypa fruticans</i> , a coastal palm
<i>Orang Kaya:</i>	Men of substance

<i>Orang Keistimewaan:</i>	Court favourites
<i>Orang neraka:</i>	People of hell
<i>Padang:</i>	Field
<i>Padi tugalán:</i>	Hill padi planted by way of dibbling
<i>Pajak:</i>	Revenue farm
<i>Pajak kecil:</i>	Minor export farm
<i>Parang:</i>	Machete
<i>Pawah:</i>	A form of agricultural tithe
<i>Pegawai:</i>	Officer
<i>Pejabat Agama:</i>	Religious Affairs Department
<i>Pelabur:</i>	Monthly issues of stores made to ladies of the Royal Household
<i>Pembasuh balai:</i>	Court fees
<i>Penghulu:</i>	Village headman
<i>Penghulu-penghulu Besar:</i>	Men of influence
<i>Peraturan kafir:</i>	Regulation of the unbeliever
<i>Perjanjian mulut:</i>	Verbal agreement
<i>Pesuruhjaya:</i>	Commissioner
<i>Pesuruhjaya Agama dan Keadilan:</i>	Commissioner of Religion and Justice
<i>Pikul:</i>	A weight of 133½ lb.
<i>Pinang:</i>	Areca nut
<i>Pitis:</i>	A local coin
<i>Pondok:</i>	Hut
<i>Qasim:</i>	Executor of estates
<i>Raja Anak Sungai:</i>	District Chief
<i>Rakyat:</i>	Commoner
<i>Ratib:</i>	Muslim affirmation of faith
<i>Rotan:</i>	Rattan
<i>Rumi:</i>	Romanized Malay script
<i>Saberang:</i>	Across the river
<i>Sakdal:</i>	To accuse
<i>Sandar:</i>	Pledge
<i>Sawah:</i>	Wet padi (field)
<i>Sayyid:</i>	Descendant of Prophet Muhammad
<i>Sejarah Melayu:</i>	Malay Annals
<i>Serab:</i>	A form of indigenous tax

- Silat Gayong*: A type of Malay martial arts  
*Surat Sungai*: River documents  
*Surau*: A prayer house not used for Friday congregation.
- Takut raja*: Afraid of the raja  
*Tanah kebenaran*: Alienated land  
*Tanah tebang*: lit. 'Cleared land'; cultivated land  
*Tanah waris*: Inherited land  
*Tapis menapis*: lit. 'Sifted', inherited land  
*Tebas tebang*: lit. 'Cleared land', cultivated  
*Timur*: East  
*Titah*: Royal command  
*Tukang nikah*: Marriage celebrant  
*Ulama*: Religious scholars; learned men versed in the scriptures  
*Wakaf*: Religious endowment  
*Wakil*: Power of attorney  
*Wazir*: Chief Minister  
*Yang Dipertuan Besar*: He who is made Lord  
*Yang Dipertuan Muda*: Heir Apparent

# Bibliography

## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

THE proposal of Raymond and Rosemary Firth in 1939 to undertake a study of the social structure and economic organization of rural Malays in the East coast Malay states was received with apprehension by local British officials in Trengganu. The Commissioner of Lands and Mines, W. F. N. Churchill, wrote a lengthy memorandum on the subject and hoped that 'it will save a lot of talking and will help anyone busy for a time!' The British Adviser, A. E. Coope, joined forces with his senior officer and noted that the proposed project was another 'wild goose chase'.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, Professor Firth and his wife did spend a month of their stay in Malaya in Trengganu investigating the life of the fishermen there. Apart from the contributions of these two scholars,<sup>2</sup> the absence of specialist studies on Trengganu society in the period under examination leaves the student of history to rely heavily on primary official records and in part on oral tradition.

This study has been based largely on material drawn from the colonial administration which is mainly housed in the Arkib Negara (National Archives) Malaysia. It is an irony that the history of the subjugated people has to be studied from the sources of the overlords. It is possible, nevertheless, to write a new history of the past by using the sources of the colonial administration, and at the same time, to avoid being misled by the dominant themes that colour British official documents.

At the upper levels of the colonial administrative hierarchy are the *Great Britain, Foreign Office Confidential Papers* for the years 1893-1909 which may be found in the University of Malaya Library and the *Great Britain, Colonial Office Records (CO 273)*, which are available on microfilm in the Monash University Library. The latter collection is invaluable to students working on Malaysian history after British intervention in 1874; it contains material on Trengganu for the period prior to 1919. After that date Trengganu files can be found in the continuing Series, CO 717. The next level of the colonial chain of command is the High Commissioner's Office,

<sup>1</sup>See minutes, W. F. N. Churchill, 20 July 1939, and A. E. Coope, 10 August 1939, on CLM 330/1939.

<sup>2</sup>See for example, R. Firth, 'The Coastal People of Kelantan and Trengganu, Malaya', *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 101, No. 5-6, May-June 1943, pp. 193-205.

Singapore. This Office contains correspondence between that department and the various administrations in Malaya. There are about 300 files directly concerning Trengganu in their records.

Below the High Commissioner's Office is the local colonial administrative structure in Trengganu. The records here are split into British- and Malay-controlled departments. In the former category are the British Adviser, Trengganu, files which cover the period 1923-48. Unfortunately, the bulk of the records only begin in 1935 during the heyday of British rule in the state. For the period 1923-34 only five files exist. This gap can be filled by records available in other departments with which the British Adviser was in constant communication. Another important British-controlled department is the Commissioner Lands and Mines whose files cover the period 1915-48, and run for about one hundred feet in length. This department together with the twenty-five feet collection of the Settlement Collector, Trengganu, files (1926-46) cover an important period of the study. They contain voluminous material on land matters. Other important British-controlled departments whose files are available are the Assistant Adviser, Kemaman, Journals (1924-39); the Drainage and Irrigation Department (1938-41); the Mines Department, Trengganu (1934-40); the Land Office, Trengganu (1917-45), and the Land Office, Kemaman (1925-45).

The records of the Malay administration within the colonial system of government are written in Malay—either in jawi or rumi script. These records complement those found in the British-controlled departments and they are vital if a more comprehensive picture of the past is to be reconstructed. The more important documents used in this study are those of the Mentri Besar's Office (1919-45); Setia Usaha Trengganu (1915-45); Perbendaharaan Trengganu (1935-49); Mahkamah Besar: Appeal Mal (1919-32); and Mahkamah Besar: Guaman Mal (1911-33). The records of the other departments such as the various District Offices and Land Offices are sparse. They range from one to ten files.

Besides the official records seen, interviews were also conducted with persons familiar with Trengganu. They mostly confirm what is known from documentary sources. Further personal accounts of the period were gleaned from 'Syair Tawarikh Zainal Abidin III' and 'Syair Tuan Humphreys' written by Tengku Dalam Kalthum binte Tengku Wook Khazaki and Hajjah Wok Eshah binte Haji Nik Idris respectively.

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